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No Return in Sight for Displaced Residents of Al-Hajar Al-Aswad

30-11-2021/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

For displaced residents, returning to the city of Al-Hajar Al-Aswad does not appear feasible in the foreseeable future despite repeated official announcements suggesting otherwise. Rubble still obstructs movement in main and subsidiary streets, while the rehabilitation of infrastructure is still in its initial stages.

In late November, the Ministry of Local and Administration and Environment approved the start of planning and organisational studies for Al-Hajar Al-Aswad, as well as for Sabineh, Yalda, and Jaramana. According to the Rural Damascus Governorate’s Directorate for Decision Support and Regional Planning, these areas were selected because they had faced the most damage. Zoning plans for these areas are to be issued in accordance with Urban Planning Law No. 5 of 1982.

Located next to the Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp, Al-Hajar Al-Aswad is a city and the centre of a district that falls under the Rural Damascus Governorate. Its population before 2011 was about half a million people, according to official media, though some estimates say no more than 200,000 people lived in the city. Many residents were families displaced from the Quneitra Governorate as a result of the 1967 war and Israel’s seizure of the Golan Heights. Much of Al-Hajar Al-Aswad is made up of informal housing and under-served neighbourhoods, making it a destination for low-income Syrians heading to Damascus from other parts of the country.

The city had faced widespread destruction when it was under opposition control in 2012-18 as a result of heavy airstrikes by regime forces and battles on the ground. The area remains largely deserted, as the Damascus Governorate prevents residents from entering without first obtaining security approval.

In September, the governor of Rural Damascus said that returns to Al-Hajar Al-Aswad would occur soon and that rehabilitation of the city was 85 percent complete. He added that the governorate had asked residents intent on returning to fill out special forms and to submit documents that would prove their property ownership in the city.

That same month, the Al-Hajar Al-Aswad City Council resumed receiving applications from displaced residents to return to the area in order to rehabilitate their homes. Each application must include documents confirming the applicant’s ownership of the property, as well as a family statement and copies of their personal ID cards. They must submit the application to the Al-Hajar Al-Aswad Municipal Office. Afterwards, security services study the file and issue either approve or reject the request to return. If the applicant is approved, they must then obtain a permit to rehabilitate their property from the municipality.

An activist from Al-Hajar Al-Aswad told The Syria Report that when he reentered the city for the first time in late 2020 to check on his house, demolition teams were still working to extract iron from damaged buildings. When he was allowed to visit again in mid-2021, he noticed a sharp increase in the scale of destruction to the neighbourhood surrounding his home. The activist said he feared for the safety of people’s properties, should the rubble removal operations expand without any monitoring from neutral parties.

The Rural Damascus Governorate announced in late 2020 that it would launch a project to rehabilitate homes in Al-Hajar Al-Aswad to coincide with residents’ return to the area. A technical committee subsequently revealed in early 2021 that 60 percent of houses in the city were suitable for rehabilitation. Later in September, the city council said that 90 percent of rubble had been removed from main streets and 65 per cent from subsidiary streets.

However, local sources who spoke with The Syria Report questioned the statistics reported by the governorate and city council. Many smaller neighbourhoods are still covered by rubble and work to remove it has halted. They added that work usually resumes for short periods of time, particularly during visits by Syrian officials who want to attract the attention of international NGOs to fund removal of the rubble and rehabilitation of destroyed areas.

A source from Al-Hajar Al-Aswad told The Syria Report that he had submitted more than one request to return home during the past year. He has yet to receive an answer, despite having obtained a number for his file. He added that repeated official announcements calling for such applications have not been accompanied by the processing of existing requests, indicating that the governorate and city council are not serious about returns.

There have been many recent announcements that rehabilitation work in Al-Hajar Al-Aswad had either begun or had been completed. In November, the General Establishment for Drinking Water and Sanitation installed two wells equipped with pumps and electrical generators. In September, a project was implemented in cooperation with the International Red Cross to maintain and replace the sewage line that passes through Al-Hajar Al-Aswad. The city council has also indicated that schools will be rehabilitated after residents return. Finally, the General Electricity Company in Rural Damascus began work to rehabilitate the electrical networks in the city in September.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2021-11-30 15:04:012021-11-30 15:35:23No Return in Sight for Displaced Residents of Al-Hajar Al-Aswad

Investigation: Alawite Women and Inheritance

30-11-2021/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

Personal Status Law No. 59 of 1953 and its amendments regulate inheritance based on Islamic law. The law includes the Alawites, though it excludes Druze and Christians.

Though Alawite women are included in the law, their inheritance does not seem to receive much attention among popular circles of the Alawite sect. Like other local farming communities, some Alawite communities are not keen on female inheritance and instead wish to preserve the ownership of agricultural land and keep it in the hands of male family members.

Souad, a 70-year-old woman in a village near Tartous, told The Syria Report that she has suffered after claiming her legitimate right to inheritance. Not only did her family refuse to support her, but the local community ridiculed and ostracised her for her efforts.

Souad separated from her husband 25 years ago and was forced to live with her brothers. Despite the family owning many properties, she was unable to obtain a private room for herself, and since then she has only been allowed a bed in a common room with no privacy.

In response, Souad asked her brothers for her share of the family inheritance, a request that she said shocked the local community at first. After a long argument, the brothers agreed to give Souad her share, albeit in a way that she could not benefit from: in the form of square metres of farmland from different plots. They justified the move by telling her this would prevent Souad from selling her share. “In the end, I received only criticism and ridicule from the women of the village for what I wanted,” she said.

On the other hand, many Alawites moved to urban areas throughout the past century due to their employment in state civil and military institutions. These social shifts do not seem to have eased women’s inheritance rights.

If Souad represents one case of women in the rural Alawite community, similar conditions face educated women and women who engage in professional life in cities, including those who are unmarried or have separated from their husbands. When such women have demanded their right to inheritances, their families have often relented, but the quota of shares granted to women remained part of their inheritance rights, as stipulated in the law. Women who spoke with The Syria Report said they were given small portions of land, land that is of low value in the real estate market, or limited compensation. Most of the women interviewed for this report said that they had not received their full, legitimate shares as defined within Law No. 59 of 1953.

Samar is a 50-year-old woman who lives in the city of Lattakia with her husband and three children. Her father had only signed up his male children for homes within a housing cooperative. He did not give his daughters shares of the original family home and instead distributed the shares to his sons, including a wealthy son living abroad. In 2018, after a long argument between the daughters and the rest of the family, each daughter was given SYP 300,000 as their final share of the inheritance. “Even my mother stood on the side of my brothers,” Samar said. “She told me that my husband is the one responsible for me, not my own family.”

In some extraordinary cases, fathers allocated their daughters their full shares under the law, which became major news in some villages and among relatives. Ali, a man in his 80s living in the Rural Lattakia Governorate, gave a home to each of his daughters, on top of the shares that he also gave to his sons. Ali told The Syria Report that his neighbours asked him why he handed over properties to his daughters. Some believed he had been unfair to his sons, and that he should have given his daughters small plots of land at best. Ali added: “When I asked them, ‘Are we not Muslims? Shouldn’t we adhere to Sharia and the law?’ They were surprised by my words.”

An activist from a rural part of the Lattakia Governorate told The Syria Report that Ali’s approach was an individual case and does not represent the broader trend. She added that one man from her area had sold his house and distributed the earnings to his two daughters. Other residents disagreed with the man’s choice, saying that it would encourage their daughters to consider their inheritance rights.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2021-11-30 15:02:062021-11-30 15:02:06Investigation: Alawite Women and Inheritance

Explained: The Directorate of Cadastral Affairs in Idlib

23-11-2021/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

Since 2018, the Directorate of Cadastral Affairs in Idlib has been affiliated with the Ministry of Local Administration and Services under the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), the governing body of Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS). The directorate contains six departments in the Idlib Governorate cities of Idlib, Harem, Ariha, and Jisr Al-Shughour, as well as in the northwestern Aleppo Governorate towns of Atareb and Daret Azzeh. In total, the directorate holds around 10,000 real estate records, more than half of which are related to agriculture. 

The directorate also had three departments in Khan Sheikhoun, Maaret Al-Nouman, and Saraqeb before regime forces took control of these cities in 2019 and 2020. Cadastral Affairs employees were able to transfer the real estate archives and property databases of those three departments to Idlib city. To this day, the directorate continues to serve residents of those recaptured cities, most of whom were displaced to opposition-held areas. 

Many former employees continued working in the Directorate of Cadastral Affairs and its affiliated departments in Idlib. The directorate has also accepted new employees over the past three years. It adheres to the same system that was in place before 2011 in accordance with Land Registry Law No. 188 of 1926. However, the most prominent difference between the Idlib Directorate of Cadastral Affairs and the government-run directorate in other areas of Syria is that the Idlib entity does not issue financial clearances for owners and properties. This is likely due to the lack of electronic links between the directorate in Idlib and government-run financial departments. On the other hand, all real estate sale processes in HTS-held areas of Idlib require a security approval, which is issued by a department called the Office of Studies.

Fees for real estate-related services imposed by the Directorate of Cadastral Affairs in Idlib go to the SSG-run Ministry of Local Administration and Services, which in turn uses the funds to pay the salaries of directorate employees. The salaries are no more than USD 100 per month. 

Damascus has refused to recognise procedures carried out by the Directorate of Cadastral Affairs in Idlib, as it considers Idlib to be a “closed” area – that is, an area that is outside regime control and where the work of state institutions has been suspended. In 2015, a special branch within the Directorate of Cadastral Affairs for the city of Hama was established for Idlib, based on copies of the governorate’s land registries that had been archived by Damascus’ General Directorate of Cadastral Affairs. That said, most residents prefer to work with the Directorate of Cadastral Affairs in Idlib, which holds the original registries. 

An official within the Idlib Directorate of Cadastral Affairs told The Syria Report that since 2015, the directorate has managed to preserve land registries and continue working in accordance with standard Syrian laws and procedures. The directorate completes between 16,000 and 17,000 property transfers per year. The body has managed to serve residents of Idlib governorate, whether they are in opposition-held areas or areas controlled by the regime, who prefer to carry out transactions through the SSG-run directorate due to its possession of original registries. 

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2021-11-23 16:43:592021-11-23 16:51:16Explained: The Directorate of Cadastral Affairs in Idlib

Daraa Witnesses Increased Supply of Real Estate Property Following Latest Settlement Deal

23-11-2021/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

The real estate market in the Daraa Governorate has witnessed increased supply and lower prices, coinciding with the conclusion of the recent security settlement deal. The likely reason for this increase in supply is due to people selling their properties in order to afford migration outside of Syria. Daraa residents fear that there will be a new wave of security restrictions in the near future, after regime forces tightened control over the governorate in recent months.

Most towns and villages in the Daraa Governorate underwent a series of settlement agreements in October. The agreements included the “settlement of the security status” for certain people by representatives of the regime security apparatus. People were also required to hand over some weapons.

The biggest problems buyers and sellers have faced are security and administrative restrictions on sales, especially the prior security approval for any real estate sale. According to local sources, sellers could now obtain the security approval within a few weeks if they pay bribes to the security officers.

Another obstacle is Council of Ministers Decree No. 28 of 2021, which requires a minimum deposit of SYP 5 million into the bank account of the party selling their residential or commercial property or vehicle. This deposit is a condition for accepting the official registration of sales contracts. In addition to freezing SYP 500,000 of the seller’s money for a period of three months, there are daily withdrawal ceilings for the rest of the deposit. These measures serve to pressure sellers, as many of them wish to sell their properties quickly in order to emigrate.

On top of all these restrictions are new taxes set by Real Estate Sales Law No. 15 of 2021, which amount to one per cent of the current value of a given property.

To circumvent these rules, stakeholders have resorted to carrying out sales outside of the official procedures. Several methods for selling real estate have emerged recently, most notably the transfer of ownership through a “donation.” This is the simplest method and has become the most common. The “donor” need only pay the fees related to the donation and the ownership of the property is transferred within days. Under Law No. 15 of 2021, the tax for donations is no more than 15 percent of the sales tax, which itself is set at one percent of the cost of the property based on its current value.

Another method to avoid administrative and security hurdles is to write a sales contract and sign it in the presence of two witnesses. The buyer then files a lawsuit to authenticate his or her ownership of the property Such lawsuits usually need years to go through the judiciary. However, if the two parties involved appear before a judge and acknowledge that the sale occurred the judge can issue a decision transferring the ownership to the buyer.

According to local sources, a large number of sales have occurred in the past two months. For example, one resident in the rural western part of the Daraa Governorate sold five hectares of agricultural land to pay for the costs of travel for his son, who was wanted for mandatory military service. Half of the amount went towards obtaining a fast-track passport and an entry visa to Belarus. The remaining half went towards paying a smuggler to help his son reach the Belarussian-Polish border, in the hopes of eventually reaching Germany.

There are no precise figures on the number of people who have recently emigrated from the Daraa Governorate. A travel office in the town of Nawa told The Syria Report that more than 6,000 people have left the town in the past three months, headed toward Lebanon, the UAE, Egypt, Iraqi Kurdistan, and Europe. A decision made following the security settlement deal to postpone the mandatory military service for a period of one year and ease the process for obtaining passports has made it easier for young men to leave the Daraa Governorate. In addition, the cost of smuggling persons wanted by the security forces from Daraa to Lebanon decreased from USD 1,500 in 2018 to USD 150 currently.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2021-11-23 16:04:272021-11-23 16:44:46Daraa Witnesses Increased Supply of Real Estate Property Following Latest Settlement Deal

Real Estate Documentation Office Amends Delimitation and Census of Properties in Arbeen

16-11-2021/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

The Directorate of Cadastral Affairs in the Rural Damascus Governorate stopped working on real estate records in Arbeen during the period of opposition control over the city in 2012. With the resumption of the directorate’s work in 2019, it was clear that many real estate registries had been lost or damaged. To fill this void, the Real Estate Documentation Office at the time worked to re-register those records, even while the Syrian opposition possesses a copy of the pre-2012 documents.

In East Ghouta, where Arbeen is located, there are three directorates of Cadastral Affairs: one in Douma, one in Arbeen, and one in Al-Mleiha. Each of the three districts has its own Real Estate Documentation Office. The office in Arbeen contains real estate records for the cities and towns of Arbeen, Al-Eftris, Beit Sawa, Hamouriyeh, Zamalka, Saqba, Ain Termeh, Kafr Batna, Jisreen, and Al-Muhammadiyeh.

In September 2019, the Director of Cadastral Affairs in Rural Damascus told the pro-regime Al-Watan newspaper that 310 out of a total 898 original real estate registries from the Arbeen office were missing. He added that work was underway to gather the lost documents as part of the implementation of Law No. 33 of 2017, which regulates the restoration of partially or completely damaged land registries. However, he did not specify when work would be completed, as there were “a great number of missing real estate documents.”

The Ministry of Local Administration and Environment issued Decree No. 5 of 2019 to restore damaged or missing real estate documents in accordance with the provisions of Law No. 33 of 2017. After the committees formed under Decree No. 5 finish gathering the documents, an administrative decree will be issued to approve the new registries. If the gathering goes uncompleted, the issue will be referred to the judiciary.

A legal expert from Arbeen told The Syria Report it was likely that the delays were caused by the Directorate of Cadastral Affairs taking on two major real estate tasks at the same time: digitising the Land Registry and restoring lost or damaged real estate records. According to the source, the overlap between the two endeavours, as well as the massive scale of lost registries and lack of clarity surrounding the implementation mechanisms, led the Arbeen office to redo the Delimitation and Census of some properties. Delimitation is the process of determining the borders of a property on the ground in the presence of a judge and marking those borders with clear signs. Census or Demarcation, on the other hand, is the creation of a document displaying the status of the property and opening a Land Record for the property within the Land Registry. A return to Delimitation and Census means a return to the first steps of any real estate documentation process – all this amid great dangers to ownership rights in Syria related to the scale of recent destruction, eradication of property boundaries, and mass absence of forcibly displaced property owners.

On the other hand, after withdrawing from Arbeen in July 2012 regime forces bombed some governmental and official sites in the city, including the Real Estate Documentation Office. Opposition members and residents managed to extinguish the flames caused by the bombing, but not before some of the registries were destroyed. Fearing a repeat of the incident, they moved the remaining registries to a safe location underground. Then in 2015, fearing damage as some of the registries were exposed to moisture, activists began volunteering to make copies of the documents. They photocopied all the pages of each land registry and all their contents. Activists then re-archived those records according to their administrative and real estate distribution. They saved these photocopies to external hard drives.

Pro-regime mediators negotiated with the opposition in Arbeen at a number of stages during the siege of East Ghouta between 2012 and 2018, in an effort to pressure opposition authorities to hand over paper real estate registries in exchange for partially lifting the siege. Mediators also said they would provide the city with flour and fuel to run bakeries. The opposition-run Arbeen Local Council rejected the proposal, fearing that the regime might tamper with or falsify real estate registries.

Then in 2017, the Arbeen Local Council decided to convert the city’s real estate archive, which at the time simply consisted of photocopies, into an automated, interactive platform designed by an IT engineer. However, the last military operations on East Ghouta, which started in early 2018, brought that conversion to a halt. During the forced displacements of residents who refused reconciliation with the regime, members of the Arbeen Local Council took the external hard drives with them to northern Syria. However, they left behind the remaining paper registries.

The person responsible for automating the records confirmed to The Syria Report that real estate registries for Arbeen from before 2012 were preserved, while no real estate incidents that occurred between 2012 and 2018 were recorded in order to “preserve rights and prevent distortion of registries.” He added: “The recording of incidents cannot be complete unless they are recorded by the General Directorate of Cadastral Affairs in Damascus.” This is why the focus was on preserving the registries from before 2012.

The registries that opposition members worked to archive likely include a large number of those that the Directorate of Cadastral Affairs had announced were lost in Arbeen. The existence of any of these documents serves as a guarantee of rights during the digitisation and restoration process.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2021-11-16 13:51:392021-11-16 14:22:30Real Estate Documentation Office Amends Delimitation and Census of Properties in Arbeen

Explained: The Destruction of Buildings Under the Rubble Removal Law

16-11-2021/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

Law No. 3 of 2018, which is concerned with the removal of rubble from buildings damaged by natural or unnatural causes, or those slated for demolition, was actually issued to deal with buildings damaged by the conflict. The law also aimed at removing buildings considered to be in violation of construction codes under various laws, most notably Decree No. 40 of 2012.

The 2018 law allowed governors the authority to determine the real estate area and damaged buildings to be removed, leaving the owners of properties slated for removal only one month to prove their rights. The owner may not appeal the governor’s decision. The law also granted governors the right to issue removal decrees for buildings at risk of collapse.

Under Law No. 3, the governor may form a “committee to categorise the damaged buildings and prove ownership of the buildings and the rubble.” The committee has five members: a real estate judge, the head of the survey department in the Land Registry, a real estate expert, a representative from Cadastral Affairs and a representative of local residents. The five members are tasked with surveying the damaged buildings and verifying ownership then drawing up a chart that lists the name of the real estate area, plot numbers, owners’ names, building conditions, scale of damage, structural safety of the buildings, and recommendations for full, partial, or no demolition.

Law No. 3 allows real estate owners to object before the Civil Court of Appeals, but only regarding mistakes in the list of rights holders’ names as drawn up by the committee. They may not object to the committee’s decisions regarding the condition and potential demolition of their properties, despite the fact that the committee may make mistakes in classifying a building’s condition or in recommending whether the structure is suitable for demolition, habitation, or rehabilitation.

Administrative units may demolish the buildings before the objection is dealt with in court. This means that the right to object does not actually halt demolition and is beneficial only for proving ownership of a piece of real estate.

Law No. 3 does not refer to the legal fate of lands where the demolished buildings or buildings at risk of collapse are located. It also does not clarify whether the owners of such lands may construct new buildings or if the building owners must be compensated. Also, it is unclear if the land is meant to be expropriated and if the owners would be paid an allowance or compensated via alternative housing. However, the law did clearly indicate the right of the real estate owner to own the rubble of their building.

Finally, Law No. 3 does not take into account the situation of displaced Syrians, as the deadlines granted to owners during the implementation of the law are insufficient to complete all the procedures and potential complications surrounding the process of proving ownership. Many owners may be altogether unable to prove their ownership as their fear of security persecution and other risks may impede them from receiving proper legal representation.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2021-11-16 13:27:422021-11-16 13:39:38Explained: The Destruction of Buildings Under the Rubble Removal Law

Marota City: Construction of First Tower’s Framework Completed

09-11-2021/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

The governor of Damascus recently met with the owners of some plots of the Marota City project to listen to their problems and work towards solutions, according to the Damascus Governorate’s official website. Present at the meeting was the head of the Decree No. 66 Implementation Directorate, which is affiliated with the Damascus Governorate.

The meeting, attended by the governor in his capacity as head of the Damascus Cham Holding company, followed the announcement that the framework for the first tower in the Marota City construction project had been completed – tower “Delta H47.” Damascus Cham Holding Private JSC is a private joint-stock company tasked with managing and investing in Damascus governorate property. The company was founded in 2016 based on Decree No. 19 of 2015, which allows local authorities to create joint-stock companies to manage governorate properties by proposal from the governorate council.

The Delta H47 tower was the first to obtain a construction permit in the Marota City project in 2019. Construction began in October that same year. Delta H47 features three basement levels, a ground floor, and 12 storeys containing a total of 38 apartments.

The pro-regime newspaper Al-Watan published an article on the latest developments in Marota City, in which it quoted real estate expert Ammar Al-Qaisi. After the article was published, controversy broke out on social media between Delta H47 executive engineer Wael Al-Shammat and Al-Qaisi. Some general observations can be drawn from the discussion between the two men:

First, there are contradictions in the data that the Damascus Governorate published about the total number of plots prepared for construction in Marota City, as well as the number of construction licences that were granted and the time limits given for implementation. Plots prepared for construction have a specific area of land large enough to fit one building block and are granted to owners or investors. There are between 226 and 275 such plots of land and they fall into three categories: residential, commercial, and investment. The only certain figure is that of Damascus Cham Holding’s share, which constitutes 69 such plots of land.

Second, statistics differ on the number of construction licences that have been granted in Marota City, ranging from 40 to 67 licences. Only 35 licences are proven to have undergone construction work, while only 10 have seen work completed at the basement levels.

Third, all of the plots licenced so far have been for residential construction, while none have been licenced for investment or commercial purposes – this despite four years having passed since licencing began. This is due to administrative difficulties and the high cost of the licencing process. In addition, the licences come with time limits and must be renewed through the payment of additional fees in case of delayed construction. If the licence cannot be renewed, then the owners must source construction materials at market prices, incurring additional costs.

Fourth, there are no large companies specialised in building and cladding currently working on the Marota City project. Rather, work is limited to small contractors. Meanwhile, the advanced engineering equipment needed to construct tall towers remains unavailable.

Finally, Marota City’s period of exemption from certain taxes ends in 2022, namely the taxes on the unbuilt-on lands (‘arassat’). Owners and investors of these plots of land fear that the return of this tax – under Legislative Decree No. 53 of 2006, which regulates real estate and property taxes – may add a large financial burden. According to Al-Qaisi, the real estate expert, this increase in taxes, in addition to other taxes, may reach 10 percent of the value of each plot, which is to be paid annually for the duration of the period that the plot is prepared for construction, whether licenced or not.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2021-11-09 14:21:222021-11-09 16:19:30Marota City: Construction of First Tower’s Framework Completed

Approvals ‘Private and Not Available to All’ in Mazzeh Real Estate Development Project

09-11-2021/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

A private company recently obtained approval to establish the first real estate development area within the city of Damascus. The project is a clear violation of the executive instructions of Real Estate Development Law No. 15 of 2008.

The Real Estate Development and Investment Commission (REDIC) approved a project proposed by the Emessa Real Estate Development and Investment LLC to create a real estate development area on real estate plot 1710 and part of plot 1696 in Mazzeh, as well as on public properties surrounding the two plots. The properties are located near the Southern Ring highway, not far from the Basilia City construction project. The new development project in Mazzeh extends over five hectares of land and is planned to include residential buildings, as well as educational and tourist facilities, a commercial building, a private medical complex, and a park.

Law No. 15 of 2008 created REDIC as a public administrative body with financial and administrative independence with ties to the Minister of Public Works and Housing.

Emessa was founded in Homs in 2015 with a capital of SYP 50 million. The company obtained the first approval of its kind in Syria to establish a real estate development area in the Um Al-Izam area in Rural Homs, covering 95 hectares of land. The Minister of Public Works and Housing laid the foundation stone for the development area in March 2021.

Nearly a year earlier, in May 2020, REDIC’s board, headed by the Minister of Public Works and Housing, studied the request submitted by Emessa to establish the real estate development area in Mazzeh. The board then decided to write to the Prime Ministry to receive approval.

In March 2021, the Damascus Governorate Council approved a recommendation from its Building and Reconstruction Committee to permit the announcement of Detailed Zoning Plan No. 46. The plan amended the building classification of real estate plot 1710 and part of plot 1696, in addition to the public properties adjoining them in Mazzeh. They were modified from being “areas under government protection” to “areas under real estate development” in accordance with the provisions of Real Estate Development Law No. 15 of 2008. Protected areas are likely wooded areas located on state-owned property.

At the time, some members of the governorate council objected, claiming that the approval was “private and not available to all,” especially with regard to public properties located within real estate development areas. It also appears that the deal between Emessa and government officials may have been based on corruption and clientelism, as the area granted for development includes part of a public wooded area. The head of the Building and Reconstruction Committee responded to the criticism, saying that that approval was available to everyone under certain conditions specified in the real estate development law. He added that the request to convert the area into a real estate development area was submitted to the Minister of Works and Public Housing and, from there, received approval from the Prime Ministry.

Approval of the real estate development area in Mazzeh violates the executive instructions of Law No. 15, which classifies the city of Damascus as “category one” for real estate development, meaning any such development project within the city must cover at least 25 hectares. Emessa’s project is only five hectares.

In May 2021, the Parliament convened over a new draft law for real estate development and investment meant to replace Law No. 15 of 2008. The assembly referred the draft law to the constitutional and legal committees for further study. There are now 67 licenced real estate development companies in Syria. Six of them belong to the public sector. However, none of them has completed a project under Law No. 15 thus far. The actual number of such development companies is continually changing as new companies obtain licences, while others lose them.

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Arbitrary Decisions to Remove Rubble in Yarmouk Camp

26-10-2021/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

A team from UNRWA is continuing to assess the damages to real estate in the Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp south of Damascus. However, the assessment does not include an action plan to clarify the next steps for the return of residents to the camp.

According to the Action Group for Palestinians of Syria, a London-based human rights watchdog that monitors the situation of Palestinian refugees in Syria, the UNRWA team is assessing properties by scale of destruction and safe habitability. They classify buildings into three categories, marked by drawings they place at the entrance: an empty circle for habitable buildings; a circle with a slash through the middle for restorable buildings; a circle containing an X for uninhabitable buildings. This assessment comes as residents face a deadline to remove remaining rubble from their homes by the end of October.

The Damascus Governorate has permitted some real estate owners to remove rubble from their properties in the camp since the beginning of September, while the governorate handled the removal of rubble in the streets. Since September 10, these property owners were allowed temporary entry into the camp on a daily basis without prior security approvals. They are permitted to enter in the morning to remove the debris from their homes, but must leave in the evening. Returning to reside in the camp still requires prior security approval.

An informed source told The Syria Report that so far no more than 500 families have obtained security approvals to return and live inside the camp, while only 300 other families were allowed temporary entry to remove rubble from their homes. However, for those who have returned, it has become clear that the electricity cuts and shortages of fuel for heavy machinery have hampered the rubble clearing process. In addition, the rubble, which is mostly a result of the intense aerial bombardment of the camp, presents serious obstacles to reaching many parts of the camp.

There is uncertainty regarding the situation of the camp, as official parties have yet to clarify the next steps following the rubble removal deadline. According to an informed source, current removal work is not carried out in accordance with Law. No 3 of 2018, which concerns the removal of rubble from damaged buildings. The source added that current operations are haphazard and not based on any official decisions or laws.

The source pointed out that there are still complications surrounding the security approvals required to return and live inside the camp. The governorate has demanded that prospective returnees show receipts for electricity, water, and phone bills since 2012. This is a virtually impossible precondition because these services were halted in 2012 when regime forces imposed a siege on the camp. In addition, paying bills for nonexistent services will only increase the financial burdens on those hoping to return to the camp, most of whom are impoverished and have few other options for housing. And even when people are able to offer such receipts, their return to the camp remains subject to security approval, which is a decision made by the security services and is unrelated to the Damascus Governorate.

The fate of the camp’s zoning plan is also unclear, as the governorate has delayed issuing the plan after facing many objections. According to the source, the biggest legal problems facing the issuance of the zoning plan stem from Law No. 23 of 2015, an Urban Planning and Urbanisation Law that specifies the methods for issuing zoning plans, as well as the methods for handling areas where there are building code violations and informal housing. The law excludes real estate property that has been previously subject to zoning from being incorporated into a new zoning area except by decree; however, such a decree has not yet been issued for Yarmouk. The source confirmed the previous existence of a zoning plan for the camp, No. 1915, issued on December 26, 2004.

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Explained: Who Lives in Kafraya and Al-Fuaa?

26-10-2021/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

In July 2018, Islamist opposition factions seized control of the two Shia towns of Kafraya and Al-Fuaa in the north of Idlib after evacuating the remaining residents according to the “Four Towns Agreement.” Since then, there have been disputes and clashes between the controlling armed factions and displaced Sunni civilians, who have recently arrived in the towns, over who has the right to live in the homes left behind by displaced Shia civilians. The towns were divided into districts, which were allocated to each armed faction present.

The Four Towns Agreement was settled between representatives from Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) and Ahrar Al-Sham, on one side, and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, on the other, through Qatari mediation in Doha in April 2017. The agreement stipulated that residents of the Rural Damascus towns of Madaya and Zabadani, who had refused to reconcile with the regime, evacuate to northern Syria in exchange for the evacuation of residents from Kafraya and Al-Fuaa. All four towns had been under siege by various armed forces at the time. The agreement saw different stages and successive setbacks, as well as the addition of new areas and stipulations, before it was finally implemented in July 2018.

HTS controls more than half of the houses in Kafraya, while the other half is split between the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) and Ansar Al-Tawhid. These homes are mostly inhabited by the families of armed faction members, and housing priority was granted to married members. HTS, Jaish Al-Ahrar, Failaq Al-Sham, Ahrar Al-Sham, and the Gathering of the Sons of Damascus share control of the neighboring Al-Fuaa. Each of these groups controls an entire section of the town, including the houses and shops.

Meanwhile, displaced civilians with no ties to the armed factions also live in these two towns and comprise more than half of the current population. Most of these people are displaced civilians from the towns of Madaya and Zabadani, as well as other parts of West Ghouta outside Damascus, and are in urgent need of housing. Often, they do not pay rent for their housing in Kafraya and Al-Fuaa.

In some cases, civilians displaced from other parts of Syria ended up renting homes in the districts of Kafaya and Al-Fuaa controlled by the armed factions. However, the housing needs of fighters have led to disputes with these displaced residents. Last September, TIP demanded that someone who had been displaced to Kafraya be evicted. All of TIP’s fighters are Uighur Muslims, an ethnic minority group in China. Most of the fighters moved to Syria with their families in waves beginning in 2012. They are concentrated in the western countryside of the Idlib Governorate and the northern part of the Lattakia Governorate.

The person whom TIP wanted to evict was among the 15 families displaced to Kafraya from the town of Al-Latamna in the Hama Governorate. The dispute escalated when the tenant refused to leave his rented home, prompting HTS’ security forces, which are in charge of resolving such disputes, to intervene. They ruled in favor of TIP and forced all residents displaced from Al-Latamna to leave their rented homes in Kafraya, citing previous eviction warnings.

This dispute came after forces affiliated with Ahrar Al-Sham evicted a widow from the home she was inhabiting in Al-Fuaa in May 2020. The group then fired bullets into the air to disperse civilians who gathered to protest the eviction.

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The Lattakia Governorate: Residents Return to Al-Ghaneimiyeh

18-10-2021/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

Five years after Syrian regime forces regained control over the area, the Lattakia Governorate announced the return to normal life in the villages of Al-Ghaneimiyeh and Wadi Sheikan in the rural northern part of Lattakia. This comes after homes damaged during the decade-long conflict were repaired with the help of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate and after the Lattakia Governorate guaranteed that it would restore basic public services.

In an apparent move to deflect accusations of sectarian bias, Al-Ghaneimiyeh and Wadi Sheikan were both included in the restoration effort, despite their differing living conditions. Wadi Sheikhan residents were predominantly Sunni Muslims of Turkmen minority who fled their homes in 2012. Many of them ended up in Turkey, while some sought refuge in northern Syria. Only a few of them have returned home to Wadi Sheikhan since then, despite the Lattakia Governorate’s claim of normalcy in the village.

Meanwhile, most residents of the neighbouring Al-Ghaneimiyeh are Christians. As battles approached the village in 2012, residents fled to Lattakia city, where the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate provided them with aid. But the assistance was insufficient, causing displaced residents to continuously protest against institutions affiliated with the Greek Orthodox Church.

In 2016, Russian-backed regime forces took control of Al-Ghaneimiyeh. However, displaced residents were not permitted to return home. Instead, many of them had to obtain security permits that only authorised short visits to check on their houses and lands. They were also barred from working on agricultural land they owned. Government officials justified these restrictions by claiming that returning to the village was too dangerous.

An official from the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate told The Syria Report that the real reason people couldn’t return home was that regime fighters had taken up residence in the village. He added that, a year ago, the Church had pressured the Russians to convince security forces to allow residents to return to Al-Ghaneimiyeh without security permits. Enabling the return of residents would require that Russia intervene to remove regime forces from the village and that the governorate rehabilitate electricity and water networks. However, many village residents discovered that regime forces looted their homes.

Meanwhile, some returnees have complained that their homes have only been partially restored from the wartime damage. The Patriarchate official said that household necessities would be obtained at a later time with support from the Russian Orthodox Church.

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Building Demolitions Target Low-Income Residents of Masyaf

18-10-2021/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

Poor living conditions and substantial unmet housing needs have spurred widespread “building violations” that are in violation of construction codes in the city of Masyaf in the countryside of the Hama Governorate. In recent years, many families have resorted to seizing state-owned lands on the outskirts of the city, especially on the western side.

Some people resorted to appropriating publicly owned lands and either cultivating or constructing buildings on them. Usually these seizures are done regardless of local authorities or with the complicity of influential officials. Oftentimes, people seize these properties by demarcating the borders of the land with stone, concrete fences, or barbed wire. They then construct simple buildings on part of the land, usually consisting of just one room.

Masyaf is the centre of an area consisting of dozens of villages, home to Ismailis, Alawites, Sunnis, and Christians. The city’s zoning plans, first issued in 1961, have been amended a number of times, most recently in 1978. However, the city extended beyond both the original and amended zoning plans, bringing about many “building violations” and infringements on publicly owned properties.

Most of the illegal construction is carried out by low-income residents who had little choice but to carve out publicly allocated areas for housing or agriculture. According to a The Syria Report correspondent in the area, some local leaders from the National Defense Forces have carried out even larger violations of public property than those executed by civilian residents. The older violations dating back to before 2011 were carried out by members of the military and senior civil servants, including judges. This last category of offenders took larger portions of public property, constructing luxury buildings on them.

According to official regime media, in recent years, there have been 1,400 instances of such “building violations” in Masyaf. The Hama Governorate Council and the Masyaf City Council launched a campaign in late 2020 and early 2021 to demolish these buildings in accordance with Legislative Decree No. 40 of 2012, which regulates the penalties for construction code violations.

The Syria Report correspondent said that the Decree No. 40 demolition campaign targeted some 73 “violations,” most of which were attributed to Masyaf’s low-income residents. At the same time, the campaign refrained from demolishing older violations of security and military officials and senior civil servants. To justify this discrepancy, Masyaf City Council President Ahmad Al-Basha said that his council bore no responsibility to address the older construction code violations. Decree No. 40 made it possible to settle some violations if violators could prove that they occurred before the decree’s issuance in 2012.

However, the demolition of newer violations while older ones were spared spurred residents to protest in August. Some local leaders from the National Defense Forces also participated in defending their illegally constructed properties.

Facing the pressures of popular protest, authorities in the Hama Governorate requested negotiations with a committee formed by protesters to convey their demands to the governor of Hama. The day before the committee was to meet with the governor, fires broke out in the area, spreading to the illegally constructed buildings in question. It took the fire brigade several consecutive days to suppress the blaze. Local sources told The Syria Report that they blamed security forces for causing the fires. They said they felt the fires were an act of retribution against the protesters whose demands went beyond merely halting the demolitions, and touched on poor living conditions in the city. Sources added that the fires only affected building violations belonging to low-income residents, while those belonging to influential figures were left unscathed.

The Syria Report was unable to confirm these accusations. In recent years, the countryside in the Hama Governorate witnessed increased fires during the summer months due to droughts and high temperatures resulting from climate change.

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Explained: Preventing the Disposal of Lands Meant for Construction

12-10-2021/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

Law No. 3 of 1976, which regulates land sales, fully and explicitly prohibits trading lands intended for construction within an approved general zoning plan. The law justifies this ban, stating that it will control real estate speculation, thereby preventing the prices of these lands from rising and compelling owners to construct on them. However, the ban constitutes a legal and constitutional violation of the rights granted to property owners – namely, the right to dispose of their own property.

In order to register the sale of a piece of land, civil courts – especially those in Damascus, Aleppo, and Homs – required a statement proving that the property was not covered by Law No. 3 of 1976, i.e. that it was not included in an approved general zoning plan. If it turned out that the property was included within a general zoning plan, then the court would issue a decision to dismiss the case and prohibit the registry of the sale.

This protocol continued until the issuance of Legislative Decree No. 26 of 2013, which “determines the cases for permitting or not permitting the owners of lands located within the boundaries of the zoning plans” and cancels the prohibitions set in Law No. 3 of 1976. In other words, Decree No. 26 permitted owners of lands located within zoning plans to dispose of those properties, with three exceptions:

First: Lands that belong to housing cooperatives may not be sold before they are constructed upon.

Second: For land that is sold by public institutions to a natural person or legal entity (a foundation or company), the buyer may not sell the property before constructing on it. Decree No. 26 exempts heirs who jointly own land that was purchased by their ancestors from public institutions, allowing them to sell such properties. However, those who buy such properties from these heirs may not sell them before constructing them.

Third: This exception concerns plots of land that were allocated by public institutions tasked with housing for natural persons or legal entities, or plots that were sold to these parties with the aim of building housing on them. The recipient or buyer of such properties – whether a natural person or legal entity – may not sell them before constructing them. The land after its subdivision takes the form of plots.

Decree No. 26 of 2013 prohibited cadastral affairs offices and notaries public from conducting real estate sales in the three cases above, and considered them null and void if they did occur. The decree also considered such sales, when they occurred, a type of fraud, with both the seller and the buyer punished with a fine and imprisonment between three months to two years.

It is clear, then, that Decree No. 26 of 2013 did not actually repeal Law No. 3 of 1976, in that it kept prohibitions on sales in the above three cases. This prohibition also constitutes a violation against the right of ownership, which is protected by the constitution. Infringing on this right is forbidden except in the public interest. This measure, however, is not included in Law No. 26 of 2013, as prohibition in the above three cases contains no clear public benefit. That being said, the decree does indirectly imply that prohibiting such sales has some social function.

On the other hand, owners of lands slated for construction may in some cases be unable to build anything due to financial hardship. In such cases, banning disposal of such land makes little sense. As such, the bans are inconsistent with the spirit and intention of the law, which is to develop the real estate investments process.

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Damascus’ Al-Tadhamon District: Can Residents Return Home?

12-10-2021/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

The Damascus Governorate is delaying the return of residents to Al-Tadhamon District in southern Damascus, despite its optimistic statements in the past. The governorate recently halted work to remove rubble and rehabilitate the district with no explanation.

In June, the governor of Damascus visited Al-Tadhamon to announce the completion of work to reopen main and secondary roads and to restore the electricity and water grids. However, the heavy machinery that was used to remove the rubble during the governor’s visit was quickly removed from the site after the official visit ended.

The Damascus governorate previously announced that around 2,500 families would be permitted to return to Al-Tadhamon. The correspondent, however, said only 150 families had actually returned and that most of them had relatives fighting in the pro-regime National Defence Forces. Those families returned to the northern part of Al-Tadhamon, which remained under regime control throughout the war. Houses in this northern area of the district only need minimal repair work. Meanwhile, residents are still prohibited from returning to the southern part of Al-Tadhamon, which was under opposition control and faced large-scale damage due to bombardments.

In June, the pro-regime Al-Watan newspaper reported that only some areas in the southern part of Al-Tadhamon witnessed procedures by the Damascus Governorate thus far. The newspaper added that these preparations were limited to the partial reopening of some main roads, as rubble still covered the majority of secondary roads. High mounds of dirt also block entrances to some areas.

According to the correspondent, some real estate owners from the southern part of Al-Tadhamon submitted official objections to the Damascus Governorate recently for categorizing their properties as uninhabitable. They also accused the committee in charge of this evaluation of “lacking impartiality.” A number of lawyers from Al-Tadhamon vowed to reject this evaluation before the judiciary if the governorate did not meet their demands.

In July 2018, the Damascus Governorate formed a committee under Law No. 3 of that same year, which focused on removing rubble, to determine the habitability of certain buildings. On October 2018, the committee held a meeting with a delegation of representatives from Al-Tadhamon and presented the results of its evaluation. The Al-Tadhamon delegation objected to these findings, arguing that they contradicted the facts on the ground. Since that meeting, however, the committee has not changed its course. The process of return to Al-Tadhamon is still lagging, with the exception of some intermittent public statements and promises by the Damascus Governorate.

On the other hand, The Syria Report spoke with well-informed local sources who said that some influential traders bought real estate that the Damascus Governorate had been reluctant to allow the original owners to return to. Traders purchase these properties cheaply, taking advantage of owners’ desperation to return as their living conditions deteriorated elsewhere. Many people from Al-Tadhamon are still paying expensive rents in different areas of Damascus and the outlying countryside, waiting until they can return home.

Eyewitnesses told The Syria Report that families of National Defence Forces fighters recently tried to return to their homes in the southern part of Al-Tadhamon to restore their houses, but were quickly expelled. The Syria Report was unable to confirm which party was responsible for expelling the families, though it was likely the Damascus Governorate.

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Partial Restoration Programmes in Lattakia: The Governorate Controls the NGOs

08-09-2021/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

Lattakia governorate continues to launch projects to restore partially damaged homes in the northern countryside of the governorate, which has witnessed war operations and the displacement of part of its resident population.

The governorate is collaborating with the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Antioch in restoration and reconstruction projects with financial support from UNHCR, Première Urgence Internationale and other international organisations. These organisations are funding local NGOs to carry out certain projects, including partial restoration and reconstruction; however, the Lattakia governorate controls where the projects are implemented and the profiles of the beneficiaries.

The partial restoration project is currently targeting the farming villages of Al-Shmeisat, Deir Hanna, and Ghammam, which administratively belong to the Al-Rabiea sub-district​​, as well as the villages of Gheineimiyeh and Wadi Sheikhan which administratively belong to ​​the Kinsabba sub-district.

The governorate requires the owners of damaged homes to personally submit requests to the relief office in the governorate building, including copies of their personal IDs, family cards, ownership documents, and a receipt of payment for an electricity or water bill. The governorate requires partial restoration applicants to submit a police report proving that the damage to their homes was due to “terrorist attacks.”

Restoration is provided free of charge and covers one house per family. Those who have previously benefited from restoration work from any other party may not apply for restoration from the governorate.

An informed source working for the Lattakia governorate told The Syria Report that the governorate divided up Lattakia’s administrative districts between local aid and development NGOs. In all cases, the activities of those organisations were subject to management by the Lattakia governorate. This has impacted the work of these NGOs to the extent that some of them saw changes in the composition of their administrative and executive staff based on governorate directives. The governorate has gained the upper hand in distributing restoration projects to the NGOs.

The work crews that carry out the restoration projects are mixed, some belong to the NGOs while others belong to the governorate. However, the NGOs are the ones that pay workers’ wages and repair costs. Engineers employed by the governorate also supervise the work.

According to the source, the Lattakia governorate administration for relief, reconstruction and restoration files has been accused of discriminating between the residents benefitting from the restoration projects receiving international funding, as well as between the areas being targeted for restoration work. Neither do the international and local organisations have the freedom to operate as they wish, nor can they specify the groups or geographic areas they wish to target for restoration.

In Ghammam, for example, the names of only a few dozen residents who have been displaced to Lattakia city years ago were registered for restoration work. As for the affected residents of the Turkmen minority who qualify for restoration relief, their names were not registered. Most of them have fled to opposition-held areas in Syria or to Turkey. Sources add that the fates of some Turkmen houses in the village remain unclear due to terrorism charges against those who participated in both peaceful and armed opposition activities.

Some residents with damaged homes said to The Syria Report that the partial restoration project proposed by the governorate is not enough to address medium and large damages. They fear that registering for the partial restoration programme now may deprive them of the opportunity for full restoration or reconstruction in the future.

A source in the Lattakia governorate said that governorate-employed engineers working in the restoration programme usually neglect repairing damages to walls and electrical wiring. Additionally, the restoration of private homes has not yet been accompanied by restoration to publicly shared infrastructure in the target areas. For example, the village of Ghammam has not yet seen any repairs to its public electricity network.

While officials from the government, municipalities, and Baath Party have been keen to visit areas targeted by the restoration programme in a bid to further their political agenda, they have failed to respond to the demands of residents to improve living conditions and implement restoration work.

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What Is New with Raqqa’s Zoning Plan?

01-09-2021/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

The municipality of Raqqa (known as the “People’s Municipality,” part of the majority-Kurdish Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria–AANES) has issued a zoning plan for the city and presented it to the Local Administrations and Environment Authority, which serves as a governmental ministry. The body approved the city plan on July 7. Work will begin in September to implement the new zoning plan, after obtaining final approval and studying any public objections.

Joint President of the People’s Municipality in Raqqa Ahmad Ibrahim told The Syria Report that it could take more than five years to implement the new zoning plan, adding that implementation was tied to “the extent of citizens’ cooperation,” as the area included within the plan is public property of the Syrian state.

According to Ibrahim, the municipality’s dispute resolution committee has received 120 objections to the zoning plan so far, some of which were approved and responded to. He added that the judicial office doors remain open for final adjudication on objections that received no response, and that “if the grievance of any citizen is confirmed, he will be compensated”.

This is the first zoning plan to be issued by the Raqqa municipality since the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) took control of the city in late 2017, expelling the Islamic State (IS). The new plan is an expansion of a previous plan for the city from before 2011 that measured four by six kilometres. The old plan extended from the Euphrates riverbed to the railroad track, and from the Al-Mashlab Checkpoint to the Al-Sibahiyeh Checkpoint.

The need for a new zoning plan stems from the large-scale destruction Raqqa witnessed during the battles with IS in 2017. The lack of safe housing, coupled with demand for homes, has caused informal urban expansion in Raqqa’s northern and southern suburbs. The new plan is meant to regulate urban expansion and prevent the spread of unlicensed, informal construction in the city. Raqqa is today home to 350,000-400,000 people.

In January 2021, the Raqqa municipality launched a campaign to demolish dozens of homes and shops that it described as being in violation of construction codes in the northern part of the city. The first phase of demolitions targeted more than 15 residential and commercial properties that had been constructed on state owned land in the Andalus neighbourhood, as well as the area around the Hazimeh Roundabout and the Agricultural Airport Road. The municipality said that it demolished the properties, which were located in the zoning area after meeting with residents and explaining the plan to them.

The Syria Reportspoke with a man who submitted an objection to the People’s Municipality after the demolition of his home, which consisted of two bedrooms and a salon, near the Al-Sunbulah Roundabout. The committee rejected his objection. According to Ibrahim, no property is demolished unless it is confirmed to be a “building violation” (a building that does not comply with construction codes). He added that the properties so far demolished were those that were constructed after the first topographical survey conducted by a team of People’s Municipality surveyors in 2019. On January 13, 2020, the AANES-run Legislative Council in Raqqa issued a decree prohibiting the disposal of public properties in the city after 2013. Any actions in violation of the decree would be considered not to have occurred, and all legal effects nullified.

The objections submitted to the dispute resolution committee centred around the municipality’s expropriation, through the deduction of private properties under Urban Planning Law No. 23 of 2015, which is in force in Damascus. The Raqqa municipality followed this law due to the absence of laws on urban planning in the AANES.

The private properties that were expropriated in Raqqa under the law were seized for the public benefits, including the construction of schools, roads, parks, and hospitals. Ibrahim explained that the legal percentage determined for deduction is 50 per cent in areas close to the city centre and 40 per cent in other areas. If more than thaExplained: Law No. 23 of 2015 – Seizure of Propert percentage is deducted, then the affected parties will be compensated.

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Explained: The Role of the Power of Attorney in Transferring Real Estate Ownership

01-09-2021/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

Syrian law grants the notary power of attorney the status of a real estate title deed, in one limited case stipulated in Article 681 of the Civil Code–that is when the power of attorney is irrevocable and therefore the sale of the property is considered final.

The notary power of attorney is one type of real estate ownership document, as the notary public in charge of it documents an irrevocable power of attorney under which the seller entrusts the buyer with a special, irrevocable power to sell the property to himself or anyone he chooses.

The notary public’s irrevocable power of attorney must include an explicit statement that the seller has authorised the buyer to execute the sale, as well as register the property in his name or the name of whomever he wants, without the presence of the principal, i.e., the person that signed the power of attorney. After the notary public documents the seller’s statement before him that he has sold the property to the buyer, the document is kept in the notary’s records. The document is given a general number, a special number and a record number, and the buyer obtains a certified copy.

Though the irrevocable power of attorney is an official deed, it is not recorded in the Land Registry. This is a potential source of problems, as the property remains, in the Land Registry, under the name of the seller, with no evidence of the buyer’s rights. This discrepancy may result in fraud, as the seller may attempt to sell the property again.

As a temporary measure, Land Registry Law No. 188 of 1926 grants the buyer the right to place a temporary entry in the Land Registry based on the notary’s irrevocable power of attorney, without the need for approval from the court. However, the validity of this entry lasts no longer than 10 days, during which time the buyer must formally transfer ownership of the property to his name in the Land Registry according to the rules, or risk cancelling the temporary entry.

In all cases, the process of transferring real estate ownership to the name of the buyer requires filing a court case against the seller to document the sale or inheritance. The process is not a real court case, but rather a formal process the buyer must go through in order to officially transfer the property to their own name. Essentially, this means that the notary public irrevocable power of attorney alone is not enough to fully transfer ownership of the property to the buyer.

Why do people use this type of documentation?

In the 1980s and 1990s, real estate sales via the notary public were common because this is an easy method, especially in informally built neighbourhoods where it is not usually possible to transfer ownership to the name of the buyer in the Land Registry. This method also spread because of its relatively cheap fees. More importantly, this method did not require obtaining a financial clearance for the property–however, this requirement has since been introduced, leading to a decline in demand for irrevocable power of attorney in documenting real estate sales.

Like other real estate sales, the irrevocable power of attorney process requires prior security approval according to a ministerial circular issued in 2015. That same year, the Ministry of Local Administration issued another circular stressing that confirmation of a real estate sale in the Land Registry may not be accepted based on the notary public’s irrevocable power of attorney before addressing the notary public who notarised the document, in order to prevent fraud.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2021-09-01 10:30:002021-09-02 10:33:20Explained: The Role of the Power of Attorney in Transferring Real Estate Ownership

Selective Return to Palestinian Refugee Camp

11-08-2021/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

Many displaced residents of the Husseiniyeh Palestinian Refugee Camp southeast of Damascus have been unable to return, after it appears to have been turned into a military compound with only one entrance and exit through a security checkpoint.

Al-Hussseiniyeh is in the Housh Sahia area, located 13 kilometres from the Damascus city centre and two kilometres from Sayyida Zeinab. It was once considered the second largest Palestinian refugee camp in Syria, with 50,000 residents in 2012, more than half of whom were Palestinian refugees according to unofficial statistics from the Palestinian Refugees Portal website. The camp is also relatively new, established in 1982. It was supervised by three municipalities that fell administratively within the Damascus, Damascus Countryside and Quneitra governorates. Al-Husseiniyeh underwent urban expansion and a rising population as a result of displacement from the Jaramana refugee camp in the 1980s. Residents of the Jaramana camp were fleeing the government’s demolition of their homes to expand the road network at the entrance to the city of Jaramana.

Al-Husseiniyeh faced massive destruction by regime artillery fire, barrel bombs and aerial strikes during the brief period of opposition control in 2013. The bombing caused the displacement of most camp residents and put the electricity and sewage networks out of service.

Regime forces prevented displaced residents from returning to the camp until August 2015, nearly three years after recapturing it, claiming they were protecting residents from war remnants and rehabilitating the camp. In early 2016, the Minister of Reconciliation stated that the government was rehabilitating Al-Husseiniyeh’s infrastructure, including electricity networks, roads, sewage, and water in order to facilitate return to the camp. He said the costs amounted to SYP 300 million.

The Military Security branch in the area only allowed people back into the camp if they could prove ownership of their properties there and obtain security approval. Families whose members had been in the political or armed opposition or participated in civil society organisations during the period of opposition control were expressly banned from returning, local sources told The Syria Report.

To restrict movement in Al-Hussseiniyeh, entries and exits were all funnelled through one Military Security checkpoint at the main entrance to the camp. The camp’s remaining entryways were blocked off with dirt mounds.

After retaking the camp, regime forces seized the homes of opposition members, allowing the families of foreign and local Shia militia fighters to take up residence. Regime forces also blew up a number of other homes after confiscating the possessions still inside. The number of returnees to Al-Husseiniyeh never reached more than half of its former population, according to local sources.

Those who returned to the camp did so in stages. First were the families of Reconciliation Committee members and the families of regime soldiers and pro-regime militia fighters killed in battle, followed by public sector and government ministry employees. The rest of the population was allowed after them. However, the Military Security checkpoint prevented certain families from returning even if they had obtained security approval, on the pretext that one of their family members had belonged to an opposition institution or armed faction. Former tenants in the camp were also prevented from returning.

Residents of Al-Husseiniyeh still suffer from deteriorating public services, including sewage problems, drinking water and electricity cutoffs, poor phone coverage and uncollected garbage. Theft is also rampant, while criminal gangs impose fines.

In November 2020, camp residents submitted an official complaint to the municipal authorities, asking for the removal of the main checkpoint and dirt mounds. The mounds had made it difficult for residents to move around, as they had to walk long distances to reach the main entrance, which had become a dumping zone for uncollected trash. The municipality responded to the complaint saying that the issue was not within their powers, but rather fell to the security forces.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2021-08-11 18:22:262021-08-11 18:22:29Selective Return to Palestinian Refugee Camp

Looting Continues in Former Opposition Areas of Idlib

11-08-2021/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

Contractors are still extracting and recycling materials from houses belonging to displaced people in the regime-held southern part of Idlib.

Workers are dismantling iron rebar from roofs in the eastern neighbourhood of the city of Kafr Nubl, according to aerial photographs taken by an opposition-owned drone. Kafr Nubl is located along the current line of contact between regime and rebel forces. Civilians are prohibited from entering the area, now run as a closed military zone.

Activists also shared videos filmed outside the city of Maaret Al-Numan, which appeared to show homes in which only the walls remained after the iron rebar had been removed from the roofs. The looting also included removal of marble countertops, electrical wiring, and exterior cladding. Maaret Al-Numan is under the control of the Russian-backed 25th Special Task Force Division, which is led by Colonel Suheil Al-Nimr.

Last September, The Syria Report reported on the iron rebar extractions taking place in the Al-Halak neighbourhood of Saraqib in the Idlib governorate. It appears that such looting has become an oft-repeated model after being observed in more than 20 towns and villages across previously opposition-held southern Idlib governorate. Since regime forces captured the area in early 2020, it has remained a closed military zone, with displaced residents prohibited from returning home. Many houses there now have no roofs, plumbing or electrical wiring, sources told The Syria Report.

According to a correspondent for The Syria Report in the area, the contractors include permanent workers who earn a share of the profits, or labourers earning daily wages. Workers use both manual and electrical demolition equipment to extract iron for later use without damaging it. Most workers on these sites are led by a contractor who is directly affiliated with regime forces and shares a portion of the profits with them. Different regime military divisions share between them areas of influence in southern Idlib in the form of “work sectors.” Contractors affiliated with each division are active in that division’s work sector.

Work crews sell one kilogram of extracted iron rebar for about SYP 2,000. The iron is collected at collection points on the outskirts of cities and towns where the work crews are active, then transported to factories for processing and polishing through special machines. This treated iron sells for about SYP 2,750 per kilogram at markets in regime-held areas that specialize in recycled building materials.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2021-08-11 18:20:482021-08-11 18:21:36Looting Continues in Former Opposition Areas of Idlib

Government Prioritises Coastal Area in Regional Planning Scheme

11-08-2021/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

The Higher Regional Planning Council (HRPC) is set to approve and implement the regional plan for the Syrian coastal region this summer, making it the first such completed plan, according to official government statements. The information raises questions as to why the coastal area was prioritised over other parts of Syria that witnessed higher rates of destruction during the war, causing the displacement of residents and depriving them of their rights to housing and property.

The Director of Regional Planning and Decision Support in Lattakia’s governorate council said that the plan will highlight natural resources and the potential future use of lands for economic or residential purposes, as part of strategy to ensure sustainable development. He added that the coastal region is a priority for such development because of its strategic location and natural resources.

Coastal Syria is where most members of the Alawite community are based, with Sunni and Christian minorities and as such it is an area of staunch support for the regime. At the same time it has been relatively spared by the conflict,  although clashes in the northern part of Lattakia governorate in 2013 led to the forcible displacement of some Turkmen and Sunni residents.

According to official statements, the recently announced regional plan covers 4,367 square kilometres of land in the Lattakia and Tartous governorates. The plan highlights the government’s vision for the coast for the coming 20 years, allocating land for different usages, including residential areas, urban expansion zones, agriculture, nature reserves, economic activity, tourism and health facilities, energy transmission networks, water sources and dams.

In 2018, as part of the regional planning process, the HRPC divided Syria into seven regions, each of which having distinct geographic, demographic, economic or administrative characteristics, facilitating the drawing of regional and zoning plans. Those regions are Greater Damascus, the south, the Badia, the east, the north, the central region, and the coast.

Regional Planning Law No. 26 of 2010 did not explicitly stipulate that priority would be given to certain regions over the others, rather stating the importance of achieving balanced national and regional development. The coastal region faced few of the sort of wartime damages that would justify choosing it as a priority for regional planning. The other regions that are currently under government control are under similar, if not worse, economic, and urban conditions. Thus, contrary to what was stipulated in Law No. 26 of 2010, choosing the coast as the first regional planning project will only exacerbate pre-existing imbalances in development. The goal behind this choice appears to be political–the coastal region is the most important centre of support for the regime, which may be trying to alleviate poor local living conditions by allocating more funds for investment and public services.

Regional planning presents myriad repercussions on the living conditions of ordinary people, as it serves as a middle link between national planning for the state’s general policy and urban planning for local communities. Regional planning directives are a mandatory part of urban planning and are meant to provide optimal spatial and social conditions for economic and development projects.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Rand Shamaa https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Rand Shamaa2021-08-11 12:21:002021-08-10 12:22:58Government Prioritises Coastal Area in Regional Planning Scheme
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Read also

  • A New Classification for Housing Cooperatives: Between Project Completion, Dissolution and Liquidation
  • Decree No. 66 of 2012: Objections and Judicial Proceedings Following the Reparation Package
  • Reconstruction Through Reduced Engineers’ Fees: Engineering Fee Exemptions Fall Short of Enabling Displaced People to Return to Their Areas
  • Rising Rents in Damascus and Its Nearby Suburbs: Demand Pressure and Limited Supply

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