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Explained: How Customary Marriage Harms Women’s HLP Rights

12-04-2022/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

Customary marriages in Syria have negatively impacted women’s housing, land, and property rights. These types of marriages have increased in recent years as civil courts have suspended their work in many parts of the country. Even in areas where courts remain functional, many people were reluctant to register new marriages out of fear of forced military conscription or detection by security forces.

Customary marriage was the dominant form of marriage in Syria before the establishment of civil status records in 1922 and the government’s adoption of official marriage contracts. A customary marriage is a marriage contract between a man and a woman that is usually carried out by a religious cleric either orally or in writing. Such marriages are practiced not only by Sunni Muslims, but by members of other sects and religions in various forms. An official marriage contract, on the other hand, is only valid when done through a court and requires certain documents specified in the Personal Status Law.

While official marriage may, in theory, preserve the financial rights of the wife, in a customary marriage the wife may be at risk of losing those same rights. Women are usually the ones who suffer the most from not registering marriages in court, as leaving their marriages unregistered could compromise many of their rights, including their HLP rights, especially upon divorce or the death of their husbands.

Registering customary marriages

A woman may formally register her customary marriage in accordance with the Court of Cassation’s Decision No. 685 of 2015, which stated that such a marriage may be registered with the testimony of two witnesses. The witnesses are not required to be the same parties who signed the customary marriage contract so long as they heard about the marriage.

To formally register a customary marriage in the event of the husband’s death, first his death must be recorded in the Civil Registry. Next comes the process of legal inheritance, then filing a legal case to register the marriage. Afterwards, the wife may request to claim her unreceived dowry and inheritance.

Legal rights in customary marriage

However, even when a woman manages to register her customary marriage, it may still be difficult for her to prove the actual amount of her dowry. This process requires two witnesses who know the amount of the dowry and who were present at the time of the marriage contract. If she is unable to prove the amount of her dowry, the court will provide the woman with a substitute payment equal to the amount typically paid for dowries in her local area.

A woman has the right to the dowry in the event of divorce or her husband’s death. This dowry has two parts: the advanced dowry, which the woman may or may not receive immediately, and the deferred dowry, which is paid later. The dowry may come in the form of money, real estate, or another form of benefit.

In customary marriages, the wife may not obtain her unreceived dowry until the marriage is officially registered in court. And if she is unable to prove her marriage, she may lose her right to the dowry in case of divorce or her husband’s death.

The lengthy amount of time needed to settle issues of proving marriage and sorting out inheritance presents an obstacle for women hoping to obtain their rights. This is in addition to the high financial cost of various fees, expenses and attorney payments.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-04-12 15:08:472022-04-12 15:09:30Explained: How Customary Marriage Harms Women’s HLP Rights

Aleppo City Council Demolishes Buildings of Displaced Residents

05-04-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

For the first time in years, the Aleppo City Council is demolishing buildings that it says are in violation of construction codes or at risk of collapse in the city’s western neighbourhoods, which remained under regime control throughout the Syrian conflict. The demolition campaign appears to target properties owned by absentee residents, most of whom were displaced to opposition-held areas outside of Aleppo.

In early March, the Services Directorate for Aleppo’s Al-Siryan district demolished more than 20 buildings that it said were at risk of collapse in the Tajmeel Al-Khalidiyeh area. The directorate also removed buildings that it said were in violation of construction codes and that had encroached on public property, in addition to at-risk buildings in the neighbouring Bani Zeyd area. The Aleppo City Council has declined to grant licences to restore the damaged buildings in those neighbourhoods, prompting some owners to undertake restoration work without licences. The city council considers such work to be in violation of construction codes.

Tajmeel Al-Khalidiyeh and Bani Zeyd areas are part of the Al-Khalideiyh neighbourhood in west Aleppo. Much of the Tajmeel Al-Khalidiyeh area became a frontline for clashes between rebel and regime forces between 2012 and 2016. Bombardment by both sides led to widespread destruction of the area and displacement of virtually all residents.

Al-Khalidiyeh neighbourhood is a relatively new urban area of Aleppo, built on an otherwise barren plateau in the mid-20th century. Among the first residents was the teacher Al-Sheikh Mohammad Taha Anjarini, who established a school there in 1948. Anjarini had purchased the land for the school from Al-Khawaja Maurice Abaji, who at the time owned most of the land on the plateau. The area surrounding the school quickly became urbanised as Syrians from the countryside west of Aleppo moved to the neighbourhood due to its proximity to central Aleppo. The Aleppo municipality incorporated Al-Khalidiyeh in 1967. Newer neighbourhoods soon also grew around Al-Khalidiyeh, including Al-Shahbaa Al-Qadimeh, Al-Mokambo, and Al-Lirmon.

The recent demolitions targeted not only buildings at risk of collapse and those that violated construction codes, but also those that posed no risk of collapse despite having been damaged in the war, according to a local correspondent for The Syria Report. This third category of buildings are owned by opposition-affiliated people, most of whom originally came from the western countryside of Aleppo. Civil sources told The Syria Report that the demolitions were not truly aimed at protecting the structural safety of the buildings, but rather to “retaliate” against certain building owners for their political stances. The correspondent pointed out that the demolitions had extended into neighbouring Al-Lirmon with little media attention. There, the city council has demolished apartment blocks, most of whose owners have been displaced from the area.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-04-05 11:38:052022-04-06 04:54:53Aleppo City Council Demolishes Buildings of Displaced Residents

Displaced Residents of the Atmeh Camps Face the Threat of Eviction

05-04-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

The residents of 40 tents in the western section of the “Atfalouna Tunashidikom” camp, part of the Atmeh cluster of camps in northern Idlib governorate, are facing potential eviction with no alternative shelter.

The Atmeh cluster near the Syrian-Turkish border consists of dozens of camps, each of which contains dozens of tents. Some of these camps are set up on lands owned by camp residents themselves, while others are rented from landowners for annual rents of up to USD 500 per hectare in some cases. In most cases, such payments in the Idlib governorate are made in US dollars or Turkish liras. In addition, some of the camps in Atmeh are set up on the public property. Since mid-2020, the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), which controls most of Idlib, has imposed an annual fee of TL 50 on residents of these camps as a form of rent in exchange for using the public property.

The residents of the western section of the Atfalouna Tunashidikom camp set up their tents three years ago on a 0.6-hectare piece of land, assuming that it was public property. But in January, the owner of the land obtained a decision from the court in Atmeh to immediately evict the camp residents from his property. The court then detained 16 camp residents for refusing to abide by the eviction decision. They were released after the landowner agreed to grant the camp residents three months to leave. Though the three-month deadline was in March, residents have yet to leave the camp due to a lack of alternative housing options. Camp residents expect the landowner to renew his request to the court to implement the eviction decision, according to a local correspondent for The Syria Report.

Land and real estate prices in the Atmeh camp area have increased in recent years, especially after NGOs implemented service improvement projects, such as paving roads, installing public lighting, and extending the sewage networks. These projects prompted landowners to demand that camp residents be evicted from their lands or that they purchase the lands at up to USD 15 per square metre.

The situation is especially difficult for residents of the Atfalouna Tunashidikom camp. Finding new housing is not easy, and their departure from the Atmeh camps cluster could mean that they will lose the monthly aid provided to them by NGOs.

In all cases, displaced people who wish to leave the Atmeh camps must obtain a clearance from the Department of Displaced Persons, part of the SSG’s Ministry of Local Administration. However, in some cases, it may take up to a year to obtain the clearance after someone moves out of Atmeh to reside in a new area. This is problematic, as displaced people can only receive aid again if they have the clearance.

Eviction presents even more challenges for women, including widows living alone in the camps or those whose housing options depend on kinship or social obligations, or women who depend solely on the aid provided by international NGOs.

Map of the Atmeh Camps

Source: Correspondent for The Syria Report in northern Idlib

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-04-05 11:24:152022-04-05 17:36:17Displaced Residents of the Atmeh Camps Face the Threat of Eviction

State Council General Assembly Explains Mechanism for Implementing Judicial Rulings

05-04-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

The General Assembly of Syria’s State Council issued Opinion No. 8 of 2022, which details the mechanism for implementing judicial rulings issued by the council’s courts. The opinion stressed the need to respect the rules for implementing such rulings.

Opinion No. 8 explained once again the mechanism for carrying out rulings in the interest of public institutions and against individuals. A public institution for which such a ruling has been issued must send a copy of the original judgement to the authorities that are responsible for registering real estate and other assets. These authorities may include the General Directorate for Cadastral Affairs, the Directorate of Transportation, or the state’s related banks. If the sentenced person owns any assets registered with these authorities, then their assets must be seized by those same authorities.

Such rulings may include decisions by the Minister of Finance to place executive seizures on the assets of convicted individuals as part of the implementation of a judicial ruling issued by the State Council (and in a manner that preserves and protects public assets).

In the event of a judicial ruling that favours a public institution against an individual, the ruling includes procedures for implementation. Opinion No. 8 clarified that the public institution may implement the ruling directly with the assistance of public force personnel, such as police or any body granted the authority to execute the law by way of force.

For a ruling that favours individuals against a public institution, Opinion No. 8 outlines the procedures for implementation. First, a copy of the original implementation ruling is sent to the office of the public institution that has been sentenced in the ruling. This institution must then begin implementation immediately and without delay, as well as without causing any additional burden to the individual for whom the ruling was in favour.

The State Council

According to the 2012 Constitution, the State Council is an independent judicial and advisory body with its own special law to outline its mandate. That special law, State Council Law No. 32 of 2019, was issued as a replacement to Law No. 55 of 1959 and attached the State Council to the Council of Ministers; it had previously been attached to the Presidency. In either case, attaching the State Council, which is a judicial body, to an executive authority violates the independence that the constitution explicitly grants the body and is more generally inconsistent with the principle of judicial independence.

Under Law No. 32 of 2019, the State Council is an independent judicial and advisory body based in Damascus that assumes the administrative judiciary. The council has two sections: judicial and advisory. The judicial section includes the Supreme Administrative Court, the Administrative Judiciary Courts, Administrative Courts, Disciplinary Courts, the State Commissioners Authority, and the Department of Inspection. The advisory section focuses on fatwas and legislation. It includes the General Assembly, other specialised departments, and an office for drafting legislation.

The General Assembly

With its two sections, the General Assembly plays two different roles. In its judiciary role, it examines administrative disputes between state institutions or disputes in which a public institution is one of the parties involved. The assembly’s legal advisory role is represented chiefly by the General Assembly. This assembly is tasked with considering legal matters referred to it by the Presidency of the Republic, the Presidency of the Parliament, tje Presidency of the Council of Ministers, individual ministers, or by the State Council president. The General Assembly also has the authority to settle disputes arising between different public institutions. The opinions that it issues in these disputes are of a binding nature. The General Assembly has seven members, the State Council president as chairman and the six longest-serving advisors on the council.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-04-05 11:19:002022-04-05 11:19:00State Council General Assembly Explains Mechanism for Implementing Judicial Rulings

Restoring Lost and Damaged Real Estate Documents in Deir-ez-Zor

29-03-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

The Directorate of Cadastral Affairs in the Deir-ez-Zor governorate is working to restore lost and damaged real estate documents in accordance with Law No. 33 of 2017.

Under Decision No. 6 of August 17, 2021, which was published in the Official Gazette, the General Directorate of Cadastral Affairs (GDCA) launched restoration work for damaged real estate documents in the areas of Mayadeen East 1/1 and Mayadeen West 2/2 in the Deir-ez-Zor governorate. On that same date, the General Directorate also issued Decision No. 7, launching restoration work for damaged real estate documents in Baghailiyeh, Hawi Baghailiyeh, Al-Hufreh, Hatleh, Ayyash, and Hawi Ayyash. These six areas are all within the city of Deir-ez-Zor.

Law No. 33 required that decisions to restore damaged real estate documents be posted in the Official Gazette and three well-known media outlets, as well as in the main hall of the General Directorate of Cadastral Affairs. Under the law, publication of the decisions constitutes official notice to the rights holders in the areas for which the documents were to be restored.

The main building of the GDCA in Deir-ez-Zor city was targeted in 2012 in what state media described as “terrorist attacks, theft, and vandalism of a large number of real estate records, files and documents.” Many of the documents were lost. Cadastral Affairs opened a new building in 2020 in the Hamidiyeh neighbourhood to replace the old, damaged one. The real estate records for properties in Deir-ez-Zor, Mayadeen, and Al-Boukamal were then transferred to the new building.

Law No. 33 defines restoration as a set of procedures taken to issue a verified replacement for damaged real estate documents or to complete one of the document’s required components. There are two methods for restoration outlined by the law. Administrative restoration relies on the documents available within the GDCA, which help to restore the damaged ones. Meanwhile, judicial restoration is the chosen method in cases of total damage to real estate documents. This method relies on documents that a real estate property owner submits to a real estate judge.

In official statements in March 2022, the real estate judge in Deir-ez-Zor said that inventory and statistics committees were formed in the governorate. Under Law No. 33, such committees are formed by the decision of the GDCA and are headed by the relevant governorate’s Director of Cadastral Affairs. These committees must identify the damaged real estate documents and the necessary methods for restoration, which would be subsequently approved by the GDCA in Damascus.

In accordance with the executive instructions of Law No. 33, which were issued in March 2018, a governorate hoping to start producing restored replacement documents must send a request to the GDCA to apply the provisions of Law No. 33 in the relevant real estate areas. The governorate must specify the affected real estate areas and the type of documents to be restored. Cadastral Affairs then approves the request and the Minister of Local Administration and Environment issues a decision to launch the restoration work, including a list of the real estate documents to be restored and the date on which work will begin in each of the concerned real estate areas. The decision also includes a description of the duties assigned to the local administrative authorities, the rights holders listed within the Land Registry, and any applicable penalties.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-03-29 14:15:432022-03-29 14:17:22Restoring Lost and Damaged Real Estate Documents in Deir-ez-Zor

Government Grants Licences to Build Two Towers in East Ghouta’s Ayn Tarma

29-03-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

In November 2021, the Tammuz Construction Company obtained a licence to build two tower blocks in the city of Ayn Tarma, which is located in the Douma district of East Ghouta.

According to a local correspondent for The Syria Report, Tammuz is owned by real estate contractor Maamoun Zeydan, who had a real estate office in Ayn Tarma before 2011. After the uprising began in 2011, Zeidan left Ayn Tarma, which rose up against the regime during the uprising. He only returned after regime forces recaptured the city in 2018.

The company began removing rubble from the streets and filling tunnels in Ayn Tarma and working to restore the foundations of some local buildings in early 2021. This restoration work was carried out only after a clearance from the security services was obtained, our correspondent said. It is unclear whether this work had been approved by the owners of those buildings, as many former Ayn Tarma residents were forcibly displaced from the area.

It is also unclear who owns real estate property number 1077, where Tammuz obtained the licence to build its two towers. The property appears to overlook the Southern Ring Highway from the east, as per a promotional video the company posted on its Facebook page. The Southern Ring was built in the 1980s and 1990s to surround Damascus on its southern and eastern city limits. In doing so, the highway cut through Ayn Tarma’s agricultural land, dividing it into two parts: the east, which was the larger section and remains under the administrative authority of the Ayn Tarma municipality in the Rural Damascus governorate, and the west, which was annexed by the Damascus governorate. This division of Ayn Tarma’s agricultural land came alongside large expropriations of land from the city. In 2010, the Damascus governorate issued a zoning plan for the Ayn Tarma land located west of the Southern Ring, dubbed the “Eastern Gate Plan.” The plan included commercial and residential towers, but was never implemented due to the uprising in 2011.

Ayn Tarma is among the closest East Ghouta cities to Damascus proper and was once home to 40,000 people, according to statistics from 2009. Ayn Tarma also contains large neighbourhoods of informal housing, the most notable of which are Al-Zainiyeh, Al-Tabbaleh, and Wadi Ayn Tarma. These neighbourhoods saw rapid urban expansion in the years leading up to 2011 due to cheap real estate and rental prices and their proximity to the capital. On the other hand, Ayn Tarma is also home to a formally zoned commercial and residential area that includes the neighbourhoods of Al-Kheir Souqs, Al-Shimiland, and Kaziyeh Sunbul. These neighbourhoods witnessed rising demand for real estate before 2011, particularly by members of the Damascene middle class who were looking to buy property.

Syria’s armed opposition took control of Ayn Tarma in 2013. Regime forces launched a military campaign in 2017 to cut Ayn Tarma off from the neighbouring Damascus district of Jobar. The fighting lasted for eight months, during which the regime bombarded Ayn Tarma with so-called “elephant” missiles and airstrikes, causing widespread destruction. The intensity of the bombing pushed the Ayn Tarma local council to dig underground tunnels that link the main service sites in the city with one another. Local military factions also dug supply and evacuation tunnels reaching the front lines. Consequently, these tunnels impacted the structural safety of the buildings above them, particularly in the informal housing neighbourhoods.

Only around 8,000 people currently live in Ayn Tarma amidst the widespread destruction of buildings and infrastructure, as well as remaining rubble. Residents had begun to gradually leave Ayn Tarma in 2013. Later, in 2018, the regime forcibly displaced around 1,000 remaining residents to opposition-held northern Syria.

 

Plan for One of the Residential Towers Slated for Construction on Real Estate Number 1077

Source: Tammuz Construction Company Facebook Page

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-03-29 14:13:002022-04-22 11:40:38Government Grants Licences to Build Two Towers in East Ghouta’s Ayn Tarma

Homs City Council Issues Data on Returns to the City

29-03-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

The Homs City council issued official statements in February and March detailing how many residents have returned to their homes in war-damaged neighbourhoods of the old city centre, as well as to other areas. However, the statements ignored some Homs neighbourhoods that witnessed widespread destruction and whose residents remained displaced en masse.

Strangely, the statistics included in the statements rely on tracking how many families have returned to Homs, rather than the total number of individual returnees. The statistics are “misleading,” a local source familiar with the returns told The Syria Report, as one individual returnee could be counted as an entire family having returned to Homs. The intention is to suggest larger numbers of returnees than there are in reality, the source added. According to the source, “the actual number of returnees is smaller than the statements suggest, and are mostly elderly people, particularly women. In addition, most of them did not leave Homs city but rather were displaced to other neighbourhoods.” Young people in general, but especially men, mostly remain forcibly displaced in opposition-held areas of northern Syria.

Returns to the old city centre of Homs

According to the statements by the city council, 9,710 families have returned to Homs’ old city neighbourhoods in recent years. Returns were recorded in terms of the number of families that have returned vs. how many were displaced by the war. However, it is unclear what criteria is used to estimate the number of families displaced from the area. The distribution of returns to the old city was as follows:

Some 1,300 families, or 13 percent of those displaced, returned to the Bab Houd; 4,000 families returned to Bab Al-Sabaa (85 percent); 1,650 families returned to Bab Al-Dreib (65 percent); and 1,200 families returned to Bab Tadmur (30 percent). Finally, 1,560 families returned to the two neighbourhoods of Bani Al-Sabaai and JamalEddin (35 percent).

Meanwhile, also according to the city council’s statements, humanitarian organisations restored more than 1,450 houses: 100 houses in Bab Houd, 500 in Bab Al-Dreib, 300 in Bab Al-Sabaa, 150 in Bab Tadmur, and 400 in Bani Al-Sabaai and JamalEddin.

Returns to other neighbourhoods of Homs

People have also returned to neighbourhoods outside the old city centre, according to the statements that council issued in February. The returned families were distributed as follows:

Some 2,100 families returned to Deir Baalbeh Al-Janoubi (30 percent of those displaced); 2,500 families returned to Deir Baalbeh Al-Shimali (35 percent); and 8,100 families returned to Al-Bayadeh (50 percent).

Humanitarian organisations managed to restore more than 3,400 homes in these neighbourhoods: 1,300 homes in Al-Bayadeh, 800 in Deir Baalbeh Al-Janoubi, and 1,300 in Deir Baalbeh Al-Shimali.

As in the old city centre, all of these neighbourhoods saw massive displacement during the battles between regime and rebel forces in Homs in 2012-2014, and were subject to varying degrees of destruction.

Neighbourhoods without returns

The city council did not mention any returns to other neighbourhoods that were destroyed and whose residents had been displaced, such as the Al-Waer neighbourhood in the western part of the city. Opposition fighters based themselves in Al-Waer, where they settled after they withdrew from the rest of Homs city’s neighborhoods in 2014. As a result, regime forces subjected the neighbourhood to siege and bombardment. Residents were also forcibly displaced to the rural northern part of the Homs governorate in accordance with a settlement deal between regime and rebel forces reached in May 2017.

The statements also left out the Baba Amro, Al-Qusour, Al-Qarabis, and Jorat Al-Shiyah  neighbourhoods, which were largely destroyed and saw the near total displacement of their residents. While it appears likely that Baba Amro will be subject to zoning under Law No. 10 of 2018, Al-Qusour, Al-Qarabis and Jorat Al-Shiyah are currently subject to an amendment to their original zoning plans.

Reasons for few returns

The president of the Homs City Council said that the low rate of returns was due to poor basic services such as water and electricity, as well as the council’s limited abilities to undertake restoration work and remove rubble. He added that the council was still working on restoration and rubble removal, including the demolition of buildings at risk of collapse. He did not specify a timeline for completion.

There appear to be additional reasons preventing the return of displaced residents. People hoping to return to Homs must visit the security branch that controls the area in order to obtain security approval. Many displaced people are afraid of arrest due to past opposition activities, or because of malicious security reports written against them, or even the possibility of facing financial extortion in exchange for non-arbitrary arrest.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-03-29 14:10:292022-03-29 14:10:29Homs City Council Issues Data on Returns to the City

Aleppo’s City Council Demolishes Cracked Buildings

29-03-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

On March 23, the Aleppo City Council demolished several residential buildings in the city’s eastern neighbourhoods. The demolition campaign first targeted five buildings in the Al-Saliheen neighbourhood, then expanded to include other buildings in neighbouring areas. The city council’s Public Safety Committee previously evacuated residents from the buildings slated for demolition.

Several residential buildings have collapsed in Al-Saliheen since regime forces recaptured the neighbourhood and other parts of east Aleppo in late 2016. The most recent incident was in December 2021, when two buildings collapsed just days after they had been evacuated due to structural cracks. Afterwards, the Directorate of Technical Services in Bab Al-Neirab, which is affiliated with the city council and serves Al-Saliheen, demolished a third building nearby that was at risk of collapse.

Residents from five buildings in Al-Saliheen informed the Directorate of Technical Services in early March that their buildings had new cracks, a source from the directorate told The Syria Report. The body then informed the Public Safety Committee, which inspected the buildings and assessed their technical conditions. The committee concluded that the five buildings, home to 35 families, must be evacuated and subsequently demolished.

The committee then turned to the police branch in Al-Saliheen to evacuate the buildings after some residents refused to leave until alternative housing was secured for them. Police officers evacuated the residents by force without securing alternative housing for them, but allowed the families to retrieve their personal belongings first.

The Public Safety Committee told former residents that the structural cracks in the buildings came from the high level of groundwater after the recent winter rains, and that the buildings had been built in violation of construction codes. This reportedly caused the soil beneath the building foundations to sink, forming cracks and causing some portions of the buildings above ground level to slope downwards.

The five damaged buildings in Al-Saliheen were demolished on March 23 and their rubble removed. However, three additional buildings east of the local cemetery, another building behind the Al-Ibtihaj Pharmacy, two buildings in the neighbouring Karm Al-Dada area, and several other buildings in Masaken Al-Firdous were also demolished. The residents of those additional buildings had been evacuated in accordance with decisions issued by the Public Safety Committee after it determined the buildings to be structurally unsafe.

Several residents in Al-Saliheen told The Syria Report that the frightening cracks had appeared suddenly and that some buildings began tilting noticeably, prompting them to evacuate even before the Public Safety Committee arrived for inspection. Those who left the buildings early were able to move to other houses or stay with relatives, residents said. Others, who had nowhere else to go, waited for the Public Safety Committee in the hopes of receiving alternative housing. That housing was never secured for them.

Al-Saliheen is among east Aleppo’s most densely populated informal neighbourhoods, and is known locally as “Al-Seen Al-Shaabiyeh,” or “The Popular China.” During opposition control of the neighbourhood in 2012-2016, the regime launched heavy airstrikes and artillery fire on Al-Saliheen, especially barrel bombs dropped by helicopters. The bombardment wrought severe damage on urban infrastructure and building foundations. The nearby Al-Firdous and Al-Maadi neighbourhoods saw similar damage. Structural cracks also began to appear on many of the buildings that were not directly hit by the bombs.

Not all residents are convinced of the Public Safety Committee’s explanation for the cause of the new structural cracks. They believe that the cracks were not only attributed to the wealth, but also to ongoing leakage from run-down sewage and drinking water networks, which have not seen proper maintenance since regime forces recaptured the area.

There has been a noticeable increase in the number of buildings displaying such cracks due to previous bombardment on the area, a source from the Aleppo City Council told The Syria Report. The cracks had also appeared on many buildings that the Public Safety Committee allowed property owners to restore in 2017 and 2018. Structural foundations in Aleppo’s eastern neighbourhoods feature severe damage, the source said, adding that it is only a matter of time until new cracks begin appearing on other buildings that, until now, seem otherwise safely habitable.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-03-29 14:07:292022-03-29 14:07:29Aleppo’s City Council Demolishes Cracked Buildings

Explained: Real Estate Rights, Compulsory Land Readjustment and Shares

22-03-2022/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

Land in any area being zoned is usually redistributed to the rights holders in that area in accordance with the principle of compulsory land readjustment. Sometimes this redistribution is done by allocating the rights holders shares in the zoned area.

Through compulsory land readjustment, the rights holders within the area being zoned receive plots of land that are prepared for construction as a form of compensation for the loss of their original properties. These new plots of land are often not in the original locations of those rights holders’ former properties and are distributed after deducting as much as 40 percent of the surface area of the plots. Compulsory distribution as a principle is mentioned in most planning, zoning, and expropriation laws in Syria, the latest of which was the Planning and Urban Development Law, also known as Law No. 23 of 2015.

Meanwhile, Decree No. 66 of 2012 (which allowed for the creation of two new zoned areas within the general plan for Damascus) and Law No. 10 of 2018 (which allowed the establishment of one or more zoned area within the general zoning plans of administrative units) introduced new rules for land readjustment. Under Decree No. 66 and Law No. 10, the land within one of these zoned areas is redistributed to the rights holders via shares. Real estate properties in this instance have the status of shares owned commonly between the rights holders in a given zoned area. A share owner has three options if they wish to dispose of their share: converting their shares into a plot of land, selling their shares in a public auction, or joining other right holders in forming a joint stock company.

On the other hand, compulsory land readjustment grants property owners the right to dispose of their real estate properties during the zoning period, i.e. when a certain area is being zoned. That right is only restricted during preparation of the charts for distributing the compensatory plots of land as part of the land readjustment process. The owners may then dispose of these new plots of land only after registering the properties in their names within the land registry, following the publication of the final distribution charts. That being said, Decree No. 66 prohibits all forms of property trading once the zoned area has been announced. In this case, owners of shares may trade them  only after one year has passed since they were allocated the shares.

Decree No. 66 and Law No. 10 specify which rights holders may receive shares. An owner who was occupying their real estate property before the announcement of the zoned area may obtain a share, as well apply for alternative housing (which they must pay for). However, an owner who has not been living on their property may only obtain shares, without having the option for alternative housing. And as for occupants who did not own the property they lived in, they may apply for alternative housing, which again they must pay for. Ownership in these cases is considered the possession of a title deed issued by the Directorate of Cadastral Affairs.

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Women Face Challenges Returning to Al-Hajjar Al-Aswad

22-03-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

Although the government has ostensibly opened the way for displaced residents to return to the southern Damascus city of Al-Hajjar Al-Aswad, a slew of challenges continue to prevent women, in particular, from returning home.

Among them is Umm Muhammad, a displaced woman from Al-Hajjar Al-Aswad. Regime forces killed her husband during the period of opposition control over the city between 2013 and 2018. Through all the means available to her, she has tried to return to her home. However, her repeated requests to obtain the security approval necessary for returning have all been rejected on account of her late husband’s opposition activities.

Umm Muhammad told The Syria Report that she has never personally taken part in any opposition-related activities and that the security apparatus has no evidence of her alleged participation. Still, without a security approval she cannot return to the only home she owns, which has forced her to continue paying rent elsewhere.

On top of being barred from returning home by the security apparatus, Umm Muhammad also struggles to make ends meet after losing her husband, the family’s sole breadwinner. She said that even if she were permitted to return some day, “how will I secure the costs to repair my home when I currently depend on humanitarian assistance to meet my daily needs?”

Rudaina, a lawyer, told The Syria Report that most women from Al-Hajjar Al-Aswad are also facing legal issues related to proving their property ownership. The Sharia Court in Al-Hajjar Al-Aswad, which was in charge of handling legal inheritances, was burnt down in 2013. Consequently, everything, including legal documents, inside the court was destroyed. Many women are therefore unable to obtain their legal inheritances to prove their right to inherit after the death, killing, or imprisonment of their male family members in whose names the properties are registered.

Some women are unable to prove their property ownership because they were transferred property, yet the transaction was not legally registered. Fathia is one such resident. She told The Syria Report that her father transferred a property in Al-Hajjar Al-Aswad to her, but that he had not formally completed the registration process. According to Fathia, failure to complete such official transactions is at times intended to keep the right of disposal of a property in the hands of its original, predominantly male owner – a form of disguised, gendered guardianship. In Fathia’s case, her father is unable to complete the legal process of transfer because he is currently living as a refugee outside Syria.

In general, living conditions in Al-Hajjar Al-Aswad present particular challenges for women. Women returnees have found that they feel unsafe for numerous reasons, including the almost continuous electricity blackouts in the war-devastated area. Walking outside is also unsafe because of remaining rubble and unexploded ordnance, as well as armed militia members who patrol the area and are not subject to controls on their behaviour.

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Explained: Executive Instructions for Investment Law No. 18

22-03-2022/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

With Cabinet Resolution No. 1596 of 2021, the Higher Investment Council (HIC) approved the executive instructions for Investment Law No. 18, which was issued in May 2021. The most notable part of the law, with regards to housing, land and property rights, was a provision allowing the use of private investment to establish business projects in some areas of Syria that have been damaged by the war.

The Investment Law

In practice, there are two types of projects included under the scope of Law No. 18 of 2021. One type includes those established by a lone investor or by private companies in partnership with public sector entities, other than banks, while the other involves public sector entities offering their properties for investment to the private sector.

Law No. 18 of 2021 restructured the Syrian Investment Agency, giving it the power to propose establishing special economic zones. The private sector can invest in these zones on its own or in partnership with the state in what is known as the “mixed sector.” Law No. 18 also restructured the HIC and tasked it with establishing special economic zones, approving rental allowances for private state properties and allocating land for investors to implement their projects.

The executive instructions

The executive instructions introduced several new definitions to the Investment Law, alongside clarifications for the mechanisms and methods for implementing the law. All together, there were 19 chapters in the executive instructions, containing a total of 68 articles.

Some notable points from the executive instructions include the following:

State-owned private properties: The instructions define state-owned private properties as any real estate that belongs to administrative units or to any public entities, whether owned by those entities or supervised by them. This new definition broadens the scope of state-owned private properties. Previous laws in Syria limited private state property to real estate not intended for the public benefit though it belongs to the state in its capacity as a legal entity, whether such property is actually at the state’s disposal or is at the disposal of other individuals.

Investment safeguards: The instructions placed limits on the power to place precautionary seizures on projects and their assets via the judiciary. Expropriation for the public benefit is permitted, albeit in exchange for a “fair compensation” that is determined by the current value of the property on the date of the expropriation.

Establishing an economic zone: Under both Law No. 18 and its executive instructions, there are three types of economic zones: development zones, specialisation zones, and privately owned zones. The economic development zone is the one that poses the greatest danger to HLP rights; this is an administrative area that is considered an investment zone for development purposes, for real estate development purposes, or for purposes of reconstruction if the area was damaged during the war. Economic development zones are established by decree of the HIC, which also defines the zone’s administrative boundaries, the activities permitted within that zone, and the time period for implementation. A ten-member committee chaired by the Minister of Local Administration and Environment supervises the zone. This committee must also prepare a general plan describing the locations of the projects proposed for the zone, as well as a financial schedule. Finally, the committee studies applications to allocate plots of land within the state-owned property to investors and assigns a specified partyfrom the public sector the task of creating general and detailed zoning plans for the area.

Mechanism for allocating land: After establishing an economic zone, the investor asks the HIC to allocate it a specific piece of land. The HIC decides on the request after consulting with the local administrative units, then authorises the use of the private state property allocated for investment. Allocation here means granting the investor the right of usufruct for state land in return for compensation or lease payments.

Amending the organisational description of land allocated for projects: Under Law No. 18 and its executive instructions, it is permissible to change the legal character of land allocated for a project – such as, from agricultural to residential or commercial. Such a change is subject to the approval of local administrative units, as well as whether the investment complies with the new legal character of the project. In addition, the investing party must be the owner of the land slated for the project or have the legal agency to make such changes.

Women not guaranteed safeguards: Neither the executive instructions nor the law itself stipulates any special support for women that would guarantee their economic empowerment or participation in such projects. No seats are allocated to women within the HIC and the Syrian Investment Agency.

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Explained: Agricultural Land Ownership, Between Agrarian Reform and Reclamation

22-03-2022/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

The Agrarian Reform Law No. 161 of 1958 allowed the Syrian state to expropriate more than the previously determined ceiling for agricultural land ownership and to redistribute the expropriated land to small farmers. On the other hand, the Agricultural Land Reclamation Law No. 29 of 2012 legalised state expropriation of agricultural land with the goal of increasing its productivity and then redistributing it to rights holders after deducting any land that is considered to be in excess of the ceiling for agricultural land ownership.

Under Law No. 161 of 1958, the maximum limit for agricultural land ownership is 80 hectares of irrigated or wooded land and 300 hectares of rainfed land. The state compensates the owner in return for expropriating any land in excess of those limits in accordance with expropriation laws. Afterwards, the state has the right to preserve part of the expropriated land that would be used in projects of public benefit or to even to sell it. However, the state’s main role is to hand down the right of usufruct of the expropriated lands to small farmers. The farmers then gain full ownership of the land after paying instalments over a period of 40 years.

Meanwhile, Law No. 29 of 2012 is directed at preparing a given piece of land after reclamation to become suitable for irrigated agriculture; this is what the law defines as the process of agricultural reclamation. Furthermore, Law No. 29 sets its own upper limit (16 hectares) for agricultural land ownership entitled to farmers after the reclamation process. Ownership of any land in excess of that limit goes to the state. The landowners pay the cost of the reclamation process, which is determined by finding the average of the “real” cost of land reclamation.

Both Law No. 161 and Law No. 29 work to limit the rights of farmers to dispose of their agricultural land. The most recent amendment to Law No. 161, which was issued as part of Law No. 61 of 2004, prohibited beneficiaries of agrarian reform land from disposing of the land granted to them until five years had passed since they registered the property in their name in the land registry and obtained approval from the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform. Law No. 29 meanwhile prohibits beneficiary farmers from building any facilities on the lands distributed to them. A “prohibition of disposal” note is also placed in the land registry entry for each of those properties and is not removed until completion of the payment process.

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Hama Governorate Begins Removing Commercial Kiosks

15-03-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

In a move similar to that of the Damascus governorate, the Hama City Council told owners and occupants of commercial kiosks in the popular Souq Jourah Hawa that they must remove the stalls. Only kiosk owners who were wounded in war or family members of “martyrs” were exempted; however, even them were only given an additional, non-renewable year before they too are required to remove their kiosks.

Removal of kiosks means dismantling them and transporting them elsewhere or selling them to people who have the proper licences to operate them. The kiosk owners have full ownership rights over the stalls, but must obtain licences from local administrative units and pay an annual fee in order to occupy public sidewalks and spaces.

Souq Jourah Hawa is located in the heart of the Hama city centre, east of the historic Souq Al-Tawil. The popular market is home to more than 200 kiosks, some of which have been operating since 2001 in accordance with Hama City Council Decree No. 922 of 2001. However, in 2013, Souq Jourah Hawa was allocated 62 kiosks for displaced people with special needs and for family members of war “martyrs,” as part of a plan to secure 400 new jobs.

The recent warnings sought to implement the Ministry of Local Administration and Environment’s Decree No. 1809, issued in December 2021, to remove kiosks. That decree was in turn based on the ministry’s Circular No. 347, issued in January 2019, which stipulated that the duration of the licence period of such kiosks would be three years (effective from the beginning of 2019). The kiosks now slated for removal are so-called “aid” kiosks, which had been granted to people with special needs and previously had no occupancy time limits. The licence for this type of kiosk typically expired upon the owner’s death and could not be passed down.

Following the warning, owners of the kiosks in Souq Jourah Hawa objected to the legality of the decree and demanded its cancellation. These kiosk owners have legal licences, most of them dating back to 2001 and some to 2013. In addition, the kiosks in Souq Jourah Hawa fall under the legal description of “popular markets,” rather than standard commercial kiosks.

The Hama City Council has implemented previous kiosk removals in various neighbourhoods in recent years. In 2016, the city removed 30 kiosks that had been set up in an endowment property behind the Pullman bus station. Those kiosks dated back to 1998, when the city council gave them to store owners in Souq Al-Atiq on what was intended to be a temporary basis in exchange for abandoning their stores. The reason for the exchange was unclear. Later, in 2016, the tenant of that endowment property requested that the Endowment Directorate remove the kiosks. The city council agreed on the pretext that the kiosk owners did not have proper licences.

In 2019, the Hama City Council removed kiosks from various parts of the city, claiming that the owners had not obtained licences.

There appears to be a new plan for licensing new types of kiosks according to different standards and at higher prices. Under the Financial Law of Administrative Units No. 37 of 2021, the occupancy of public property requires a licence granted by the executive office of the relevant administrative unit. This licence determines the area granted for occupancy, as well as the time span and type of occupancy, and may not be handed over to others. Though the 2021 law did not specifically mention kiosks, it set the fee for occupying public property at SYP 100-3,000 per square metre per day. The payment is collected in advance every three months or for the entire occupancy period, whichever is less.

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Explained: The Law on Managing Buildings’ Shared Areas

15-03-2022/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

The Law on Building Occupants’ Organisations and their Administrative Committees No. 55 of 2002 aims at managing common areas in buildings and at enabling occupants to resolve disputes related to the use of these common areas. The organisations mentioned in the law are those established by a building’s occupants but they are not obligatory and many buildings do not have them.

Under Law No. 55, an apartment occupant may be the owner, tenant, person with the right of usufruct, or an investor. Common areas may include the surrounding land, the foundation, entrances, hallways, stairwells, basements, roofs, elevators, pipes, shared lighting, and other features or equipment meant for shared use by all occupants of the building. These common features of the building are treated as commonly owned property.

The 2002 law also allows occupants to form a general organisation if there are more than eight apartments in their building. This body includes a three-member administrative committee that manages affairs related to construction, garbage collection, and maintenance and that publicly represents the occupants of the building.

Based on the bylaws for occupant organisations and administrative committees (issued by the Ministry of Local Administration and Environment under Decree No. 931 of 2002 and later amended by Decree No. 1005 of 2002), each local administrative unit forms an office to supervise the formation of such bodies.

According to these bylaws, an occupant organisation has broad powers to dispose of a building’s financial resources. These are collected by its administrative committee through contributions, i.e. payments made by occupants according to rates determined by the organisation, gifts, donations, rent or sale allowances, and investment in common features of the building.

Article 27 of Decree No. 931 authorises occupant organisations to form financial reserves from the estimated annual costs of maintaining each apartment within the building. These funds are collected in four scenarios, as determined by Decree No. 931: leasing to a Syrian citizen or their legal equivalent, leasing to a non-Syrian citizen or their legal equivalent, selling an apartment, or assessing the damage caused by one of the building occupants to a common feature.

Furthermore, the administrative committee for a building may collect a certain percentage of funds if one of the residents leases or sells their apartment. This percentage varies from one building to another, according to what the occupant organisation sees fit.

If an occupant finds the payment too high, they may raise a complaint with the General Organisation for Building Occupants after paying half of the sum. However, if the General Organisation decides that the occupant must pay, then they must complete the payment immediately, as the decision has immediate effect. Should the occupant fail to pay, then their building’s administrative committee may place a hold on the property’s land record in the Cadastral Affairs, barring that person from disposing of the apartment.

Neither Law No. 55, nor Decree No. 931 specifies the percentage that the administrative committee may demand for such payments. The two laws also fail to mention rules that the committee must follow when determining that percentage. Instead, such decisions are left in the hands of the occupant organisations, which raise housing, land, and property rights issues.

Since the issuance of Real Estate Sales Law No. 15 of 2021, occupant organisations and administrative committees appear to have adopted the current value of real estate when determining the rates to be collected from occupants. Some cases have been recorded where occupant bodies demanded rates that were burdensome and exceeded the real estate sales tax. The semi-official Al-Watan newspaper reported that building occupants in Tartous complained in February 2022 that they had been charged large percentages when selling or renting their apartments. According to news outlet, the Tartous City Council proposed making an amendment to Article 27 of Decree No. 931 in order not to discourage occupants from forming committees.

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Systematic Campaign to Demolish Buildings in Al-Tadhamon

15-03-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

The Damascus governorate is continuing its demolition of buildings in the Tadhamon neighbourhood. The lack of clarity regarding the legal bases for these  demolitions and the fact that most property owners remain displaced threaten residents’ housing, land, and property rights.

Al-Tadhamon lies six kilometres southeast of the Damascus city centre and is considered the southern gateway to the capital. Following the 1967 war with Israel, thousands of Syrians were displaced from the Golan Heights and Quneitra to Al-Tadhamon. There, they built houses in an informal manner on agricultural land.

According to a local correspondent for The Syria Report, there are credible estimates that over 300 buildings have been demolished in various parts of Al-Tadhamon since the regime regained control of the neighbourhood in 2018.

Residents told The Syria Report that the recent demolitions were concentrated in the area around the Salman Al-Farsi Mosque at the intersection of Balour Al-Shahbaa and Al-Spourat Streets. The area was a military defence zone during the period of opposition control in 2012-2015 then during Islamic State control in 2015-2018. Since 2018, the Damascus governorate has demolished dozens of buildings spanning from this area to Palestine Street, which neighbours the Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp.

Opposition forces dug over 20 tunnels under the area around the Salman Al-Farsi Mosque to use for military operations, a former military source from one of the Tadhamon opposition factions told The Syria Report. The source did not deny that the tunnels could potentially loosen the ground beneath the area and harm building foundations. However, he alleged that the Damascus governorate is working under security and military orders to demolish the entire area in order to fill in the tunnels and prevent their future use, rather than ensure the structural safety of buildings.

Some witnesses explained the slow pace of the demolition campaign as a tactic by the governorate to avoid provoking property owners. Others attributed the slow demolition progress to the governorate’s poor financial and logistical capabilities. In any case, the campaign does appear organised and ongoing, and has resulted in the razing of a large swathe of multi-storey buildings.

Despite the slow pace of the campaign, there have been specific periods during which the demolitions increased markedly. In early 2020, eight buildings and seven multi-storey homes in the Al-Shawam neighbourhood of southeastern Tadhamon were detonated in one blow under the pretext that there were tunnels beneath them. However, Al-Shawam was never a frontline between regime and opposition forces, so there is little reason for tunnels to exist underneath, according to the opposition military source.

Meanwhile the Damascus governorate continues to remove the rubble left behind by its demolition work, transferring it to the Tubab area of Al-Tadhamon. Regime forces detonated and destroyed Al-Tubab in early 2013. The area was filled with old informal housing structures that were built without observing construction safety codes. Most of them lacked proper foundations. Residents were mostly low-level public sector employees, with a large portion of them working in the police force.

The former governor of Damascus formed a committee in July 2018 to implement Law No. 3 of 2018 in order to remove and recycle rubble and determine which buildings were safely habitable in the Tadhamon neighbourhood. In October 2018, the committee concluded that there were 690 habitable homes which residents could safely return to on a temporary basis; however, not until all of Al-Tadhamon was zoned under Decree No. 10 of 2018, which stipulates that at least one zoned area may be created within the general zoning plan.

After widespread opposition from the few remaining residents who were supported by the local National Defence militia, the governorate reneged in 2020. It divided Al-Tadhamon into three sectors – A, B and C – in order to study the engineering condition of real estate there. The governorate eventually found 2,500 habitable homes and around 1,000 uninhabitable homes in sectors A and B. However, it deemed sector C, which represents the southern part of Al-Tadhamon, to be uninhabitable and highly damaged.

The governorate recently permitted some displaced families to return to their homes in sector B for the first time. The returnees were required to first submit an application that included proof of ownership and to obtain security approval from the local branch of Military Intelligence, which controls the neighbourhood. Those who returned to sector B suffered a lack of public services such as water, electricity, and sewage networks. Homeowners who needed to restore their damaged houses were also required to apply for restoration permits from the Tadhamon municipality.

Many women are not granted the security approval to return to Al-Tadhamon if they have a male family member, such as a husband or son, who participated in opposition activities. This prohibition is automatic, as the security apparatus does not examine whether or not the woman approves or disapproves of her family members’ political or military activity.

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Al-Tal Expands City Zoning Plan

15-03-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

The process for expanding the zoning plan for Al-Tal in the Rural Damascus governorate appears to be nearing completion decades after it began. However, the expansion has caused negative impacts on housing, land, and property rights.

The expansion area extends over about 500 hectares of land, approximately the current surface area of Al-Tal. There are 3,081 plots within the expansion area that are allotted for construction. The extension will be located mainly to the northwest of the current city boundaries, as well as two smaller areas south and west of Al-Tal.

Al-Tal is the urban centre of a district that belongs administratively to the Rural Damascus governorate and was home to around 150,000 people before 2011. Today, approximately 300,000 people live in the city, of which a large portion are internally displaced from other areas in Syria.

The land included within the expansion area was zoned in accordance with the principle of compulsory land readjustment, which stipulates the redistribution of land to the rights holders, but not usually in their original locations. The rights holders are not given the right to choose the locations of their new plots of land. As part of the redistribution process, the local administrative unit deducts a percentage of the area of these properties without compensation in return for the supposed benefit incurred to the rights holder who is handed property within the newly zoned area. The principle of compulsory land readjustment appears in many planning, zoning, and expropriation laws in Syria.

On February 23, the Al-Tal City Council announced that the Compulsory Land Readjustment Committee had finished redistributing properties located within the expansion zone in accordance with Planning and Urban Development Law No. 23 of 2015. Under the 2015 law, the Compulsory Land Readjustment Committee is formed by decree of the Minister of Justice. The committee appraises the value of each plot of land within a zoning plan. The process of zoning the area ends with distributing the properties therein to rights holders according to the number of shares they own.

Together with its announcement the city council produced a chart that displays the rights holders’ names, newly distributed plots of land, the surface areas of those plots, and plans for distribution. The council also issued the appraised values of the plots within the expanded zone. The values varied widely, with the lowest at SYP 200,000 per square metre and the highest at SYP 573,000. The value of properties closest to the city centre of Al-Tal appears to be higher than those further away from the centre.

The city council gave rights holders one month to present any objections to the redistribution.

Expansion of Al-Tal’s zoning plan dates back to 1995 and has always been tied to the issue of compulsory land readjustment for properties located within the expansion zone. Major issues arose over the fact that the actual blueprints for the areas located within the planned expansion did not match the expansion zone’s compulsory readjustment plan. The case was sent to the Directorate of Cadastral Affairs for a solution.

In 2018, the Al-Tal City Council issued a so-called “exceptional announcement” that it had released details of the expansion to the city zoning plan and was open to hearing objections. An exceptional announcement is usually made before the regular date for issuing zoning plans. The governor of Rural Damascus approved the Al-Tal expansion in 2020. Afterwards, all that remained was for the Compulsory Land Readjustment Committee to finish its duties.

Finally, in January 2022, the process of appraising the plots of land within the expansion was complete, after which the committee began determining which plots would be given to each rights holders, as well as where they would be located.

The committee worked surprisingly quickly, completing the process in February. However, the announcement was marred by a slew of objections that appeared on social media. The Syria Report could not verify the objections, though some are worth mentioning.

One social media commenter wrote that his new property was located eight kilometres away from his original property and is now far from the city centre, lowering its value. Another person wrote that their original property was 900 square metres, while the new one was only 290 square metres. Under Law No. 23 of 2015, no more than 40 percent of a property’s surface area may be deducted during the land readjustment process. Finally, another person wrote that the land readjustment caused their family’s properties to be physically dispersed, with each household receiving a plot of land far from the others.

The Compulsory Land Readjustment Committee will study the objections that were submitted within the one-month deadline and then issue a decision on the distribution of the plots to the rights holders. This decision, however, is subject to appeal before the Civil Court of Appeals, which makes a final and unchallengeable decree. Afterwards, the administrative unit will notify the Directorate of Cadastral Affairs to register the new ownership rights in accordance with the redistribution scheme.

It is notable that all of the people who were found to have objected to the Al-Tal expansion plan on social media are men. This fact raises concerns about the extent to which women rights holders have access to the plans and charts that were posted in the city council hall, as well as their knowledge of their rights, including the right to object to these plans should they disagree with the results of the Compulsory Land Readjustment Committee.

The Al-Tal city expansion plan

Source: Al-Tal City Council

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Evacuation of East Aleppo Building Affirms Risks of Indirect Damage from Prior Bombardment

08-03-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

The Aleppo City Council demolished a five-storey residential building in the east Aleppo Masaken Hanano neighbourhood on February 23 after evacuating residents. The building displayed cracks and was at risk of collapse, indicating the risks to housing, land, and property wrought by indirect damage of aerial bombardments in areas that were formerly under opposition control.

The demolished Arouset Hanano Building was home to 15 families. Most of them owned the apartments they lived in, while others were tenants.

The city council’s public safety committee had inspected the building and compiled a technical report detailing cracks in both the external and internal walls on all storeys, as well as depressions in some of those walls, a council source told The Syria Report.

Based on the findings of the report, all occupants of the building were evacuated, the source added. The roads surrounding the building were closed in cooperation with the Hanano police. Afterwards, the building was completely demolished in accordance with procedures recommended by the committee and in cooperation with the Military Housing Establishment, a construction company affiliated with the Ministry of Defence. The city council said that, with the help of the neighbourhood’s mukhtar, it had secured alternative housing for the evacuated residents.

However, evacuated residents who spoke with The Syria Report tell a different story. According to them, residents had submitted an appeal to the city council in early 2021 informing officials of the large cracks in the building. Council-affiliated engineers inspected Arouset Hanano at the time and said that the building’s foundations were fine and there was no danger of collapse. A resident said, however, that the cracks only increased since then, with more appearing in recent months.

A local correspondent for The Syria Report was unable to confirm official statements saying that a technical committee had inspected the building prior to its evacuation. Residents’ accounts suggest it wasn’t until after evacuating the residents of the building that the committee inspected the building and decided to demolish it.

Hanano police reportedly used loudspeakers late at night on February 22-23 to call on residents to evacuate the building quickly, at risk of seeing it collapse with them inside. Frightened residents complied and exited to the public plaza near the building. A police patrol then shut the main doors of the building and barred entry after confirming that everyone had evacuated.

One former resident told The Syria Report that people were unable to take their belongings out of the building and instead went outside in their pajamas. In fact, most residents had not brought their own deeds with them.

So far, the city council’s statement about having secured alternative housing for the evacuees have not come to fruition. Though the council suggested letting the families stay in a nearby youth housing complex, most of the former building residents are still living with relatives in adjacent neighbourhoods.

The Arouset Hanano Building was never directly bombed. However, it is located between a number of other residential buildings that were partially destroyed by Russian and regime airstrikes during the period of opposition control of east Aleppo in 2013-2016.

Previous bombardments, including seismic bombs and thermobaric bombs, on some residential areas, caused indirect damage even on buildings that had not been directly hit or destroyed. Some Russian bombs designed to penetrate concrete fortifications pose a great danger to buildings, as they destabilise the ground soil and other surfaces. This damage is often invisible, though it harms the foundations of homes. Such damage appears much later in the form of cracked walls or collapsed columns. The damages accumulate, and only worsen as sewage water infiltrates the building foundations.

Since regime forces retook east Aleppo in 2016, there have been no actual repairs to infrastructure in Masaken Hanano, including to the sewage, water, and electrical networks, according to local sources.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-03-08 17:16:292022-03-08 17:21:20Evacuation of East Aleppo Building Affirms Risks of Indirect Damage from Prior Bombardment

No Title Deeds for Manufacturers in the Suweida Craft Zone

08-03-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

Thirty-seven years after the Suweida Craft Zone was established, craftspeople and manufacturers in the zone have yet to obtain title deeds for their so-called craft-plots.

The land allocated for the Suweida Craft Zone was first expropriated in 1962 and annexed into the Suweida city zoning plan that same year. However, the Craft Zone was not established until 1985. It then underwent two expansions, one in 1992 and the other in 2019. Today the zone is composed of 444 plots and covers an area of 29 hectares. Businesses there employ some 2,000 people.

The Directorate of Industrial Cities and Zones, which was established in 2004 as part of the Ministry of Local Administration and Environment, is the body responsible for regulating and servicing industrial and trade zones with infrastructure. That includes roads, electricity, water and sewage networks. Before the Directorate of Industrial Cities and Zones was established, such zones were under the purview of the councils of their respective governorates.

Many problems have blocked the issuance of title deeds to owners of plots within the Suweida Craft Zone in the past decades. The zoning plans issued in 1962 have become outdated and inconsistent with realities on the ground. There has also been continued informal urban expansion around the zone. Meanwhile, the standardised format of the plots was often unsuitable for certain professions, forcing owners of those plots to change their internal design throughout the 1980s and 1990s. These changes were considered a violation of the construction code for the zones.

A committee formed in 2018 to address these issues. Members included representatives from the Directorate of Industrial Cities and Zones, the Suweida City Council, the Union of Craftspeople in Suweida, and the Directorates of Finance and of Cadastral Affairs in Suweida. The committee studied the plots within the zone and drew up plans consistent with their current status. Afterwards, it made a topographic layout and confirmed the new plan. In accordance with the Suweida Governorate Letter No. 2385 of July 2018, that new plan was submitted to the Regional Committee to complete the approval process. Afterwards, the committee that was working to fix the Craft Zone issues in Suweida focused on addressing problems of formal division and ownership transfer for the plots, and put together title deeds for the owners.

Despite these efforts, more problems arose that slowed the approval process and the separation of the plots, as shown in the letters and memos exchanged between the Suweida City Council, the governorate council, the Regional Committee and the Directorate of Cadastral Affairs.

Amid this administrative labyrinth, the Suweida City Council formed yet another committee in 2020 to address the problems of the Suweida Craft Zone in cooperation with the Ministry of Public Works and Housing and the Ministry of Local Administration and Environment. This new 2020 committee concluded that the main reason for the issues facing the plots was the expansion of the Craft Zone in 1992 and 2019, both of which were inconsistent with the main zoning plan outlined in 1962. A solution has yet to be found.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-03-08 17:10:092022-03-08 17:19:10No Title Deeds for Manufacturers in the Suweida Craft Zone

Explained: Where Does Syrian Law Stand on Coercive Relinquishment of Real Estate Ownership?

08-03-2022/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

Recent years have seen the coercive expropriation of private real estate in areas under the control of the government through pressuring owners to either relinquish the properties or sell them at low prices. At the helm of these expropriations are usually influential figures supported by the security or military apparatuses.

The Syrian Civil Code outlines certain conditions that must be met in order for a sales contract to be considered valid. Among those conditions is consent. A sales contract is a consensual contract in which a seller must transfer the ownership of a thing to the buyer in exchange for a payment.

Coercion is considered a flaw in any sales contract under Syrian law, one that, if present, either renders the contract void or threatens to do so. The Court of Cassation, in Decision No. 10376/3182 of 1991, defined coercion as the usage of the means of coercion on an individual, which creates a sense of fear in that person that pushes them to accept something they otherwise would not have accepted.

Coercion can be physical, such as through beating, torture or kidnapping, or it can be moral, such as through making threats to kidnap or murder. Article 128 of the Civil Code states that the psychological fear that an individual faces under coercion forces them to imagine grave and impending danger either to themself or to others, whether that danger is to their life, body, dignity or money. This concept was further affirmed in the Court of Cassation Decision No. 569/1805 of 1971, which said that the purpose of coercion was to instil psychological fear, forcing the affected individual to imagine grave and impending danger. Such coercion pressures the victim against their will, leaving them without the freedom of choice so that they sign a contract under the perpetrator’s authority.

Article 128 of the Civil Code specifies certain factors that are taken into consideration when defining coercion and its impacts on an individual, including the victim’s gender, age, social and health status, and every circumstance that might affect the severity of the coercion. Under Article 128, a sales or relinquishment contract is described as null if it occurred under coercion. A person who faced coercion to relinquish their real estate property may file a lawsuit to nullify what occurred. The coercion must be proven by any means available, including by witnesses.

Article 635 of the Syrian Penal Code also defines coercion as a crime of “coercing another person to perform an act that damages their assets.” The victim has the right to file a civil suit to nullify the transaction that occurred under duress, or to incriminate the perpetrator.

Syrian law categorises coercion as a misdemeanour punishable by three months to two years imprisonment and a fine. The crime becomes a felony punishable by hard labour if the perpetrator bore a weapon while threatening the victim.

A gendered lens

In distributing inheritances, there are many cases of women having relinquished their shares to the men in their families. This is in line with the principle of “disassociation” in the Personal Status Law, or a waiver by one of the parties of their share of a property or inheritance before a Sharia judge, in exchange for the payment of an allowance. This allowance is often worth far less than the actual property value. In theory, “dissociation” must be done with the consent of all parties involved, but for women, consent to give up her share is often based on social customs or coercion from her family. Such cases could be considered a form of coercive relinquishment.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-03-08 16:53:152022-03-08 16:53:15Explained: Where Does Syrian Law Stand on Coercive Relinquishment of Real Estate Ownership?

Returnee Numbers Remain Very Low in Al-Hajar Al-Aswad as Looting Continues

08-03-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

Only 40 families have thus far managed to return home to the nearly deserted town of Al-Hajar Al-Aswad outside Damascus, as rubble still covers large areas of the town and basic public services remain absent.

The Al-Hajar Al-Aswad municipality announced in January 2022 that it was providing what it called “facilities,” or easier tracks, for those wishing to return to the town. Among those facilities is the replacement of the homeownership deed, which is required for returning, with an electricity or water pay slip along with a statement from the mukhtar confirming that he knows the homeowner. However, some rights holders have not benefited from these easier conditions for return, including land owners or owners of uncompleted buildings who had not previously applied for electricity and water services.

The mayor of Al-Hajar Al-Aswad stated in mid-February 2022 that 300 of around 1,350 families who had applied to return had been granted approval. So far only 40 families have actually made the return home, however.

Returns have been confined to the Tishreen and Al-Thawra neighbourhoods thus far, while the other areas of Al-Hajar Al-Aswad remain deserted and riddled with wartime rubble.

The municipal council had begun in September 2021 to reopen applications for displaced residents wishing to return. Applicants must comply with a complex set of conditions before obtaining final approval to return home. First, they must fill out a form and attach documents proving their ownership of the property they wish to return to, as well as provide a family record statement and copies of each family member’s personal ID card. The security services then study the complete file and either approve or reject the application. In the event of approval, a technical committee from the municipality inspects the property and assesses its damages. Should the committee find the property safely inhabitable, the property owner must then apply for a permit from the municipality to restore it. Afterwards, the applicant finally receives their official approval to return.

A number of obstacles still prevent many families from returning to Al-Hajar Al-Aswad. Most notably, families face significant delays in the return security approval process without being informed of the reasons. Some families who were allowed to return decided against returning because local schools remain closed. This is despite previous statements from municipal officials that three schools were being rehabilitated. Rubble also still blocks some of the streets in the Tishreen and Al-Thawra neighbourhoods, despite the municipality having announced its removal.

One resident called Mohammad told The Syria Report that he had been granted security approval in late 2021 to return to his partially damaged house. He had also applied for permission to restore the house. However, he must pay SYP 500 for each square metre of the house in order to obtain the permit, a requirement that he said made him hesitate to go through with returning home.

Nidal, another resident, owns two houses in the Tishreen neighbourhood. He said he applied for return by providing all the necessary documents, after which he obtained security approval. The technical committee then inspected both of his houses and found them safely habitable. However, Nidal has now been waiting three months to hear back about his final approval in order to be able to return home, he told The Syria Report.

Al-Hajar Al-Aswad sits adjacent to the Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp and is the centre of a district that belongs administratively to the Rural Damascus governorate. Around half a million people lived there before 2011, a large portion of them displaced from Quneitra governorate due to the 1967 war and Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights. Al-Hajar Al-Aswad faced significant destruction when it was under opposition control in 2012-2018 due to intense regime airstrikes and fighting on the ground.  The remaining residents were evacuated after regime forces retook control of the town in 2018.

The 40 families who have returned to Al-Hajar Al-Aswad live in poor conditions, without running water or electricity and with weak cellular coverage. Even the sewage network is still not running, despite that the municipal council announced the completion of repair work in Tishreen and Al-Thawra.

Local sources also told The Syria Report small-scale looting is ongoing. The looting is currently being done by small work crews affiliated with the local branch of the Military Security services, which is the security force in control of Al-Hajar Al-Aswad. These crews take apart the roofs of some houses to extract iron from them. The local sources added that these crews had stolen five solar-powered lighting poles of 40 poles that had been provided by the aid organisation Premiere Urgence Internationale in 2021.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-03-08 13:46:582022-03-08 17:14:16Returnee Numbers Remain Very Low in Al-Hajar Al-Aswad as Looting Continues
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Read also

  • A New Classification for Housing Cooperatives: Between Project Completion, Dissolution and Liquidation
  • Decree No. 66 of 2012: Objections and Judicial Proceedings Following the Reparation Package
  • Reconstruction Through Reduced Engineers’ Fees: Engineering Fee Exemptions Fall Short of Enabling Displaced People to Return to Their Areas
  • Rising Rents in Damascus and Its Nearby Suburbs: Demand Pressure and Limited Supply
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