Visit The Syria Report Subscribe to our mailing list
EN ع
  • Twitter
Syria Report
  • Green Tabu
    • Issues
    • Updates
    • Analysis
    • Policy Briefs
    • Interviews
  • Archive
    • All articles
    • News
    • Analysis & Features
    • Reports & Papers
    • Regulations
    • Directory
  • Search
  • Menu Menu
Home1 / english2

Posts

Explained: The Department of Land Registry in Afrin

17-05-2022/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

Opposition authorities established their Department of Cadastral Affairs in 2018 in the Afrin region of the Aleppo governorate’s northern countryside. The legal office  of the opposition-run Afrin Local Council supervises the Department of Cadastral Affairs, while the more than 30 department employees receive their salaries from the Turkish government, as do employees of other local councils in opposition-held rural Aleppo.

Historically, Afrin, which hosts a majority Kurdish population, never had its own Department of Cadastral Affairs, unlike other areas of the Aleppo governorate. Instead, real estate registries in Afrin were performed in the Directorate of Cadastral Affairs in Aleppo city. In 2009, the Directorate of Cadastral Affairs opened a subsidiary office in Afrin, though the office’s role was limited to merely documenting transactions and contracts and sending them to the Aleppo headquarters.

The lack of any Department of Cadastral Affairs in Afrin caused delays in the delimitation and census process for properties there, which also delayed the process of zoning large parcels of land in Afrin. In addition, a security circular from the 1970s historically prevented owners of lands within 15 kilometres of the border from disposing of their properties without prior security approval. Furthermore, the delays of subdividing lands in the area has also meant that large portions of real estate remain classified as jointly-owned common properties. All of this has pushed residents of Afrin to conduct real estate transactions informally, without documenting them in the Land Registry.

In 2012-2018, the majority-Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) took control of Afrin, which subsequently came under the authority of the Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria (AANES). This authority established a real estate registry division, subdivided many common properties to owners, organised new real estate transactions, and documented old transactions.

However, during that same period, Afrin witnessed rapid urban expansion, most of which was building violations and the influx of displaced Syrians from elsewhere in the country. The AANES-run real estate registry division recorded around 20,000 new apartment sales in Afrin during this period, though the sales went unregistered in the regime-run Directorate of Cadastral Affairs in Aleppo city. In effect, there is no formal documentation of those 20,000 apartment sales except through sales contracts approved by the AANES courts.

In 2018, when Turkish-backed opposition factions seized the Afrin region during Operation Olive Branch, many local residents, the majority of whom were Kurdish, were displaced. The military operation was accompanied by a slew of housing, land, and property rights violations. Meanwhile, the over 100,000 people who had been forcibly displaced from their homes in rural Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo arrived in Afrin; many took up residence in homes belonging to displaced Kurds.

Since then, the opposition in Afrin has struggled to address real estate issues for three main reasons. First, the pre-2011 real estate database for Afrin is available only at the regime-run Directorate of Cadastral Affairs in Aleppo city. Second, the AANES left behind many real estate documents, though most of them are for building violations. Third, Afrin witnessed rapid urban expansion, most of it containing building violations, after the opposition took control, and particularly since 2021.

In 2019, Afrin’s opposition-run Department of Cadastral Affairs established a surveying office, which in turn began to build a database of real estate properties, owners, and occupants. The office conducted a survey of Afrin city and is now completing another survey of the surrounding countryside. As part of the process, the office is assigning a number to each street and property, with the aim of tallying local properties and documenting occupants and their addresses.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-05-17 16:20:452023-11-14 09:00:09Explained: The Department of Land Registry in Afrin

Relinquishment of Inheritance Violates HLP Rights for Women

17-05-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

The relinquishment of inheritance involves an agreement between heirs before a Sharia judge in which one or more of them gives up their share in exchange for compensation. The rules for real estate contracts apply to the relinquishment of inheritance, which must be done with the consent of all parties involved. In many cases, however, women are coerced into relinquishing their inheritance due to customary, familial, and marital pressures, causing violations of their housing, land, and property rights.

Nawal, a 65-year-old retired schoolteacher from the Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp in Damascus, was displaced by the war and has been living in the Rural Damascus governorate since 2012. Nawal’s father owned an apartment in the Mazzeh district of Damascus, which was passed down to his children upon his death in 1990. Facing pressure from her family, Nawal relinquished her share of the inheritance to her brothers in exchange for SYP 1.5 million, which would be paid to her in installments over the next 20 years.

The value of that apartment today has increased to SYP 400 million, which brings Nawal’s brothers a sizable monthly income through tenants, she tells The Syria Report. Meanwhile, Nawal lives in a small apartment in Rural Damascus and finds it difficult to afford both rent and the rising cost of living with her retirement pension, which is her sole source of income. She feels that her agreement to relinquish her inheritance should have come with a guarantee that she be compensated with a percentage of the rental payments that her brothers currently receive from their tenants.

Nawal’s story is not an isolated one. In some cases, male heirs may take advantage of relinquishment of inheritance agreements and sideline their sisters from inheritance agreements without any compensation.

Nadia, a widow in her 40s who does not have children, tells The Syria Report that she was pressured by her family to lie before the Sharia judge that she had received financial compensation for relinquishing her part of the real estate inheritance.

Before the agreement, Nadia’s part of the inheritance had been 200 shares of a large real estate property in the Al-Zahireh district of Damascus. In 2019, her brothers agreed among themselves to sell the property that their father had passed down to them so that they could pay the fees excusing their young male children (residing outside Syria and who are wanted for military service) from mandatory military service.

They sold the property in 2021, with Nadia’s share valued at around SYP 100 million, but refused to give Nadia her rightful share of the money, claiming that her work in the clothing trade made her financially self-sufficient. Nadia, however, says she remains convinced that the real reason they never paid her is that her brothers believe male heirs are more entitled to the inheritance than she is as a widow with no children.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-05-17 16:15:532022-05-17 16:15:53Relinquishment of Inheritance Violates HLP Rights for Women

Building Violations on the Rise in Afrin City

11-05-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

Building violations have increased in the western Aleppo city of Afrin since 2021, amid the local council’s inability to combat the trend and as the real estate market remains at the behest of real estate contractors linked to armed opposition factions. The rise in building violations appears to be a result of increased demand for housing in a part of Syria that has become the destination for many forcibly displaced people.

The building violations refers to any construction on public property or without a license on private property, or outside the area specified within a zoning plan. It may also be any construction that violates structural safety norms.

Afrin has witnessed widespread illegal construction since 2021, especially in Sharaa Al-Faylat, the city’s newest and largest neighbourhood. The most common violations are when building owners and contractors coordinate to build additional storeys. Those additional storeys also constructed on the roofs of buildings that had been extorted by opposition factions, under the pretext that the owners of these buildings had belonged to the majority-Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG).

Turkish-backed opposition factions took control of the Afrin region in 2018 during Operation Olive Branch. The campaign displaced many of the area’s original residents, most of whom are Kurds. Gross violations of housing, land and property rights ensued.

According to a source close to the Afrin Local Council, both Arab and Kurdish construction contractors involved in the recent spate of building violations have ties to opposition factions and share profits with them. The contractors also have good relations with the Afrin Local Council, which is in turn affiliated with the opposition. The contractors have become so powerful that nobody can obstruct their violations, the source said.

The construction violations extend to other areas of the city as well, such as the Afrin River Belt, where construction is banned under the city’s old zoning plans. Building violations have also sprung up in the Afrin-Azaz Highway area, which is outside the zoning plans for Afrin city. Informal housing has meanwhile appeared in Hay Al-Boubana and the Been Al-Jisreen area.

The source added that the local council’s police force can organise a control against a contractor if someone lodges a complaint against him. The police then send the control to the local council legal office, which in turn sends it to the court. These procedures take a significant amount of time, during which time a contractor can finish building the additional storeys, or even an entire building. For this reason, the court usually only ends up punishing the contractors financially through fines, while the building violation remains in place.

Even when a court order is issued to remove the building violation, it is difficult to implement amid a lack of centralised authority in opposition-controlled territory, and a general failure to adopt clear laws for such removal. Even in areas of Syria that are under regime control, where the provisions of Law No. 40 for 2012 for removing building violations apply, actual implementation of the law is subject to regional and local concerns. In many cases, bribery and corruption by municipal council employees prevent implementation. Law No. 40 imposes a penalty of up to three years imprisonment for constructing storeys above the predetermined limit, and stipulates that the illegally constructed storeys be demolished.

To grant a construction permit, the Afrin Local Council requires applicants to submit documents proving their ownership of the property, the cadastral plan, and an engineering study by the Chamber of Engineers,as well as a payment of 300 Turkish liras to cover municipal and engineering fees. However, many original title deeds have been lost or damaged and many residents have been displaced from the area, hindering the issuance of new construction permits. This in turn causes an increase in building violations without the proper permits. Facing this dilemma, the Afrin Local Council recently began accepting urgent sales contracts and declarations before the judiciary or through power of attorney, similar to the process that has been adopted across Afrin for documenting real estate sales.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-05-11 06:58:432022-05-11 12:09:56Building Violations on the Rise in Afrin City

Explained: How Pro Forma Marital Status Decisions Affect Syrian Women

11-05-2022/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

In Syria, pro forma marital status decisions, which are reflected on marriage documents, can have negative impacts on married women’s housing, land, and property rights.

For example, in the case of an unregistered marriage, known as customary marriage, the couple agrees between themselves on a dowry that the husband owes the wife. If the couple wishes to legally register their marriage in a court, they will declare a dowry that is less than what they previously agreed upon as a way to avoid paying higher fees. As a result, the dowry as agreed upon in the customary marriage contract is the true dowry, while the dowry recorded by the court exists only on paper.

In the event of divorce, this legal discrepancy can harm the rights of the wife. Therefore, the law allows her to claim the dowry is only pro forma and to prove the actual dowry amount in accordance with Article 54/5 of Personal Status Law No. 4 of 2019. Under this law, a woman can use all methods of proof, including witnesses to the customary marriage, to prove that the legally registered dowry was merely pro forma and that her actual dowry, which she and her husband agreed upon outside the court, was a different amount.

Any other legal acts between spouses can also be pro forma. For example, a wife may relinquish a real estate property that she owns to her husband through a pro forma sales contract without receiving any payment. In this case, the wife is entitled to prove that the sales contract was pro forma, according to precedents from the Court of Cassation, including Decision No. 173 of 1975. In this decision, the court stated that the marital relationship prevents obtaining written evidence proving that a given legal act was pro forma. Instead, and in a divergence from the general rules, the wife may rely on testimonies from witnesses and other evidence.

In other words, Syrian law views the marital relationship as an obstacle to writing sales contracts between spouses which would record certain rights  for the wife in particular. Article 57 of the Evidence Law of 1947 stipulated that the marital relationship prevents couples from obtaining written evidence for certain legal acts that require proof, such as proof of ownership via a written deed. This measure was reaffirmed by the Court of Cassation in its Decision No. 1112 of 1997.

A wife may also prove that a sales contract that she previously made with her husband was pro forma, even if the husband had registered the sold real estate in his name in the Land Registry. In such cases, the wife may submit a claim to cancel that registration based on the fact that the transfer of ownership had been pro forma. This right is confirmed in the Court of Cassation’s jurisprudence in Decision No. 3439 of 2001, which states that people may use personal evidence (i.e. witness testimonies) against a Land Registry entry if there is an objection.

There is no statute of limitations for cases of pro forma legal actions by a wife in favour of her husband, so long as an objection exists, according to Court of Cassation Decision No. 832 of 1980. This decision stated that an objection halts the statute of limitations.

In this case, Syrian law and jurisprudence grant married women some special legal guarantees enabling them to preserve their financial and real estate rights.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-05-11 06:53:452022-05-11 10:40:57Explained: How Pro Forma Marital Status Decisions Affect Syrian Women

Property Extortion Targets Opponents of Syrian Regime

11-05-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

Since a wide-scale campaign of arrests in 2013 and the mass displacement of political dissidents outside Syria, some regime security and military services have begun extorting detainees’ and refugees’ unattended properties. What sets many of these properties apart is that they were not subject to seizure orders issued by the Anti-Terrorism Court. Rather, they were simply extorted after their owners fled elsewhere or were arrested.

Such property seizures are commonly referred to as “istilaa,” but the Civil Code defines “istilaa” as taking possession of something that has no owner. Furthermore, “istilaa” can become one of the reasons for someone gaining ownership, if that was their intention. In short, “istilaa” is a seizure that occurs when the property in question has no owner, and is therefore not understood to constitute a crime.

Meanwhile, the Criminal Code defines property extortion (or “ghasab” in Arabic) as taking possession of another person’s property without their consent, without a legal ownership deed or without a valid reason.

Sometimes that extortion is systematic, such as when security apparatus’ seize specific homes in a certain area then distribute those homes to pre-selected people. In other instances, extortion appears to be random, as military and security personnel act on their own to seize properties.

Abou Safi, who now works as a senior economic advisor, previously formed a pro-regime militia that fought against opposition forces in East Ghouta. In 2013, one security apparatus deemed Abou Safi’s house, which was located in a Damascus suburb, to be unsafe, so they gave him a luxurious home near the headquarters of one security apparatus in Damascus. That new home had been extorted in 2012, but it was unclear whether the original owners had been detained or were living as refugees outside Syria. The property had not been subject to either executive or precautionary seizures, sources told The Syria Report.

Another man, Abou Mohammad, is a volunteer in the regime’s security services. He also led a pro-regime militia, though his original job was as a driver to escort “guests from outside the country,” that is, members of pro-regime Lebanese and Iraqi militias. Abou Mohammad, who is an Alawite from Homs, does not own his house. Rather, he lives in a home that the Airforce Intelligence extorted in a residential complex in a Damascus suburb.

These extortions appear not to be purely chaotic, but rather adhere to the security and military apparatus’ special set of criteria. For example, one security agency officer told a correspondent for The Syria Report that extortions do not usually occur in areas known to support the opposition, as it wouldn’t be safe for the new, pro-regime, residents of extorted homes to live in these areas. Rather, houses are often chosen for extortion in politically mixed areas such as Mazzeh and Baghdad Street in Damascus, as well as Qudsaya and Dhahiyat Al-Assad in the Damascus suburbs.

Sometimes, however, the extortions do appear less organised, such as when security and military personnel take advantage of their positions and sow fear by seizing properties for themselves. One real estate office owner, Abou Ali, told the correspondent for The Syria Report that the flat he currently has on the market won’t sell for a decent price because of its location one storey above a flat that was extorted by a member of the pro-regime National Defence Forces (NDF) militia. The militia member has a motorcycle, is rowdy, and often frightens those around him, Abou Ali said. The extorted flat is large, with a surface area of more than 200 square metres and a private garden. It costs no less than SYP 400 million, by Abou Ali’s estimate. The flat’s original owner is reportedly a man from Idlib who fled the area after that member of the NDF accused him of being a member of the Islamic State (ISIS). According to Abou Ali, who is originally from the Syrian coast, the original owner was not, in fact, an ISIS member, but instead was simply a religious person and now lives in the Gulf.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-05-11 06:43:592022-05-11 10:40:11Property Extortion Targets Opponents of Syrian Regime

Ministry Rejects Zoning Plan for Tartous Seafront

03-05-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

A five decade-old problem reemerged in April when Syria’s Ministry of Public Works and Housing rejected a zoning study, proposed by Tishreen University, concerning the eastern seafront of Tartous.

The corniche, or seafront, in Tartous is around 1,400 metres long and between 30 and 130 metres wide. It is currently occupied by old, worn-down homes and shops whose owners have been denied permits to construct or renovate since 1976.

Troubles on the Tartous seafront date back to 1976 when the Minister of Housing issued Circular No. 3230 which halted any new construction permits in the area before a new tourism zoning plan in the area was issued. By 1988, a zoning plan was issued for the city which stipulated that the surface area per construction plot on the seafront be at minimum 2,000 square metres. Rights holders considered this rule to be a violation of their seafront properties, as the area is home to many small properties of no more than 100 square metres. The issue continued in 2006, when an updated zoning plan was issued for the seafront that included only 27 organisational plots, each of which had a minimum area of 900 square metres.

Then, in 2018, the Tartous City Council contracted Tishreen University in Lattakia to prepare a zoning study. The university released its study the next year, increasing the number of organisational plots on the seafront to 80 and lowering the minimum surface area for each plot to 250 square metres on the condition that each plot contains up to five properties with dozens of owners, occupants, heirs, and tenants.

The Tartous City Council adopted the study via Decision No. 102 of October 2019, afterwards referring it via Letter No. 7135 of December 2019 to the city council-affiliated Regional Technical Committee for further examination. It is unclear whether the committee actually approved the study, but in July 2020, it did record objections from representatives of the Ministry of Public Works and Housing. According to these representatives, the study “adopted social and real estate reasoning regardless of the architectural harmony between the construction blocks resulting from the city and the surrounding empty spaces.” The ministry representatives also criticised the “mixed usage of single construction blocks without any conditions.”

From the series of subsequent correspondences between Tishreen University, the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, and the Regional Technical Committee, it appears that the university did not heed the contractual conditions of the study to review the amendments requested by the ministry’s representatives. Thus, in April, the minister decided to reject the study, instead requesting either that it be amended in accordance with previous comments or that a new study be conducted altogether. This new study would have to include technical, legal, and planning controls that take into account the local, regional, and national importance of the seaside project. The ministry also resolved that, as a third option, an expanded technical committee of zoning experts be formed to propose appropriate alternative solutions.

It is unclear why exactly the study was not approved, though it appears that the Ministry of Public Works and Housing aims to exclude the Tartous City Council and Tishreen University from waterfront zoning plans. Indeed, there is a separate contract between the Regional Planning Council and the Ministry of Public Works and Housing-affiliated General Company for Engineering Studies (GCES) to conduct studies in the coastal region. In October 2020, the ministry sent a letter to the Regional Planning Council to refer the proposed zoning study for the Tartous seafront to the GCES. This was done in accordance with Urban Planning Law No. 5 of 1982 and its amendments, which restrict the process of issuing new zoning plans to the purview of the Ministry of Public Works and Housing.

The Assistant Minister of Housing told the semi-official newspaper Al-Watan in March that the seafront zoning study had solved the issue of the small property owners. However, she added, the study raised new issues for large property owners by dividing their real estate into smaller properties. The zone would need a large real estate company to gather the small property owners and distribute their shares back to them, as happened in Marota City, she said.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-05-03 15:15:512022-05-03 15:15:51Ministry Rejects Zoning Plan for Tartous Seafront

Unexploded Ordnance Threatens HLP Rights in Opposition-Held Territory

03-05-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

War remnants, including landmines and unexploded ordnance, pose significant risk to residents of opposition areas of Northwest Syria, limiting access to housing, land and property rights. Many people are afraid to work on their farmland or live in homes that were hit by cluster munitions.

Since the start of 2021, the Syrian Civil Defence, also known as the White Helmets, have responded to 20 explosions caused by war remnants. The explosions killed a total of 15 people, among them eight children. Civil Defence bomb squads have recorded 60 different types of ordnance that could not immediately be detnoted, including 11 types of internationally banned cluster munitions that regime and Russian forces used extensively in civilian areas.

Two children were critically injured this past February when an unidentified object exploded in a wheatfield in the western Idlib government town of Adwan. A young girl was also injured after a cluster bomb exploded in the backyard of an apartment building, located in the western neighbourhood of Darkoush, where her family lived. Some residents of the building prohibited their children from playing outside, while one family decided to move away from the neighbourhood altogether.

Cluster munitions pose the greatest danger of any other bombs to local residents, as they were heavily used over large swathes of land during periods of bombardment and had a low rate of immediate detonation upon hitting the ground.

Some opposition factions left unexploded ordnance at military sites they had vacated, or in areas where they had previously fought, posing further threat to residents’ safety. Most notable are locally made mortars, landmines, and hand grenades. Some of these unexploded ordnance were also left behind in agricultural fields that had been used as artillery positions.

Unexploded ordnance remain spread across much of opposition-held Northwest Syria, especially in areas that witnessed heavy bombing, such as Sahel Al-Ghab, Jisr Al-Shughour, and east of Idlib city, namely Sarmin, Binnish, Taftanaz, Jabal Al-Zawiyah.

Sami Al-Muhammad, coordinator for the Syria Civil Defense unexploded ordinance programme, told The Syria Report that Civil Defence bomb squads conducted more than 600 surveys in 2021, in which they identified 400 danger zones and disposed of around 23,000 explosives of various kinds. Among those explosives were 21,000 cluster bombs.

Unexploded ordnance nevertheless remains scattered among civilian homes, agricultural fields, and playgrounds, and will remain potentially explosive for decades. Removing these explosives helps to support and revitalise communities, as well as empower displaced people to return to their homes, use playgrounds, work farmlands, and safely attend schools.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-05-03 15:09:202022-05-03 15:09:20Unexploded Ordnance Threatens HLP Rights in Opposition-Held Territory

Bribery Facilitates Building Violations in Syria’s Zoned Areas

03-05-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

Building violations – which include buildings constructed on public property or on land that has been expropriated for state-use, violations of relevant zoning plans, or buildings that does not adhere to safety codes – occur through two main channels. Often, they occur  when builders bribe municipal council members and employees to overlook construction code breaches within organised zones in government-held territory. Other times, construction violations occur when the violator is a government official or security or military commander who weilds influence. It is difficult to remove buildings that have been constructed illegally, either due to the impunity of those involved or to employees tampering with the relevant official documents. In some cases, such buildings are demolished for undisclosed reasons.

Since 1960, Syrian authorities have issued four laws to remove so-called illegally constructed buildings, the most recent of which is Legislative Decree No. 40 of 2012. This law stipulates the demolition of such buildings that were constructed after it was issued, while previously constructed buildings that violate construction codes may remain in place and attain legal status. The authorities carry out organised demolition campaigns from time to time, usually targeting buildings that were constructed by ordinary Syrians who could not afford to pay bribes.

There are many different forms of construction that violate the law. Generally, it is nearly impossible to build within zoned land without paying bribes to municipal council employees.

Sanaa is a mother from the Rural Damascus governorate whose husband, a military intelligence officer, was killed during the war. After his death, she and her children moved to an apartment in a residential area affiliated with a government social housing programme in Rural Damascus. Sanaa decided to expand the small apartment by building a 70-square-metre addition that protruded into a public road.

Through acquaintances, Sanaa was able to reach an employee in her community’s municipality, a man described as a “key,” that is, a middleman who facilitates bribes for influential municipal authorities. This employee demanded SYP 8 million as a bribe after inspecting Sanaa’s apartment and the location of her planned addition. He explained to Sanaa that there are varying degrees of building violations, and that the bribes and the recipients vary according to these degrees. For example, if the “violations” consisted only of iron columns, false ceilings, and glass facades suitable for a commercial store, then the cost of the bribe would be much lower. Sanaa agreed to pay the bribe, subsequently built her addition on the public road, and currently leases out the space as a separate apartment.

Muhammad, an employee at a municpial headquarters in a major Rural Damascus city, told The Syria Report that the municipality witnessed a surge in construction code violations during the term of its former mayor, who was recently dismissed due to corruption. Previously, Muhammad had received a commission for his role as the middleman between the head of the municipality’s demolitions committee and members of the community who had committed construction code violations. To avoid the risk of complaints about these violations, employees resorted to concealing official documents, submitting false demolition orders, and, in some cases, denying that they had witnessed any violation take place, according to Muhammad.

On the other hand, high-status officials do not resort to paying bribes in order to protect buildings they may have constructed against the law. Instead, the influence of their public positions protects them. For example, one criminal security officer in a Rural Damascus suburb illegally constructed a building over 100 square metres of public property, taking advantage of his position to do so. The mayor of that suburb ignored the officer’s violation, telling others in the municipality that he could not prevent the officer from carrying out such acts even if someone submitted an official complaint to the governorate, an eyewitness told The Syria Report.

However, and rather unusually, a high-ranking government official who resided in that same suburb submitted a complaint about the violation directly to the Presidential Palace. Despite having made the complaint, this high-ranking official was not actually affected by the criminal security officer’s violation. It remains unclear why he submitted the complaint, though it may have simply boiled down to a personal dispute.

Immediately following the complaint, the municipality’s demolition committee, escorted by a police patrol, arrived on the scene to remove the building. The governor of Rural Damascus personally followed up on the demolition, accompanying the local mayor to the municipal hall to contact the Presidential Palace and confirm that the violation had been removed.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-05-03 15:01:142022-06-17 11:59:30Bribery Facilitates Building Violations in Syria’s Zoned Areas

Explained: Delimitation and Census

03-05-2022/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

Syria’s system of delimitation and census, as outlined in Decree No. 186 of 1926, remains in force for surveying zones that have not yet been entered into the Land Registry. As a part of the process, a land record is established for the properties located within a specified zone, with each property assigned a number and entered into the Land Registry under the names of the owners.

Many parts of the delimitation and census process pose the risk of property rights violations, as many real estate owners have been displaced either within Syria or abroad, while others have been forcibly disappeared or imprisoned.

Steps to delimitation and census

First, a real estate judge sets a date for the start of the implementation process for delimitation and census in a certain area of their governorate. This decision must be published in the Official Gazette at least two months before the scheduled start of delimitation and census. Engineers accredited by the Land Registry’s Surveying Department then carry out the process under the supervision of their respective governorate’s real estate judge.

Once the judge initiates delimitation and census, real estate owners and rights holders in the concerned area are invited to show the boundaries of their properties and provide statements; this stage can be referred to as the delimitation process. If a rights holder fails to show up, the process goes on without them, according to Articles 10 and 12 of Decree No. 186. In this case, delimitation is based on statements by the mukhtar, the head of a local village, town, or neighbourhood, neighbours, and other people who are present.

Delimitation may perhaps be summarised as an investigative process to record statements made by rights holders, owners, and neighbours, as well as to register objections and gather any supporting documents. If a dispute arises over the ownership of a given property, then the occupant is considered the owner, while the person initiating the argument is registered as the objector.

Next, the engineer proceeds to define the borders of the properties whose ownership has been proven, including any disputed properties,  then compiles a list of the names of owners whose properties are located within the area undergoing the process.

Formally registering a property in the name of the occupant could pose the risk of ownership rights violations, as the occupant may have illegally seized the property, such as through extortion. In any case, the real estate judge may, in the course of delimitation and census, determine the validity of the boundary definition work carried out by the engineer. However, the judge may not decide on disputes over real estate rights until after completion of the delimitation and census process.

Afterwards, the engineer makes a file for each property, called the delimitation and census transcript. This transcript includes a description of the property, its location, and legal type (whether Amiri land or owned real estate), surface area, boundaries, and the names of the owners for common properties, as well as their personal information, shares, and addresses. Also included are any rights arising from the property that benefit others, such as the right of usufruct. Finally, the transcript contains any deeds and documents submitted by the rights holders, as well as any objections.

The transcript is then stamped and signed by the engineer, owners, objectors, neighbours, and anyone else whose  statement is contained within the file.

Then the engineer starts the census process, which includes preparing a table called the “census table,” which includes a summary of the work that the engineer has undertaken to identify the owners and rights holders. The real estate judge then decides on any objections and the engineer submits the census table to the Surveying Department.

The engineer submits the entire delimitation and census transcript, as well as the census table, to the real estate judge.

Afterwards, the real estate judge invites any objectors to submit the necessary documents to prove the rights they wish to lay claim to. They must submit these documents within 30 days. During this period, any individual may approach the real estate judge to object to the process; their objections and documents are recorded.

When the 30-day period ends, the real estate judge issues a decision to conclude the delimitation and census process. This decision is announced to the concerned parties and published in the Official Gazette.

The real estate judge approves the delimitation and census transcript and the census table, then issues a decision to enter them into the Land Registry. The judge does not need to notify any parties or announce this decision publicly. The transcript and table are then sent to the head of the Real Estate Office at the General Directorate of Cadastral Affairs to be registered in the owners’ names.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-05-03 14:57:512022-05-03 14:57:51Explained: Delimitation and Census

The Financial ‘Privileges’ Granted to Syrian Women through Marriage

26-04-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

A Syrian law grants women a so-called “privileged debt” status as part of their financial rights arising from their marriage contracts, including dowries and any potential alimony. Under the law, some of their debts are given priority for collection when a debtor has multiple debts to pay.

Dowry

The maher, or dowry, debt is a privilege that grants a woman the right to collect her husband’s assets, whether movable or immovable. She may collect her dowry debt even if her husband’s assets are burdened by seizures or other debts.

A woman can collect her dowry directly through the Department of Implementation at the Sharia Court. As a condition for dowry collection, her marriage contract must be legally registered with the court. However, if it is a customary marriage, she must file a legal case in order to register the marriage and the amount of the dowry. Only upon doing so can she obtain the dowry payment.

When a woman goes to the Sharia Court to collect her dowry, the marriage contract (or the court ruling confirming her customary marriage) is put into effect. The court then notifies her husband, who must pay the dowry within five days of notification. If he fails to pay, then the court can detain him for a period of 90 days. Afterwards, the wife is entitled to seize his movable and immovable assets.

In cases where the marriage contract specifies that the dowry be received in the form of purchased goods, which may include real estate, the court rules in favour of the wife’s right to those belongings, which the husband must hand over to her. In Decision No. 171 of 1981, the Jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation considers the wife’s right to those belongings to be a ‘right in rem’ – that is, a right related to the belongings themselves, rather than their price.

Alimony

The same rules generally apply to alimony, which is considered a marital debt privilege and has precedence over the dowry under Article 1120 of the Civil Code. According to the Personal Status Law, alimony includes food, clothing, and housing. A woman must submit a claim to the Sharia Court, then wait until the court issues a ruling before she can receive alimony. The court’s decision may be implemented immediately after its issuance even if it is not final. Because appeals against such decisions do not halt the implementation of alimony, Syrian law gives these decisions a status of “expedited enforcement.”

When the court rules in favour of alimony, it then puts the ruling into effect and notifies the husband that he must pay. If he fails to pay, then the court may detain him and seize both his movable and immovable assets in order to implement the payment of the alimony debt.

The alimony ruling is subject to a statute of limitations after five years, as the alimony debt is considered to be a periodically renewable right according to the jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation’s Decision No. 147/167 of 1972. This is why all measures must be taken to halt the statute of limitations and prevent the loss of a woman’s right to alimony, including submitting a request to renew the executive seizure of her husband’s assets or to renew his detainment.

However, Article 73 of the Personal Status Law states that a wife may lose her right to alimony, in few cases, such as if she leaves the marital home – that is, the residence that her husband has chosen for her – without a legitimate justification.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-04-26 16:02:052022-04-26 16:02:05The Financial ‘Privileges’ Granted to Syrian Women through Marriage

Building Collapses in Darayya After Indirect Damage from Prior Bombing

26-04-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

On April 11, a four-storey building in Darayya, Rural Damascus governorate, collapsed, killing two people. While the building had not been directly damaged from previous fighting in the area, the collapse was likely due to the indirect damage caused by nearby bombardment. 

The Ministry of Interior said in a statement that the building was old and that two workers who were inside at the time of the collapse had been killed instantly. The head of the Darayya Local Council said that the building, which had been licensed for construction in 2003, was not inhabited and had not been damaged or renovated. Rather, he said, the collapse was likely due to the existence of tunnels beneath the building.  

Darayya was subject to a punishing siege by regime forces from 2012 to 2016, ending in the forced displacement of all residents after entire neighbourhoods were flattened by airstrikes. Around 255,000 people lived in Darayya in 2007, according to official statistics, while only about 25,000 people remain in the city today, according to local estimates obtained by The Syria Report.  

The collapsed building was located on Al-Wahda Street near the Omar Bin Al-Khattab Mosque, a former Darayya City Council official told The Syria Report. The street had been a frontline during the opposition’s control of Darayya and witnessed intense bombardment at the time, including heavy artillery, missiles, and barrel bombs. 

The building was old and was owned by a contractor named Abu Imad Al-Sakka, himself native to Darayya. It was licensed, located within the zoning plan for Darayya, and inhabited before 2011. 

The former official added that the building itself had not been directly hit by bombs, though its surrounding area faced widespread destruction from bombardments. After Darayya residents were forcibly displaced, large portions of the city, including where the collapsed building was located, were looted by regime forces. Looters took furniture, windows, doors, electrical wiring, sewage pipes, and even tiles. Former residents did not return to the collapsed building after the fighting in Darayya subsided, as it had been looted until only the structure remained, making the building uninhabitable.

According to the former official, after 2016, the owner of the now collapsed building sold the ground floor, which includes a shop, to a member of the local Al-Hussan family. The two people killed in the collapse were from this family and had been working to remove rubble and rehabilitate the ground floor, he added. The technical committees in the Darayya municipality did not previously reveal the structural safety of the building or of other nearby buildings located along that same former frontline zone. It was not until after the collapse that the municipality removed a portion of the rubble and sent a technical committee to investigate. 

A former opposition military commander who had been present in Darayya ruled out the existence of a tunnel beneath the building. He told The Syria Report that, despite the building’s location on the former frontline, it had been far from the area where regime forces had been concentrated, so it would not have been feasible to construct a tunnel underneath. The Syria Report was unable to confirm or deny the former commander’s claims. 

Meanwhile, the former city council official said that the collapse was probably due to indirect structural damage wrought during bombardment of the surrounding area. The bombing loosened the foundations of nearby buildings, as well as the ground soil. Some of these damages are invisibile, albeit cumulative, and may subsequently cause impacted buildings to collapse somewhat suddenly, as is what happened to multiple buildings in areas formerly controlled by the opposition in Syria. 

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-04-26 15:36:392022-04-26 16:35:39Building Collapses in Darayya After Indirect Damage from Prior Bombing

Explosion of Weapons Depot Destroys Residential Neighbourhood in Kurdish-Controlled Northern Aleppo Area

26-04-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

In early April, a huge explosion in Al-Ahdath, a town in the rural Aleppo governorate that is under the control of the SDF-affiliated Afrin Liberation Forces (ALF), destroyed homes surrounding an ALF headquarters, which appeared to have contained a storage facility for weapons and ammunition.

The explosion killed three Kurdish civilians who had been displaced from Afrin. Six ALF fighters who had been in the headquarters at the time of the blast were also killed. The SDF has not issued any official clarification about the explosion and its aftermath, though some activists wrote on social media that the cause of the incident was an exploded gas canister in the weapons depot.

Al-Hadath is located near the Central Prison, the Free Zone, and a cement factory north of Aleppo. The town was under opposition control from 2012 to 2016, after which the SDF took over with the help of Russian air cover.

Al-Hadath is one of thirty towns and villages under SDF control in the northern countryside of Aleppo, the largest of which is Tel Rifaat. This area of SDF control is called Mouqataa Al-Shahbaa. After the SDF seized the area, most residents fled to displacement in camps in opposition-held areas near the border with Turkey.

In 2018, more than 100,000 displaced people from Afrin arrived in Al-Shahbaa after Turkish-backed opposition forces took control of their hometowns. The SDF subsequently distributed the empty homes of displaced Al-Ahdath residents to these newly arrived families, most of whom were of Kurdish descent. Other homes were converted into military and security offices, as well as offices for a party affiliated with the majority-Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD).

The early April explosion completely destroyed the military headquarters, known as Commune Building No. 7,  as well as seven surrounding houses, turning them into rubble, according to a local source in Al-Hadath who spoke with The Syria Report. The Kurdish Red Crescent subsequently worked to unearth the survivors, as well as remove the bodies of the dead from under the rubble.

According to the local source, residents were not previously aware that there existed a weapons depot inside the military headquarters. After the explosion, however, residents discovered that other abandoned homes in Al-Hadath were also being used by the ALF to store weapons and ammunition, raising fears of future explosions.

Since 2018, the ALF has maintained a presence along the lines of contact with opposition forces in the northern part of Aleppo governorate. The ALF sometimes carries out armed operations against opposition forces in towns near the line of contact, such as Maara, Azaz, Afrin, and Al-Bab. ALF fighters fear that their weapons in Al-Ahdath could be targeted by Turkish drones, which maintain a near-constant aerial presence in the region. The ALF could be storing their weapons and ammunition in residential areas as a form of cover, raising serious concerns for the housing, land and property rights, not to mention the lives of local residents.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-04-26 15:28:012022-04-27 13:57:42Explosion of Weapons Depot Destroys Residential Neighbourhood in Kurdish-Controlled Northern Aleppo Area

Instalments for the Youth Housing in New Dimas City to Be Paid Over 437 Years

26-04-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

In March 2022, an official delegation, led by the prime minister, visited the Youth Housing project in the city of New Dimas in the Rural Damascus governorate to examine construction works and confirm that the project would be completed by the end of 2024.

The project is located on a 600-hectare plot of land along the Damascus-Beirut highway. According to plans, it will include 350 residential towers and 26,000 apartments. Of those apartments, 12,000 are allocated as alternative housing for owners of real estate expropriated under Expropriation Law No. 20 of 1983. The project also includes 14,300 apartments slated for youth housing, a social housing programme run by the General Housing Establishment (GHE) of the Ministry of Public Works and Housing.

During his visit, the GHE director announced the allocation of 2,000 apartments to applicants from 2020 as part of the body’s obligations to build 14,300 youth housing apartments in Dimas. The director’s reference to “allocation” describes the signing of a contract between an applicant and the GHE which defines the obligations of both parties; it does not mean that the construction has been completed or that the handover of the finished apartment will occur soon. The director also added that the GHE was aiming to finalise contracts with implementing parties with the goal of completing 3,200 new apartments.

Subscription for the Dimas youth housing project began in 2002. Construction was launched a decade later, with completion scheduled for 2016. Following a long delay, the GHE announced in 2018 that construction on the project had restarted.

One notable aspect of the recent government visit to Dimas was the prime minister’s assertion that the instalments to be paid by applicants would be no more than SYP 8,000 per month. The GHE director added during the same visit that his organisation would allocate housing to applicants after they pay 30 percent of the value of a given apartment. Applicants could then pay the remaining value over a period of 25 years, with monthly payments of no more than SYP 8,000. However, these two statements appear to contradict the facts on the ground.

The estimated value per square metre of an apartment within the youth housing project was SYP 12,000 to 15,000 when the project launched in 2002. That value rose to SYP 20,000 in 2009 then to SYP 100,000 in 2019. In early 2022, the GHE further increased the value per square metre of the apartments that were considered 80 percent complete to SYP 600,000.

Based on this price, the cost of one 100-square-metre apartment is around SYP 60 million. Applicants must pay 70 percent of this after allocation – that is, over the next 25 years – which amounts to SYP 42 million, with monthly instalments of SYP 140,000. Should they pay the maximum SYP 8,000 per month for the apartment, as per the prime minister’s estimation, applicants would complete their payments in 437 years.

In any case, the government’s estimation of the value of these apartments does not match current real estate market prices in Dimas City. The semi-official newspaper Al-Watan said that housing prices in Dimas City are influenced by supply and demand, which the GHE has no ability to control, especially amid the widespread trading of subscription and allocation documents on the black market. The news outlet cited one example of an allocated 90-square-metre apartment on the seventh floor of a residential building, reporting that the current market price of the apartment is SYP 115.7 million, while the GHE’s estimation is no more than SYP 54 million.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-04-26 14:33:452022-04-27 13:47:24Instalments for the Youth Housing in New Dimas City to Be Paid Over 437 Years

Explained: Taxation of Lands Slated for Construction

19-04-2022/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

For a third consecutive time, the Damascus Governorate Council agreed on March 9 to delay imposing a tax on plots of land within the Marota City project that are slated for construction. The tax has been postponed for an additional year, ending in March 2023.

The Building Plot Construction Law No. 82 of 2010, divides plots of land slated for construction (known as arsat in Arabic for plural and arsa for single) under several categories: plots resulting from zoning laws; plots resulting from expropriation laws; plots and properties located within real estate development zones; plots in areas belonging to housing cooperatives outside a given zoning plan; and, finally, some endowment plots of land.

Law No. 82 of 2010 imposed an annual tax on these properties at a rate of 10 percent of their estimated value. The tax remains in force pending the obtention of a construction permit, starting one year after the zoning plan is announced. If four years pass with no construction permit, then the plot is offered for sale via a public auction by decree of the local administrative unit.

If the owner of the plot does manage to obtain a construction permit, then they are exempted from the tax for a period of three years, which may be extended to five years. If the construction licence period for a given plot ends without any construction having taken place, then the property is subject to a tax of 10 percent of its estimated value for two successive years. Afterwards, if the construction is still uncompleted, the plot is sold via public auction, with the administrative unit receiving one percent of the estimated value as a commission. Law No. 82 of 2012 prohibits the formal registry of any sale of a plot whose owner fails to build within the licence period granted to them. Registration may only occur after the owner pays the required tax and after the deduction of a quarter of the estimated value of the plot for the benefit of the administrative unit.

Under Law No. 82, the values of the plots are estimated according to a bracket system previously approved by the Ministry of Finance. It is still not clear whether the law may be amended at some point to adopt the current value of real estate properties in line with Real Estate Sales Law No. 15 of 2021. If the current value is indeed adopted without reducing tax rates, then the tax will become very expensive.

Here a distinction must be made between the tax imposed by Law No. 82 of 2010 and another tax called the Real Estate and Building Plots Income Tax Law, which was issued by Decree No. 53 of 2006. The latter is an annual tax on real estate properties and construction of all kinds, whether they are fully or only partially built, for residential, commercial or industrial purposes. The tax is calculated, theoretically, from the supposed income each liable individual earns by charging their tenants rent, and is collected as one payment at the beginning of the year. Plots of land and other properties in Marota City are not exempt from the Real Estate and Building Plots Income Tax under Law No. 53 of 2006. Only properties belonging to public institutions or used for agricultural purposes have exemptions. In 2013, law No. 15 was issued to impose a 10 percent tax on the real estate and building plots income tax issued by Decree No. 53. In practice, this is a tax on a tax. It started being levied in 2014.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-04-19 14:42:002022-04-19 15:38:56Explained: Taxation of Lands Slated for Construction

HTS Tightens Restrictions on ‘Jihadist Emigrants’ in Rural Idlib

19-04-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), the fundamentalist Islamist organisation that controls most of the Idlib governorrate, is continuing to restrict so-called ‘jihadist emigrants’ in the territory under its control, preventing them from residing in certain areas, including the neighbouring towns of Kafraya and Al-Fuaa.

HTS has barred jihadist emigrants and their families from renting homes or residing in Kafraya and Al-Fuaa, or even from living with relatives and acquaintances there.

In February, HTS sent a one-month notice to jihadist emigrants and their families residing in the two towns to evacuate the homes. In March, it evicted dozens of residents from their homes, while some families were given until Eid Al-Fitr, that is, by early May 2022, to leave. According to a local correspondent for The Syria Report, HTS’ security forces singled out jihadists from Tunisia and Morocco in its eviction campaign, ordering them to move out to any other place in the governorate except Idlib city.

‘Jihadist emigrants’ define themselves as foreign fighters who came to Syria during the war to support the Islamist cause. Today HTS is seeking to seize the homes currntly inhabited by those jihadist emigrants and put them at the disposal of the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), in line with similar steps the group took in Idlib city in February.

In an attempt to justify the evictions, HTS issued a statement on February 19 saying that most of the homes slated for eviction were actually public properties, while some were private properties whose owners were demanding they be returned.

Most of the ‘jihadist emigrants’ who had been notified of eviction are those who are known as ‘independent’ – that is, they are no longer affiliated with any militant faction after HTS dismantled many other jihadist organisations in the past two years. HTS focuses much of its evictions on these ‘independent’ former fighters, most of whom oppose the hardline group, according to the local correspondent.

Most of the original residents of Kafraya and Al-Fuaa were Shia Muslims. They were expelled from their homes in July 2018 as part of the “Four Towns Agreement” that was reached in Doha in April 2017 between Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), HTS and the Islamist Ahrar Al-Sham group. The agreement stipulated the simultaneous expulsion of residents in the besieged twin towns of Madaya and Al-Zabadani in the Rural Damascus governorate, as well as Kafraya and Al-Fuaa in Idlib.

After the expulsion of residents, opposition and extremist Islamist factions split control of Kafraya and Al-Fuaa. The Islamist factions considered the properties of expelled Shia residents to be spoils of war and split them amongst themselves, distributing some of the seized properties to jihadist emigrant fighters among their ranks. Many people who had been forcibly displaced from other, formerly opposition-held areas such as Homs and the northern countryside of Hama also took over the houses left behind by expelled Shia residents.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-04-19 14:32:202022-04-19 14:32:20HTS Tightens Restrictions on ‘Jihadist Emigrants’ in Rural Idlib

Regime Oversees Agreement Enabling Return of Bedouin IDPs to Druze Town

19-04-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

Displaced Bedouin residents from the town of Thibin in the southwestern part of the Suweida governorate reached an agreement with other town residents this month allowing them to return home after five years of displacement. Those planning on making the return began repairing and re-equipping their homes in recent days, with the aim of settling permanently in the town.

Around 300 people from the Al-Shanableh Bedouin clan used to live in the so-called Bedouin neighbourhood in the southern part of Thibin, where they owned houses and lands. But in July 2017, four Druze women from Thibin were killed by unknown gunmen on the town’s main road, which had been the site of frequent kidnappings. Relatives of the four women accused Bedouin clan members of having participated in the killings. Bedouin families subsequently fled Thibin to the neighbouring Daraa governorate, fearing potential reprisals. On the day of the women’s funeral, armed Druze residents attacked the Bedouin neighbourhood, burning down 17 empty homes belonging to displaced families.

Afterwards, the Thibin bedouins settled near the city of Busra Al-Sham in the eastern part of the Daraa governorate. Then in early 2022, the displaced families asked Druze notables, including religious ones, to mediate with the Druze residents of Thibin to allow them to return home. Representatives of the two sides met with the Druze mediators in March 2022 in the city of Salkhad south of Suweida. Family members of the slain women agreed to permit the Bedouin families to return. The meeting resulted in what became known as a “return agreement” that included a settlement on the methods and conditions for return.

Then in April, representatives of the victims’ families and of the Bedouin residents met with one another in the presence of the head of the security and military committee for Syria’s southern region, which includes the Suweida, Daraa, Quneitra, and parts of Rural Damascus governorates – each region of regime-controlled Syria has a so-called security and military committee, which comprises officials from the main security services, and which oversees overall security in the region. The two sides agreed on the terms of the return agreement and signed it. The head of the security and military committee also signed the agreement and requested that the governor of Suweida secure the public services needed for residents to return home. He also ordered the heads of the relevant security apparatus to “take the necessary measures” to carry out the agreement.

The agreement includes provisions allowing the return of the Al-Shanableh clan to Thibin, except for two families who are accused of being involved in the murder of the four Druze women. The agreement stipulated that those two families, as well as the individuals accused of the crime, could return to Thibin only after proving their innocence before the court. Until then, returnees are prohibited from harbouring the accused individuals in their homes.  The returnees must also forfeit their rights to sue for any damages to their homes and properties.

A copy of the return agreement

Source: A local correspondent for The Syria Report

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-04-19 14:29:122022-04-22 11:40:40Regime Oversees Agreement Enabling Return of Bedouin IDPs to Druze Town

Minister of Housing No Longer Licenced to Reduce Minimum Surface Area for Real Estate Development Zones

19-04-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

The Prime Ministry cancelled a power once granted to the Minister of Public Works and Housing that licences the minister to lower the minimum surface area required to establish a real estate development zone. This move apparently came due to an exception obtained by a private company to set up one such zone in Damascus in late 2021.

More specifically, the Prime Ministry issued Decree No. 398 in February 2022, cancelling Council of Ministers Decree No. 6023 of 2012. The 2012 decree had in turn amended the executive instructions of Real Estate Development and Investment Law No. 15 of 2008 and allowed the Minister of Housing to change the minimum surface areas required for establishing real estate development zones. However, the original executive instructions of the 2008 law allowed only the prime minister to reduce such areas after a proposal from the Minister of Housing.

Minimum areas for real estate development zones

The executive instructions of Law No. 15 of 2008, which were issued by Council of Ministers Decree No. 5410 of 2009, set the minimum surface areas required to establish real estate development zones in Syria as follows:

  • Area one: This area includes the Damascus, Rural Damascus, and Aleppo governorates. Real estate development zones here may be no less than 25 hectares.
  • Area two: This area is divided into two sub-categories. The first includes the Homs and Hama governorates, where real estate development zones may be no smaller than 20 hectares. The second includes the Lattakia and Tartous governorates, where real estate development zones must be at least 15 hectares.
  • Area three: This area also has two sub-categories. The first includes the Daraa, Idlib, Quneitra, and Suweida governorates, where real estate development zones may be no less than 15 hectares. In the second sub-category, which includes Deir-ez-Zor, Hassakeh, and Raqqa, real estate development zones may be established regardless of size.

Real estate development zones may be established over existing informal housing areas regardless of size, with the approval of the Council of Ministers.

Real estate development zones and companies

Under Law No. 15 of 2008, a real estate development zone contains real estate properties that are either within or outside a zoning plan. Such real estate is secured from state properties, the properties of a local administrative unit, the private property of development companies, or an individual’s private properties. The 2008 law allowed expropriation of individually owned real estate located within real estate development zones for the benefit of the relevant administrative unit.

Dozens of real estate development companies were licensed in accordance with Law No. 15 of 2008, including six public sector companies. Still, no real estate development projects have yet been completed.

According to Law No. 15, such projects are implemented by real estate development companies that assume a direct relationship with rights-holding residents. These companies may construct infrastructure and service projects within the real estate development zones and provide alternative housing for impacted residents. The Syrian government is attempting to prioritise companies addressing informal housing districts, granting such companies more concessions and benefits than others.

Withdrawing powers from the Minister of Housing

It is unclear exactly why the Council of Ministers issued Decree No. 398 of 2022. The decree could be related to the Minister of Public Works and Housing exercising his power to reduce minimum land areas for real estate development zones for the first time in late 2021. In this case, he reduced the minimum area in Damascus from 25 hectares to only five hectares.

The Real Estate Development and Investment Commission, which is linked to the Minister of Public Works and Housing, agreed in late 2021 to grant a licence to Emessa Real Estate Development and Investment LLC to establish the first real estate development zone in Damascus. The five-hectare zone was located in Mazzeh, near the southern ring highway and the Basilia City project.

Various problems have accompanied the licensing process for Emessa, such as the announcement of the detailed zoning plan for the project, inclusion of neighbouring public properties and the amendment of the legal descriptions for some properties in order to comply with the provisions of Law No. 15. Some members of the Damascus governorate council have objected to licensing Emessa, claiming that approval was “private and not available to all,” especially regarding public properties located within the real estate development zone.

The Council of Ministers Decree No. 398 of 2022

Source: The Official Gazette

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-04-19 13:23:192022-04-19 15:39:25Minister of Housing No Longer Licenced to Reduce Minimum Surface Area for Real Estate Development Zones

Tartous Governorate Removes Commercial Kiosks Amid Sharp Backlash

12-04-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

Like the Damascus and Hama governorates, the Tartous governorate has been removing commercial kiosks since mid-March despite widespread objections from their owners who are not offered an alternative.

Local administrative units began removing the kiosks in accordance with Ministry of Local Administration and Environment Decision No. 1809, issued in December 2021, which is itself based on a previous circular, No. 347 of January 2019. That circular set the licence duration period of the kiosks at three years, ending at the start of 2022. The kiosks slated for removal are known as “support kiosks” and were granted to people with special needs. They previously had no specified time limit. Meanwhile, Decision No. 1809 grants kiosks owned by the war-injured or family members of war “martyrs” additional time, with their licences expiring at the end of 2022.

The kiosk removal campaign began in mid-March, in the Karaj Al-Jadid, Karaj Al-Qadim and Karaj Al-Sheikh Saad areas of Tartous city. Many owners of other kiosks, fearing that their kiosks and goods could be seized, and preferring not to clash with municipal authorities, decided to dismantle their kiosks and move them to other areas at their own expense. Legally, kiosks belong to their owners; the role of the local administrative units is simply to grant kiosk licences so that owners may occupy sidewalks and other public spaces in exchange for an annual fee. During the removal operations since March, owners dismantled their kiosks under police control, and with the heads of relevant neighbourhood committees present, alongside employees of the city’s Department of Technical Services, the semi-official Al-Watan newspaper reported.

The governor of Tartous sent a letter in January 2022 to the Tartous City Council asking that it address the issue of the kiosks in line with the decision of the Ministry of Local Administration. That same month, the governorate announced its intention to send 1,556 warnings to kiosk owners should they fail to meet the terms of the licence period. The kiosk owners raised objections in response and protested, prompting the governorate to retract the announcement. However, the governorate later began to implement the kiosk removal decision by surprise in mid-March.

The majority-Alawite, coastal governorate of Tartous represents one of the regime’s most important bases of popular support. It is also home to among the highest number of war-dead and wounded among Syrian regime forces. Talk of the kiosks often centres around the wounded and killed, as many of them were granted to the wounded, as well as family members of dead soldiers. There are around 2,500 commercial kiosks in Tartous city alone, providing income to thousands of families, according to official estimates.

Removal of the kiosks prompted widespread resentment from the owners themselves, as well as from Tartous residents in general, according to official news reports and social media. In some cases, owners whose kiosks were under threat of removal accused municipal authorities of “betraying the blood of the martyrs,” “disrespecting the sacrifices” of regime soldiers, and tossing their families to an unknown fate as the kiosks represent their sole source of income amid difficult economic conditions.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-04-12 16:18:292022-04-12 16:44:56Tartous Governorate Removes Commercial Kiosks Amid Sharp Backlash

Kurdish Municipal Authorities in Aleppo Stall Return of IDPs’ Properties

12-04-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

Recent years have seen authorities from the Kurdish-majority Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria (AANES) seize real estate properties owned by people who were displaced from areas under their control in Aleppo. Though some of those displaced people have recently returned to the area, AANES municipal authorities are slow to return the seized properties.

The Kurdish-majority People’s Protection Units (YPG), which is the main component of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), has controlled the Al-Sheikh Maqsoud and Al-Ashrafieh neighbourhoods in the northern part of Aleppo city since 2013. Both neighbourhoods are inhabited mostly by Syrian Kurds. In 2014, the AANES established special municipal authorities called the “People’s Municipality” in these two neighbourhoods with agreement from the government in Damascus. The YPG later supported regime forces in their fight against opposition factions in east Aleppo in late 2016.

The AANES still controls the Al-Sheikh Maqsoud and Al-Ashrafieh neighbourhoods. However, clashes break out intermittently between the YPG and regime forces, the latter of which sometimes imposes blockages on the AANES-held area.

In recent years, the AANES municipal authorities have seized hundreds of real estate properties from displaced people who are originally from Al-Sheikh Maqsoud and Al-Ashrafieh, according to the correspondent for The Syria Report. Those were displaced largely due to the deteriorating security situation after 2013. Many of the displaced owners of these seized properties still remain in displacement, in regime-held areas of Aleppo city, opposition-held areas of northwestern Syria, or outside the country altogether.

The People’s Municipality distributed these seized properties to families of female and male YPG fighters, as well as employees of AANES institutions. In addition, a number of the properties were distributed to displaced Kurdish families from Afrin, an area in the rural western part of Aleppo governorate that was seized by Turkish-backed rebel forces in early 2018. According to the local correspondent, the People’s Municipality also seized shops belonging to displaced people. These properties were usually then distributed free of charge under contracts called “temporary housing contracts”, issued by the People’s Municipality. It remains unclear what conditions beneficiaries must meet in order to obtain such properties through the temporary housing contracts, or how to terminate the contracts and evict occupants.

Since the battle for Aleppo ended in 2016 and a relative stability took hold, some displaced people from Al-Sheikh Maqsoud and Al-Ashrafieh began to return home, only to find their houses occupied and their shops run by the People’s Municipality.

Facing pressure from real estate owners, People’s Municipality authorities pledged in mid-2021 to vacate the homes that had been occupied through the temporary housing contracts–however, eviction would only occur upon the return of the property owner themself or of one of their first-degree relatives that includes father, mother, wife and children. Those same authorities later retracted their pledge, issuing Decree No. 175 in November 2021 to halt the evictions “for humanitarian considerations, at the onset of winter”. The decree put the evictions on hold until the beginning of April 2022.

With the onset of April, property owners are once again demanding that Municipal authorities keep their pledge and return their properties, the local correspondent said. There were rumours among some of the property owners that authorities wished to delay the returns and keep the properties, though The Syria Report could not confirm such claims. Local sources also told The Syria Report of fears that the People’s Municipality could soon only accept the return of property owners themselves as a condition for returning the properties, rather than also accepting first-degree relatives.

 

Decree No. 175 of 2021

 

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-04-12 15:40:042022-04-12 16:43:51Kurdish Municipal Authorities in Aleppo Stall Return of IDPs’ Properties

Regime Military Officers Invest in Al-Ghab Plain Fisheries Owned by IDPs

12-04-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

When regime forces took control of the Al-Ghab Plain region in the Hama governorate in early 2020, most residents were displaced to opposition-held areas in northern Syria. Among the displaced were owners of local fisheries. Regime military officers are now investing in some of these abandoned fisheries for their personal benefit.

Most of the fisheries are located north of the town of Qalaat Al-Mudhiq in the eastern part of the Ghab region. They were fed by a special irrigation system made up of a network of wells and springs that drained into channels flowing into the Orontes River.

According to official statements published by the semi-official newspaper Al-Watan in September 2021, the fisheries were also located in a number of other parts of the Hama governorate to the point that Hama boasted the highest rate of fish production in Syria before 2011. In 2011, there were 518 fisheries in the Ghab region alone (250 so-called “family” fisheries, 153 licensed fisheries and 115 unlicensed fisheries), occupying a total area of approximately 655 hectares. It is unclear what differentiates the licensed and unlicensed fisheries, other than their licensing status. Family fisheries, on the other hand, are small fish farms that feature multiple ponds ranging in size from one to five hectares, according to a local correspondent for The Syria Report. These fisheries are named as such because each piece of land on which they are built is owned by a single family.

According to The Syria Report’s correspondent in the area, regime military officers are now investing in some of the fisheries that were left behind, some of which are family fisheries in the towns of Al-Huweijeh and Al-Hamra. Officers invest in these fisheries with the cooperation of fish sellers in Hama city, in exchange for up to 50 percent of the profits, preferring ponds located near springs to avoid paying the costs of pumping water from wells.

Most fisheries remain abandoned and inoperational. Aside from the owners’ absence, many of the fisheries cannot function because their owners took their equipment with them as they fled the area. Equipment includes water pumps and machinery for preparing the fish food. The special irrigation system that had been designed to pump water into the ponds in sequential order is also now out of service.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-04-12 15:30:442022-04-12 15:30:44Regime Military Officers Invest in Al-Ghab Plain Fisheries Owned by IDPs
Page 3 of 17‹12345›»

Read also

  • A New Classification for Housing Cooperatives: Between Project Completion, Dissolution and Liquidation
  • Decree No. 66 of 2012: Objections and Judicial Proceedings Following the Reparation Package
  • Reconstruction Through Reduced Engineers’ Fees: Engineering Fee Exemptions Fall Short of Enabling Displaced People to Return to Their Areas
  • Rising Rents in Damascus and Its Nearby Suburbs: Demand Pressure and Limited Supply
LinkedIn Logo Twitter Logo
HelpAbout usContact usAdvertise with The Syria ReportTerms & conditions
Copyright © 2026 The Syria Report – all rights reserved. Your use of this website is subject to our legal terms & conditions
Scroll to top

This site uses cookies. By continuing to browse the site, you are agreeing to our use of cookies.

Ok

Cookie and Privacy Settings



How we use cookies

We may request cookies to be set on your device. We use cookies to let us know when you visit our websites, how you interact with us, to enrich your user experience, and to customize your relationship with our website.

Click on the different category headings to find out more. You can also change some of your preferences. Note that blocking some types of cookies may impact your experience on our websites and the services we are able to offer.

Essential Website Cookies

These cookies are strictly necessary to provide you with services available through our website and to use some of its features.

Because these cookies are strictly necessary to deliver the website, refuseing them will have impact how our site functions. You always can block or delete cookies by changing your browser settings and force blocking all cookies on this website. But this will always prompt you to accept/refuse cookies when revisiting our site.

We fully respect if you want to refuse cookies but to avoid asking you again and again kindly allow us to store a cookie for that. You are free to opt out any time or opt in for other cookies to get a better experience. If you refuse cookies we will remove all set cookies in our domain.

We provide you with a list of stored cookies on your computer in our domain so you can check what we stored. Due to security reasons we are not able to show or modify cookies from other domains. You can check these in your browser security settings.

Other external services

We also use different external services like Google Webfonts, Google Maps, and external Video providers. Since these providers may collect personal data like your IP address we allow you to block them here. Please be aware that this might heavily reduce the functionality and appearance of our site. Changes will take effect once you reload the page.

Google Webfont Settings:

Google Map Settings:

Google reCaptcha Settings:

Vimeo and Youtube video embeds:

en_USEnglish
en_USEnglish