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Explained: Agrarian Reform Laws in Syria

01-03-2022/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

During the period of Egyptian-Syrian unification in 1958-1961, the unity government issued Agrarian Reform Law No. 161 with the aim of setting a maximum limit on agricultural land ownership.

The ceiling set by the law for private agricultural land ownership was 80 hectares for irrigated and forested land and 300 hectares for rainfed land.

Under Law No. 161, the state may seize any land in excess of those maximum limits in return for a compensation payment. The state then becomes the owner of these surplus lands and grants the right of usufruct of the properties to small farmers. The share of land granted to each farmer may not exceed eight hectares of irrigated or forested land or 30-45 hectares of rainfed land, depending on the levels of rainfall the land receives.

A farmer who has been granted the right of usufruct to these excess farmlands must repay the cost of their parcel of land within 40 years. The price the farmer must pay is equal to the compensation the state paid the original owner of the seized parcel of land plus a 1.5 percent interest fee and 10 percent of the acquisition expenditures as determined by Law No. 161. The farmer may not dispose of the land before paying the full price. It is prohibited to seize the land in order to pay a debt unless that debt is to the state or the Agricultural Cooperative Bank. Essentially, for lands seized due to the ownership limits set by the Agrarian Reform Law, the state is the landowner, while farmers are entitled only to the right of usufruct.

The Agrarian Reform Institution, a legal entity connected to the Presidency albeit with financial and administrative independence, is responsible for implementing the provisions of Law No. 161. This body handles the expropriation, distribution, and management of the lands seized in line with the 1958 law.

However, Law No. 161 grants the Agrarian Reform Institution some powers outside the scope of the law’s stated objective. The institution has the right to retain some seized land to construct projects to the public benefit. It may also delay distribution of the lands or sell some of the seized lands for the public benefit at prices and under conditions it considers appropriate.

The institution forms committees to undertake the land seizures, conduct inventory, and distribute seized properties. A judicial committee may also be formed by decree of the Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform to consider disputes arising from the implementation of Law No. 161, especially those related to ownership, seizure, and distribution.

Law No. 161 includes penalties against those who object to or violate it, ranging from 10 days to three years imprisonment.

Several amendments to the law were issued throughout the 1960s: Law No. 3 of 1962, Decree No. 166 of 1968, and Decree No. 66 of 1969, all of which centre around the conditions for distributing state-owned agricultural lands to farmers.

These lands, granted to farmers with the right of usufruct, are subject to the Law on Transfer of Immovable Amiri Properties. This means that female and male inheritors are held in equal regard once a legal inheritance inventory document is compiled before the Civil Magistrate Court.

An amendment made by Law No. 61 of 2004 considered beneficiaries of Agrarian Reform farmlands to be the “full owners” of such lands, starting from the date the land was distributed to them. The land is registered in the Directorate of Cadastral Affairs under the beneficiary’s name. After their death, ownership is transferred to the heirs in accordance with the rules of legal inheritance stipulated by the Personal Status Law.

Under the 2004 amendment, neither the beneficiary nor the heirs may dispose of the land until five years have passed since the property was listed within the land registry under the primary beneficiary’s name and approved by the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-03-01 17:42:402022-03-01 18:30:23Explained: Agrarian Reform Laws in Syria

Explained: Executive Instructions of the Financial Law of Administrative Units

01-03-2022/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

The Minister of Local Administration and Environment issued on February 3 the executive instructions for the Financial Law of Administrative Units No. 37 of 2021. The instructions include clarifications on some real estate-related fees and taxes.

The Financial Law of Administrative Units was issued on December 27, 2021, to regulate the fees and taxes collected by local administrative units, as well as the methods for collection. The law also updated some real estate fees, basing them on the current values of real estate properties.

The executive instructions for the law included:

First: The so-called “added fees” are fees collected directly by the Ministry of Finance on real estate properties that are redistributed by the ministry to local administrative units.

Under the executive instructions, these fees are distributed to administrative units on the following basis: 65 percent goes to all the administrative units based on their population size; 12 percent to the city of Damascus; 12 percent to administrative units that are of “developmental nature,” which refers to underdeveloped parts of the country; six percent to port cities; and five percent to “touristic” administrative units. The Council of Ministers is in charge of determining what administrative units count as developmental and touristic, and has the right to amend these share percentages.

Second: The administrative units collect “direct fees” in return for the services it provides and licenses it grants. These include road building, paving and lighting, urban planning costs and construction permits.

Among these direct fees are construction permit fees, set at SYP 3,000 for each permit. The administrative unit also collects one percent of the current value for the total surface area of a multi-storey building, and four percent of the current value for building protrusions, such as balconies. There is also a planning expenses fee of SYP 2,000 and a one-time flat fee for using the sidewalk to store the building materials during the construction period.

The construction permit for a six-storey building remains valid for three years, and extends to five years if there are additional storeys. The administrative unit collects the full permit fee even if construction has not yet begun, or is only partially complete.

The direct fees also include a fee every 10 years for paving the roads that surround a given building. The value of this fee is based on the surface area of the property and its street-facing facades. The administrative unit likewise collects fees for the extensions of sewage networks, for advertising and for cleaning.

Third: Improvement fees are collected for works that are for the public benefit and implemented by either public or private entities, and that result in an improvement in the property’s value. These fees are collected from owners of both built and unbuilt real estate located both within and outside the zoning plans, for every public benefit project that improves the property, i.e., increases its value. Public benefit projects may include the construction of roads, bridges, waterways and stormwater drainage systems and the implementation of urban planning laws, tourism and hospitality projects, modifying the conditions for usufruct, and changing construction codes.

The Improvement Value Estimation Committee

The administrative unit’s executive office is in charge of determining the areas that are undergoing improvement. It inspects the properties that have been improved so that it can be “fair” in either levying or exempting the improvement fees. Then, it informs the Ministry of Finance of the property numbers in the cadastral registry of improved properties in order to re-appraise their current value and to put a mark in the land registry on those properties. The Directorate of Cadastral Affairs will prevent any real estate transaction on these properties until the owners pay the improvement fees.

A special committee composed of a judge appointed by the Minister of Justice, two experts appointed by the governor and two experts representing the residents, appraises the value of the improvement. The committee’s term lasts up to three months, after which the administrative unit has 15 days to inform the property owners of the improvement fees. The property owners are entitled to object to the value of the fee before the committee or appeal it before the State Council. This council was formed under Law No. 32 of 2019 to settle administrative disputes and decide on appeals to decisions issued by public entities.

The improvement fee may not exceed half the value of the increase in the value of the property as determined by the committee.

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Hama Governorate Offers Displaced Residents’ Lands for Investment for the Third Time in a Year

01-03-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

The Hama governorate appears to be facing difficulties in finding investors to take on farmlands that were left behind by forcibly displaced people in the Hama governorate and in parts of the neighbouring Idlib governorate under government control. Repeated announcements for investment auctions suggest that few potential investors have come forward, while some of those who have been granted land in the auctions have failed to cultivate it or pay financial dues.

On February 16, 2022, the Hama governorate issued Announcement No. 85, the third of its kind in a year, calling for investments in “saleekh,” or unforested farmlands. According to the announcement, auctions for the lands will continue until March 3. The governorate will accept applications from potential investors until the deadline provided that the initial deposit is paid.

Announcement No. 86, also issued on February 16, states that the winners of the land investment auctions who have not yet paid their financial dues are required to visit the Governorate General Secretariat to pay their dues and immediately begin investing in the lands before the March deadline. The announcement was meant to serve as a final warning to investors who would be punished with legal action if their payments are late.

The legal punishment for late payments includes seizing the investor’s initial security deposit, re-listing the land up for auction, and forcing the investor to pay the difference in value of the new auction. The security deposits are SYP 10,000 per hectare of rainfed land and SYP 50,000 per hectare of irrigated land.

The Hama governorate has been holding these public auctions in its main headquarters to encourage investments in lands owned by people displaced from rural parts of Hama and the neighbouring Idlib governorate. The auctions are meant to achieve a plan set out by the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform.

The Minister of Agriculture stated in January that in the southern government-held part of Idlib governorate, investors have cultivated only 11,000 out of a total 18,000 hectares of rainfed land in Idlib and 3,000 out of a total 12,000 hectares of irrigated land. He added that failure to cultivate these lands would force the Ministry of Agriculture to step in and cultivate the properties.

In the Hama governorate, only 15,500 of 25,124 hectares of irrigated land had been cultivated with wheat, while 16,600 of 20,000 rainfed hectares had been planted with wheat,  according to figures from the Ministry of Agriculture’s 2021-2022 agricultural plan.

Some investors who were awarded large parcels of farmland in the Hama governorate were unable to fully cultivate them, sources in the area told The Syria Report. Other investors focused solely on rainfed crops due to low production costs.

According to a local correspondent, some investors were unable to cultivate the land because they never received the first round of fuel promised to them for the pumps they needed to irrigate the crops. Meanwhile, the cost of ploughing land has risen to SYP 250,000 per hectare as tractor owners ignore the official price of SYP 100,000 per hectare, which is listed by the agricultural committee. Tractor owners received only 30 litres of subsidised fuel per hectare of land to be ploughed at SYP 1,700 per litre. However, the 30 litres were not enough, forcing some investors to purchase fuel at the market price of SYP 3,000 per litre.

The Syria Report found several cases of investors unable to secure the seeds they needed due to high prices or because they were unavailable. Some investors also complained of a lack of transparency in the Syrian Red Crescent’s distribution of supplies provided by the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), including rations containing 200 kg of wheat seeds and 150 kg of superphosphate fertiliser. None of these rations were distributed in the Idlib governorate. Meanwhile, 4,000 rations were handed over in rural Hama governorate, distributed to landowners and some investors whose names appeared on lists made ahead of time by the governorate’s so-called “spatial technical” committees. The governorate had originally formed these committees in mid-2021 to tally farmlands left behind by people who had fled the war.

Finally, much of the farmland auctioned to investors this past year went uncultivated due to a lack of public transportation, bureaucratic and security complications to obtaining official documents, electrical outages, and some water well failures. The Agricultural Bank has also refused to provide loans to investors.

February is also an unusual time of year for the Hama governorate to announce a new auction for farmland investment. It is no longer possible to plant wheat, especially on rainfed land, while on irrigated land farmers can only plant summer crops, such as certain vegetables that have high production costs.

A gendered lens

The Syria Report found that women had signed up to participate in auctions in which preference was given to family members of the absentee landowners. These women had remained in formerly opposition-held areas of rural Hama governorate that regime forces recaptured in recent years, and are relatives of the farmers who had fled the area in order to seek safety further north in opposition territory. The Hama governorate announced on October 21, 2021, that it had accepted applications from relatives of the absentee farmers to invest in the “saleekh,” or unforested, agricultural lands for one season. Preference was given to relatives of up to the third degree residing in the area.

At the same time, a small portion of the lands being offered for investment are in fact owned by women. In rural areas of Syria, ownership of agricultural land is typically registered to male family members – women rarely appear on the title deeds or in inheritances. This absence is in stark contrast to the large role women play in manual agricultural labour. The wages for women day labourers are often equal to those of men labourers.

The “spatial technical” committees formed in Hama and Idlib governorates also failed to include women amongst their members, according to the correspondent for The Syria Report. The committees were composed of representatives from the farmers’ unions, the local Baath Party branch, and agricultural engineers. However, the committees that were formed to supervise the auctions did include female governorate employees.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-03-01 16:48:102022-03-01 16:48:10Hama Governorate Offers Displaced Residents’ Lands for Investment for the Third Time in a Year

Government Raises Mandatory Bank Deposit Rate for Real Estate Sales

01-03-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

The Council of Ministers issued Decree No. 7 on February 13, requiring 15 percent of the current value of a real estate property to be deposited in the bank in the event of the sale of that property. The deposit is a condition for completing a real estate sale and for registering the transaction with the government or the notary public.

Decree No. 7 is an amendment to Decree No. 28, which the Council issued on March 24, 2021, and which required buyers to deposit a minimum of SYP 5 million in the seller’s bank account as a condition for official departments to register the sales contract. Decree No. 28 was itself issued to amend Council of Ministers Decree No. 5 from January 2020, which stipulated that public authorities may not register a sales contract before enclosing proof that at least a partial payment was transferred to the owner’s bank account.

Essentially, Decree No. 7 of 2022 kept the provisions of the previous decrees while raising the price of the deposit. The buyer must deposit 15 percent of the property’s current value into the seller’s bank account, even if the sales contract differs in value. Under Real Estate Sales Law No. 15 of 2021, the current value is a value determined by committees from the Ministry of Finance. Real estate taxes are calculated according to the current value of a property, rather than the value recorded in the sales contract.

The owner (or his or her official representative) is entitled to withdraw the amount of that deposit after the sale process is completed and the ownership transferred. However, there are daily withdrawal limits set by the Central Bank of Syria. The Central Bank issued Circular No. 920/16 on February 22, raising the daily cash withdrawal limit in real estate sales-related cases to SYP 10 million. The circular also raised the daily cash withdrawal limit for individuals and legal entities for non-real-estate related purposes, from SYP 2 million to SYP 5 million.

The decision to raise the daily withdrawal limit in real estate sales cases came after widespread criticism of Decree No. 7. For example, a mid-priced property in Damascus city, valued at SYP 500 million based on its current value, would require the buyer to deposit a minimum of SYP 75 million into the seller’s bank account. Under the previous daily withdrawal limit of SYP 2 million, the seller would need 38 working days to withdraw the full SYP 75 million deposit in cash. Now the owner can withdraw the deposit in eight working days. At the same time, Decree No. 7 of 2022 maintains the provision from Decree No. 28 of 2021, requiring sellers to freeze SYP 500,000 in their bank account for a period of no less than three months.

From an economic standpoint, it is unclear why the government has required an increase in the value that must be deposited for real estate sales. It is possible that the government wants to increase the amount of money deposited in the banks, encourage electronic payments, and freeze liquidity for as long as possible, thereby lowering the demand for dollars in order to limit pressure on the foreign exchange rate of the Syrian pound. This, however, would stand in contradiction to the Central Bank circular, which raised the daily cash withdrawal limit and therefore allowed cash to exit the banks and circulate in the market.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Finance recently released a report on the number and value of real estate sales between May 3, 2021, when Law No. 15 which regulates the property sales tax entered into force, and February 17, 2022. According to the report, 231,000 sales contracts were signed during this period, with the total current value of the contracts reaching SYP 7,770 billion – that is, the value of the sales during those 10 months was equivalent to 91.4 percent of the 2021 budget, which amounts to SYP 8,500 billion, according to statistics from the Higher Council for Economic and Social Planning.

Decrees No. 7, 28, and 5 all violate the Syrian Civil Code, which places no specific restrictions on the documentation of sales, transfer of ownership, or any processes of documenting ownership transfer contracts in the land registry. Under Article 825 of the Civil Code, real estate rights are acquired and transferred through their entry into the registry.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-03-01 16:45:272022-03-01 18:30:25Government Raises Mandatory Bank Deposit Rate for Real Estate Sales

Personal Testimonies: Women Alawite Activists Deprived of Inheritance

22-02-2022/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

Some women activists from Syria’s Alawite community who opposed the regime during the 2011 revolution have since been shunned by their families and social circles, at times even deprived of their housing, land, and property rights.

The issue of women’s inheritance rights does not receive much attention in the Alawite community, yet the problem is becoming clearer among female Alawite activists who oppose the regime. On the contrary, there was no similar cutoff of inheritance rights for Alawite women who had taken part in the opposition Communist Labour Party in the 1970s and 1980s and who subsequently faced persecution and served long prison sentences.

A correspondent for The Syria Report interviewed several Alawite women who had been deprived of their HLP rights due to their political activism. Rula, Rana, and Rima, three sisters from Masyaf in the Hama governorate, illustrate this issue. Rula is an opposition political activist who faced persecution by security forces for her work during the revolution, prompting her to leave Syria in 2013 and seek refuge in Europe. Rana, meanwhile, has never been interested in politics and is uninterested in opposing the regime. Like Rula, Rana left Syria, married, and settled down in Europe. Finally, Rima is not a political activist, but nonetheless went against her family’s wishes by marrying a non-Alawite man. The three sisters also have several brothers.

As with many Alawite families, inheritance goes to the sons. However, Rula, Rana, and Rima inherited land from their mother, who herself had obtained the land inheritance after a long dispute with her brothers.

The family successfully pressured Rima, who married a non-Alawite, to give up her share of the inheritance to one of her brothers. Rana received her full share without dispute. Rula, on the other hand, ended up the weakest link after her family members owing to her opposition political views. The family began pressuring her to sell her share of the land to one of her brothers for a meagre price.

Despite Rula’s refusal to give up her share, her brother began investing in the land on his own amid increasing family pressure. The family also recently received a visit from the Political Security branch in Masyaf. Officers asked them about Rula and her opposition activities, as well as her property ownership inside Syria. Family members subsequently feared that the state could seize Rula’s property. They considered Rula’s brother more deserving of the land than Rula, whom they saw as having caused them trouble.

Samira, an Alawite opposition activist from rural Jableh, also faced harassment. Her family members, as well as the residents of her small village, bullied her because of her political views. Samira fled the village for Damascus, where she was arrested. When she was released from detention, she returned to her village, where the residents threw stones at her.

Samira, whose father owns large parcels of land and property, was deprived of everything and later forced to leave Syria. In one recent phone conversation, she asked her brother about her share of the inheritance. He responded: “Instead of asking for your share, you should pay for the shame you’ve caused us.”

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-02-22 14:22:072022-02-22 14:22:07Personal Testimonies: Women Alawite Activists Deprived of Inheritance

Explained: How Does Syrian Law Handle the Forgery of Real Estate Title Deeds?

22-02-2022/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

The forgery of real estate title deeds by specialised criminal networks is widespread in most areas under Syrian regime control.

These networks are exploiting the fact that many property owners are currently outside Syria and cannot return to legally claim or protect their properties. As a result, forgers transfer ownership of these properties through fraudulent documents or by colluding with judges and employees of both the courts and the General Directorate of Cadastral Affairs, which runs Syria’s official real estate registry.

Syrian law takes a firm stance against forgery of real estate ownership documents. Article 14 of the Land Registry Law of 1926 states that a registry of ownership is illegal if it is done “unjustly,” and whoever is harmed by this can claim that the registration is illegal. Article 15 stresses that a person whose rights have been violated due to a change in the real estate records without legitimate reason is entitled to cancel the change. The owner of a certain property derives their ownership right from the land registry. Invalid or forged documents do not grant someone the right of ownership.

Jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation affirms that forgery of ownership deeds is a form of registration “without right” or without legitimate reason. Decision No. 41/58 of 1972, released by the court’s general assembly, explains that registration without right may include both (1) registration made without the presence of the concerned person, (2) registration based on fraud or deception, or (3) a forged statement or power of attorney. In such cases, the registration is not based on the official land registry, but rather on fraud. Records made from these invalid ownership deeds must be cancelled.

A more recent judgement issued by the court’s general assembly, Decision No. 111 of 2016, considered that the phrase “without right,” which appears in Article 14 of the Land Registry Law, includes any of the aforementioned reasons that invalidate ownership registration. In such cases, the registration is cancelled and undergoes a “registration annulment” case before the Civil Court of First Instance where the property is located.

The matter does not stop there. Forgery of judicial rulings, notary power of attorney, or official real estate documents while registering ownership in the land registry is considered a form of tampering with official documentation. This offence, a felony, is punishable by at least five years of hard labour under Articles 446 and 447 of the Penal Code.

In such cases of forgery, the Criminal Court also invalidates the registration. Anyone who lost their ownership due to forged documentation may file a case before the Criminal Court claiming that forgery had occurred. They may also file a case before the civil judiciary to cancel the registration.

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Explained: Real Estate Bank Loans

22-02-2022/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

Established in 1966 as a public institution, Syria’s Real Estate Bank finances various kinds of loans related to the purchase, renovation, or restoration of real estate.

According to the bank’s financial statements from 2021, published in the Al-Watan newspaper, the Real Estate Bank granted loans related to real estate as follows: 1,661 restoration loans (i.e. for damage repair) worth a total SYP 8.7 billion; 414 renovation loans (i.e. cladding, clay, paint, and electrical and sanitary installation) worth a total SYP 2.6 billion; and 409 purchase loans at a total value of SYP 4.3 billion.

The Real Estate Bank’s website lists the types of loans it currently offers. The bank often changes the names of the categories of loans to suit their financial and legal needs. Sometimes, high-ranking bank officials, in their official statements, confuse the titles of those loans.

The loans differ in the conditions for obtaining them, the payment methods, and the loan ceilings. However, for all of the loans offered by the Real Estate Bank, the real estate property, the subject of the loan must be formally listed within the land registry in a zoned area under regime control. The land record for that property must also be free of any problems related to documentation and subdivision.

As part of the loan process, the bank requests that the borrower provide a real estate registration statement, a copy of the building licence from the relevant municipality, a copy of the subdivision plan from the Directorate of Cadastral Affairs, and a copy of the “general site” map from the municipality. The bank also requires a certified statement of income and a copy of the applicant’s professional or trade certificate.

The applicant must secure a number of guarantors working in the public sector, in accordance with the value of the loan. For example, a SYP 5 million loan does not require a guarantor, while in order to receive an SYP 20 million loan, the applicant must find at least two guarantors. The Real Estate Bank is currently considering eliminating this requirement if the applicant is able to secure a real estate collateral equivalent to 200 percent of the loan’s value.

For purchase loans, the bank grants loans at a ceiling of SYP 50 million to fund the purchase of a real estate property at an interest rate of 10.5 percent to be paid within five years. The ceiling for loans meant for “purchase and completion of a property whose structure is unfinished” is also SYP 50 million, but the interest is 11 percent, to be paid within 10 years. Finally, a real estate construction loan has a SYP 50 million ceiling, though with an 11.5 percent interest rate and repayment timeline of 15 years. In the cases mentioned above, the bank loan covers 60 percent of the value of the residential property, based on an assessment by the bank’s experts. A self-employed or freelance loan applicant must secure three guarantors working in the public sector.

Recent years have seen the Real Estate Bank introduce new types of loans to meet the need to restore homes damaged by the war. These loans passed through various iterations before the bank specified the following two types: “re-completion of a residential property” and “reinforcement of a damaged residential property.” Both have a ceiling of SYP 10 million.

There is also a unique type of loan that the Real Estate Bank offers: purchase of a residential property for people who applied for a so-called savings housing, one of the government’s social housing programmes implemented by the General Housing Establishment (GHE). The loan goes to the GHE’s account, rather than the applicant. The value of the loan is set at half the estimated value of the home granted through the housing programme. The applicant must repay the loan to the Real Estate Bank within 15 years, at an interest rate of 10.5-11.5 percent, depending on the length of the repayment period.

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Lack of Durable Solutions to HLP Issues in Northern Aleppo, Report Warns

15-02-2022/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

Violations of housing, land, and property (HLP) are rampant in northern Aleppo governorate, according to a wide-ranging report published in January 2022 by iMMAP, an international NGO that provides information management services to humanitarian organisations. The report focused on areas in Aleppo’s northern countryside alongside the Turkish border, which are under the control of Turkish-backed opposition forces and, thus, under de facto Turkish control.

Northern Aleppo has been the target of successive waves of attacks and land grabs throughout the Syrian war, including by the Islamic State (ISIS), opposition factions backed by Turkey, and Turkish forces, displacing tens of thousands of residents to neighbouring Turkey and other places. In addition, northern Aleppo has been a major destination point for displaced families from other parts of Syria, who were relocated by bus after regime forces recaptured former opposition strongholds outside Damascus and elsewhere. As a result, over 1.3 million people now live in a part of Syria that was home to only 550,000 before the war, according to the report. More than 800,000 of the current 1.3 million residents are displaced people from elsewhere in Syria, one-third of whom live in camps or “collective shelters.”

In addition, the destruction wrought by fighting in northern Aleppo has meant the destruction and loss of key HLP documentation, stored in cadastral offices previously controlled by the regime. However, according to iMMAP, exact statistics on the scope of such losses are “difficult to ascertain.” And of course, wide swathes of properties and lands northern Aleppo had yet to undergo the delimitation process through the regime’s official Cadastral Affairs offices even before the war, meaning that tenure of such properties is weak should owners wish to transfer or prove their ownership.

The result is that this heavily populated corner of Syria – and one now home to a hundred of thousands of vulnerable displaced people – is embroiled in a complex web of potential and ongoing HLP rights issues.

Also notable is the violations reported by Kurdish residents from Afrin, an area in northern Aleppo governorate along the Turkish border. Previously, Afrin had been controlled by the People’s Defense Units (YPG), the Kurdish military force affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Turkish-backed groups seized Afrin in 2018, displacing nearly 150,000 people, many of whom were Kurds, according to the iMMAP report. The report notes numerous HLP violations since the invasion, including the destruction and looting of homes and seizures of private land, among others.

The report warned of a lack of durable solutions as population growth and poor economic and security conditions continue to mire northern Aleppo governorate.

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Indirect Damage from Bombardment Threatens Homes with Collapse in Idlib

15-02-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

Despite the looming dangers left by the indirect impact of the previous aerial bombardment on the populated areas, and consequently on the rights of housing, land, and property, this problem has not yet been seriously studied.

A two-storey house on the outskirts of Idlib city collapsed on February 09, killing three children and an adult. The house had previously faced indirect damage from a Russian airstrike, yet residents continued living in it as they had no housing alternatives.

Also in early February, a building collapsed on a farm raising cattle in the town of Mantaf. A month earlier, one person was killed when a ceiling fell on him in the city of Dana, while a child was killed in the town of Al-Jineh west of Aleppo when his family’s house collapsed. November 2020 saw one person killed after the roof of a house in the southern Idlib governorate town Jabal Al-Zawiyeh caved in. Only several days before then, a house collapsed in the Al-Ghab Plain area, killing five people.

All of these buildings had collapsed as a result of indirect damage from previous shelling on populated areas. Some Russian bombs, which are desinged to penetrate concrete fortifications, are among the biggest threats to structural safety due to their damage to the ground soil and floors. Some damages to the foundations of homes may be invisible, while the violent shaking wrought by bombs can also cause visibile damages such as cracks in the walls, supporting column or ceilings.

The scope of these indirect damages depend on the strength and proximity of the bombs. Sometimes these damages accumulate with repeated bombings on the same area, which may cause an affected building to collapse unexpectedly. Oftentimes, damages may not appear until a period of time has passed since the bombing. In all cases, an engineering study is needed in order to estimate the danger of such damages. Such studies may conclude that the walls or a damaged section of the home must be rebuilt or that the home be reconstructed altogether.

The line of contact between opposition and regime forces in the southern part of Idlib governorate is one of the areas most affected by indirect damage to homes. The area is rural, and many of the houses there are old, constructed of stone and mud. Newer homes in this part of Idlib governorate are largely informal and built without permits. Many of these houses were constructed without the supervision of engineers and without observing structural safety rules. They also often lack thermal and moisture insulation, leaving their foundations vulnerable to erosion and rust. These factors increase the risk of severe damage amid bombardment.

Still, many residents remain in their damaged homes despite knowing the risks, as they lack opportunities for alternative housing. Moving to a more structurally sound home means paying high rental costs, while the costs of renovation are prohibitively expensive for many families.

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Explained: Agricultural Reclamation and Private Property Infringement

15-02-2022/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

The Agrarian Land Reclamation Law has not received sufficient attention, despite its potentially serious implications for housing, land, and property rights. The law issued in 2012, which is concerned with agricultural lands, can be considered equivalent in terms of risks to the urban planning laws issued during the same period as Decree 66 of 2012 or Law 10 of 2018.

The Agricultural Land Reclamation Law, issued in Legislative Decree No. 29 of 2012, defined agricultural reclamation as a series of agricultural actions designed to prepare a given piece of land and make it suitable for irrigated cultivation, with the goal of increasing the agricultural production of the land and making it more attractive for economic investment.

Agricultural land reclamation occurs following a decree by the Minister of Irrigation, made in consultation with the Minister of Agriculture, and after gathering the opinions of the General Farmers’ Union and the executive office of the governorate where the farmland in question is located. The Minister of Irrigation’s decision includes a statement that the agricultural reclamation will serve a public benefit. However, the law does not stipulate that the landowners themselves must agree with the reclamation decree, nor does it give them the right to object to it. The law also fails to specify the authority to which the landowners may raise potential objections.

After the Minister of Irrigation issues a reclamation decree, a reclamation sign is placed in the land record of the property in question. The party tasked with the reclamation process then takes possession of that property. Under the 2012 law, a technical committee is then formed that lists the facilities and crops included in the property, identifies the property’s occupants, estimates the compensation required for depriving them of their agricultural investment, and finally, compensates them for the destruction of the property’s components. The law sets a one-year deadline for compensation.

After the initial procedures are completed for the reclamation process, the property is listed in the land record as land reclaimed for irrigation.

Furthermore, the costs of the reclamation process are paid by the owners or the beneficiary, according to Article 14 of the 2012 law. Rights holders are prohibited from undergoing any transfer of ownership for such properties before paying the costs of the reclamation process which is determined by the Prime Minister’s decree. Instead, a compulsory insurance sign is placed on the property’s land record barring disposal of the property. The sign is not removed until after the payment is made.

Subsequently, a body called the Distribution Committee distributes reclaimed properties to the rights holders, taking into account that it should return lands to the rights holders when possible, otherwise handing over neighbouring and similar properties when not possible. In the event that the properties are unavailable for distribution, the party in charge of the reclamation process makes a compensation payment to the rights holder within a three-month deadline. The compensation amount is calculated according to the “real” price of the land.

In this sense, the reclamation process has become a form of expropriation, forcibly depriving farmland owners of their right to ownership in exchange for financial compensation. However, unlike in expropriations carried out under the Expropriation Law, here owners whose lands are subject to reclamation are not given the opportunity to object.

Under the Agricultural Land Reclamation Law, beneficiaries may receive a maximum of 16 hectares of their land after the completion of the reclamation process. Any land in excess of these 16 hectares is considered state property registered in the state’s name within the land record. This measure is yet another violation of ownership rights, through state expropriation of “excess” land.

When the Distribution Committee issues its decisions, it includes the names of the rights holders, the surface area and numbers of the properties in question, the surface area of the land deducted from each rights holder, and the owners whose lands have been deducted free of charge.

The committee announces its distribution decision in the main governorate headquarters, as well as at the district level and at the concerned General Farmers’ Union and local administrative unit offices. This announcement is considered a personal notification. The objections to the distribution decision may field to the committee itself, making it both an adversary and arbitrator at the same time.

Afterwards, the distribution decision is sent to the General Directorate of Cadastral Affairs to amend its records accordingly and register the changes in the Land Record under new real estate zones and numbers.

Decree No. 29 of 2012 restricted an owner’s right to dispose of their reclaimed agricultural land, while specifying no timeline for lifting these restrictions. In addition, rights holders may not make any changes to the reclaimed lands or the facilities they contain, at risk of legal penalties including imprisonment, fines, or paying compensation for damages.

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Salvation Government Imposes Lease Contract Regulations

15-02-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

The Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), the political arm of Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) that administers much of the Idlib governorate, is attempting to address the issue of rising rent in areas under its control by imposing so-called “emergency solutions.”

The SSG issued Decree No. 121 on February 02 to adopt a group of measures that would not be applied retroactively. Under the new decree, lease contracts must be documented with the SSG’s Ministry of Justice, while courts may consider lease contracts documented by the notary public to be executive deeds. The decree also sets the lease term at one year before it may be renewed. Monthly rental payments must also be explicitly stated in the lease contract in either Turkish lira or US dollars, while the one-time commission fee paid to real estate brokers may not exceed half of one month’s rent. The February decree entitles lessors to evict tenants at the end of the lease term. If lease contracts are not properly documented, they may be settled through the court.

The SSG formed a real estate committee in November 2021 to undertake two tasks. First, it sets the real estate rental values according to the monthly income levels of residents, most of whom are displaced, including those who were forcibly displaced to Idlib from formerly opposition-controlled areas elsewhere in Syria. Second, it identifies solutions to the issue of documenting lease contracts. To this end, the committee met with a wide cross-section of tenants, lessors, and real estate brokers. While Decree No. 121 adopted the committee’s recommendations regarding lease contract documentation, it did not heed its recommendations for rental prices. Informed sources told The Syria Report that large property owners and some real estate investors close to the SSG were opposed to rental ceilings.

Opposition-held parts of northwestern Syria have been witnessing a major housing crisis since regime forces recaptured former opposition territory in northern Hama governorate and the southern parts of the Idlib governorate in 2018 and 2019. Hundreds of thousands of people were displaced during the military escalation to northern Idlib and neighbouring northern Aleppo governorate, where those without the means to rent houses now live in camps. Those who were financially able to do so rented homes in urban areas. Monthly rent for an 80-square-metre apartment in Idlib city is now about USD 100, while rent can be as high as USD 150 in Sarmada and Dana, towns close to the Bab Al-Hawa border crossing.

An ongoing currency crisis in opposition-held areas and the collapse of both the Turkish lira and the Syrian pound has caused issues between lessors and tenants. Many property owners have turned to raising rent, whether they are in TL or still in SYP, to suit the current exchange rate without any controls in place to protect tenants’ rights. To solve this problem, Decree No. 121 obliges both the lessor and the tenant to adopt a rental value mutually agreed upon, set in either USD or TL, for the year-long period of the lease contract. The adoption of a unified model for lease contracts, as well as their official documentation with the SSG’s Ministry of Justice, is useful in resolving contract-related disputes between lessors and tenants.

The head of the SSG met with the real estate committee at the end of 2021, stating afterwards that the SSG praised the assistance that international NGOs and civil society organisations had provided in handing over more than 9,200 housing units to residents in need. The housing units had been part of the SSG’s ongoing solution to the housing crisis, he added. He said that the SSG had tasked several technical committees with conducting studies to expand zoning plans and grant licences to establish new housing cooperatives and accommodate increasing demand for housing.

A correspondent for The Syria Report raised doubts over the SSG’s statement, pointing out that certain investors close to the SSG are not required to obtain construction permits and that their construction work has not halted in order to wait for the expansion of zoning plans. These privileged investors mainly include owners of urban expansion projects at the outer limits of Sarmada and Dana. For instance, New Sarmada City, a residential project on the outskirts of Sarmada in northern Idlib governorate, is located outside the town’s zoning plans. The project is being implemented by the Al-Raqi Construction Company, whose director is the former commander of HTS and previously held the position of “Emir of Aleppo.”

An photocopied image of Decree No. 121

 Source: Facebook of the Prime Minister’s Office of the Syrian Salvation Government

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Explained: Women’s Rights in Inheriting Amiri Lands

08-02-2022/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

The Law on Transfer of Immovable Amiri Properties, issued in 1928, sets provisions for transferring the possession of such properties to inheritors. Under this law, female and male inheritors are held in equal regard if they are of the same degree of kinship with the deceased, in contrast with inheritance rules as laid out in the Syrian Personal Status Law, which is based on Islamic Sharia principles.

Amiri lands are state property for which individuals are granted the right of disposal. Usually these properties are agricultural lands located outside the administrative boundaries of cities.

Equal distribution of Amiri lands between women and men contradicts neither Islamic law nor the Personal Status Law. That is because Amiri lands are subject to the rules of transfer of possession, meaning the transfer of the right of disposal for a property that is owned by the state rather than fully owned by an individual. Here the state distributes the inheritance to heirs of the deceased who had the right of usufruct of the Amiri land.

On the other hand, non-Amiri properties are distributed to heirs in accordance with the inheritance principles in Personal Status Law No. 59 of 1953, which in turn is based on Islamic Sharia law. Islamic inheritance in the Personal Status Law adheres to the general rule that “one man’s share is equal to two women’s shares,” while taking into account the specific terms for distribution of inheritance included in that same law.

Based on the Law on Transfer of Immovable Amiri Properties, the wife also receives a quarter of her husband’s estate if the couple have children, and half the estate if they do not. The same applies to a husband upon his wife’s death. The mother and father of a deceased may also receive one sixth of the estate.

Law No. 61 of 2004 amended some of the decrees on state distribution of certain lands. The new law gave the possessor, or usufructuary, of state-owned lands the right to finally own them, if the property had been entrusted to them as part of agrarian reform decrees or were private state property. However, properties that are still classified as Amiri lands still remain subject to the 1928 law.

The usufruct of lands that were distributed by the state–whether through agricultural reform programmes or from privately owned state property–transfers to a person’s inheritors after their death. Essentially, the properties specified in Law No. 61 of 2004 are now treated as property and are subject to the rules of legal inheritance. The result is that women have been deprived of their equal standing they once had with men under the 1928 law, in terms of receiving Amiri lands as inheritances from deceased family members.

In other special cases, when a piece of Amiri land falls within the administrative limits of a city, the legal description of the property changes automatically from Amiri to a regularly owned property, meaning that the legal inheritance provisions laid out in the Personal Status Law, rather than those in the 1928 law, apply.

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On Syrian-Turkish Border Strip, Aid Groups Replace Tents with Alternative Housing

08-02-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

Non-governmental organisations are coordinating with local councils in opposition-controlled areas of northwestern Syria to transport displacement camp residents to housing units newly constructed on state property or private property that was bought to serve as shelter.

In January, a group called Molham Team launched a fundraising campaign called “Until the Last Tent” aimed at moving 500 families from displacement camps scattered along the Syrian-Turkish border into alternative housing units. The organisation, which claims to aid displaced Syrian children and child refugees in dangerous areas, managed to raise USD 1 million in donations.

So far, Molham Team has transported 100 families whose tents were damaged in the recent winter storms to ready-made homes. The organisation says it expects to house additional families throughout February. The housing units are located just outside the city of Azaz, north of Aleppo; Molham Team supervised their construction, which was supported by financial donations.

There are more than one million displaced people in northwestern Syria, spread across approximately 1,300 camps, some of which were informally constructed. Work began in 2016 to build residential villages containing alternative housing for the displaced. Initially, such projects focused on widows, orphans and their families, but expanded after 2018 to target various other groups. The pace of construction has increased in recent years, as the residential villages become widespread.

According to Molham Team, the cost for a 55-square-metre, two-room housing unit is around USD 4,000. Molham Team has ownership of the land which it purchased using donated funds, and possesses a “green tabu” document proving ownership. It then converted the land into endowment properties. Syrian law classifies endowment properties as having a special nature: they are neither state nor individually owned properties, although most were originally owned and then donated by individuals. Endowment properties can include mosques, convents, schools, libraries, cemeteries, and shrines.

This classification means that residents may utilise the endowment without paying a fee or rent. However, residents may not sell or lease their housing units.

Other aid organisations have conducted campaigns similar to Molham Team’s, transporting displaced families from tent encampments to villages and housing complexes in Afrin, Jarablus, Azaz and Al-Rai in the rural part of the Aleppo governorate, as well as Deir Hassan, Atmeh and Harem in the rural part of the Idlib governorate. Displaced people need the new shelter after their tents were damaged and camps flooded by heavy rains. Construction continues in the new housing complexes along the border strip.

Asked about the ownership of the land on which alternative housing is constructed in similar projects, a local council source near Afrin explained to The Syria Report that the council usually provides the land on which aid organisations wish to build housing units. The land is typically state-owned property that the aid organisation may not obtain ownership of–that is, the local council is the actual owner of the land.

On ownership of the housing units themselves, the local council source said that residents have the usufruct right of the homes during the period of their residence. They are not entitled to own or bequeath the units. The local council is charged with supervising the transport of displaced families and distributing the units to them.

The same usually applies for other opposition-held areas in rural Aleppo governorate. In Idilb, which is mostly controlled by Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, a hardline Islamist group, the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG)-affiliated Directorate of Humanitarian Affairs and Displaced determines which land can be used for the housing unit complexes. These lands are generally also state-owned properties or endowment lands.

Residential village in Idlib

Source: The Syria Report

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Ghweiran: Homes and Shops Destroyed After ISIS Attack on Prison

08-02-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

Military clashes in recent days between the majority-Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and extremist Islamic State (IS) group in the northeastern city of Hassakeh led to the destruction and razing of homes and shops.

ISIS launched an attack on January 20 on the Al-Sinaa Prison in the Ghweiran neighbourhood in the southern part of Hassakeh city, where the SDF is holding thousands of ISIS prisoners. Subsequent fighting in and around the prison caused thousands of residents to flee the neighbourhood.

The battles hit Ghweiran as well as the nearby Al-Zuhour neighbourhood, the largest Arab-majority neighbourhood in Hassakeh. Helicopters and warplanes belonging to the international anti-ISIS coalition forces bombed houses where ISIS members were thought to be hiding. The SDF also combed the southern neighbourhoods of the city, where they destroyed and bulldozed a number of homes and businesses.

The SDF said in a press conference on January 31 that it had eradicated the last pockets of ISIS control in Al-Sinaa Prison. According to the SDF’s count, 121 SDF fighters, 374 ISIS fighters and seven civilians were killed in the fighting. Displaced residents were permitted to return to their neighbourhoods after the SDF finished its combing operations.

Most of the destroyed homes were an informally built residential neighbourhood near a cemetery and the Al-Sinaa Prison. Human rights sources told The Syria Report that more than 20 homes faced damage, some of them completely, in addition to a number of businesses, including a pharmacy.

One homeowner told The Syria Report that the SDF destroyed and then bulldozed his house and three surrounding homes on Al-Asfanj Street following suspicions that ISIS fighters who had escaped the prison were hiding in one of the homes as residents fled the area. The homeowner accused the SDF of destroying and razing homes as well as the surrounding area when it suspects ISIS members of hiding in them.

Another resident said that his house and the 12 houses surrounding it had been razed with heavy machinery after their owners had fled the neighbourhood. The resident said that there were no signs of bombing or ground fighting in the area where the houses had stood.

Ghweiran is among the largest and most densely populated neighbourhoods in Hassakeh, and sits to the city’s southeast. The neighbourhood is home to a number of vital government institutions and some faculties of Al-Furat University, as well as the Central Prison and Al-Sinaa Prison, which is a series of civilian buildings that the SDF converted into a prison for ISIS members.

Source: The Syria Report

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Changing the Evaluated Prices of Homes in Social Housing Projects

01-02-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

In January, the General Housing Establishment (GHE) issued newly evaluated housing values within social housing projects that are ready to be allocated in 2022. According to the GHE, the new values would help in achieving the social goals of the projects.

In a statement, the GHE said that a portion of the costs for infrastructure meant to serve social housing projects will not be collected from housing applicants within those projects, but rather from the accompanying investment plots, which are parcels of land usually allocated for commercial use. The GHE added that it had also unified the prices of some social housing projects and reduced the percentage of profits from 15 to 10 percent.

According to the GHE, the average value per square metre of a building that is 80 percent constructed and ready to use in a youth and savings housing project is SYP 596,385. The estimated value of one square metre in labour housing is SYP 480,000, with the exception of labour housing in Hama governorate, which is SYP 810,000 because it is fully clad and ready to use. The GHE said that its method for calculating the values of housing units in such projects is based on the total costs of each project in accordance with Legislative Decree No. 26 of 2015, which regulates the work of the GHE.

It is worth noting that in a statement, the GHE used the term “evaluated prices of housing” rather than the previously used “appraised values of housing.” However, it is difficult to determine the actual difference between the two. Law No. 8 of 2012, which concerns the profession of real estate experts and the conditions for practicing the profession, real estate evaluations means estimating the value of properties based on a comparison with market prices, while an appraisal sets the value of a property in accordance with the intention of the appraisal process and in compliance with certain criteria.

Changing these values, as the GHE has done, could directly impact the overall subscription, allocation, and handover processes for social housing projects. The GHE mandates that subscription for such housing only occurs after a prospective applicant makes a cash payment of no less than 10 percent the estimated value of a given housing unit. Before allocation of the housing unit they must pay 30 percent and pay off the remaining value in instalments over the next 25 years.

For example, the evaluated price of a 100-square-metre apartment in a youth housing project is now around SYP 60 million (in 2004, at the time of subscription, the value of that same apartment would have only been around SYP 1 million). In light of the newly announced values, the applicant must now pay SYP 18 million (30 percent of the new evaluated price of the apartment) in order to complete the allocation process then pay the remaining value over the next 25 years in instalments of more than SYP 140,000 per month before accounting for interest. Meanwhile, the current average monthly salary for an employee in Syria is around just SYP 150,000. This alone contradicts the conditions for housing subscription – that is, that the payment instalments may not exceed 30 percent of an applicant’s monthly income.

It is also worth noting that the GHE called on applicants in November 2021 to pay 50 percent of the value of their plots or equity shares within three months before being entitled to a housing allotment. This demand violates the principle that allocation occurs after the applicant pays 30 percent of the evaluated price of their desired housing unit.

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Explained: Is It Legal to Auction Off the Properties of ‘Terrorism’ Suspects?

01-02-2022/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

The Antiterrorism Court in Syria is an exceptional entity that contradicts the principles of fair trial, as reflected in the legality of its rulings, including confiscating the properties of those it convicts. Violations are also evident in how outside parties interact with the court’s rulings, for example: people purchasing the properties of convicted “terrorists” in public auctions.

The Antiterrorism Court is composed of officers rather than judges and does not provide any of the legal guarantees meant for the accused, such as the right to defence, representation by a lawyer, transparent procedures, and the right to a second hearing. The court also issues rulings with political motives.

Under Article 12 of Antiterrorism Law No. 19 of 2012, the Antiterrorism Court must confiscate the movable and immovable assets of all the people whom it convicts. After the conviction decision becomes final and is not subject to appeal, the court sends a letter to the Department of State Property, which then carries out the confiscation in one of two ways: by transferring ownership of the property and registering it with General Directorate of Cadastral Affairs under the name of the Syrian Arab Republic or by selling the property by public auction through the judiciary.

The public auction is run by the local Enforcement Department, which is headed by a judge from that region’s local Judicial Department, with the aim of settling the “debts” theoretically owed by the convicted party. These procedures begin with an invitation to a public auction session under the supervision of the enforcement judge. More than one person applies to attend the auction, with the property subsequently awarded to the highest bidder. Afterwards, the judge issues a decision to register the property in the name of the auction winner. Then the Enforcement Department sends a letter to the General Directorate of Cadastral Affairs to put together a contract ensuring the transfer of ownership and official registry of the property in the buyer’s name.

In principle at least, the procedures for carrying out these public auctions are legitimate, as they agree with the legal principles used when implementing judicial rulings. However, their legality is still up for debate, as they are the result of exceptional legal rulings from an arguably impartial court.

Rights Holders who are convicted before the Antiterrorism Court may, in theory, repeal this registration process with the General Directorate of Cadastral Affairs. For example, they may prove the bad intentions of the auction winner in order to invalidate registration of the confiscated property in the winning bidder’s name. According to the procedures for public auctions, the bidder must view the “enforcement bond,” that is, the ruling issued by the Antiterrorism Court. Thus, the buyer cannot claim that they acted in good faith or that they did not know the origin of the bond.

Article 13 of Cadastral Affairs Law No. 188 of 1926 (later amended in 2008) states that it is not permissible for someone to claim ownership of a certain property based on the records within the Land Registry if they know of any defect or reason that ownership right may be stripped from them. Article 14 of the same law also states that documentation within the Land Registry is illegitimate when done without the proper right. Whoever was harmed by the illegitimate transaction may directly claim its illegality against the third party, who in such cases acted in bad faith.

According to its Decree No. 292, issued on May 27, 1962, the Court of Cassation may not uphold the registry of a piece of real estate if it is aware of any legal flaws in the registration process. This principle applies to those who have purchased real estate through public auctions based on rulings from the Antiterrorism Court. In order to invalidate subsequent transfer of property ownership to the party who purchased it in bad faith, the claimant may file a case to terminate registration of the property. The same applies to properties that were confiscated after rulings by the Antiterrorism Court and registered in the name of the Syrian Arab Republic.

In light of the many provisions in place for expropriating Syrians’ properties for political reasons, and through illegal means, recovering such properties to rights holders could be included in a national program to return improperly confiscated or auctioned real estate.

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General Housing Establishment Begins Allocation to Applicants in Some Social Housing Programmes

01-02-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

Nearly two decades after launching a number of youth housing projects and four decades after launching savings housing projects, the General Housing Establishment (GHE) began on January 16 to allocate hundreds of housing units to applicants.

The units were spread out across social housing projects in four governorates: 2,080 youth housing units in the Dimas project in Rural Damascus, 633 youth housing and savings housing units in Aleppo, 160 youth and savings units in Homs, and 160 youth housing units in Quneitra.

Allocating housing to an applicant means concluding a contract between the applicant and the GHE that determines the obligations of both parties. The contract, which is registered by the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, includes the location and description of the housing unit. However, allocation does not mean that construction of the housing unit has been completed or that the date for handover is near. Rather, the contract serves as a title deed so long as the remaining financial obligations are met.

During the allocation process, applicants for housing check lists of names published by various branches of the GHE. If they find their names on the lists, they must bring their personal documents and a so-called housing “allocation book” to an “allocation session,” the date for which the GHE determines. During the session, the applicant may choose the location of the apartment they want. When part of the housing payment is made, the contract is then signed and officially registered by the Ministry of Public Works and Housing. Applicants are entitled to appoint someone to act on their behalf during these steps. Those who do not attend the allocation sessions receive whatever housing remains in a given project. Allocation is canceled for those who fail to complete these procedures within the specified deadline.

The GHE’s initial announcement for the launch of its various social housing programmes were usually accompanied by three main points of information: location, timeline for implementation, and the estimated cost of the resulting housing units. However, these three points are not legally binding as they are merely part of a preliminary announcement and are usually subject to change. Meanwhile, housing allocation contracts impose no timeframe or financial obligations on the GHE.

It remains unclear whether the GHE has ever fully implemented any social housing projects within the initially announced time frame. For example, subscription for youth housing in the New Dimas project has been completed since 2004 and units were planned to be handed over to applicants in 2016. Years after that target date, the GHE is only just now inviting applicants who have paid their dues to attend allocation sessions and participate in the allocation process. It must be clarified that once again the time period between allocation and handover of housing units has not yet been determined.

The Ministry of Public Works and Housing said in March 2021 that it would finish all ongoing social housing projects by the end of 2024. However, the director of the GHE reneged on that statement, saying in October 2021 that the body would finish allocation for all housing applicants by the end of 2024. That is, 2024 would see the completion of the allocation process rather than handover of completed housing units, meaning there remains no clear deadline for applicants to receive their homes.

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Winter Storms Bring Increased Suffering to Displaced People in Northwestern Syria

01-02-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

Heavy rain and snow storms this month brought increased misery to displaced Syrians living in camps scattered near the Syrian-Turkish border. 

More than a million displaced people live in 1,293 camps in the rural parts of the Aleppo and Idlib governorates under opposition control. Of those encampments, 282 were informally built on agricultural lands by camp residents themselves, each camp serving as temporary home to the forcibly displaced former residents of a given village or town in Syria or to large extended families. Such informal camps usually receive no aid from international organisations. 

The winter storms this January have brought damage to 266 camps, a source from a local NGO that monitors living conditions for displaced people in opposition areas told The Syria Report. Aid organisations working in the area were also unable to implement any of their usual camp improvements due to poor weather and storm damage, the source added. These organisations also lack funding to properly respond to the needs of displaced Syrians this winter. 

Most displaced people in northwestern Syria are unable to secure heating supplies, while most of the camps still need rain and thermal installation for the tents to mitigate the rain and cold weather. Children and the elderly are the most vulnerable to the low temperatures, heavy rain, and snow without heating. 

The most recent snow storm severely impacted camps located in the rugged, mountainous Afrin area in the northwestern part of the Aleppo governorate. The snow has cut off roads leading to many camps while collapsing hundreds of tents with their owners inside. Heavy rains have also flooded hundreds of tents in many of the informally built camps across rural parts of Idlib and Aleppo. 

The impact of the winter storms on some camps in Afrin prompted armed opposition factions, with the help of the Civil Defence, also known as the White Helmets, to organise an emergency relief campaign. Hundreds of displaced families were transported to temporary shelter in mosques and service centres, while roads were reopened to allow aid delivery. The campaign also aimed to bring people impacted by the cold to safe places, provide heating and ready-made meals, replace destroyed tents and hand out winter clothing, especially for children. A number of people in local villages and towns also launched their own initiatives to host families impacted by the storm. 

However, the response of international and local organisations, as well as armed militias and grassroots initiatives, remained limited as more than a million displaced people were impacted by this winter’s storms and low temperatures. Indeed, this year’s crisis is one that repeats nearly every year, alongside a increasingly limited aid response that fails to find sustainable solutions. 

Source: The Syria Report

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-02-01 17:15:092022-02-01 17:15:09Winter Storms Bring Increased Suffering to Displaced People in Northwestern Syria

Damascus Removes Commercial Kiosks: Could the City Soon Increase Licence Fees?

25-01-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

Early in January 2022, the Damascus governorate began removing most of the portable commercial kiosks that had been set up on public property, given that the kiosks’ licencing period had ended last year. The governorate exempted kiosks owned by wounded regime veterans and family members of “martyrs.”

The Damascus governorate began distributing warnings in late 2021 informing kiosk owners that they must clear out and remove their portable shops, as per a circular issued by the Minister of Local Administration on December 19. The circular was based on the ministry’s previous Circular No. 347 of 2019, which granted licences to existing kiosks for a period of no more than three years, ending at the beginning of 2022. Kiosks owned by wounded regime soldiers and family members of “martyrs” were granted an additional one-year occupancy period, so long as the licence holders pledged not to demand renewal.

Removing the kiosks means demanding that owners permanently dismantle them and either move them outside Damascus or sell them to others who do have licences. This is because ownership of the kiosks belongs to the owners themselves, rather than to the Damascus governorate. The governorate’s role is simply to grant licences for the kiosks that will then occupy certain sidewalks and public spaces in return for an annual fee.

Until the end of 2021, there were around 500 such kiosks in the city of Damascus, divided into two categories according to the type of licence they had obtained:

“Support kiosks,” which had been granted to people with special needs and whose licences were previously not subject to any time limits. These are the category of kiosks that the Damascus governorate has now begun to remove. Usually, the licence for these kiosks ended with the death of the licence holder and could not be inherited. The licences for “support kiosks” were often granted to people who had collaborated with the security forces, with some kiosk owners tasked with certain security duties. In 2019, the Ministry of Local Administration decided to end licencing for this type of kiosk and forbade local administrative units from granting new licences of the kind. The ministry also informed owners of a three-year deadline to remove their kiosks. There are 300 of these “support kiosks” in Damascus city.

The second category is called “kiosks for wounded veterans or martyrs’ families.” These were granted over the past decade to some family members of regime soldiers or pro-regime militia members who had been killed at war and to some injured soldiers. There are around 200 of these kiosks in Damascus and were granted an additional one-year licence period, set to conclude at the end of 2022.

The Damascus governorate issued a booklet in 2017 that detailed the specifications that kiosks must meet in order to operate and the locations in which they are authorised to set up. The price of the new kiosk’s structure, which conforms to the specifications, amounted to SYP 1.5 million at the time.

Then in 2019, the Damascus governorate determined the criteria for granting licences for the second category of kiosks. Wounded beneficiaries must have a disability rate of 70 to 100 percent, according to government criteria. Meanwhile, for family members of killed soldiers, beneficiaries must not be employees or recipients of any other government support programmes. Licences for the kiosks would only be granted to Damascus city residents.

Neither the Ministry of Local Administration nor the Damascus governorate clarified whether there would be alternatives provided for the kiosks removed in 2022. However, there does seem to be a new plan to licence the kiosks at higher prices in the future, which is likely given the recent increases in the fees for occupying public property.

Article 16 of the Financial Law of Administrative Units No. 37 of 2021 states that occupancy of public properties, such as roads, sidewalks, squares, and parking lots, requires a licence granted by the local administrative unit’s executive office. This licence, which the grantee may not hand over to others, determines the surface area permitted for the occupancy, as well as the length and type of occupancy. Though the 2021 law did not mention kiosks by name, it set the fee for the occupancy of public spaces at SYP 100-3,000 per square metre daily. The fee would be collected in advance every three months or for the entirety of the occupancy period – whichever is less. The maximum annual fee for a four-square-metre kiosk in Damascus would be around SYP4.32 million, meaning that the Damascus governorate could collect at most SYP 2 billion from the 500 local kiosks annually.

The 2021 law also imposes a fine of SYP 10,000-50,000 on anyone who occupies a public space without a licence. The administrative unit’s executive office has the power to cancel licences, provided that the occupant is given no more than one month’s notice to vacate the property. The occupancy fee would still be in effect for this period.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-01-25 15:11:552022-01-25 15:44:47Damascus Removes Commercial Kiosks: Could the City Soon Increase Licence Fees?

Violations Against Residents in Afrin’s Al-Sheikh Hadid District as Complainants Face Threats

25-01-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

A newly formed committee is examining accusations of violations committed by the Sultan Suleiman Shah Division of the Syrian National Army against residents of the Al-Sheikh Hadid district of Afrin, an area in the western part of Aleppo governorate. Some of the opposition groups in control of Afrin had agreed to form the committee, including the “Azzam” Unified Operations Room and the Revolutionaries Movement with which the Sultan Suleiman Shah Division is affiliated.

Turkish-backed Syrian opposition forces seized the Afrin region from the majority-Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in 2018 as part of the so-called Olive Branch military operation, after which the Sultan Suleiman Shah Division was stationed in Al-Sheikh Hadid. The group’s commander, Muhammad Al-Jassem, nicknamed Abu Amsha, made the district into his own area of influence, banning other military factions and civilians from entering without permission and monitoring the area via his security apparatus.

In addition, Al-Jassem’s faction forced the original Kurdish residents of the area to pay rent for their homes, even those that they owned. Everyone who had been newly displaced to the area were also compelled to pay rent, mostly for homes that belonged to Kurdish families that fled during the 2018 military incursion. The Sultan Suleiman Division claims that rent collection is meant to protect residents. People displaced from Al-Sheikh Hadid must also pay the faction if they wish to return to their homes.

All olive mill owners must also pay the faction up to USD 10,000 in order to restart their factories, while anyone who owns more than 200 olive trees in the area must pay the faction a USD 500 tax. Civilians have also complained that the faction confiscated 25 percent of their olive oil production. This complaint was only confirmed when the committee reviewed local olive mill records, according to a correspondent for The Syria Report.

The committee returned 4,800 litres of the confiscated olive oil to its owners, yet the faction’s security office came back and seized the oil once again, publicly beating the owners. The violation was captured in photos and videos in the committee’s possession, one committee member told The Syria Report.

Through local mosques, the committee called for anyone with complaints to come forward. Later, committee members found that those who did come forward to be interviewed by the committee or present their complaints faced death threats and detainment from the Sultan Suleiman Shah Division. According to the correspondent, the faction also forced the mukhtar of Al-Sheikh Hadid to record an audio message calling on residents, especially Kurds, to cease their complaints. The message also claimed that the taxes were imposed only on residents loyal to the YPG and were meant to provide public services.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-01-25 15:10:122022-01-25 15:10:12Violations Against Residents in Afrin’s Al-Sheikh Hadid District as Complainants Face Threats
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Read also

  • A New Classification for Housing Cooperatives: Between Project Completion, Dissolution and Liquidation
  • Decree No. 66 of 2012: Objections and Judicial Proceedings Following the Reparation Package
  • Reconstruction Through Reduced Engineers’ Fees: Engineering Fee Exemptions Fall Short of Enabling Displaced People to Return to Their Areas
  • Rising Rents in Damascus and Its Nearby Suburbs: Demand Pressure and Limited Supply
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