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No Clear Rules Regulating Foreign Ownership of Property in Opposition Areas

21-06-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

In opposition-held parts of northwestern Syria, there is confusion about the legal relationship between local governing bodies and foreign donor groups, particularly regarding housing and foreign ownership of local property. The issue has recently come under increased discussion amid the many local housing projects being funded and implemented by foreign organisations.  

For example, within the Turkish government’s “voluntary” refugee return project, Ankara’s Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) is to coordinate with NGOs to construct new residential areas in northern Syria that will accommodate more than one million Syrian refugees currently living in Turkey. In addition, many Ankara-backed Turkish and Syrian aid organisations have implemented alternative housing projects in recent years for residents of the northern Syrian displacement camps. 

In both cases, certain details remain unclear, especially the legality of some foreign organisations working on Syrian soil. It is also unclear whether these organisations have the right to rent or purchase the lands on which they have constructed the housing projects, or how the ownership of such properties will be subsequently transferred to the new rights holders.

Backed by Turkey, the Syrian opposition controls the rural northern part of the Aleppo governorate, as well as rural parts of the Hassakeh and Raqqa governorates. The Syrian Interim Government (SIG), local councils, various security and judicial bodies, and armed forces are all present in those areas.  

In areas under SIG control, Local Administration Law No. 107 of 2011 (which regulates the relationship between local councils and governmental and non-governmental organisations) is still in use, sources told The Syria Report. The areas still also use Law No. 11 of 2011, which restricts foreigners’ ownership of real estate properties inside Syria. No real estate sales to foreigners have yet been registered in those areas, the sources said.

Law No. 11 of 2011 allows the Minister of Interior to grant exceptions to facilitate foreigners’ property ownership, whether those foreigners are individuals or legal entities. The SIG’s Minister of Interior is therefore entitled to assume the rights granted to him/her by Law No. 11 and grant exceptions to foreign organisations to own land inside Syria. In such cases, the transfer of ownership to the foreign organisation would be recorded in the Land Registry and the act considered legal.

It is worth noting that under Law No. 11 of 2011, children of Syrian women married to foreigners are barred from real estate inheritance as they are considered foreigners and, therefore, not entitled to own real estate.

At the same time, the areas under SIG control in the rural Aleppo, Raqqa, and Hassakeh governorates are considered border areas. As such, sales of real estate in those areas – to Syrians and foreigners alike – are subject to the provisions of Law No. 41 of 2004 (which defines the border areas) and its amendments in Decree No. 49 of 2008 and Decree No. 43 of 2011. 

Under Article 1 of Law No. 41 of 2004, it is not permitted to create, transfer, amend, or acquire any real property right on land within the border area or to occupy it through leasing, investment, or any other form for a period of more than three years in the name of or benefitting any natural person or legal entity without a previously granted licence. According to the 2011 amendment to the law, lands located within zoning plans are excluded from the provisions of Article 1. Under Article 2, licences may be granted by decree of the Minister of Interior or an authorised deputy based on a proposal from the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform and with the approval of the Ministry of Defence. 

As the SIG has not made any amendment to Law No. 41 of 2004, the licensing requirement remains in force in the areas under the opposition governing body’s control, sources told The Syria Report. However, no requests have yet been submitted to the SIG Ministry of Defence or Ministry of Interior to obtain licences for foreign land ownership in those areas. 

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-06-21 19:07:422022-06-22 01:22:21No Clear Rules Regulating Foreign Ownership of Property in Opposition Areas

Explained: Amending the Land Classification Plans Guide

21-06-2022/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

The Syrian Prime Ministry issued Notice No. 15/17/B on June 2 to “amend the instructions of the Land Classification Plans Guide and determine its production capabilities in order to obtain the required approval and undertake investments on lands located outside of zoning plans.”

Its unusual name aside, the notice was also replete with technical terms that were often complicated, repetitive, and incomprehensible. From a housing, land and property rights perspective, the most dangerous part of the notice was its stipulation that those who violate its instructions would be punished according to the provisions of Law No. 40 of 2012, which concerns the removal of “building violations.” 

The Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform compiled the Land Classification Plans Guide in 2008. The guide was approved on December 3, 2008, via Prime Ministerial Decree No. 10409/1, and was amended once in 2014. The guide is a directory of soil types in different regions of Syria, classified by their fertility and suitedness for agriculture. The guide can be used to determine areas suitable for agricultural investment and urban, industrial, and touristic development. 

Under Article 1 of the new notice, the Land Classification Plans Guide serves as the main reference for determining proposed sites for zoning plans, industrial zones, service or touristic facilities, and renewable energy projects. Such sites are referred to as lands located outside of zoning plans; that is, they have yet to be zoned. 

The amendment made in Notice No. 15/17/B centres on protecting agricultural land, including preventing erosion and determining the investment sites outside of agricultural zones. The amended instructions are meant to preserve agricultural land and ensure that they are used only for their specified purposes. 

Under Article 2 of the notice, proposed project sites may be approved if they achieve the principles of regional planning, namely “leading and managing the spatial organisation in the region in a manner that is integrated and balanced.” Regional planning, according to Regional Planning Law No. 26 of 2010, is integrated planning that regulates and directs residential and environmental policy. Such planning is considered a link between larger national planning for general state policies and urban planning for metropolitan communities. Article 2 of the notice stressed compliance with the results of the regional planning process within areas that have undergone study “in order to ensure a developmental, environmental and comprehensive planning perspective.” However, since regional planning work has so far only been completed in Syria’s coastal region, the application of the new notice is limited to that area until planning studies are completed elsewhere. 

Article 3 required the Regional Planning Commission (RPC) to coordinate with the Ministry of Agriculture to identify “areas of restricted development,” which are lands designated solely for agricultural investment and protection of natural resources. Article 3 added a new requirement, “integrated environmental planning for land usage,” which is another uncompleted planning. That is, areas of restricted development are dependent upon two still uncompleted processes: regional planning and integrated environmental planning for land usage. 

Article 4 required the Ministry of Agriculture to work towards the completion of digitising the approved land classification plans and coordinating with the General Military Survey Establishment (part of the Ministry of Defence) to match those plans with topographical maps. 

Article 5 pressed governors to settle the statuses of industrial or trade facilities located outside cities or industrial zones. According to previous statements by the Minister of Local Administration and Environment, there are a total of 7,519 such facilities located outside of any zoning plans in all governorates. Of those facilities, 5,535 are licensed and 1,984 are not. For every new zoning plan within an administrative unit, the government tends to include a trade or industrial zone to meet that administrative unit’s needs. When there is no such zone, lands, where certain industrial facilities are concentrated outside the zoning plan, are considered to serve that purpose and will receive both a general and detailed zoning plan, as well as construction codes. 

Articles 6, 7 and 8 contained a set of conditions for obtaining approval for building projects and facilities outside of zoning plans – that is, the rules that are meant to regulate the licensing of agricultural facilities, industrial facilities that depend on agricultural goods, and facilities for services and tourism. These conditions also include settling the status of any unlicenced facilities, as well as construction codes and building guidelines for tourism projects. Article 7 prohibited the construction of these facilities on some types of arable land, except for lands that are rocky or cannot be reclaimed for agricultural purposes. 

Article 9 included some general provisions and stressed that the instructions within the notice apply to all lands outside of zoning plans: state-owned land, privately owned land, land belonging to the public sector and joint sector, i.e. land owned jointly by the private and public sectors, etc. In addition, any old investment licences that have not yet been implemented must be cancelled, alongside any approvals previously granted to investment projects that were proven to have been used for purposes other than those stated in their licences. 

Finally, Article 9 stipulated that local administrative units must coordinate with the agricultural departments in their respective governorates to follow up on licences granted to projects and compile quarterly reports. These reports must be submitted to the Ministry of Agriculture so that it can take the appropriate legal measures against any rule breakers. Article 9 especially emphasised adherence to the provisions of the removal of “unlicenced structures” which were issued in Legislative Decree No. 40 of 2012, as well as its amendments. In essence, Article 9 stipulated that buildings or facilities that were constructed in violation of the 2022 notice, and following the date of its issuance, would be demolished. The provisions of Decree No. 40 would be applied to any detractors. 

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-06-21 19:05:452022-06-21 20:43:51Explained: Amending the Land Classification Plans Guide

Report Surveys IDP Housing Complexes in Northwest Syria

14-06-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

A new report titled “Housing Complexes in North-Western Syria,” published by the Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU), surveys the growing number of housing complexes in Northwest Syria, namely in the Idlib and Aleppo governorates. 

Since the start of the decade-long conflict, many internally displaced persons (IDP) have sought to improve their situation by converting their tents into cement rooms, while some humanitarian organisations and donors have built several housing complexes. In both cases, these complexes have turned into new cities and towns.

The number of individuals living in the housing complexes covered by the ACU’s study is 171,407, constituting 32,062 families, including 141,939 individuals in the Idlib governorate and 29,525 in the Aleppo governorate. Of the residential population, 54 percent (76 complexes) of the housing complexes were all IDPs.

In February 2022, the number of IDPs in the camps of Northwest Syria reached 1,705,299, constituting 321,840 displaced households. Of the total, only about 10 percent of the camp residents have been transferred to decent housing.

The ACU’s recent report seeks to clarify the nature of these complexes in terms of construction, location and services, legal agreements. The following is a summary of the report. 

Construction

The ACU defines housing complexes as new concrete buildings that have emerged in displacement sites or on the outskirts of cities and towns in both an organised and unorganised fashion. The study was limited to complexes in which the number of cement houses exceeds forty.

According to the report, 117 new housing complexes exist in Northwest Syria, with 79 percent (93 complexes) in the Idlib governorate and 21 percent (24 complexes) in the Aleppo governorate. The ACU’s findings show that 67 percent (78 complexes) of the housing complexes were planned before their establishment (with construction plans), while 33 percent (39 complexes) weren’t planned before construction, making them random buildings. 

The housing complexes differ drastically in size. The study found that the number of buildings within 35 percent (41 complexes) of the housing complexes does not exceed more than 107 buildings. Meanwhile, 25 percent (29 complexes) have 108 to 207 buildings; 14 percent (16 complexes) have 208-307 buildings; and 9 percent (10 complexes) have between 308-407 buildings. The majority have only one-storey buildings (94 percent or 97 complexes) and two-room houses (61 percent or 52 complexes). 

Housing complexes have been financed in a number of ways, either at the expense of the residents, through donations, or by contractors. 

The ACU states that 30 percent (35 complexes) of the housing complexes were built at the residents’ own expense; according to the report, these complexes were likely camps that residents converted into rooms or cement houses. Meanwhile, international organisations established 21 percent (31 complexes), donation funds established 9 percent (11 complexes), and contractors established 7 percent (8 complexes). 

Location and services

As per the report, 46 percent (54 complexes) of the housing complexes were public lands owned by the government before the housing complexes were established on them; 42 percent (49 complexes) on private agricultural lands; 7 percent (8 complexes) on agricultural lands owned by the government; and 4 percent (5 complexes) on forested and tree-planted lands not owned by anybody.

The location of housing complexes largely determines the job opportunities and services available to residents. 

Out of the 117 complexes, 99 complexes are more than 1 km away from the nearest city or town and 79 percent (92 complexes) are located far from the main roads, making it difficult for service vehicles to reach residents, such as water tankers, water transport vehicles, ambulances when patients need urgent aid, and civil defence during disasters. 

Meanwhile, 9 percent (14 complexes) of the complexes do not have any roads; 8 percent (12 complexes) have dirt roads; and 51 percent (80 complexes) were only paved with gravel.

The ACU also states that 48 percent (41 complexes) of the housing complexes have regular networks for drinking water and water for daily usage, compared with 59 percent (69 complexes) that don not have any water networks and depend on tank water. 

According to the report, 74 percent (87 complexes) of the housing complexes have sewage systems, while 26 percent (30 complexes) depend on irregular cesspits for sewage disposal. These cesspits are not equipped with layers of stones and sand to filter wastewater before reaching groundwater, making wastewater a threat to groundwater and soil within these complexes.

Finally, nearly 51 percent (60 complexes) of the housing complexes do not have schools or informal education centres. In contrast, schools are available in 46 percent (54 complexes) of the housing complexes. Informal education centres are available in 3 housing complexes.

Legal agreements

The report showed that only 11 percent (13 complexes) of the housing complexes do not have any authority responsible for managing the complex. In 38 percent (45 complexes) of the housing complexes, a civilian administration was appointed by a specific entity. Meanwhile, 21 percent (25 complexes) of the housing complexes are run by a civilian administration elected by the population; 15 percent (17 complexes) by local humanitarian organisations, and 7 percent (8 complexes) by the local councils responsible for managing the complex’s area. International humanitarian organisations run only 6 percent (7 complexes) of the housing complexes.

In 45 percent (51 complexes) of the housing complexes, the residents do not have any residence status documents. In 16 percent (18 complexes), the residents have ownership papers (sale and purchase contracts) registered with the local authorities. As per the report, these houses are often found in the complexes established by the contractors. In complexes established by the international or local humanitarian organisations, the residents have a paper from the organisation proving that the dwelling has been handed over to them temporarily or permanently.

The housing complexes were handed over according to varying mechanisms.  

In the case of 34 percent (43 complexes) of housing complexes, residents were required to request a document from the local council or any other official body proving compliance with some criteria, e.g. that the beneficiary family residing in the complex is displaced, one of the family members has a disability, or one of its members has died during the war. Meanwhile, 33 percent (42 complexes) were required to pledge not to sell the apartment. This pledge includes a condition requiring the beneficiary family to hand over the apartment to another displaced family or to the local council or local authorities, which will supervise the transfer process to another family that meets certain criteria. Only 17 percent (22 complexes) were not required to provide documents. 

Finally, it was also found that the residents of 87 percent (102 complexes) of the housing complexes live in the complexes for free, while 13 percent (15 complexes) of the housing complexes are rentals. 

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-06-14 18:15:512022-06-15 09:49:43Report Surveys IDP Housing Complexes in Northwest Syria

Will HTS Give Back Seized Druze Properties in Jabal Al-Summaq?

14-06-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) leader Abu Mohammad Al-Jolani attended the opening of a water well in the town of Qalb Lawzeh in the Jabal Al-Summaq area in the Idlib governorate. This visit, the first of its kind to majority-Druze Jabal Al-Summaq, appears to be an attempt by the hardline Islamist group in control of Idlib to reassure Druze residents about their safety and properties following previous major violations. 

Historically, the Druze community has inhabited 18 towns and villages in Jabal Al-Summaq, most importantly Kaftein, Maarat Al-Ikhwan and Qalb Lawzeh. In 2015, the Jabhat Al-Nusra group, or Nusra Front, appointed a Tunisian jihadist to be “emir” of Jabal Al-Summaq. As a Salafi jihadist group, Jabhat Al-Nusra viewed the Druze as apostates of Islam who must either be killed or fought against in order to return them to Islam. Jabhat Al-Nusra gave the local Druze community a deadline of one year to convert to Islam or flee Jabal Al-Summaq. Before this deadline was reached, the Tunisian emir restricted the rights of Druze residents, killed and arrested a number of them and extorted many of their properties, real estate and agricultural lands by force. 

In June 2015, following a dispute between residents and Jabhat Al-Nusra personnel at a checkpoint in the centre of Qalb Lawzeh, the jihadist emir oversaw a massacre of 30 Druze townspeople in Qalb Lawzeh. After the massacre almost half of the Druze fled Jabal Al-Summaq to regime-controlled areas. There were around 20,000 Druze residents in Jabal Al-Summaq in 2015, though only about 10,000 today remain, according to estimates by local councils. 

Jabhat Al-Nusra brought the emir to trial and punished him with removal from office and only one month imprisonment. 

After changing its name to Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) and establishing the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) in Idlib in 2018, the organisation tried to win over the residents of Jabal Al-Summaq. It contributed to founding a unified local council to supervise the management of public services. This local council partly managed the properties of absentee Druze residents and used the revenue to improve municipal services. Still, HTS continued extorting Druze properties in order to house its members’ families as well as forcibly displaced people who had arrived from the Rural Damascus and Homs governorates. The current population of Jabal Al-Summaq is, in large part, made up of displaced people. 

During his meeting with notables from the Jabal Al-Summaq villages, Al-Jolani focused on showing HTS as moderate, similar to the stance he took with Idlib’s Christians as part of a programme of pragmatism he has followed since 2018. Though Al-Jolani did not explicitly mention the 2015 Qalb Lawzeh massacre, he mentioned that the event was a matter of the past, avoiding holding Jabhat Al-Nusra responsible. He added: “The individual who committed the crime, you know what happened to him in the end.” The Tunisian emir who oversaw the killings remained in Idlib for several years afterward, later defecting in 2018. HTS subsequently accused him of being responsible for the assassination of the former SSG Minister of Education and killed him in a 2021 security raid. In the end, the Tunisian former official’s killing was unrelated to his violations against the Jabal Al-Summaq Druze community. 

Al-Jolani also used the recent visit to promise greater services to Jabal Al-Summaq residents, such as drinking water, municipal administration and healthcare. The region has suffered marginalisation and a lack of basic services such as water and medicine. The new water well is now meant to provide water for around 6,000 people in the villages of Banabel, Qalb Lawzeh, Bashandalanti and others. The second stage of the water well project will additionally provide water to the town of Kafr Kila and the remaining villages of Jabal Al-Summaq. Notably, local residents had themselves collected monetary donations to pay for the water well and to extend the water network before Al-Jolani provided funds to compensate them. 

There are no precise statistics on the properties and agricultural lands extorted by HTS in Jabal Al-Summaq, though the SSG has been working since early 2021 to return some of the properties to their owners and to owners’ first-degree relatives. Property extortion is the seizure of someone else’s property without their consent, or without the existence of a legal title deed or legitimate reason. In a video published by HTS after Al-Jolani’s visit, one Jabal Al-Summaq notable said that the situation had improved over the past year. The notable also demanded more improvement and for a response to the injustices that have occurred against residents.  

Al-Jolani ruled out a response to the injustices committed by people he referred to as “shabiha,” no matter the sect, affirming that there would be no such discussion and no redress. “Shabiha” is a general term that usually refers to regime loyalists–especially state employees who have fled to regime-controlled areas of Syria and who serve within the regime forces or security services. 

At the same time, it appears that many of the extorted properties remain in the hands of influential HTS leaders, who are not keen on giving them up. Sources who spoke with The Syria Report indicated that there are plans to invest in some of the extorted lands and use them as stone quarries. The Al-Raqi Construction Company, whose owner is the former HTS emir of Aleppo Ibrahim Salameh, is reportedly behind the plans. 

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-06-14 18:14:052022-06-15 11:39:24Will HTS Give Back Seized Druze Properties in Jabal Al-Summaq?

Explained: Rules for Inheritance

14-06-2022/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

Inheritance refers to any movable or immovable assets left behind by an individual after their death. Their heirs become entitled to this inheritance in accordance with certain rules, and after fulfilling the deceased person’s wills and any debts they owed. 

The origin of inheritance in Syria lies in Islamic Sharia rules, adopted by the Personal Status Law issued in 1953. These rules applied to both Muslims and non-Muslims. However, an amendment to the Personal Status Law issued within Decree No. 76 of 2010 instead placed inheritance and wills under the provisions of religious communities. There are now different personal status laws for Muslims, Christians and Druze, which deal with inheritance issues.

For most Syrians, except therefore Christians and Druze, inheritance is based on a few basic rules in the personal status law No. 76 of 2010, which includes Islamic Sharia rules. The most important of these rules includes the distribution of inheritance by nearest degree of kinship to the deceased. For example, the deceased person’s grandson may not receive inheritance if the son is present. There is also the rule of paternal kinship. For example, if the deceased person has two grandchildren–the daughter of a son, and the son of a daughter–then their inheritance goes to the former, because in this case, the granddaughter has the closer paternal kinship to the deceased. 

Male heirs receive double the share of inheritance as female heirs, though only when they have an equal degree of kinship, such as brothers and sisters. However, this rule does not apply in other cases. Women may indeed inherit more than men in a number of cases, such as when a woman dies and leaves behind a husband, two parents and two daughters. In this case, her daughters receive two thirds of the inheritance, her husband one fourth and each of her parents one sixth. If the deceased woman had only one daughter, then the daughter would receive half the inheritance. And in some cases, women may inherit while men do not. For example, if the deceased person had a paternal grandmother and maternal grandfather, then the grandmother inherits while the grandfather does not. 

Under Syrian law, there are two types of inheritance, if the assets to be passed down include real estate: 

First is Sharia “legal” estate inventory, which is subject to the provisions of inheritance distribution as laid out in the Personal Status Law in cases where the real estate properties in question are all located within a given zoning plan. In such cases, a legal estate inventory document is organised before the Sharia court after an expert appointed by the court determines the share to be given to each heir. Then the Sharia judge issues a legal estate inventory document that includes the names of each heir. 

Second is legal estate inventory, which is used for Amiri lands or for properties located outside of a given zoning plan. This inventory document is subject to the provisions of the Law on Transfer of Immovable Amiri Properties of 1928 and is issued by the Civil Magistrate Court. In such cases, the court issues a decision determining the rights holders for Amiri lands to be passed down. Here the share for male heirs is equal to that of female heirs, regardless of their degree of kinship to the deceased. 

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-06-14 18:12:372022-06-15 12:01:30Explained: Rules for Inheritance

Displaced Women from Qusayr Fear to Return

14-06-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

Despite the harsh living conditions in displacement camps in Lebanon, some Syrian women prefer not to return to their home city of Qusayr, located in the rural southwestern part of Homs governorate. Returning poses a high risk amid the widespread destruction to many homes and a slim likelihood of repairing or rehabilitating them, as Hezbollah holds direct military and security control over Qusayr.

A decade ago, Umm Mohammad was displaced to Lebanon from her home village in the countryside outside Qusayr. A widow in her 30s raising six children, she moved between camps and faced poor housing conditions. Most recently, she ended up in a camp where she pays annual rent to a landowner to live in a tent with her children.

Umm Mohammad was forced to flee Qusayr after her husband was killed during clashes between Syrian opposition forces and the Lebanese Hezbollah group in 2013. He had been the family’s sole breadwinner and worked as a tractor operator on farmlands owned by other people, Umm Mohammad told The Syria Report. According to her, Hezbollah not only killed her husband, but also destroyed their home and confiscated the tractor, the family’s sole source of income. Since then, Umm Mohammad and her children have been homeless and without income. She did not work prior to her husband’s killing and did not study past elementary school, leaving her with no choice but to leave to Lebanon, she said.

Umm Mohammad showed the title deed for her destroyed home to a correspondent for The Syria Report, explaining that she is afraid to return to Qusayr. She fears pursuit by security forces, as well as the possibility of declaring her possession of the title deed.

Qusayr is located within the Homs governorate some 15 kilometres from the Lebanese border and encompasses more than 80 surrounding towns and villages. Hezbollah and Syrian regime forces took control of Qusayr in June 2013, displacing around 50,000 people–that is, the majority of residents of Qusayr and the surrounding countryside–to Lebanon. Since then, Hezbollah has run Qusayr as a military zone, with training camps, weapons depots, an airport and barracks. Today, Qusayr is considered to be under Hezbollah, rather than Syrian state control. There is also a great deal of confusion surrounding housing, land and property rights in the area, as only a handful of displaced people were permitted to return home to Qusayr. Widespread demolitions and physical changes to many parts of Qusayr as it became a military zone have also contributed to the confusion.

The Syria Report also met with Maryam, a widow in her 40s from Qusayr. Her house was destroyed 10 years ago by a Hezbollah missile, killing her husband and disabling her youngest child, she said. Maryam has no place to return to in Qusayr, and prefers to stay in the Syrian displacement camps in Lebanon. “My house was destroyed, and all the residents of the village were displaced,” she said. “I don’t have any more family members there.” On top of that, Maryam’s oldest son will soon turn 18 years old, making him eligible for compulsory military service in Syria. For Maryam, returning to Qusayr is out of the question, despite all the difficulties of staying in Lebanon.

The Qusayr City Council announced the issuance of a new zoning plan for the city in October 2018, in accordance with the controversial Law No. 10. The 2018 law stipulates that one or more development zones may be established within the general zoning plans of an administrative unit. Through the new zoning plan, Qusayr became the first instance of Law No. 10 being applied in practice. The city council announced a one-month deadline for people to submit objections to the new zoning plan, despite most residents having been displaced. Then in November 2018, Law No. 10 was amended, extending the deadline for objections to one year. Still, the Qusayr City Council made no announcement to extend their deadline. And four years after its supposed implementation, no further details or announcements have been issued about the new zoning plan.

 

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-06-14 18:08:332022-06-15 12:02:30Displaced Women from Qusayr Fear to Return

Multiple Committees Working to Remove Rubble in Yarmouk

07-06-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

The Damascus governorate appears to be moving towards implementing the provisions of Law No. 3 of 2018, which concerns rubble removal, in parts of the Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp. It is still unclear how the law will be implemented, especially as a previous committee set up to remove rubble from the camp remains in existence.

The Action Group for Palestinians of Syria, a rights organisation, reported in mid-May 2022 that the Damascus governorate had agreed to remove rubble from the Yarmouk camp in accordance with Law No. 3 of 2018. According to the Action Group, the move was meant to address the buildings damaged during battles and was aimed at removing those that violated construction codes according to various laws, most notably Decree No. 40 of 2012.

To begin implementing Law No. 3 in any part of Syria, the governor of that area issues a decree specifying the real estate area and damaged buildings to be removed, based on a proposal from the local administrative unit. This decree must be published in the Official Gazette. The governor of Damascus has issued no such decree so far for Yarmouk. In any case, after issuance of a decree, the governor forms a committee to categorise the damaged buildings and verify who owns them. The committee also determines the structural integrity of the buildings in question and recommends whether to demolish them completely or partially or to leave them intact.

Strangely, a committee already exists called the Yarmouk Committee for Rubble Removal and Restoration of the Old Cemetery, which has supervised the removal of rubble from the camp in recent months. This committee was formed in September 2018 by a decision from the Commitee to Monitor the Return of Displaced Palestinians to the Yarmouk Camp. The latter includes representatives from various Palestinian-Syrian organisations, most notably the Higher Follow-Up Committee for Palestinian Factions, the General Administration for Palestine Arab Refugees (GAPAR) and the ambassador of the Palestinian Authority in Damascus, in coordination with relevant Syrian authorities. The Yarmouk Committee met in November 2021 with the president of the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah, thanking him for covering their work expenses and suggesting he would continue to provide support. It remains unclear whether the Yarmouk Committee is working in accordance with Law No. 3.

In implementing Law No. 3, it is also unclear whether the Damascus governorate will simply rely on previous work carried out by the Yarmouk Committee or form a new committee. Over the course of 2021, the existing committee worked to classify buildings in the camp, sorting them into three categories that it posted on the buildings’ entryways: those that are habitable, denoted by an empty circle; those that may be restored, denoted by a circle with a slash; and those that are uninhabitable, denoted by a circle with an “X”. Such work appears to be consistent with the tasks of the categorisation and ownership documentation committee stipulated in Law No. 3.

Notably, the Yarmouk Committee announced in mid-February 2022 that it had stopped its work. It didn’t provide a reason. Citing committee members, activists said that the committee had halted because it ran out of funds. However, a source informed on the matter told The Syria Report that the Damascus governorate had requested that the committee stop its work–again, without providing a reason.

Before halting work in February, the Yarmouk Committee asked returnees to clear their homes of debris and leave it in the streets for the committee to later remove. However, the committee tasked by Law No. 3 with classifying buildings and documenting their ownership has no direct role in removing such rubble.

According to a correspondent for The Syria Report, many Yarmouk returnees – whether permanent or temporary – had already removed the debris from their homes and piled it into the streets. This has caused an overflow of rubble, especially in the Al-Taqaddom, Al-Thawra, Al-Aroubeh and 15th Street neighbourhoods. These are the areas in which Law No. 3 implementation is set to begin.

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Explained: Leasing Endowment Properties

07-06-2022/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

Endowments properties, particularly those located in opposition-held territory, are today the centre of much discussion about the most appropriate way to invest in them or build housing projects in their place.

Some endowment properties are private agricultural lands allocated by their owners as being for charitable (“for the sake of God”), i.e. for public benefit. An endowment property is a property that the owner willingly loses possession of in order to transfer its benefits to the public. Ownership of such property may not be transferred to anyone. Endowment properties have a special nature, in that they are neither state-owned nor privately owned. Most of these properties were originally owned by individuals who donated them.

Leasing and investing in endowment properties

Leasing endowment properties is an acknowledged practice in Islamic jurisprudence. It is also oftentimes a point of dispute between those who authorise leasing such properties long term and those who do not. Syrian laws permit leasing endowment properties for long term so long as there is a greater benefit to the endowment funds and to society. This is consistent with jurisprudence that says it is possible to invest endowment properties to obtain a greater profit that can contribute to social endowment goals. This principle can be seen in the granting of investment rights and right of usufruct to others, in exchange for rental payments to the Ministry of Religious Endowments, while the property remains under endowment ownership.

Before 2011, the Ministry of Religious Endowments used public auctions to lease endowment properties, whether those properties were agricultural lands, residential units, or commercial shops. Resulting tenants then paid a sum of money called a “gift” to the Endowments Directorate, alongside a symbolic annual rent. The lease has a fixed term, but can be renewed. The provisions on leasing that are mentioned within the Civil Code (issued in 1949) apply to these properties as well on the condition that they be documented by the Ministry of Religious Endowments and its directorates.

After 2011, endowment properties were subject to many violations, including tenants’ refusal to pay rent or seizure of endowment land for the purpose of illegal construction. Many such violations occurred in opposition-held areas, especially in rural Aleppo governorate amid an urgent need for housing and other resources for displaced people. Since 2018, opposition-run local councils and endowment offices have worked to reorganise and manage endowment properties, whether by removing those who seized such properties, re-appraising rental prices, or even investing them in projects that yield a greater benefit to endowments and to the public.

The ‘right of two leases’

Article 1004 and subsequent articles of the Civil Code expanded endowment leasing rights by giving endowments directorates the right to take greater advantage of such properties for long rental periods, through what is known as “the right of two leases.” Under this right, an individual may permanently acquire the right to use and exploit an endowment property in exchange for a payment lower than the actual value of the property, in addition to a symbolic annual rent. This individual may then use the property, benefit from it, or even pass it along to others. The right of usufruct may also be passed down to heirs, though the property must remain categorised as an endowment.

Under the right of two leases, the owners is considered the original in rem rights holder for the property, as recorded in the property’s Land Registry page in accordance with Article 4 of Decree No. 189 of 1926, which concerns the executive regulations of the Land Registry Law.

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Turkey’s Project for ‘Voluntary’ Return of Syrian Refugees

07-06-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

Turkish officials have recently increased talk of “voluntary” repatriation for more than one million Syrian refugees currently living in Turkey to Syrian soil. The project would include the establishment of new residential areas in northern Syria to accommodate returnees.

Turkey has already carried out three military operations in northern Syria in cooperation with Syrian opposition factions: Operation Euphrates Shield in 2016 against Islamic State forces in rural eastern Aleppo governorate; Operation Olive Branch in early 2018 against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in rural western Aleppo; and Operation Peace Spring in October 2019 against the SDF in rural Hassakeh and Raqqa governorates. Following each of these three operations, Turkey established local governing bodies, security and judicial structures, and armed contingents. The voluntary returns project would include the establishment of new residential settlements in those areas.

Also, the voluntary returns project could also include repatriating refugees in areas currently controlled by the SDF, the armed wing of the majority-Kurdish Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria (AANES). Such areas are especially likely to include Tal Rifaat and Manbij in the rural part of Aleppo governorate. The project has spurred increased media attention not only about possible returns, but also about a potential Turkish military operation targeting SDF-controlled areas.

In May, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that his government was working to build 200-250,000 units in 13 different residential complexes of Syria with funding from international organisations in order to repatriate more than one million Syrian refugees. The Turkish Interior Minister said in February 2022, that about 3.7 million Syrians live in Turkey under international protection.

Turkey’s Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) was the first to announce the voluntary returns project in mid-March 2022. The organisation asked NGOs that specialise in building residential projects for displaced persons to present studies for potential projects with the aim of repatriating one and a half million Syrians from Turkey.

Among the most notable areas where the residential projects may be built are Jarablus, Al-Bab, Afrin, Idlib, Tal Abyad and Ras Al-Ayn, with dwellings ranging from 40 to 80 square metres.

According to statements and leaks to the media, the general outline for Turkey’s repatriation plan includes several stages: securing international funding, constructing the residential projects (including schools and hospitals), and providing infrastructure. The plan also includes establishment of industrial and commercial zones with the aim of creating jobs for returnees.

The repatriation project is still in its initial brainstorming stage and may take years to actually implement. Even so, precise details have made their way to the media, such as one provision that refugees who return to Syria will receive a ready-made, furnished home with right of usufruct for a period of five to 10 years. Such details may simply be meant to promote or encourage returns. Indeed, it is difficult at this stage to separate the facts on the ground from political exploitation of the Syrian refugee issue in Turkey, especially as the 2023 Turkish general elections approach.

There is also a great deal of confusion in the media about the difference between the proposed voluntary return project and an already existing project to build alternative residential units and distribute them to residents of northern Syria displacement camps. The former is related only to Syrian refugees in Turkey and is merely in the initial stages, while the latter, which has already begun implementation, targets displaced people living in camps in Syria along the Turkish border.

It is not yet clear where the residential areas for the new project will be built, who currently owns that land and how those owners will be compensated. The land for previously constructed displacement camps and residential projects in northwestern Syria varied between endowment ownership, public ownership, and private ownership.

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Demolished Properties and Exaggerated Returnee Numbers in Rural Homs

07-06-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

On May 24, the president of the Rastan City Council, in the northern part of Homs governorate, told the semi-official newspaper Al-Watan that work was fully underway to remove rubble, restore homes, and demolish buildings that are at risk of collapse. He also said that most people who had been displaced from Rastan had returned and that the necessary assistance was being provided to facilitate the return home of others, too.

However, the city council president provided exaggerated numbers of returnees and demolished homes, even overstating how much rubble had been cleared, according to local sources who spoke with The Syria Report.

Rastan is located along the Aleppo-Damascus international highway, some 21 kilometres from the centre of Homs city. The city was home to around 85,000 people in 2011. In early 2012, opposition forces took control of Rastan, and like other towns and cities across the northern Homs governorate, it came under a punishing siege for six years. During that period, Rastan faced heavy artillery fire and airstrikes that destroyed infrastructure, official government buildings, and civilian homes. In 2017, a census survey conducted by the opposition-run local council found that around 55,000 people were still living in Rastan, meaning around 30,000 had fled. A large portion of them were displaced to regime-held areas, while others left to seek asylum abroad.

In May 2018, the opposition in the rural northern part of the Homs governorate agreed to a reconciliation deal with the regime. The deal included expelling opposition faction members and any remaining civilians who did not wish to reconcile. Around 25,000 people were forcibly displaced as a result of the agreement and transported to opposition-held areas in northern Syria. After the implementation of the agreement, around 30,000 people remained in Rastan.

The city council president told Al-Watan that around 16,000 of an original 20,000 displaced people had returned to their homes in Rastan. According to a correspondent for The Syria Report in the area, the returnees were limited to those who had fled Rastan during the period of opposition control between 2012 and 2018. The correspondent added that many of those returnees had not come back to settle down permanently in Rastan, but rather to visit and inspect their properties in the city. Rastan has not yet been rehabilitated to the extent that returnees can resettle in the area, with most of its neighbourhoods still destroyed. In addition, the costs of restoring homes is far too expensive for most residents.

The city council president added that around 250 homes have thus far been restored by the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC). The restoration work included fixing doors and windows and providing water tanks. A committee of SARC volunteers in Rastan chose homes for restoration based on a set of criteria, the local correspondent said. For example, one criterion was that the owners of a given house are without a breadwinner, though taking into account the scale of damage to the home. However, observing the beneficiaries of the restoration work seems to indicate that the preferences of security and military officials were the most important factor in choosing which homes to restore. Additionally, the correspondent noted that in most cases the restoration work amounted to no more than providing three wooden doors and five aluminum window frames per house.

The city council president went on to say that the council had cooperated with Rastan residents to demolish around 100 destroyed homes that were at risk of collapse and a threat to public safety. However, the correspondent expressed doubt over the number reported by the president, suggesting that 100 was an exaggeration. The Syria Report was unable to independently confirm the precise number of demolished homes. According to the correspondent, the city council lacks the means and funding to carry out demolitions on such a scale, while residents themselves often incur these costs.

Finally, the city council president said that the council had cooperated with local actors to remove around 5,000 square metres of rubble, while the Military Construction Establishment had removed 10,000 square metres of rubble. According to the correspondent, the Military Construction Establishment had indeed removed the bulk of the rubble, while the contribution by the City Council was much smaller than stated.

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Recurring Auctions of Absentees’ Lands in Hama, Precautionary Asset Seizures Against Investors

31-05-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

In May, for the fourth year in a row, the Hama governorate held a series of public auctionsy for lands belonging to absentee pistachio farmers. The auctions, which target farmlands owned by forcibly displaced people, appear to have become an annual occasion.

Similar to previous auctions, on May 8, the Hama governorate announced that it would hold a new round of public auctions between May 15 and 21. According to the announcement, the auctions were held in accordance with Public Contracts Law No. 51 of 2004 which addresses the properties of public entities. The auctions were also based on the Ministry of Agriculture Letter No. 438 which was issued on April 23, 2022. The announcement stipulates that potential investors taking part in the auctions may not include more than one real estate area within one investment application.

On May 12, a central committee, tasked with allocating displaced or absentee farmers’ lands for investment, convened in the presence of the Hama governor, the governorate police chief, and the head of the farmers’ office in the Hama branch of the ruling Baath Party. Among the committee’s most important decisions was to give priority to hopeful pistachio farmland investors who are paternal relatives of the original owner, though only up to the fourth degree. In the previous growing season, only relatives up to the third degree were given priority, though both paternal and maternal relatives were accepted. First-degree relatives are parents; second-degree are siblings; third-degree are aunts, uncles, nieces and nephews; and fourth-degree are cousins.

Initial deposit payments

The Hama governorate set May 21 as the deadline for investors to pay their initial deposits on pistachio farms being offered for the 2022 agricultural season. Applicants for the pistachio farms were required to pay the deposits to the Financial Directorate or to the Central Bank branch in Hama. Unlike previous pistachio farm auctions, which have been held annually since 2019, applicants for this year’s public auctions could invest only in one agricultural season, and their investment periods can not be renewed. The change could indicate that the Hama governorate hopes to raise the cost of investment next year.

Last winter, a group of “spatial technical” committees in Hama tallied the properties of displaced pistachio farmers in preparation for offering them for investment at public auctions. Based on that tally, the Hama governorate issued a list on April 26 that included the lands on offer for the 2022 agricultural season. The list was posted on the governorate’s General Secretariat bulletin board, as well as in the Directorate of Agriculture and associated outreach centres. The governorate gave residents until May 12 to submit any objections to the lists. People who object to their lands being offered for investment must submit documents proving their ownership of the lands, as well as their personal presence within regime-held territory. The resulting objections were submitted to the Hama governorate’s General Secretariat through a single drop-off point.

Precautionary asset seizure

On February 16, the Hama governorate issued a final warning to investors who had failed to pay their financial dues, urging them to visit the General Secretariat and pay before March 3.

In the first move of its kind, the Ministry of Finance imposed a precautionary “administrative seizure” of movable and immovable assets belonging to AbdulKarim Al-Amouri and his wife, a couple in the rural Hama city of Morek. They were targeted for the asset seizure because Al-Amouri failed to pay the value of Investment Contract No. 278 for pistachio farmland in rural Hama. According to the Ministry of Finance, Al-Amouri is now obligated to pay more than SYP 13 million for the investment contract, as well as a late fee and the value of any stamps and interest. The Hama governorate published Al-Amouri’s precautionary asset decision publicly, a move that one local investor told The Syria Report was intended to serve as a warning to other investors.

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Rubble Scavengers Killed as Building Collapses in Jobar

31-05-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

Four people, including a child and a woman, were killed after the roof of a cracked building collapsed on top of them in the Damascus neighbourhood of Jobar.

The victims had been in the building to collect rubble – materials that they could sell or recycle, such as metals, wood, plastic, ceramics and other items. It is unclear whether they had caused the roof to collapse by sorting through the rubble. Rubble scavengers often use heavy sledgehammers to extract iron rebar from concrete or break apart large blocks to search beneath. The four victims were stuck under the rubble for a period of time before personnel from a nearby security checkpoint removed their bodies, according to the pro-opposition media outlet Sawt Al-Asimah.

Jobar has been enclosed by security and military checkpoints since regime forces retook the area in 2018, preventing residents who own homes in the neighbourhood from returning. However, checkpoint personnel do allow rubble scavengers to enter Jobar and sort through the debris in return for a portion of the profits.

Originally part of Eastern Ghouta, Jobar was a small village surrounded by agricultural land, similar to the Qaboun and Barzeh neighbourhoods. Jobar was annexed to Damascus in 1968, according to the zoning plan for the capital city drawn up by French architect Michel Écochard. With time, Jobar developed into an urban expansion of Damascus and became the city’s entrypoint to Eastern Ghouta. The southern ring highway separates Jobar from the Eastern Ghouta towns of Ain Tarma and Zamalka.

Jobar underwent rapid urban growth in the 1970s that engulfed much of its agricultural land. Legally classifying the remainder of the land as agricultural did not help prevent construction on the land, such mass informal housing which is prohibited on agricultural land and state property. After 2000, Jobar witnessed a new urban expansion plan within its ancient town centre, with the Damascus governorate granting construction licenses for some sites.

Jobar was under rebel control from 2012 to 2018 and became a first line of defense for opposition fighters in Eastern Ghouta. Opposition forces built many defense fortifications in the neighbourhood, especially trenches and tunnels. Stationed in Jobar, rebels posed a real threat to regime control of Damascus due to the neighbourhood’s proximity to Al-Abbasiyeen Square and Bab Touma. Jobar became the site of many intense battles and faced aerial bombardment by the regime, causing widespread damage to buildings.

Regime forces recaptured Eastern Ghouta in early 2018 and forcibly displaced the opposition to northern Syria. Jobar was among the last areas that the opposition forces surrendered. Since then, the regime has prevented people from entering Jobar as it continues a small-scale campaign to demolish buildings and remove rubble.

In September 2021, the Damascus governorate council agreed to amend the urban classification of the Jobar real estate area and some surrounding areas from a protected agricultural and residential expansion area into an area undergoing re-zoning. This amendment was named Detailed Zoning Plan No. 106 and included the real estate areas of Qaboun, Arbeen, Zamalka, Jobar, Ayn Tarma, and Masjid Al-Aqsab. The Damascus governorate refers to this broader area as the “area that overlaps Damascus and its countryside.”

The announcement in September lacked some clarity, as detailed zoning plans are not meant to be issued until after issuance of general zoning plans. According to other statements by Damascus governorate officials, what was issued in September was actually the general draft zoning plan for Jobar, which is the step that precedes the general zoning plan.

In any case, the expected next step is issuance of the new zoning plan for Jobar. According to governorate officials, the new plan will account for the structural safety of undamaged and repairable buildings, while damaged ones will be removed.

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Explained: Public Safety Committees

31-05-2022/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

Recently in Syria there has been an increased reliance on engineering reports issued by public safety committees to determine structural dangers of buildings, especially in areas affected by fighting during the conflict. Obtaining such reports has become a condition for displaced people who seek to return to their homes in some partially damaged neighbourhoods.

Despite the importance of these reports, as well as the dangers they pose for housing, land, and property rights, there is no clear definition of the public safety committees, nor is there a clear and unified description of their mission and the nature of their work. There are also doubts about the supposed impartiality of these committees, amid accusations from members of the opposition that committees are subject to intervention by state security services.

The Local Administration Law, which was issued as part of Decree No. 107 of 2011, allowed administrative unit councils to form multiple permanent or temporary committees, composed of their own members or non-member experts, to undertake certain tasks. Under Decree No. 107, the Ministry of Local Administration’s rules of procedure determine the nature, composition, and work methods of these committees. The Syria Report was unable to obtain a copy of these rules.

In general, an administrative unit council may form one or more public safety committee and give it tasks that vary from studying available ways to dispose of removing medical waste to addressing structural safety issues for buildings at risk of collapse. The public safety committee’s size may range from six to twenty members.

There are many types of public safety committees, including engineering committees that are responsible for issuing structural safety reports for buildings or reports on the extent of damage in certain areas. Sometimes these committees are referred to as technical committees, structural cohesion committees, construction and reconstruction committees, and damaged building evaluation committees. The different titles are due to the lack of a unified criteria for naming the committees and defining their tasks, often leading to confusion.

It is worth noting here that Syria’s Syndicate of Engineers also carries out studies on the structural safety of buildings. However, it is up to the administrative unit to receive assistance either from the syndicate or by forming its own public safety committee. This article addresses only the latter.

Law No. 40 of 2012, which addresses the removal of construction code violations, is the only law to explicitly mention public safety committees. Under Article 2 of the law, buildings that violate construction codes and are at risk of collapse must be removed, and those responsible for constructing them fined and imprisoned. Such actions are based on the findings of the governorate’s public safety committee.

Administrative units have become increasingly reliant on the work of public safety committees, especially in areas damaged by wartime fighting. The committees are now responsible for determining the levels of danger buildings face, as well as recommending whether certain buildings should be removed, reinforced, or maintained in their current form.

In some formerly opposition-held areas that have been retaken by the regime in recent years, such as Al-Hajar Al-Aswad in Damascus, forcibly displaced residents who wish to return home must fulfil certain conditions. One condition is that a technical committee from the municipality must inspect the home that the person wishes to return to and assess the damage. If the committee finds the building habitable, then the homeowner must apply to the municipality for a restoration permit.

The Aleppo City Council demolished and removed several residential blocks in eastern Aleppo in March 2022 after the city’s public safety committee discovered dangerous cracks in the buildings. Later in April, the council demolished buildings in the western part of the city after the committee reported that the structures were in violation of construction codes or at risk of collapse. Meanwhile, the demolitions in western Aleppo appeared to be political in nature, as they targeted buildings owned by absentees, most of whom were forcibly displaced to opposition territory outside of regime-held Aleppo city.

In Damascus’ Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp, a structural cohesion committee worked with the General Company for Engineering Studies in 2019 to examine properties and determine whether they were habitable and in need of reinforcement, or destroyed and uninhabitable. The committee also suggested building additional storeys atop buildings that had been deemed safe.

Public safety committee reports play a large role in determining the fate of certain urban areas. Committees may assess the degree of damage to a certain area, sometimes referred to as an area’s zoning factor. Based on this factor, an administrative unit may decide to close the area and demolish it completely or issue a new zoning plan for the area, similar to what happened in the Qaboun Industrial Zone. In this case, the Syndicate of Engineers in Damascus issued a structural safety report for the industrial zone that contradicted the public safety committee’s report. The difference may indicate politicised reporting on the part of the public safety committee.

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Fault Line Threatens Buildings in RuknEddin Neighbourhood of Damascus

31-05-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

On May 21, the Damascus governorate evacuated residents of 18 homes in the Wadi Al-Safirah area of the RuknEddin neighbourhood, known informally as the “Kurdish quarter,” which is located at the base of Mount Qasioun. The evacuation came after a fissure appeared in the ground along a fault line, causing some stone formations to collapse.

The fault line is linked to a series of underground caves in Damascus about 10 kilometres long and 20-30 metres wide. It extends along the foot of Mount Qasioun from Barzeh to Al-Mazzeh, passing through the RuknEddin and Al-Muhajireen neighbourhoods. The first mention of a potentially destructive fault line came in 2008. At the time, the state-owned Al-Thawra newspaper published statements by Damascus governorate officials warning that thousands of people living at the base of Mount Qasioun were at risk from building collapses due to potential seismic activity. Since then, officials have repeatedly spoke of plans to evacuate RuknEddin residents. The plans included providing alternative housing for residents living next to the fault line. However, none of the plans have been put in motion.

On May 21, the director of the Department of Services in the Damascus governorate told local media that a landslide within the boundaries of the fault line had occurred as a result of the land drying up after the rainy season. He added that the area is highly prone to landslides due to the fault line, and that a study was underway to study the soil in order to assess risk levels and necessary measures. The governorate said that it had secured temporary shelter for residents who wished to evacuate their homes and transported them to social support centre in the Dummar project. Other evacuated residents preferred to stay with friends or relatives.

There have been similar incidents in the past in the RuknEddin neighbourhood. In 2020, a one-story house collapsed near the Younes Agha Mosque. Earlier, in 2010, more than 20 buildings were evacuated along Al-Wadi road in Al-Sheikh Khaled neighbourhood after heavy rain and snow.

The Kurdish quarter in RuknEddin sprouted in the 1940s as a series of individual buildings scattered along the base of Mount Qasioun above the Yazid River. The area was inhabited mainly by Kurds and Circassions who had migrated to the capital city from the east. After the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Palestinian refugees also moved into the neighbourhood. Then, during the period of Syrian-Egyptian unification in 1958-1961, the neighbourhood was given the name RuknEddin .

In 1975, the Damascus governorate expropriated the land of RuknEddin , after which it was considered an informal settlement built on public property. The governorate did not carry out any serious zoning process for the area or any projects to rehabilitate local streets and infrastructure. Today, tens of thousands of people live in informal housing in RuknEddin with poor services. They also face the serious danger of their homes collapsing, as most were constructed without adhering to structural safety rules.

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Explained: Alternative Housing

24-05-2022/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

The alternative housing – which is housing granted as compensation for a demolished or expropriated home that was built informally or unregistered in the real estate records – is one of the confusing concepts in the Syrian laws. Because there is no clear definition for alternative housing and who it is meant to benefit, different laws have addressed the concept in various ways.

Syrian laws have usually ignored the rights of people who own built housing in informal neighbourhoods, especially homes built on publicly owned property, land expropriated by the state, or land categorised as agricultural, i.e. land on which homes are not legally permitted to be built.

The first mention of “compensatory housing” appeared in a presidential recommendation issued by former president Hafez Al-Assad in 1975. The recommendation stipulated that informal homes built of cement, i.e. reinforced concrete, may not be demolished without providing compensatory housing. The occasion and context of this recommendation remain unclear, as does its standing among existing laws and decrees. Still, the recommendation has an important function, as rights holders often use it to defend themselves against the expropriation or demolition of their properties.

Expropriation Law No. 20 of 1983 completely overlooked the rights of Syrians who own homes in informal neighbourhoods and failed to provide them with any compensation. The law did not even address the issue of compensation through alternative housing, even for owners of legally constructed housing that are targeted for expropriation (with the exception of homes that are expropriated in order to build public housing).

Real Estate Development and Investment Law No. 15 of 2008 mentions alternative housing multiple times, albeit with contradictions. Though the concept appears multiple times within the law, there is no clear definition or description of who stands to benefit from alternative housing. This lack of clarity makes the application of the law difficult, especially given that even the executive instructions fail to define the concept.

Article 11 of Law No. 15 stipulates that real estate developers must secure alternative housing either within or outside the real estate development zone, or pay a cash compensation to occupants who are slated to lose their housing. However, Article 11 refers only to properties owned by the real estate developer and to properties whose original owners subject the properties to the provisions of Law No. 15, in agreement with the developer. This only highlights the law’s ambiguity towards the meaning of alternative housing.

Article 14 of Law No. 15 gives the priority in real estate development to projects that aim to provide alternative housing to people whose homes are slated for demolition and to provide housing projects for people affected by natural disasters. Article 20 states that, as part of real estate development projects in informal housing neighbourhoods, the developer must provide alternative and appropriate housing for occupants of the development zone. The developer must either hand over the alternative housing to the relevant administrative authority or give monetary compensation to occupants who prefer to receive a cash allowance instead. After handing over the alternative housing, the local administrative unit must then evict occupants from their former homes and pass the emptied project site over to the real estate developer.

The concept of alternative housing took a more defined shape in a series of laws issued after 2011, and can be summarised as follows: alternative housing is housing that owners of homes within informal neighbourhoods may buy at their own expense in the event that their original homes are expropriated or demolished, or the areas in which they live are re-zoned. In practice, however, not all homeowners in informal neighbourhoods are entitled to an alternative house.

Legislative Decree No. 66 of 2012, which establishes two development zones within the general master plan for the city of Damascus, and its subsequent amendment, Law No. 10 of 2018, are among the most detailed laws on the subject of alternative housing. According to Decree No. 66, alternative housing is housing that someone, who was evicted from the home that they owned or lived in within the zone, may obtain. Beneficiaries must pay for their alternative housing; its cost is measured based on the estimated construction cost, through a series of interest-bearing instalments.

Decree No. 66 lists the two types of owners who are entitled to obtain alternative housing. According to the decree, people who built their homes on state property will receive a rental allowance for a maximum of two years, and can receive alternative housing only in the case that the local administrative unit where the zone is built still owns some homes after other beneficiaries received theirs. Also, people who owned agricultural land within the zones delineated by Decree No. 66 and built residential or commercial properties on it are entitled to an annual rental allowance until they are given alternative housing, again only in the case that alternative housing is available.

Other types of homeowners, for instance those whose housing was built with a proper licence on private property on which construction is permitted, benefit from shares in the new real estate developments, which they can trade or use to own a home.

Decision No. 112 of 2015, issued by the Minister of Housing, specifies the conditions for beneficiaries to  alternative housing. The demolished home must have existed and have been inhabited prior to the issuance of Decree No. 66. The occupant of that home must be an owner or tenant, and the primary breadwinner of the family should be residing with them. Inventory and description committees are required to verify any document proving home ownership, such as a title deed, a temporary registry statement, notarised proof of sale via power of attorney, a notarised lease contract, judicial rulings of the final degree, and any other official documents issued by legally authorised bodies.

It is important to highlight that the other main law that regulates the zoning of real estate areas makes no mention of alternative housing. Article 51 of the Planning and Urban Development Law No. 23 of 2015 explicitly states that people who constructed property atop publicly or privately owned land without a building licence, as well as those who purchased such properties, are entitled to take the rubble of their buildings. These homeowners may only be allocated alternative housing if the administrative unit has a housing surplus and, again, at a cost.

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Social Customs Hold Sway in the Inheritances of Ismaili Women

24-05-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

Women’s inheritance within the Ismaili sect in Syria rarely receives much attention because the sect lacks religious instructions on the issue. Thus, inheritances among Ismaeli women remain largely at the whim of social customs, families, individual cases, and social acceptance or rejection.

Similar to Alawites, Ismailis do not have special doctrinal status laws meant for their group, unlike other groups, such as Druze and Christians. On an official level, inheritance within the Ismaili sect is subject to the provisions of Personal Status Law No. 59 of 1953 and its amendments, which are based on Islamic Sharia. In practice, however, social customs appear to be a stronger factor in determining the rights of Ismaili women to their inheritance.

A correspondent for The Syria Report met with a group of women in the majority-Ismaili city of Salamieh in the Hama governorate. The women agreed to tell their personal stories of struggling with inheritance, though it is worth noting that their stories don’t reflect the situation in Salamieh  on the whole. Indeed, there does exist more positive inheritance cases among Ismaili women.

For years, Salma, a woman in her forties, lived in a Gulf country with her daughter and her husband, who is also her paternal cousin. She was forced to return to Salamieh  recently with her daughter after her husband, who was still a young man, died in a work accident. Neither Salma nor her daughter received any inheritance from him, she told The Syria Report. Salma added that her husband’s brother, who lives in the same Gulf country, pressured Salma to authorise a general power of attorney on his behalf. As soon as she did, Salma said, he pressured her to return to Syria with her daughter.

At first, Salma and her daughter stayed in a home belonging to her relatives. When Salma later decided to move to a house that her husband had owned, his relatives forbade her, on the pretext that “I’m a woman, and I cannot live alone and need support,” Salma said.

Because her late husband was also her cousin, Salma now faces her family alone. “I’m in the midst of a big conflict with my family. I was forced to appoint a lawyer, and through mediations, I’ve been seeking ways to obtain my rights and my daughter’s rights,” she said. Salma’s aunt, her mother-in-law, was the most stringent against Salma receiving a share of the inheritance. According to Salma, her aunt told her, “If you had a son, that would have changed things, but under the current circumstances, you won’t receive anything.”

Salma said she felt certain that she would receive her share of the inheritance through the court, even if it is meagre.

The Syria Report also spoke with Rudaina, a mother of one whose husband was killed in 2018 while fighting in a battle alongside the pro-regime National Defence Forces (NDF) in Salamieh. Rudaina received no compensation from the NDF except for some food baskets.

At the time, Rudaina was living in a house that her husband had inherited from his family. However, two months after Rudaina’s husband died, her father-in-law demanded that she and her daughter leave the house to live with her relatives. His excuse, Rudaina said, was that the house was not the property of her husband alone, but that it was now shared amongst his brothers after his death. One of the brothers wanted to marry and had no other place to live. “It isn’t good for you to live with your husband’s brother and new wife,” Rudaina said her father-in-law told her. Her late husband’s family pressured Rudaina until she agreed to move into a relative’s home, where her mother had been living alone. Rudaina’s father-in-law promised her that if he sold her late husband’s house, he’d give a share of the proceeds to her and her daughter.

Rudaina said she now fears that if her elderly mother dies she will become homeless again. She could lose her and her daughter’s right to live in her mother’s house, should her brothers decide to split the inheritance of the house amongst themselves.

Lastly, The Syria Report spoke with three sisters from Salamieh whose father had bequeathed them a house downtown. He did not allocate any inheritance for his sons, as they were all in good financial condition, and each of them owned more than one house.

However, after their father died of old age in 2004, the eldest brother demolished the house without the permission of his sisters. In its place he constructed a multi-storey building and gave each of his brothers an apartment. He gave each of his sisters SYP 200,000. This sparked outrage from the sisters, who have since stopped speaking with their oldest brother.

One of the three sisters, Munira, said that she feels they bear part of the responsibility because they failed to claim their right in court. This was due to a sense of shame over the negative social attitudes towards disputing inheritances, she said.

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Military Trench Spurs Fears of Additional HLP Violations in Rural Aleppo

24-05-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

The Turkish army is continuing its efforts to dig a military trench separating the opposition-held territory in the rural northwestern segment of the Aleppo governorate from territories under the control of the Syrian regime and Syrian Democratic Force (SDF). Though the digging began in early April in the countryside outside Jarablus, it halted when diggers reached the town of Tadef in May, where they confronted local protests against the trench’s potential housing, land, and property rights violations.

The trench is aimed at preventing the smuggling of goods between the different areas of control and tightening security in opposition territory, a commander of a Turkish-backed opposition faction told a local correspondent for The Syria Report. The opposition considers the trench to be a necessary fortification to strengthen its line of defense and better define the boundaries of its territory of control. This is all meant to reportedly stabilise the region, where Turkey plans to resettle more than one million Syrian refugees.

Before the trench diggers reached Tadef, residents organised protests against the project. Tadef is geographically split between opposition and regime control, and constructing a section of the planned trench through the town would only solidify the division. Residents have demanded that opposition forces and the Turkish army stop digging the trench, and instead resume military operations to seize the entirety of the town.

Opposition factions, supported by the Turkish army, captured the majority of Tadef in 2017 as part of Operation Euphrates Shield. The operation also expelled the Islamic State from the area. At the same time, the regime’s 25th Special Mission Forces Division, known more commonly as the Tiger Forces, captured the remaining part of Tadef with Russian military support. Since then, the town has remained split between the two sides.

Regime forces control around one third of Tadef, including buildings and agricultural land. This section of the town is empty of residents, though home to a slew of regime military sites and weapons depots. Most former residents of this part of the town were displaced to areas of opposition control in the northern countryside of the Aleppo governorate. Regime forces have forbidden residents from returning to the part of town under their control, deeming the area a closed military zone. Destruction is widespread in this zone due to bombardment, the demolition of homes, and the looting of iron rebar. Regime forces have also destroyed a number of homes on the pretext that they were owned by armed opposition members. Finally, many of the olive groves in this part of Tadef have faced excessive logging, with their wood destined for markets in the city of Aleppo.

Meanwhile, more than 2,000 families currently live in the section of Tadef under opposition control. Damage is also severe in this part of the town, also due to battles and bombardment. Homes located close to the line of contact with regime forces were converted into military points; opposition forces have prohibited expelled homeowners from returning.

On May 15, residents of Tadef began organising a popular demonstration and set up a protest tent to impede the digging of the trench, which by then had reached the town’s outskirts. Protesters met with opposition and Turkish officials, demanding that the digging cease. Digging halted temporarily due to the popular pressure, albeit without any official promises to reroute the trench. Residents demanded that the trench be dug alongside the southern outskirts of the town, so that the entirety of the town would be considered within opposition territory and displaced people could return home.

According to a protest organiser in Tadef who spoke with The Syria Report, the trench is around five metres deep and more than five metres wide. A 10-metre earthen berm is also in the works. The trench is reportedly being built within the opposition-held part of Tadef, a full kilometre from the line of contact with regime forces, meaning that a large portion of the town’s buildings and agricultural land will be lost or demolished. Half of the town’s residents are at risk of losing their properties and becoming displaced due to the trench, the protest organiser claimed. He added that, until now, neither the opposition nor the Turkish army have promised compensation for the potential losses should construction of the trench continue through the town.

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Rehabilitation of the Damascus Central Meat Market Threatens Tenants’ Rights

24-05-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

On February 15, the Damascus governorate called on tenants in the Central Meat Souq (Market), located in the Zablatani neighbourhood, to visit the Directorate of Property Affairs within one month to submit their personal documents and leases or investment contracts. The governorate will consider any failure to visit by merchants  the directorate as a surrender of their lease or investment contracts.

A member of the governorate’s executive office told the state-run news outlet SANA that the governorate was continuing to rehabilitate and maintain infrastructure within the market, and that it had removed more than 25,000 square metres of dirt and rubble. The official added that the governorate was providing facilities for merchants to begin restoring their shops, so that the market could reopen as soon as possible.

The Central Meat Souq is part of the larger Al-Hal Souq, also known as the Fruit and Vegetable Souq, in Damascus. It consists of three long hangars, each of which specialises in selling a certain type of meat. Within these three hangars are 138 shops, of which 85 are leased to merchants through permanent lease contracts and 53 are leased through fixed-term investment contracts.

Permanent lease contracts, known as furoogh contracts in Arabic, have no fixed duration. These contracts were signed before the issuance of Tenancy Law No. 10 of 2006 and are subject to a compulsory lease extension. Compulsory extension is an extension of a lease contract regardless of the will of the leasor, which in the case of the Al-Hal Souq is the Damascus governorate.

Under the furoogh system, shop tenants pay rent to the Damascus governorate, usually at a low price that cannot be increased. The tenant is entitled to hand over the shop, with all its materials and contents, to another tenant in exchange for what is known as a furoogh payment, which is equivalent to the shop’s real market value. The new tenant then takes over paying rent to the governorate.

As for fixed-term investment leasing, the governorate grants such contracts after conducting a public auction. The winner is the investor who offers to pay the highest amount in monthly rent. This system applies to contracts that were signed in accordance with Tenancy Law No. 10 of 2006, which are subject to the will of the contracting parties and last for a fixed and revocable term.

The Al-Hal Souq was established in the Zablatani neighbourhood of Damascus in 1987. The Central Meat Souq was added in 1999, on the side of the market that borders the Jobar neighbourhood of Damascus. Land for the souq was expropriated from private properties formerly owned by Jobar and Damascus residents for the benefit of the state. Prior to that, there were smaller, scattered meat markets in different parts of the city. Most merchants working in the Central Meat Souq are from Douma, and the Damascus neighbourhoods of Shaghour and Midan. The most popular shops in the souq are the Al-Haytham Butcher, the Al-Shalat Butcher, the Bakeer Butcher, and the Al-Ajami Butcher.

In October 2014, opposition forces stationed in East Ghouta attacked the Masharqa Military Barrack near the Central Meat Souq from the Jobar side. Opposition fighters managed to seize control of several points before later withdrawing. Afterwards, regime forces converted the Central Meat Souq into a military zone, fearing another attack by the opposition. This led tenants to move their businesses to other souqs in Damascus. Some of them left Syria altogether.

After regime forces regained control of East Ghouta in 2018, some merchants opened shops in the Central Meat Souq, albeit on an individual basis. The Damascus governorate at the time could not afford the costs of rehabilitating the souq, which would entail repairing infrastructure such as water and electrical networks, and removing rubble and garbage. This caused meat byproducts to build up within the souq and its outskirts, and foul smells to spread. A potential health crisis loomed as merchants were said to be selling spoiled and dirty meat.

According to an informed source who spoke with The Syria Report, the governorate’s request that Central Meat Souq merchants present their documents could have security-related motivations despite appearing to be an administrative matter. Some of the merchants had affiliations with the opposition, while others fled to opposition-held northern Syria or became refugees abroad. These merchants’ shops within the Central Meat Souq remained under their names in accordance with the furoogh lease contracts.

The source added that, according to the governorate’s announcement, the one-month deadline for merchants to present their documents means that they will lose their rights to their shops and be considered to have abandoned their lease contracts.

The Damascus governorate has also recently circulated an announcement requesting similar documents from all merchants in the Al-Hal Souq, the source said.

The entirety of the Zablatani neighbourhood is under the control of the Air Force Intelligence Division, which monitors the Central Meat Souq through its contingent within the market. Zablatani also features several checkpoints belonging to other security groups, including a checkpoint near the entrance of the Al-Hal Souq known as the “Million Checkpoint” for the fees its personnel impose on merchants wishing to bring their goods into the market.

There could also be economic motives behind the governorate’s rehabilitation of the Central Meat Souq. State media quoted a member of the governorate council as having said that rehabilitation of the souq would lower costs for merchants, eventually lowering the price of meat for consumers. Merchants in the Central Meat Souq purchase their goods from government slaughterhouses then sell them for less than retail price. Rehabilitation of the market is also expected to reign in sales of spoiled meat.

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Explained: What Happens to Absentees’ Properties When They Return Home?

17-05-2022/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

A new amnesty decree, Decree No. 7 of 2022, has brought back to the fore hypothetical questions regarding the fate of housing, land, and property rights for absentees, should they return home.

Syrian security apparatus have refused to acknowledge thousands of the forcibly disappeared people in the country’s detention centres or to announce whether they are alive or dead. In many cases, relatives of missing persons have been able to obtain oral confirmation about the death of their loved ones and, in some cases, even official death certificates. However, there is still some hope that the missing will come back home alive.

Syria’s Personal Status Law has provisions specifically addressing missing persons – i.e. people who may be dead or alive or whose location is unknown. A person is no longer considered “missing” when they return, die, or are judged to be dead. Under Article 31 of the Civil Code, the provisions of Islamic Sharia apply to a missing person if there are no other special laws being applied to them.

The Personal Status Law makes a distinction between three main types of cases in this regard:

First, cases of doubt over whether or not the missing person is dead or alive. In such cases, the missing person has all the legal liabilities of a living person.

Second, cases where the missing person is judged to be dead. Under Article 205 of the Personal Status Law, a judge rules a missing person to be dead at the request of concerned parties. In most cases, this judgement comes when the missing person reaches the age of 80 or if they have been missing for four years amidst extenuating circumstances, such as war. In both cases, the life of the missing person is considered to have ended and their estate is distributed to the heirs.

Third, cases where the missing person reappears living after they were judged dead. In such cases, if their estate has been distributed to their heirs, they are authorised to recover it. They also may receive any inheritance entitled to them from relatives who have died. There is only one condition for such recoveries and inheritances: that those properties and assets still exist. That is, the formerly missing person may only recover what remains of those assets and may not recover what their heirs have already disposed of or consumed. This is because the heirs in such cases did not independently seize those assets and properties by force, but rather inherited them based on a judicial ruling.

If a court judges that a missing person is dead, and the heirs distribute the person’s estate among themselves and transfer ownership to their names in the Land Registry, and then the missing person returns alive, the returnee may file a lawsuit to cancel the registration. This is because such distribution is contrary to the principles stipulated in Article 14 of Land Registry Law No. 188 of 1926. The lawsuit goes before the competent civil court in accordance with the value of the property under dispute. Such lawsuits to cancel an entry in the Land Registry are a type of personal real estate lawsuit filed by the plaintiff as either the owner of a debt or the individual entitled to confront a debtor. There is no need to record in the Land Registry that the lawsuit occurred.

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National Defence Forces Builds Church on Extorted Property in Mhardeh

17-05-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

The National Defence Forces, a paramilitary group loyal to the regime, has authorised the transformation of their former military headquarters into a church, which was built on extorted land in rural Hama.

The property, No. 98, is located on Tallet Al-Khoder near the Orontes River, north of the predominantly Christian city of Mhardeh, in the rural part of Hama governorate. The land is divided into two sections: one section that is barren and uncultivated, and the other that is cultivated with rain-fed seasonal crops.

Though originally owned by the well-known Al-Baroudi family of Hama city, Property No. 98 was distributed to local farmers under Agrarian Reform Law No. 161 of 1958. Therefore, the land is a common property jointly owned by majority-Sunni townspeople of the neighbouring towns of Abu Obeideh Bin Al-Jarrah and Al-Zulaqiyat.

Property No. 98 holds historic importance for both Muslims and Christians in the area, as it represented a site of religious co-existence prior to 2011. The property is home to a shrine that both Sunni Muslims and Christians consider important; Muslims call it the Sayidna Al-Khoder Shrine, while Christians refer to it as the Mar Jerjis Al-Khoder Shrine.

When battles intensified between opposition and regime forces in the area in 2013, the pro-regime National Defence Forces (NDF) in Mhardeh seized the whole property.

The property sits strategically on high ground, which allowed troops to scout out opposition forces in the nearby towns of Halfaya and Al-Latamneh in rural Hama. In mid-2013, the NDF set up a military headquarters on the property, just 100 metres from the religious shrine.

Since then, NDF fighters have barred landowners from entering the area, on the pretext that it is now a military zone. According to a correspondent for The Syria Report in the area, landowners are still unable to enter Property No. 98 and cultivate their land. Some of these property owners are now living in regime-held areas of Hama governorate, while others have been forcibly displaced to opposition territory since 2018.

Simon Al-Wakil is the NDF commander in Mhardeh and currently the most powerful man in the city. He enjoys good relations with Russian forces stationed at the nearby Hmeimim military base and presents himself as the protector of the Christian population in the area.

In early 2021, Al-Wakil gave the NDF’s military headquarters on Property No. 98 to the Mhardeh ecclesiastical authorities to build a small church next to the shrine called the Church of the Holy Martyrs. The church was reportedly meant to commemorate the martyrs from Mhardeh who recently died during the war. A Russian military delegation from the Hmeimim base visited the site meant for the church in early 2021.

Construction of the church took four months, with the NDF providing machinery. Some 5,233 stones were taken from the historic part of Mhardeh to build the church, while 4,000 trees were planted in the garden surrounding the building.

The church was consecrated in June 2021, with the Greek Orthodox Metropolitan of Homs and the Greek Orthodox Metropolitan of Baghdad and Kuwait and their dependencies. There was no official Syrian presence at the opening ceremony. Since then, the church has held religious rites and received visits from Syrian Christian clergy. Notably, the NDF still organises military and security meetings in the church, according to the correspondent.

The Sacred Martyrs Church and the nearby shrine

Source: The Martyrs Church of Mhardeh Facebook page

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Read also

  • A New Classification for Housing Cooperatives: Between Project Completion, Dissolution and Liquidation
  • Decree No. 66 of 2012: Objections and Judicial Proceedings Following the Reparation Package
  • Reconstruction Through Reduced Engineers’ Fees: Engineering Fee Exemptions Fall Short of Enabling Displaced People to Return to Their Areas
  • Rising Rents in Damascus and Its Nearby Suburbs: Demand Pressure and Limited Supply
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