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Explained: Real Estate and Building Plots Income Taxes

25-01-2022/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

Syria’s Real Estate and Building Plots Income Tax Law, issued as part of Decree No. 53 of 2006, imposed an annual tax on real estate and buildings of all kinds, whether partially or fully constructed, for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes.

Real estate income is rental income calculated in accordance with the provisions of Decree No. 53. Building Plots (referred to in the Arabic text of the law as “al-aarsat”) are defined in the 2006 law as any plot of land set aside for construction or other similar uses and not owned by any public institution or charitable organisation. Such properties are located within the zoning plans of local administrative units. In short, the real estate and building plots income tax targets profits or income generated by real estate or land used for construction. Under Decree No. 53, the annual tax is collected once at the beginning of each year.

The 2006 law and its executive instructions set various rates for the annual tax, calculated theoretically from the supposed income each liable individual earns by charging their tenants rent. Taxes range from 3.5 percent to 60 percent of the rent allowance, according to Decree No. 53.

Under the law, certain types of properties, such as public properties, are permanently exempt from the tax.

In 2013, the Parliament passed Law No. 15, which updated the Tax. Under the new 2013 law, 10 percent of the value of such properties were added to the annual tax to be collected starting in 2014.

So-called “initial committees” are responsible for assessing the value of real estate properties and determining their proceeds in order to set the tax. The committees are formed from the various governorate and regional centres and are each headed by an employee of the Ministry of Finance’s local Financial Directorate. Members include an engineer, assistant engineer or technician from the local Cadastral Affairs office or local council, as well as an approved real estate expert. The committees publish their work in the Official Gazette after basing their appraisals on the location, surface area, and building materials of the properties to be taxed.

The taxpayer and Financial Directorates may request a review of the initial assessments within 30 days of their notification or publication, with the objection taking place before a non-judicial appeals committee formed within the relevant governorate centre. The appeals committee’s decisions are final. The Minister of Finance appoints the members of a governorate’s initial committee and appeals committee based on a proposal from that governorate’s Director of Finance.

The real estate and building plots income tax is imposed on those who use a given property that is listed within the Land Registry, as well as on the actual owner and the person in possession of any buildings constructed on a piece of publicly owned property. In areas that are not covered by the Land Registry that lists ownership and certain transactions, the tax is imposed on all people who can prove their ownership of buildings via documents accepted by the Financial Directorates. A real estate income tax document itself is not considered sufficient proof of ownership.

The value of a given person’s real estate or building plot income may be re-assessed in several different scenarios: subdividing the property, merging the property with other properties, changing the basic description/category of the property, adding the property to an approved zoning plan, or changing the official usage of the property at the wish of the tenant or owner. A general 25 percent increase or decrease in the prices of local real estate may also trigger a re-assessment.

The tax includes any uncompleted facilities used for commercial or industrial purposes. Such facilities include those that are not yet fully constructed but have a roof, walls, columns, and support pillars. Also included are any commonly used parts of buildings, such as basements, stairways, and roofs, provided that they are occupied for residential or commercial purposes.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-01-25 14:38:572022-01-25 15:40:41Explained: Real Estate and Building Plots Income Taxes

Explained: Real Estate Experts

25-01-2022/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

The Real Estate Finance Oversight Commission (REFOC) held an exam in late 2021 to select real estate experts. Of the 155 trainees eligible for the exam, which was held at the Damascus University Faculty of Law, 127 actually took the test.

REFOC was established in 2009 in accordance with Law No. 39 of 2009, with the aim of regulating and supervising funding for the real estate sector; to protect the rights of various parties to the funding process; and to improve the performance of workers in this sector. The body, which is affiliated with the Ministry of Finance, is considered a legal entity and has financial and administrative independence. Under Law No. 39, real estate finance means financing the purchase, construction, renovation, or improvement of a home, service facility, or other property by guaranteeing the property’s lien, mortgaging the property, or through other means accepted by the financier.

Each real estate expert is granted their licence for one year and may renew it provided that they continue to undergo training and pay their fees. Real estate experts are individuals licenced by REFOC who practice the profession of appraising real estate and determining the values of different kinds of properties.

Law No. 8 of 2012, which focuses on real estate experts and the conditions for practicing their profession, specifies that applicants for the real estate expert exam must be Syrian citizens residing in Syria. They must have a university degree in economics, law, civil engineering, or architecture, be at least 25 years old, and must have spent two years as a trainee in a real estate office or in companies related to real estate and engineering.

Law No. 8 describes the stages of a real estate expert’s career as follows: First they are a real estate evaluator, or “mukhman,” then after five years they become a real estate appraiser, or “muqayyam.” Two years later they become a general real estate appraiser. The exact differences between an evaluator and an appraiser are difficult to distinguish. According to Law No. 8, real estate evaluation means estimating the value of properties based on a comparison with market prices, while an appraisal estimated the value of a property in accordance with the intention of the appraisal process and in compliance with certain criteria.

In this context, the Minister of Finance issued a decree in late 2021 in his capacity as chairperson of REFOC that listed the names of the 395 real estate experts who had been approved and licenced in Syria for the year 2022. The decree classifies those experts as real estate evaluators, appraisers, or general appraisers.

Law No. 8 of 2012 requires the assistance of real estate experts in any real estate financing process. This is why the work of these experts has become tied to the work of real estate finance companies and refinance companies, whose provisions were regulated by Law No. 15 of 2008. That being said, where such companies are absent, the field remains narrow for real estate experts, and is largely related to lending operations that use real estate as collateral through banks or lending for real estate purposes.

Broadly speaking, the Ministry of Finance has an ongoing trend of using real estate experts to appraise properties based on the co-called “current value,” in accordance with Real Estate Sales Law No. 15 of 2021 and Law No. 17 of 2021, which focuses on real estate registration fees. This trend emerged even more clearly when this year’s real estate expert exam included questions related to the aforementioned laws.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-01-25 14:36:122022-01-25 14:36:12Explained: Real Estate Experts

Title Deeds Issued for Organisational Shares in Basilia City

18-01-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

In December 2021, the Damascus governorate called on rights holders in the Basilia City area south of Damascus to submit applications for title deeds for their so-called “organisational shares” to the Directorate of Implementation of Decree No. 66. Basilia City is located south of the southern ring highway and covers 954 hectares of land, containing more than 100,000 title deeds according to official statements.

But before submitting their applications, rights holders must visit the Directorate for Implementation of Decree No. 66 in order to complete their personal data – including providing a copy of their ID and ownership contract – in order to print their organisational share deeds. It is unclear whether this completion of personal data is part of the application for the deed or if a separate application must be submitted to undergo this process.

Riyad Diab, head of the Directorate for Implementation of Decree No. 66, told local media that rightsholders may receive their organisational share title deeds five days after submitting their applications. He added that the directorate would distribute the deeds gradually and by real estate zone, from Kafr Sousseh to Darayya, then Mazzeh, Qanawat Basatin, and Midan Sultani. Distribution would take four months and be completed by early April 2022.

During the second session of the regular meeting of the Damascus governorate council on January 10, Diab told attendees that his directorate had distributed 4,000 of the total 14,000 deeds printed for the Kafr Sousseh real estate zone. However, the Kafr Sousseh real estate zone is split between Basilia City and the neighbouring Marota City project, making it unclear whether all of the 14,000 deeds were indeed for Basilia City. Diab added that half of the property owners in Kafr Sousseh had not yet completed their personal data to obtain the title deeds.

In accordance with Decree No. 66, the organisational shares for each rightsholder are calculated by several special committees in a complex process. Essentially, the first committee estimates the value of rights holders’ properties in Syrian pounds according to the “current value” on the date of evaluation. Then the development zone is converted to the common ownership of the rights holders, theoretically with each person retaining their equity. Afterwards, another committee estimates the values of organisational plots of land that are meant for construction and allocated only to the rights holders in accordance with the zoning plan. Meanwhile, the Damascus governorate is entitled to deduct large swathes of the development zone free of charge in order to create plots for investment or public services. Anyway, the values of organisational plots are also calculated in Syrian pounds, but there are no clear criteria for the appraisal process because the plots are not yet built upon. In any case, the value of the organisational plots is then divided among the rights holders according to their individual equities – this is how each rightsholder comes to obtain what is called an “organisational share”. Finally, the Directorate for Implementation of Decree No. 66 issues the nominal values for the organisational shares in each development zone.

Currently being printed are the title deeds for organisational shares in a development zone that is not yet built upon. Next, the trading process is expected to begin for those shares. According to official statements, people may only trade shares after the title deed distribution process is completed and may carry out the trading process for a period of one year. Afterwards people may apply for the allocation and selection of plots.

Several groups have formed in recent weeks on Facebook and WhatsApp, each of which includes dozens of big shareholders who had agreed amongst themselves on a unified price for the shares, an informed source told The Syria Report. Some of the group members were lawyers and notables from the area now covered by Basilia City. They offered advice and suggestions to other group members to agree on a standard share price. Still, share prices remain very low and are lower than those in the nearby Marota City project. Meanwhile, some other social media groups also emerged whose members are small shareholders. These shareholders might sell at low prices, with no public sales officially recorded so far.

Certain parties are likely to buy large numbers of shares with the aim of owning an entire organisational plot – this makes it easier to build on those plots or sell later on. Some large shareholders may also partner in some organisational plots. Usually, those with small shares resort simply to selling them, but if a part of the share remains unbought or unsold, it will later hinder the allocation and construction of many organisational plots. This is why the governorate is stressing the need to distribute all of the shares at this stage in order to ease the trading process.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-01-18 17:28:042022-01-20 07:32:48Title Deeds Issued for Organisational Shares in Basilia City

Accusations in Damascus Governorate Council Towards Former Directorate of Decree 66 Implementation

18-01-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

During the first and second meetings of the Damascus governorate council’s first session in January 2022, a dispute broke out shedding light on the duties of the previous Directorate for Implementation of Decree No. 66, particularly the issues regarding the distribution of organisational shares and residents’ lack of access to alternative housing in Marota City.

Official media outlets did not publish the names of the two Damascus governorate council members who exchanged accusations during the dispute. However, one of them was described as a former member of the parliament and the other as a current member. According to the semi-official Al-Watan newspaper, the first member accused the former administration of the Directorate for Implementation of Decree No. 66 of causing obstructions that resulted in an incorrect number of organizational shares granted in lieu of equities. He added that 2,500 families had not yet benefited from alternative housing. The second council member responded to these accusations, saying that no member has the right to address any council director without presenting any documents or records.

Decree No. 66 stipulated the creation of a special directorate within the Damascus governorate to implement the terms of the decree. The Minister of Local Administration would be in charge of appointing the administration’s members and determining its duties. Riyad Diab, a member of the Damascus governorate council, currently heads the directorate, while the former head was governorate council member Jamal Al-Youssef under former Damascus governor Bishr Al-Sabban.

Neither the Damascus governorate nor pro-regime media shared any further details about the disagreement, classifying the issue as a “dispute” between different viewpoints. The first council member’s accusations, as well as the responses to him, suggest that the media has avoided mentioning the responsibility of the previous Decree No. 66 directorate to distribute organizational shares.

However, during the same governorate council meeting, council member Ghaleb Uniz requested an amendment to the Ministry of Public Works and Housing Decree No. 112 of 2015, which concerns alternative housing. The 2015 decree had been issued to determine the mechanism for granting alternative housing stipulated within Decree No. 66. Decree No. 112 set several conditions for alternative housing, including that the house was inhabited before the issuance of Decree No. 66 and until the date of eviction, and that the occupant was either an owner or a tenant. The 2015 decree also obliged the administrative unit to verify the existence of official documents proving the ownership or tenancy of the occupants regardless of the property’s description in the land registries.

Mr Youssef said in 2019 that 8,200 people had declared their rights to alternative housing in Marota City. When screened by the Directorate of Cadastral Affairs, 5,500 were able to confirm their ownership, while the remaining 2,700 people could not.

The previous Directorate for Implementation of Decree No. 66 faced criticism on many fronts, including for the complicated conditions it imposed to prove ownership or tenancy, which were not mentioned in Decree No. 112. For example, the directorate required rights holders to present statements of emigration from the Department of Emigration and Passports in order to prevent emigrants from proving their property rights. Furthermore, some people who were otherwise eligible for alternative housing were unable to complete their files out of fear of arrest by the security forces or of forced mandatory military service.

Decree No. 66 entitled people who had built their homes on public property within the Decree No. 66 zone to receive rent compensation for a period of two years and to obtain alternative housing. Those who owned agricultural land and built housing or commercial properties on top of it could obtain annual rent compensation until they received their alternative housing. Meanwhile, whoever had been a tenant was given 30 and 40 percent of the rental property’s share depending on whether the property had been residential or commercial, respectively. Finally, those who owned agricultural land within the decree zone would only be entitled to financial compensation. In all cases, alternative housing is defined as housing given to those who owned or occupied residential property in the Decree No. 66 implementation zone and had vacated the property. Beneficiaries must pay for the alternative housing in interest-bearing installments according to the estimated construction costs.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-01-18 17:21:102022-01-18 17:21:10Accusations in Damascus Governorate Council Towards Former Directorate of Decree 66 Implementation

Law No. 10 Goes into Effect at the Northern Entrance to Damascus

18-01-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

The pace of implementation of Decree No. 237, issued on September 14, 2021, to establish a zoning area at the northern entrance to Damascus has quickened in recent weeks. The Damascus governorate appears determined to adhere to the timetable set for establishing the development zone in accordance with the provisions of Law No. 10 of 2018. The 2018 law authorises the creation of one or more such zones within the general zoning plan of an administrative unit. The northern entrance project is the first instance of the controversial law going into effect in Damascus governorate.

The more recent Decree No. 237 stipulated the creation of a development zone based on Zoning Plan No. 104, which was issued and approved in June 2019 in accordance with Law No. 10. The 200-hectare development zone encompassas the Qaboun Industrial Zone, which itself comprises 50 hectares of land carved out of neighbouring Harasta.

In October 2021, the Damascus governorate formed four committees tasked with the categorisation and inventory of real estate in the area. The governorate has granted rights holders a full year, starting from October 24, 2021, to submit documents proving their rights to the Directorate for Implementation of Decree No. 66, which is part of the governorate. According to official statements, the committees are expected to complete their categorisation and inventory work within three months – that is, by this upcoming February.

The Directorate for Implementation of Decree No. 66 oversees the development zone at Damascus’ northern entrance, despite the fact that its zoning plans fall under Law No. 10 – an indication that the Damascus governorate sees the two laws as complementary.

When the Inventory and Description Committee completes its duties, the Real Estate Appraisal committee will take over in order to determine the equities granted to right holders. Then, the Distribution Committee will convert these into development zone shares.

The Damascus governorate has wasted little time in carrying out this process. In late November 2021, the Directorate for Implementation of Decree No. 66 invited rights holders to convene at its headquarters in Al-Mazzeh to elect their representatives to the committees. On December 05, they elected two experts to represent them in the Real Estate Appraisal Committee and another two to represent them in the Distribution Committee. The Distribution Committee estimates the value of organisational plots of land within the development zone and distributes them to rights holders.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-01-18 16:44:222022-01-18 16:44:22Law No. 10 Goes into Effect at the Northern Entrance to Damascus

After Separation from Hama Governorate, Khan Sheikhoun Becomes Regime’s Administrative Centre for Idlib

18-01-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

In late 2021, the governor of Idlib announced that the administrations of the Idlib and Hama governorates were splitting, making Khan Sheikhoun the temporary administrative centre of the regime-held part of Idlib. Most of the Idlib governorate remains under the control of the  hardline Islamist opposition group Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham. The announcement came alongside an official media campaign encouraging displaced Khan Sheikhoun residents to return to the city, which has an official administrative headquarters but still lacks some basic public services. 

Since opposition forces captured the city of Idlib in 2015, the Syrian government has run its Idlib governorate branches and directorates in alternative “workspaces” in Hama governorate branches and directorates, so that people still living in regime areas could keep up with their official transactions. These workspaces included the electricity and health directorates, the Civil Registry, Cadastral Affairs, and others, as well as official bank branches. Meanwhile, both governorates maintained their own budgets and administrative structures. 

According to the governor of Idlib, the process of transferring those temporary Idlib governorate workspaces from Hama to Khan Seikhoun is now being completed. This process began in May 2020 with the opening of the Baath Party’s Idlib branch headquarters in Khan Sheikhoun alongside a headquarters for the Idlib governorate and a local police command. Afterwards the health and electricity directorates, technical services, and branches of the Farmers’ Union branches and Agricultural Bank were also moved to Khan Sheikhoun. Most of these bodies are now located in the buildings of former official headquarters, schools, and even some confiscated civilian homes, such as the Idlib Police Command, the Traffic Police, Electricity Department, and Water Unit. 

During his most recent visit to Khan Sheikhoun in December 2021, Prime Minister Hussein Arnous said that the funds allocated to Idlib governorate for 2022 were quadruple the 2021 funds, with the aim of rebuilding infrastructure and services. He added that the executive and political headquarters had moved to Khan Sheikhoun. 

Khan Sheikhoun is the third largest city in the Idlib governorate after Idlib city and Maaret Al-Numan and is located along the administrative border with Hama governorate, intersected by the M5 Aleppo-Lattakia highway. Regime forces recaptured Khan Sheikhoun on August 23, 2019, displacing nearly 30,000 residents to the opposition-held northern parts of the governorate. Only around 100 families currently live in the city, most of them in the eastern Al-Bireh neighbourhood. 

Mr Arnous alluded, albeit not clearly, to the role of civil society and international organisations in rehabilitating Khan Sheikhoun, saying he would “direct the organisations to support” the process. His words came amid the official media’s focus on the activities of the Idlib governorate, which it described as encouraging residents’ return. 

But contrary to the media campaign, Khan Sheikhoun, especially its western and northern neighbourhoods, still lack some basic services, according to a local correspondent for The Syria Report. Most of the streets are unpaved, sewers are exposed and damaged, and garbage and debris remains out in the open. In addition, some residents have been unable to obtain the necessary security permits to live in the city, which has barred them from receiving aid. No public transportation means that children must walk several kilometres through the debris to reach the only existing elementary school, which is in the Al-Bireh neighbourhood, the correspondent said. 

The Syrian Arab Red Crescent and the Charitable Society for Social Development (one of very few NGOs working in the regime-held part of the Idlib governorate) focus their work on Khan Sheikhoun and the town of Al-Tah, the birthplace of the Syrian Prime Minister. The Charitable Society has recently distributed so-called “productivity grants,” consisting of sheep and livestock feed provided by UNHCR, to some Khan Sheikhoun and Al-Tah residents. The Red Crescent also periodically distributes food baskets to residents and returnees.  

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2022-01-18 16:34:142022-01-18 16:34:14After Separation from Hama Governorate, Khan Sheikhoun Becomes Regime’s Administrative Centre for Idlib

Explained: Real Estate Taxes in the Financial Law of Administrative Units

11-01-2022/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

The Financial Law of Administrative Units No. 37 was issued on December 27, 2021, and is meant to regulate the fees and taxes collected by administrative units, as well as the methods for collection. The law also updated some real estate fees, basing them on the “current values” of real estate properties.

According to Local Administration Law No. 107 of 2011, an administrative unit is a governorate, city, town, or municipality and it has a legal character. Administrative units finance themselves through two sources. The first are direct fees, which an administrative unit collects directly in return for services that it provides or licences that it grants. These services may include the paving and lighting of public roads, urban planning costs, and construction licensing, among other things.

The second are indirect fees or percentages of fees and taxes collected by public authorities and then transferred to the administrative unit. These may include income taxes, taxes for non-built-on lands, property taxes, and transportation fees, etc. Law No. 37 granted administrative units 10 percent of property taxes and of non-built-on land taxes collected by the Finance Directorate within the Ministry of Finance. Fees collected throughout Syria are distributed to the administrative units according to percentages determined by the same law.

Law No. 37 also links the values of some fees to the so-called “current value” of real estate. For example, the new fee for obtaining a construction permit is one percent of the value of the total land area slated for construction, calculated at the current value of the land. The one percent fee also applies to what Law No. 37 describes as permits to rebuild or construct additions to existing buildings. It is unclear whether “rebuilding” refers to rehabilitating or repairing a property. In such cases, the permit fees for rehabilitating properties damaged by wartime hostilities will be affected.

Law No. 37 also uses the current value to determine the fees for property improvement. Property owners must pay these fees for both built-on and non-built-on land, surfaces, and land that have undergone improvement due to public interest works. Each administrative unit collects these fees within its administration boundary lines. The law defines works for the public interest as projects carried out by public and private institutions, such as opening or expanding roads, constructing retaining walls, markets, malls, public squares and parks (or expanding and fixing them), building bridges, waterways, covering rivers, applying laws regulating urbanisation, amending construction codes, and more.

Under Law No. 37, a committee formed by the governor determines the value of a property improvement no more than one month after determining the real estate zone in which the proposed improvement occurred. The law clarifies that the committee is meant to estimate the current value of the property both before and after the improvement, making the improvement tax equal to half the value of the property’s price increase.

Law No. 37 gave property owners the right to object to the committee’s estimates in cases of material or mathematical error so that the committee itself could correct the mistake. Finally, the law sets the State Council as the administrative judicial body with exclusive jurisdiction to handle appeals against the committee’s decisions.

 

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Syrian State Disregards Spouses of ‘Martyrs’

11-01-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

Despite surviving various hardships over the decade-long war, Syrian Alawite women are still deprived of basic property and housing rights. Among these women are those who have borne a great deal of the war’s challenges, such as the widowed wives of regime soldiers.

Rula is the widow of a Syrian army officer who was killed in 2014, leaving her to raise a young daughter alone. She told The Syria Report that her husband’s family changed their attitude towards her after his death, pressuring her to give up her share of the one-time financial compensation of SYP 1.5 million that the state grants to officers killed at war. Eventually, the family shared the compensation among themselves, leaving no money for Rula and her daughter.

That was only the beginning. The family insisted on expelling Rula, a teacher in her forties, from the house she shared with her daughter in a Damascus suburb. They said that they need the house, which is registered in the name of Rula’s father-in-law. Rula had little choice but to live temporarily with her brother in Damascus, after which she and her daughter moved back to her father’s home in the Lattakia Governorate, where she relocated her workplace.

Rula’s in-laws failed to show interest in her daughter because she is a girl and does not bear the family name, she said. The family only concerned itself with the daughter when Rula demanded her rights – that’s when the family suggested stripping Rula of her custody. This suggestion, which came as a surprise to Rula, was likely meant to push her to stop demanding that she receive the other compensations owed to her by the state, which can include financial aid, food baskets, and even her late husband’s salary.

Rula is not alone. Her case is similar to that of many Alawite women whose husbands died fighting in the Syrian army. The stories of widows whose late husbands’ families recognised their inheritance rights and rights to the state’s “martyr” compensation are the exception rather than the norm.

A source familiar with government aid to the family members of killed soldiers told The Syria Report that the state encourages male and familial hegemony and neglects widows, as the priority for assistance goes to the mother and father of the dead soldier before the wife and children. The Syrian state reveres the parents of “martyrs,” granting them certain privileges. In doing so, the entire family apportions the compensation for the death. The method for distributing aid and financial compensation only spreads further chaos, as it is given to whoever shows up first to receive it. The names of all of the deceased person’s family members (father, mother, wife, and children) are included on the list for such aid and any of them can collect it.

Reem, a 30-year-old woman from Tartous, was studying in university and had not yet found employment when her husband was killed during his mandatory military service in 2012. Reem had no children during her short marriage, but she began to face many challenges after the death of her husband who owned a small shop. First, her husband’s family abandoned her, according to Reem’s account. They expelled her from the home her husband owned and forbade her from coming to his shop. After a drawn-out dispute, the family agreed to grant Reem a share of the shop’s profits and part of his salary. This agreement held for only two months before the family stopped paying. Reem said she cannot afford to hire a lawyer to complete the inheritance process and that she fears further disputes with her late husband’s family who are influential in Tartous. She added: “Even the employment that the state grants to martyrs’ families was shared with my husband’s sister on the pretext that I have no children and that I will marry again someday!”

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Potential Armed Clash in Suweida Raises Concerns over HLP Rights

11-01-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

Threats of use of force between militants in a village in the eastern part of the Suweida Governorate have shed light on the precariousness of housing, land, and property rights. The incident also demonstrated that the most vulnerable local social groups are at the highest risk of losing those rights.

In mid-December 2021, the National Defence Forces (NDF), which are affiliated with the regime, threatened to attack the village of Al-Hariseh, which borders the desertous Badia area of eastern Suweida Governorate. The escalation came as part of an attempt by the NDF to expell an armed group calling itself the Anti-Terrorism Force from the village, amid a broader regime security and military deployment across the governorate. However, fear of military escalation prompted the most prominent leaders of the Anti-Terrorism Force in Al-Hariseh to quit the group in January 2022, lowering the risk of a potential clash and returning relative calm to the village.

Previously, the NDF tried encouraging residents of Al-Hariseh to expell Anti-Terrorism Force members from the village. For example, NDF members set up checkpoints and detonated shells in the air to incite fear. One of the shells landed on a house on November 19, partially destroying it. The Anti-Terrorism Force subsequently mobilised its members, turning Al-Hariseh into a military zone. Some residents fled to Suweida city and to the surrounding villages.

Amid these tensions, a tent encampment of more than 20 Bedouin families east of Al-Hariseh came under indiscriminate gunfire, though no injuries were reported. The incident caused the displacement of some of the families to the town of Al-Qastal, which lies deeper in the Badia region. Some of these Bedouin families work in herding livestock belonging to residents of Al-Hariseh. The recent displacement has negatively impacted Al-Hariseh residents, who now avoid going to their lands lying east of the village for fear of the reactions from displaced Bedouin families.

Though the potential for a military clash in Al-Hariseh has subsided, the displaced Bedouin families have yet to return, harming the economy of the agriculture- and livestock-dependent village.

The Anti-Terrorism Force was founded several months ago and grew rapidly in many parts of Suweida before recently declining to only some rural eastern parts of the governorate. The group defines itself as an independent force working to fill the security vacuum in Suweida. The NDF, whose members all hail from Suweida, has taken a hostile stance against the Anti-Terrorism Force since its founding, accusing the group of receiving foreign funds and conspiring against “national unity.” At the same time, the Anti-Terrorism Force accuses the NDF of affiliation with the Lebanese Hezbollah.

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Expropriation Decree Threatens Demolition of 400 Properties for the Benefit of Hama University

11-01-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

The Hama City Council has decided to demolish around 400 properties built on expropriated land in order to construct a wall for Hama University. The council informed the homeowners in December 2021 that they must vacate their properties without providing any housing alternatives.

An expropriation decree was issued in 2010 for an 11-hectare area of the Mashaa Al-Tayyar neighbourhood, part of the larger Mashaa Al-Naqarneh area southeast of Hama city. The expropriation was meant to benefit Hama University by expanding the campus and building a wall and student housing. At the time, the decree set the allowance for owning one square metre of expropriated land at SYP 35. In 2010, the expropriated area contained less than 30 houses for landowners. All these buildings are not licensed because they are built on land classified as agricultural, on which it is not permissible to build.

Under Expropriation Law No. 20 of 1983, the entity carrying out the expropriation must pay the allowances no more than five years after the issuance of the expropriation decree. If payment is delayed, the entity must pay an annual interest of six percent of the property’s value. The jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation confirmed this requirement in Decision No. 11307 of 2002, when it gave property owners the right to demand interest for late expropriation allowance payments after five years had passed since the initial expropriation decree. The Court of Cassation’s Decision No. 227 of 1982 also gave owners of expropriated properties the right to request a re-evaluation after five years without paying the expropriation allowance. Re-evaluation here means accounting for changes in the prices of real estate.

In the 11 years that have passed since the issuance of the Hama University expropriation decree, none of the expropriated land owners, including owners of unlicensed buildings, have been paid their dues. During the war, more properties were built in the expropriated area, though without construction permits, due to the cheap local prices and urgent housing needs. Owners of these newly built homes do not receive any compensation under the expropriation decree. The semi-official newspaper Al-Watan, quoted the Hama City Council president as saying that when the land was expropriated in 2010, there were 15-20 unlicensed homes on it. But due to the ensuing years of conflict, the number of informal and unlicensed buildings increased. There are now apparently more than 400 unlicensed homes located on land officially meant for the university campus, according to the Hama City Council president.

During his visit to Hama in December 2021, the Prime Minister requested an appropriate solution for the affected residents without evicting them from their homes before securing alternative housing. In reality, the solution does not appear so simple. Residents of any expropriated area are not entitled to apply for alternative housing unless the expropriation is part of the implementation of one of the urban development or regulation laws which apply in an informal area in need of zoning. This is not the case for the land expropriated for Hama University.

It bears mentioning that on October 5, 1987, the Ministry of Public Works and Housing (at the time called the Ministry of Housing and Utilities) issued a report, numbered 2/28/36, that required expropriating bodies to secure alternative housing if the expropriation project affected residential buildings. It is unclear if the report had any practical application.

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The State Takes its Share in Khan Arnabeh After 60 Years

04-01-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

The Quneitra Governorate and notables from the city of Khan Arnabeh reached an agreement in late 2021 to address the lack of state property within real estate zone number 1/58, according to a quote attributed by the Al-Watan newspaper to the director of Cadastral Affairs in the Quneitra Governorate.

According to a local correspondent for The Syria Report, agricultural land in Khan Arnabeh that had been seized under Agrarian Reform Law No. 161 of 1958 was later distributed to residents and local farmers. Under Article 6 of that law, the state may take a share of the seized property to implement public projects or build facilities for the public benefit. The state may also ensure that its share is located in one real estate zone, as it did in Khan Arnabeh, where the state was allocated a share of real estate zone 1/58. According to our correspondent, the total area of the zone is around 50 hectares and the state’s share is about 10 percent of it.

The main obstacle preventing the subdivision of properties in zone 1/58 between rights holders is that the state property within the zone has not yet been determined, nor is the percentage of deduction from private properties. Thus, the ownership of the rights holders remains only as shares. The state has subsequently placed a sign on all the properties in zone 1/58 preventing their disposal, meaning that rights holders are not permitted to sell or dispose of their shares. Nevertheless, large parts of zone 1/58 were included in the city’s zoning plans after the latest expansion of the plans in 2012-2015. The new plans changed the status of the land from agricultural to residential-commercial that can be constructed upon, which of course led to increased prices that people still cannot benefit from.

A solution to this problem came in the form of rights holders relinquishing part of their shares to the state after determining their exact location. The implementation of the agreement reached at the end of last year will positively impact private property by lifting the sign that previously prevented their disposal, according to the newspaper. At the same time, this agreement would preserve state property. Under the agreement, after officially relinquishing their shares, rights holders must file a lawsuit to terminate the common property, so that they may clearly determine their shares and the locations of those shares.  The agreement has yet to be implemented.

In the decade following the issuance of the Agrarian Reform Law, the state seized properties beyond what it described as the ceiling for agricultural ownership – that is, those between 15 and 200 hectares according to the region and type of irrigation – and became the owner of those seized lands. The state then determined the surface areas of the seized properties in each village and distributed them to residents and farmers.

 

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The Beginnings of Re-Zoning in Azaz

04-01-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

In late 2021, the local council in Azaz, a city under opposition control in the northern part of the Aleppo Governorate, carried out its first demolition of a “building violation” constructed without a licence. Despite the apparent symbolic nature of the demolition, the council attempted to demonstrate that it is serious about addressing so-called “building violations” and reining in the informal expansion of the city. The council also employed military force in the form of opposition National Army fighters to implement the demolition.

The building violation in question was the construction of a sixth storey on a building in the western part of the city, near the National Hospital. Only the sixth storey of the building was destroyed. The local council stated on its Facebook page on November 30, 2021, that its services office was working to “rehabilitate city infrastructure and preserve public properties, as well as monitor and follow up on construction work in the city and regulate violations.”

Azaz is witnessing a large urban expansion due to its location near the Bab Al-Salameh border crossing with Turkey, which makes it safe from regime airstrikes and artillery fire. In addition, the number of people who have been displaced to Azaz has increased pressure for housing in the city. At the same time, aid organisations that operate in opposition-held areas of northwestern Syria have recently increased their presence in Azaz, opening offices and carrying activities there, all of which has driven up rent. As a result, local real estate and land owners have expanded or constructed new housing to lease. In many such cases, property owners violated building code; for example, they built too many additional storeys or encroached on public or endowment properties.

There are several informally built neighbourhoods on the outskirts of Azaz that do not follow building code because the local council fails to monitor construction. Some buildings in these neighbourhoods encroach on roads and other public properties or sit on sites allocated in the city zoning plans for parks and schools. A city council spokesperson told The Syria Report that some 20 percent of construction in Azaz is now informal. He added that a new zoning plan would be issued soon, after which the city would settle the status of these construction code violations, halt informal construction and regulate existing informal construction.

The first zoning plan for Azaz was issued in 1965 and approved in 1967, with the final amendment in 2000. The new plan is meant to expand the city limits and add land formerly categorised as agricultural in order to accommodate rapid urban growth. The plan may also incorporate the neighbouring town of Sajou into Azaz, in addition to a handful of other nearby villages.

An Azaz city council official told The Syria Report that recent urban expansion has led to rising prices for land in the city’s outskirts and has surpassed the city limits as outlined in the old zoning plan. Such growth has also chipped away at agricultural areas surrounding Azaz and led to the construction of informal neighbourhoods on lands located both within and outside the city’s administative borders. According to the official, the city council in 2021 began to regulate construction, remove buildings that violate construction codes and halt the spread of informal neighbourhoods for the first time since opposition forces captured Azaz in 2012.

Over the past near-decade of opposition rule, the local council has been unable to prevent or remove buildings that violate the building code. Many of the so-called “building violations” are attributed to several  influential armed faction members who became investors in the real estate trade that sprung up on endowment lands and public properties.

Photo source: The Syria Report

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Al-Amal Suburb in Hama

04-01-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

Syria’s Prime Minister laid the foundation stone in December 2021 for the Al-Amal residential suburb project in the city of Hama, located in Al-Naqarneh along the Hama-Aleppo highway.

According to official statements, the project covers an area of 104 hectares and is composed of 7,000 residential apartments distributed over 60 plots for cooperative housing, 83 plots for social housing and 19 plots for owners of expropriated lands. The project site was expropriated by the General Housing Establishment. The General Company for Construction and Development is set to build the infrastructure for the project for an estimated cost of SYP 7.6 billion.

Following these statements, the General Housing Establishment announced the sale of the 60 housing plots allocated for cooperative housing to housing cooperatives in the Hama Governorate. Any cooperative hoping to purchase one of the plots must submit a written request to the Directorate of Housing Cooperatives in the Hama Governorate, which is affiliated with the Ministry of Public Works and Housing. The request must be accompanied by the necessary documents as well as a written pledge that the cooperative will make an advance payment of SYP 180 million before attending the public allocation sessions for the plots.

Al-Naqarneh is a big area just south of the city of Hama home to a large informally built neighbourhood called Mashaa Al-Naqarneh or Hayy Al-Naqarneh, as well as privately owned farmland. Informally built homes began to appear en masse over the past decade on farmland expropriated by the state in 1983. The Hama City C0uncil issued zoning plans in 2008 for the expropriated farmlands in Mashaa Al-Naqarneh, granting permits to housing cooperatives to construct 1,724 housing units within an area of 104 hectares. Some of the units have already been constructed. However, in September 2018, the Hama governorate waged a wide-reaching demolition campaign in the district under the Building Violations Legislative Decree No. 40 of 2012. Some of the buildings constructed by the cooperatives were also demolished for unclear reasons. The demolitions continued over the course of an entire week.

The location of the Al-Amal suburb and its zoning plans – whether or not they overlap with the current site of Mashaa Al-Naqarneh – remain unclear. However, it does appear that the suburb could be a new, amended copy of the old zoning plans for Mashaa Al-Naqarneh that were issued in 2008, with the number of housing units raised from 1,724 to around 7,000 within a 104-hectare area. What is notable is the project’s transition from merely a cooperative housing project to one that includes both cooperative and social housing under the supervision of the General Housing Establishment.

According to Al-Watan, a pro-government newspaper, Mashaa Al-Naqarneh still contains many buildings that violate the building code and that belong to “big traders whose violations nobody dares to interfere with.” Previous attempts were made to add Mashaa Al-Naqarneh to the zoning plans for Hama city, but the Agricultural Directorate in Hama, affiliated with the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, refused this change as the area is classified as agricultural land. Also, the Water Resources Directorate in Hama, affiliated with the Ministry of Water Resources, refuses the rezoning of the area because it sits within the government irrigation line project.

A home collapsed in Mashaa Al-Naqarneh in October 2021, killing two people. The Hama Governorate at the time simply warned residents of the danger and requested that they evacuate. It is worth noting that the Hama Governorate has dealt with Mashaa Al-Naqarneh according to Legislative Decree No. 40 of 2012, which concerns “building violations,” rather than as an area of informal settlement that may be addressed under any of the development or urbanisation laws in effect. Law No. 40 addresses construction code violations on an individual basis while issues related to informal neighbourhoods, on the whole, must be handled collectively in order to ensure property owners’ rights. Where Law No. 40 only grants owners of individual destroyed real estate properties the right to dispose of the debris, rights holders in informal neighbourhoods may register in alternative housing programmes or for organisational shares in the area after its rezoning.

Picture of the Al-Amal Suburb Plan

Source: SANA

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Explained: Ministry of Justice Refuses to Adopt ‘Current Value’ in Calculating Judicial Fees

04-01-2022/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

The Minister of Justice issued Circular No. 38 on December 13, 2021, to resolve disputes in the courts about how to calculate judicial fees for real estate cases. The circular affirmed that such fees are based on the appraised real estate value of a given property under the provisions of Judicial Fees Law No. 1 of 2012, rather than based on the “current value” as stipulated in Real Estate Sales Law No. 15 of 2021.

Judicial fees are collected by the court treasury to fund the work of the judicial departments. In real estate cases, the judicial fees are collected at a certain percentage of the value of the case in question.

However, some courts had started calculating fees based on Law No. 15 of 2021 rather than Judicial Fees Law No. 1 of 2012, imposing heavy costs on litigants. This disparity meant the Minister, who is the official responsible for issuing such notices to the courts in order to clarify or explain any contradictions surrounding the implementation of laws and decrees, was obliged to issue Circular No. 38.

Circular No. 38 states that the use of the current real estate price as stipulated in Law No. 15 of 2021 is restricted to determining the taxation and fees levied for real estate transactions such as sales, donations or rental agreements. On the other hand, the adoption of the appraisal value in calculating fees for real estate cases stems from the principle of equality between all litigants before the different types of courts, as well as from the standardisation of fees employed by the courts, the circular added.

The appraisal values for real estate properties are old, fixed values listed at the Ministry of Finance-affiliated finance departments. Most of these values date back to 1986, when financial commissioning began, and are usually listed according to certain financial records that cannot be circumvented. Article 41 in Law No. 1 of 2012 stipulates that fees in real estate cases would be calculated based on the specified financial value of the property under dispute, as listed in the financial departments. The jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation affirms this principle, as it considered the claimant to be the one to determine the value of the case according to the property’s value; upon any objection by the opponent, the property value is determined based on its value as listed in the financial directorate records.

Before Law No. 15 of 2021, the real estate sales tax was also determined as a percentage of the set estimated financial value of the property and codified within the financial departments. The Department of Cadastral Affairs adopted either that value or the value listed in the real estate sales contracts (whichever of the two turned out to be greater) in calculating the service fees for recording real estate instances.

Meanwhile, the current value of real estate was included in Law No. 15 of 2021 to calculate the value of fees owed for a certain property when selling, donating or leasing it. The current value is the financial value of real estate units approved by the Ministry of Finance in calculating the real estate sales tax under the executive instructions of Law No. 15, issued according to Finance Ministry Decree No. 850 on April 28, 2021. Law No. 17 of 2021, which concerns setting the fees for services provided by Cadastral Affairs, also adopted the current value of real estate as a basis for determining fees.

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Alternative Housing for Owners of Properties at Risk of Collapse in Informal Settlement Mazzeh 86

21-12-2021/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

In early December, the General Housing Establishment invited occupants of so-called “housing at risk of collapse” within Damascus’ Mazzeh 86 informal housing neighbourhood to choose alternative housing.

The housing units at risk of collapse, in this case, are 28 homes that were built in violation of construction codes. A landslide beneath them in 2017 threatened the homes’ structural integrity. The houses were then demolished in 2018, according to prior statements from the Directorate of Technical Services, which is part of the Damascus Governorate.

The governorate has leased the residents of these 28 demolished houses temporary housing in the Barzeh neighbourhood of Damascus. They were granted the right to apply for alternative housing under Prime Ministerial Approval No. 16699/1, issued in November 2019. Subscription took place within the youth housing project in the Qudsaya expansion zone with the understanding that the alternative housing units would be delivered no more than three years after allocation. The General Housing Establishment also required that residents benefitting from the alternative housing complete payments amounting to 50 percent of the properties’ value upon allocation.

Alternative housing is not free. Rather, it is among the government’s social housing programmes, which the General Housing Establishment implements, at a cost to beneficiaries. Allocating a housing unit to an applicant means drawing up a contract that is considered a title deed between the applicant and the General Housing Establishment. The deed includes the location and a description of the housing unit.

Landslides are frequent in the Mazzeh 86 neighbourhood due to the geological nature of the land, as well as non-compliance with construction codes. In 2019, the Damascus Governorate ordered the evacuation of a cracked five-storey housing block, fearing its collapse. It is unclear whether the governorate subsequently demolished the building or if residents were granted the right to apply for alternative housing. The Al-Maghar area of Mazzeh 86 also witnessed landslides in 2016. Earlier, in 2010, there was a landslide in the neighbourhood due to an underground cavity.

The Mazzeh informal housing neighbourhood is part of the broader Mazzeh area southwest of Damascus and began to appear in the late 1970s. Residents built informal homes on publicly owned property, some of which had been expropriated for the Ministry of Defence (this part was next to the 86th Battalion of the Defense Companies, which at the time was commanded by regime strongman Rifaat Al-Assad). Most residents of Mazzeh 86 are low-income Alawites from the Syrian coast who migrated to Damascus. Many of them work in the security services and army. In the 1990s, two security checkpoints were set up in the area to halt the spread of informally built housing, without success.

Granting the residents of the 28 demolished homes the right to apply for alternative housing was seen as an exception and contradicted the laws in place that handle informal housing and urban planning. These laws, including Decree No. 66 of 2012 and Law No. 10 of 2018, stipulate that residents of informal housing constructed on publicly owned land whose homes face demolition have only the right to rental compensation for two years in the best of cases. Residents may also benefit from the rubble of their demolished homes under Law No. 3 of 2018, which discusses the removal of rubble belonging to damaged houses.

In justifying the preferential treatment towards the residents of the 28 demolished homes in Mazzeh 86, the General Housing Establishment’s director of social housing called the matter “an emergency situation.” Others have not been so lucky – in November 2021, the Hama Governorate warned residents of the informal Al-Naqarneh neighbourhood of the potential collapse of their homes due to landslides and ordered them to immediately evacuate their houses. The governorate neither granted those residents temporary housing, nor allowed them to apply for an alternative housing programme. The Hama Governorate considered that its warning to residents relieved it of any responsibility for the outcomes of what may have subsequently happened.

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An Inconsistent Return to Yalda Neighbouring Yarmouk Camp

21-12-2021/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

The Rural Damascus Governorate agreed this past March to allow the return of displaced residents to various sites in Yalda, a town south of Damascus bordering the Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp. Though months have gone by, only a few families have returned.

Opposition factions took control of the bordering area in 2012, then the Islamic State took over in November 2017. The area turned into a frontline between the opposition in Yalda and fighters of the Islamic State (ISIS) in the Yarmouk camp, and also witnessed intense barrel bombs and airstrikes. Those frontline sites remain closed off since regime forces recaptured Yarmouk camp in May 2018 following an agreement with ISIS that would see the latter withdraw to the eastern Badia region of the Suweida Governorate.

In March 2021, the Yalda Municipal Council announced that people could return to the Tuesday Market and Daboul Street areas, both of which contain informally built housing. More than 10,000 families were expected to return to those areas while requesting that local notables help rehabilitate them. However, civilian sources told The Syria Report that only a few families affiliated with influential parties in Yalda have returned. The sources said that these families returned to their homes in the area surrounding the Mothers of the Believers Mosque, while property owners from other Yalda neighbourhoods were only allowed to inspect their properties without restoring or returning to them.

According to a local correspondent for The Syria Report, the mayor of Yalda met with a delegation of residents from the area adjacent to the Yarmouk camp in early September 2018, informing them that he had submitted a letter to “the relevant authorities” to remove rubble. The mayor added that those “relevant authorities” had responded to the letter and that a “private company” would remove rubble from the streets before starting repair work on the electricity networks. The “relevant authorities” may be in reference to one of the branches of the Military Intelligence Division, which controls the area.

One man who owns property in the Tuesday Market neighbourhood told The Syria Report that though his house is only a few hundred metres from the Mothers of the Believers Mosque, a checkpoint erected near the mosque has prevented him from reaching the area recently. After paying a bribe to checkpoint personnel, he was permitted to enter accompanied by a security official. The man said that the municipality had not removed the rubble from the Tuesday Market area, nor had it rehabilitated infrastructure or drawn up lists of those wishing to return.

The Rural Damascus Governorate may wish to avoid rehabilitating the area, which largely consists of informal housing, preferring instead to demolish it completely and perhaps even re-zone it in a manner similar to Marota City and Basilia City. However, the governorate lacks the funds both to re-zone the area and to rehabilitate it with the minimum necessary services, not least rubble removal. The issue of returns, therefore, remains dependent on arbitrary municipal decisions. An internal conflict between different security apparatuses may also explain the impediments to returns to the area, which is controlled by the local branch of Military Intelligence. Remaining parts of Yalda, however, are controlled by the patrols branch, which is also affiliated with Military Intelligence.

Yalda suffers poor services, power cuts, drinking water shortages, weak cell coverage, piles of uncollected garbage, stray dogs, and few transportation options to and from Damascus. In October, two buses were allocated to transport residents between Damascus and Yalda, but they have only worked for a few hours since then. In late November, the Ministry of Local Administration and Environment approved the start of zoning and organisational studies for Yalda under Urban Planning Law No. 5 of 1982.

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Social Rifts Grow as Syrian Farmers Invest in their Absentee Relatives’ Lands

21-12-2021/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

“I feel angry and ashamed because my nephew invests in my land without recognising that I’m the owner,” says one forcibly displaced farmer from Kafr Zita, a town in the Rural Hama Governorate. He adds, “I never imagined that my nephew could treat me with such disdain.”

The story of this farmer, who was displaced to opposition-held parts of northern Syria, reflects wider political divisions within local families: between those opposed to the regime who were forcibly displaced from Kafr Zita and those loyal to the regime who still live in the town. There are similar family splits across rural northern parts of the Hama Governorate and the neighbouring southern Idlib Governorate, both areas now under regime control. It appears that Syrian authorities are intentionally playing on these divisions by encouraging loyalists to invest in farmlands belonging to their forcibly displaced relatives, as revealed by documents obtained by The Syria Report.

The General Secretariat of the Hama Governorate announced on October 21, 2021, that it would accept applications for such relatives to invest in the “Saliekh,” treeless lands, for one season, with preference given to first- to third-degree relatives who live in the area. First degree relatives include the father, mother, spouse, and children; second degree relatives include grandparents, siblings and grandchildren; and third degree relatives include uncles, aunts, nieces, and nephews.

The October announcement came on the heels of a circular from the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, Letter No. 588 dated August 21, 2021, and Letter No. 594 dated August 23, 2021, which contained a “Vacant Land Investment Action Plan.” The plan is set to be announced for agricultural investment in the 2021-22 season.

Investment by relatives in absentees’ lands, in addition to increased estrangement with displaced farmers, has encouraged disputes between relatives still living in regime areas, according to a local correspondent for The Syria Report. According to a letter issued by the Ministry of Agriculture dated October 23, 2021, the priority is to set up agreements between relatives to approve one of them to invest in an absentee family member’s land. In the absence of an agreement, the system for degree of kinship is employed.

In a special letter, No. 795 dated October 3, 2021, the Ministry of Agriculture indicated that these confiscated lands are included in normal public auctions and that the investments of relatives do not apply in such cases. “Confiscated” here usually refers to properties of regime dissidents accused of “terrorism” before the “Antiterrorism Court” or lands seized by militias loyal to the regime.

There are no cases in which the investor derives any financial benefit from their relatives; the investor only has priority through kinship to the landowner. If the absentee landowner has no relatives, or if nobody is interested in investing in the land, then the property is put up for public auction. Many forcibly displaced farmers appear to have agreed to allow their relatives to invest in such lands and to share the harvest. At the same time, the risk of public auctions have compelled some displaced farmers to return to their hometowns, causing some to face arbitrary arrest.

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Suweida Governorate’s Displaced Bedouin Face Attacks and Harassment in Daraa

14-12-2021/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

After the settlement deals in southern Syria earlier this year, the regime launched a security campaign against displaced Bedouin tribes from the Suweida Governorate residing in the eastern part of the neighbouring Daraa Governorate. These displaced tribes have faced violations impacting their rights to housing and have few options for relocating, as many are unable to return to their hometowns.

Security forces claim that the attacks against these tribes have been aimed at “terrorist cells” that use displaced encampments as bases to carry out assassinations against regime members across the Daraa Governorate. However, the raids have caused the deaths of three civilians in recent weeks, as well as arbitrary arrests, the burning of tents, and the looting of livestock and other property.

According to one local source, security forces attacked a small encampment near the town of Khirbet Ghazaleh two weeks ago without warning, burning five tents and looting about 20 head of livestock. Security personnel also killed a teenage boy under the age of 18 and kidnapped his brother, the source told a correspondent for The Syria Report. Afterwards, some people who had been sheltering in the encampment fled to the outskirts of Jassem, a city in the western part of the Daraa Governorate, where they faced yet another raid. However, intervention by residents and notables from Jassem helped protect the newly displaced families and their possessions.

During clashes between regime forces and gunmen in the town of Nahteh last week, security personnel raided yet another displacement camp in the eastern part of the Daraa Governorate. One victim told The Syria Report that security personnel beat him and raided his tent despite having already verified his identity and that he was not wanted by security forces. Personnel then ordered him to leave the area and threatened to kill him if he stayed, the victim added. He and his family fled to the outskirts of the village of Al-Dareh, home to several Bedouin tribes, in the eastern part of neighbouring Suweida Governorate. The man had previously submitted a request to Military Security in 2020 for permission to return to his home village of Al-Saqieh in another part of Rural Suweida, he told The Syria Report. His request was denied because regime forces had reportedly taken his house to use as a military site.

Notables from the Bedouin tribes of Al-Lajat and Suweida held a meeting two weeks ago in the rural eastern part of the Daraa Governorate, where they denounced the increased violations and raids, as well as the restrictions they faced. Attendees decided to form a committee to reach out to the Russian Reconciliation Centre in Southern Syria to raise the issue of their suffering and to meet with the security committee responsible for the Daraa Governorate. Atop the attendee’s list of demands were to stop the arbitrary raids of their displacement camps, stop the abuses, preserve their dignity, and repair the infrastructure and rehabilitate destroyed buildings in their home villages so that they may return.

Some Bedouin tribes from the Suweida Governorate have been displaced in successive waves to neighbouring Daraa since 2013 for numerous reasons, including worsening relations with their Druze neighbours. The two groups have often differed over their political stances. Sectarian and ethnic conflicts in the area have also escalated since 2012. These clashes have only been fueled by some Bedouin residents’ affiliation with opposition factions in Daraa, including some extremist Islamist factions, as well as by kidnappings on both sides. However, the largest wave of displacement happened in 2015 as Bedouins from the Al-Asfar, the largest gathering of Bedouins in northeastern Suweida Governorate, after it was controlled by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria and then later the opposition factions. Regime forces recaptured Al-Asfar in 2018. The fighting destroyed local infrastructure and damaged most of the houses in 10 villages. Furthermore, regime forces completely razed some Bedouin villages in the nearby Al-Lajat area in 2018, including the village of Housh Hammad.

Despite Russian mediation in 2019, regime forces only allowed a partial return of Bedouin to the northeastern part of the Suweida Governorate under the condition that they undergo a security settlement process, obtain security permit, and joining the ranks of those who had failed to perform their mandatory military service. Only a few Bedouin have returned, most of them livestock workers. Government delays in rehabilitating infrastructure, such as electricity and water networks, the presence of regime and Palestinian Liberation Army checkpoints, and the regime’s takeover of some homes and schools as military headquarters, and unexploded missiles and mines have preventd a more extensive return.

 

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2021-12-14 17:30:562021-12-14 17:58:22Suweida Governorate’s Displaced Bedouin Face Attacks and Harassment in Daraa

Explained: The Syrian Real Estate Judiciary

14-12-2021/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

The Real Estate Judiciary in Syria dates back to Delimitation and Census Law No. 186 of 1926. Since the law was passed, there has been no clear definition of the Real Estate Judiciary or real estate judges. However, the body violates the principle of judicial independence by remaining subservient to the executive authority.

Under Law No. 186, real estate judges oversee the delimitation and census process in place of “ordinary” justices of the peace. They also handle disputes arising from delimitation and census. In accordance with the law, the Minister of Justice appoints real estate judges by decree based on a proposal from the Minister of Agriculture. These appointed judges are affiliated with the Ministry of Agriculture and monitored by the General Directorate of Cadastral Affairs.

Real Estate Judges Law No. 16 of 2014 brought new changes to the role of these judges, as well as the mechanism for appointing them. For one, the Minister of Justice is tasked with appointing the judges based on a proposal from the General Director of Cadastral Affairs rather than the Minister of Agriculture.

However, neither Law No. 186, nor Law No. 16 include any explicit definition of the real estate judge or Real Estate Judiciary and instead only specify their jurisdiction and mechanism for appointment. The definition of the Real Estate Judiciary may be deduced based on Law No. 16 as the judiciary that grants legitimacy to the delimitation and census process and the registration of real estate matters in the Land Records and that considers any related disputes and objections.

All this means that the Real Estate Judiciary has its own special character. It is outside the jurisdiction of the Ordinary Judiciary of the Supreme Judicial Council, which appoints, transfers, and dismisses judges. These judges work under the Judicial Authority Law No. 98 of 1961. However, under Law No. 16, real estate judges work under the Basic Statute for State Workers No. 50 of 2004 and report to the General Director of Cadastral Affairs. Real estate judges are considered independent staff members within the General Directorate of Cadastral Affairs and submit periodic reports to the General Director. The Minister of Justice is responsible for decisions to appoint, transfer, or dismiss these judges or to enact penalties against them. The Ministry of Local Administration and Environment issues a decree to determine the number of real estate judges in each governorate based on a proposal from the General Director of Cadastral Affairs.

Such affiliation indicates the direct subordination of real estate judges to the executive authority. Indeed, the direct authority figure for each real estate judge is the General Director of Cadastral Affairs, who is a member of the executive branch. This power structure explicitly violates the principle of the separation of powers. It also violates the principle of judicial independence, which prohibits other authorities from interfering in the work of the judiciary, especially given that the tasks and jurisdictions entrusted to the judiciary are of great importance for their direct impact on housing, land, and property rights.

Under Law No. 16, real estate judges are appointed from a pool of Cadastral Affairs employees who have law degrees and have been staff members for at least five years or who have law degrees and have been selected based on a competition held by the Directorate of Cadastral Affairs.

Real estate judges under Law No. 16 have jurisdiction over everything related to delimitation and census processes and disputes arising therein, real estate beautification work, and the termination of common property. They do not have jurisdiction to handle disputes related to real estate ownership, including registry of sales. Instead, such cases are within the purview of the Civil Judiciary, that is, the Magistrates’ Courts and Civil Courts of First Instance, according to the Code of Civil Procedure.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2021-12-14 17:29:032021-12-14 17:33:06Explained: The Syrian Real Estate Judiciary

Housing Establishment Accelerates Allocation of Social Housing

07-12-2021/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

In late November, the General Establishment of Housing has issued a series of consecutive statements stating that it would speed up the process of allocating homes to applicants for social housing projects. However, this move appears to come alongside an amendment to the contract conditions without prior agreement, namely increasing the value of the monthly instalments to be paid by applicants, under threat of cancellation in the event of non-payment.

In Syria, there are numerous social housing projects aimed at securing low- or medium-cost housing and at selling it to applicants. The General Establishment of Housing, which is affiliated with the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, is usually the party responsible for implementing these projects. Allocating a home to each applicant means creating a contract between the subscriber and the Housing Establishment that determines the obligations for each party. This allocation contract includes the location and description of the housing unit and is documented by the Ministry of Public Works and Housing. Allocation through this contract does not, however, mean that construction has been completed or that handover of the housing unit will occur soon. Rather, the contract is considered a title deed provided that the remaining financial obligations are met.

On November 25, the General Establishment of Housing announced that it had allocated 3,033 homes to applicants in social housing projects across several governorates. The majority, some 2,080 homes, were allocated in the youth housing programme in the Dimas City project, located in the Rural Damascus Governorate. The project is located 20 kilometres northwest of the Damascus city centre and borders the Damascus-Beirut highway to the northwest. Some 14,300 youth housing units are included in the Dimas City project, of which only about 1,000 have been completed thus far. Subscription for the youth housing units ended in 2004, while the delivery of the housing was originally planned for 2016.

It is worth noting that on November 28, the General Establishment of Housing called on those who had been allocated plots or equity shares in the Dimas City project to pay 50 per cent of the value of those plots or shares within a three-month deadline. The Housing Establishment threatened that those who failed to pay by then would have their allocations cancelled. Equity shares are given as a form of compensation for expropriation by public institutions in a given area. It is unclear whether the expropriations mentioned in the warning occurred in the Dimas City project or somewhere else.

In any case, the implementation of most social housing programmes has been interrupted over the past decade, with the Housing Establishment now trying to reactivate some projects. But due to drastic changes in the value of the Syrian pound in recent years, as well as the rising prices of construction materials, the Housing Establishment has raised the value of the monthly payments for such housing without prior agreement from the applicants. The body is now threatening to cancel existing allocation contracts if applicants do not pay their monthly instalments according to the new prices within specific time limits.

It is not clear to what extent the instalments have increased within the Dimas City youth housing project or if the increase applies to other social housing projects in Syria. An announcement on Dimas City’s unofficial Facebook page from 2019 indicated that the monthly instalments for the project had been raised to SYP 8,000 from SYP 3,000 in 2011.

The General Housing Establishment does not set final prices for allocated apartments, adhere to deadlines for handing over the allocated homes, or set final deadlines for the instalment payment process. This inconsistency has caused chaos and confusion among applicants, who fear that the Housing Establishment may not be serious about transferring the apartments it has allocated them.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2021-12-07 16:29:172021-12-07 16:55:57Housing Establishment Accelerates Allocation of Social Housing
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Read also

  • A New Classification for Housing Cooperatives: Between Project Completion, Dissolution and Liquidation
  • Decree No. 66 of 2012: Objections and Judicial Proceedings Following the Reparation Package
  • Reconstruction Through Reduced Engineers’ Fees: Engineering Fee Exemptions Fall Short of Enabling Displaced People to Return to Their Areas
  • Rising Rents in Damascus and Its Nearby Suburbs: Demand Pressure and Limited Supply
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