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Opposition Expands Zoning Plans in Al-Rai Town After Consulting Real Estate Owners

02-12-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

In the first step of its kind, an opposition-affiliated municipal council in northern Syria adopted zoning plans made for the town when it was under Syrian government control. More importantly, the plans were adopted after obtaining the agreement of town residents, which may be the first time such a step has been taken since the Baath Party took over in 1963.

The municipal council of Al-Rai, a town north of Aleppo, announced that it had begun work to implement an expansion of its zoning plans. The expansion will include lands east of the town on either side of the “Eastern Highway”. The Eastern Highway is a road built in 2018 by Turkish construction companies to connect the Al-Rai border crossing, located just two kilometres east of the town, with the main highway to the city Al-Bab, circumventing Al-Rai altogether.

The expansion began with levelling and preparing the land and building roads. Sources close to the municipal council told a correspondent for The Syria Report in the area that the construction work has so far gone according to the general expansion plans, while the detailed plans were not yet complete.

Municipal authorities in Al-Rai are carrying out the expansion as the old zoning plans are no longer enough to accommodate the town’s increased population. Residents needed to expand residential and commercial construction on the outskirts of the town.

A municipal council official told The Syria Report that the zoning expansion plans will be implemented next year. He added that the expansion will be towards the eastern side of the town, where the Eastern Highway is located, because the land there is barren and rugged, and unsuitable for agriculture. The other outskirts of the town, however, are suitable for agriculture, and expanding there would damage the agricultural sector.

The council did not say how it will expropriate the real estate for the expansion project, nor how it would provide compensation. Those details were to be delayed until after release of the detailed zoning plans.

Lands in the expansion area are owned by the residents of Al-Rai. A source told The Syria Report that the decision to expand the town’s zoning plans came after consulting the owners of the land and discussing the details of the expansion. The landowners agreed to implement the plan because they will benefit from price increases after the area is converted into a real estate zone. In the first phase, water, electricity, and sewage networks will be connected to the area, and roads will be built.

Most residents of Al-Rai and its surrounding villages are Syrian Turkmen. The town extends to the border strip with Turkey. Opposition forces took control of the town in 2012, and after rebels entered Aleppo town that same year, many Turkmen residents from the neighbourhoods of Al-Holk, Al-Haydariyeh and Bustan Al-Basha fled to their original hometowns in the north, where Al-Rai became the most notable town to receive the displaced.

Rebels lost Al-Rai and its countryside to the Islamic State in 2014, before regaining it in 2017 as part of the Turkish-backed military campaign, Operation Euphrates Shield.

Al-Rai enjoys sizable Turkish support, including funding for its municipal council, which continues to develop various service sectors. The council also receives a large portion of its funding via revenues from the nearby border crossing, which it uses to finance projects, the most important of which is the zoning expansion plan. It has also established an industrial zone and developed the transportation networks, as well as the health, manufacturing, and shoe production sectors.

Expansion work in Al-Rai

 

Source: Al-Rai Municipal Council

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A “Personal” Story of Expropriation

02-12-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

Property confiscation and expropriation in Syria are often addressed from an administrative and legal viewpoint, while property owners and their stories are ignored. In this short story, The Syria Report attempts to add a human dimension to a true story of property confiscation. Several personal details have been omitted to protect the property owner’s family.

Kamil inherited four hectares of land from his father, land that was considered the best in the village because it stretched out along the riverbank. He became the envy of the other residents, many of whom worked for him during the harvest seasons. He was also able to marry the prettiest girl in the village, after her relatives convinced her of the importance of his land.

Kamil was a persistent farmer and knew each of his trees by the names he had given them when he was a child. The big peach tree was known as “Al-Muhakalleh,” and the sweetest pomegranate tree was named “Sugar.”

But his happiness was short-lived. After the birth of his eldest son, a decree was made to expropriate Kamil’s orchard, as well as the surrounding land. Immediately, bulldozers came to raze the land and pull up all the trees. In its place was built a factory for the Ministry of Defence’s Defence Factories Establishment, implemented by experts from North Korea.

The “good” compensation that was promised to the villagers was more than 10 years late. When it finally arrived, Kamil discovered that it was worth no more than the price of one year’s harvest from his former land.

The village residents acquiesced to the compensation offered to them, but Kamil refused vehemently, feeling that it was deeply insulting. He tried making complaints and seeing officials, an officer here and an official there. He explained his case to them fervently. They all said his only course of action would be to resort to the courts, so that he might have a chance at re-assessing the price of his former land and trees.

With the loss of his land, Kamil lost his source of income. He was forced to turn to different work to keep his family and children from going hungry. But he did not lose hope that he could regain his land, hiring a well-known lawyer for his case. After ten years, he won the case and raised the compensation by four times. However, the state attorney objected, and considered the case invalid because it was filed against the Ministry of Defence, and not the Defence Factories Establishment.

When his lawyer died, Kamil lost his desire to continue with the case.

Kamil’s children grew up, his oldest son graduating as an assistant engineer and finding work in the Defence Factories Establishment. The son did not tire of answering his father’s continuous questions about a land he never knew, saying: “It is no longer land; it has become offices, departments and laboratories”. At Kamil’s insistence, the son arranged an interview for his father with the director of the factory, so that he could raise the issue of his expropriated land, which had yet to be compensated. The director responded, “This is not up to me”, and explained that he was not responsible for what happened.

After 2011, the factory was expanded into a massive facility for the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC), and security measures were increased around the area. Every time the facility was hit by Israeli airstrikes, Kamil used to ask his sons if the bombing hit his land.

A few months before Kamil’s death, he had an unbridled desire to visit his land for a final time. That would be difficult, as his son told him: “Nobody is allowed to enter the facility”. But Kamil’s insistence, and his advanced illness, pushed his son to secure another appointment with the facility director. Still, the land had become a secret laboratory, and the new director responded to the son with one word: “Impossible”.

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Housing in ‘Post-Conflict’ Syria: Is There Room for a Just Reconstruction?

25-11-2020/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by admin

Syria’s housing needs are greater than ever—and the issue must be included in reconstruction strategies, as active warfare dies down in much of the country, argues Syrian economist Samir Aita in a new report, Urban Recovery Framework for Post-Conflict Housing in Syria, published in September 2020.

Housing, Aita argues, “stands at the core among the most effective root causes that contributed to the uprising and its subsequent transformation into a civil war.”

Much of Syria’s housing today is either damaged or destroyed. But Syria needs a “transformative revival,” writes Aita, rather than simply a reconstruction of the physical structures damaged and destroyed by war.

Chief among concerns over this “revival” is that of the so-called “urbicide” that has been committed against Syria’s cities and neighbourhoods over the course of the war—that is, both physical structures and “urban life itself” have been destroyed in the fighting. Moving forward, urban planning must account for re-establishing the social fabric and “urban vitality”, in addition to “physical reconstruction”, Aita writes.

Such considerations are vital, especially in historic heritage neighbourhoods, where rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts must take care to prevent outright gentrification. Aita gives the oft-cited example of the Solidere development in downtown Beirut, launched in the 1990s over the destroyed remnants of what was once the Lebanese capital city’s vibrant downtown. The area is now more or less a luxury outdoor shopping mall.

The same concerns are important in informal, largely working-class housing areas, such as the Baba Amr area of Homs, which was mostly destroyed in the early years of the war. Neglect of these areas can lead to further harm, writes Aita. Since 2019, “the conditions that marked the failure of previous planning efforts in Syria and led to the creation of informal areas are being replicated in most of the ‘reconstruction’ master plans produced so far”.

This recent tendency towards “master plans,” drawn up without significant consultation with residents themselves, will hinder proper, just urban planning efforts in post-conflict areas, Aita argues.

Aita mentions four approaches to reconstruction, each of which “depends on the context of city and neighbourhood”: provisional housing, repairing damaged houses (a “preferred solution” when the scope of damage is low), constructing new housing (a potentially problematic venture that authorities may abuse to their own benefit) and a so-called “build-yard” approach that would support affected communities in rebuilding their own housing.

No matter the approach, the scale of reconstruction needed is massive. According to Aita, the cost of housing reconstruction is estimated to range between USD 14 billion and 31.5 billion if reconstruction takes place over five years. How might all this be funded? Aita cites Keynes’s post-conflict analysis of the First World War, adding that in the Syrian context as well, the key is that the “economy continues to function, is well managed and recovers quickly.”

Meanwhile, aid funding may be ineffective. Aita warns of the so-called “aid curse,” wherein “the ruling elites would redirect aid money to their own interests, instead of using it for reconstruction.” Similar post-conflict situations in Lebanon and Iraq have seen poor aid effectiveness for this reason, Aita writes.

Creating jobs outside the public sector, including within the housing reconstruction sector itself, could also ensure that sustainable reconstruction comes along with other economic benefits.

Crucially, Aita writes, “housing reconstruction in Syria appears to be more a matter of good governance and management of a recovering economy than of huge amounts of foreign aid directed at physical reconstruction.” In particular, he argues, Syria’s Central Bank should be key in “managing the financial end of the housing reconstruction process.”

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Plans for Maarouneh Housing Suburb Announced

25-11-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

The General Housing Establishment (GHE), which is affiliated with the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, announced last week that it had released the zoning plans for a new residential suburb development called “The Green City” in the Maarouneh area outside Damascus. Those who may be impacted by the construction project have one month to submit objections.

The project will be built about 16 kilometres from Damascus over an area of 600 hectares. The spot is just south of the Christian village of Maarouneh in the eastern Qalamoun mountain range, which belongs administratively to the Tal district of Damascus Countryside governorate. Bordering the construction zone to the south is the M5 Damascus-Aleppo Highway, and to the east is the Assad Suburb area of Harasta.

Most of the land slated for the project was formerly communal property owned by the families of Tal and Maarouneh since 1943. The land was confiscated officially in 2014.

According to the zoning plans for the new suburb, there will be 25,000 apartments built to accommodate 125,000 residents. Planners will also construct markets, schools, and health centres, as well as set aside areas designated for investment and tourism projects.

The Maarouneh project was launched in 2011 as part of a government housing programme to construct thousands of housing units in all governorates. The programme is just one of four that the government has launched in governorates since 2002, under the banner of social housing: youth housing, housing for workers, saving funds for housing, and government housing. All four programs were meant to be completed by the end of 2024.

The dissolved General Union for Housing Cooperatives (GUHC) had proposed to give the project to housing cooperatives, but the GHE rejected the idea because it preferred to fund the project from its own resources, according to statements made in 2018 by the GHE director.

The Maarouneh housing programme did not see many applicants, as its launch “coincided with the outbreak of the Syrian crisis,” according to official statements. Due to the lower number of subscriptions, the Ministry of Works and Public Housing issued Decree No. 407 in 2019 to add the project to the saving funds for housingprogramme.

The government housing and the saving funds for housing programmesdiffer in the manner of subscription and financial payments, and in the allocation of housing. The key difference is that in the housing savings program, applicants do not subscribe to housing within a specified area. Rather, they are provided with housing units within their governorate. This contrasts with the situation with the planned suburb in Maarouneh, where housing is determined in advance. No official statements have been released to clarify this matter or explain what it may entail.

The director of social housing and savings, in charge of the four programmes at the GHE, said in late 2019 that in order to subscribe for housing in the project, applicants must pay an insurance fee of SYP 500,000, as well as a cash down payment of SYP 1.8 million. This is in addition to monthly payments of SYP 20,000, until the subscriber has paid the full required sum.

In March 2020, the GHE announced that it had finished constructing 40 percent of the main roads for the Maarouneh project. It sent a warning to the Military Housing Establishment, which had been contracted since 2013 to draw up detailed studies, to speed up its work or risk losing the contract.

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Explained: What Happens to Assets Confiscated from Syrians Convicted of “Terrorism”?

25-11-2020/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by admin

Syria’s Counterterrorism Court was established byLaw No. 22 of 2012, with the purpose of implementing the provisions of Anti-Terrorism Law No. 19 of that same year. The court is politically biased and directed at retribution towards opponents of the regime, generalising them as “terrorists,” which allows it to confiscate their properties.

The court is headquartered in Damascus and consists of three judges who are named by decree. Law No. 22 also permitted, when necessary, the creation of more than one chamber in the court by decree of the High Judicial Council. The court was restructured several times through Decrees No. 255 of 2018, No. 117 of 2019 and No. 69 of 2020, which added amendments to the courtrooms and their judge appointments.

Laws No. 22 and No. 19 of 2012 did not specify the terms and procedures for litigation. Instead, Article 7 of Law No. 22 stipulates that the Counterterrorism Court does not adhere to the same principles laid out in the legislation applied by ordinary courts. The Counterterrorism Court is at its own discretion in applying these principles, which runs counter to the most basic principles of fair trial for individuals. This also contradicts Article 51 of the 2012 constitution, which states that the right to litigation, legal recourse and defence before the court is protected by the law.

The Counterterrorism Court also tries civilians, soldiers, and juveniles alike, in contravention of the rules of jurisdiction. Judges for the court are appointed by the president, which violates the principle of separation of powers.

Confiscation of property and assets

Article 12 of Anti-Terrorism Law No. 19 of 2012 explicitly states that in all crimes stipulated in the law, the court shall rule to confiscate movable and immovable property. In this way, the law generalised these crimes—the penalty issued against those convicted in alleged terrorism cases would be the confiscation of their properties. And before the verdict is issued, court authorities freeze the accused party’s assets.

Consequently, if an acquittal ruling is issued, then the freeze is meant to be cancelled. If there is a conviction, then the freeze will become a full confiscation. Such measures to freeze assets prior to confiscation do not differ in substance from precautionary seizures, which become executive seizures after a final court ruling.

Confiscation requires a court ruling, according to successive Syrian constitutions. Previously, confiscation was imposed by Legislative Decrees No. 23 of 1965 and No. 29 of 1969, against those accused of obstructing the “process of socialist transformation.” However, the properties confiscated in accordance with these two decrees were not transferred to state ownership and remained formally in the name of their original owners, despite being leased by the Ministry of Finance’s Department of Confiscated Assets.

What is new in Law No. 19 of 2012 is that confiscation now refers to the permanent removal of movable and immovable properties, as well as transfer of their ownership to the state according to a court ruling. After Law No. 19 was released, confiscations expanded to an unprecedented scope, prompting the Ministry of Finance to create a Directorate for Confiscated Assets. The directorate is larger than the previous Department of Confiscated Assets and has multiple departments.

Mechanism for confiscating properties

After the issuance of a final ruling by the Counterterrorism Court, including confiscation of movable and immovable properties, the Ministry of Justice must transfer a copy of the ruling to the Ministry of Finance to confiscate the movable properties. The Ministry of Justice also sends a copy to the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, which is in charge of confiscating immovable properties. The Ministry of Agriculture has the mandate over such properties, according to the provisions of State Property Law No. 252 of 1959.

However, in reality, the Ministry of Finance is implementing confiscations of both movable and immovable properties. It is doing this on the pretext that Martial Order No. 4562, which was issued on 26 September 2010, gave it and its directorates across Syria’s governorates the responsibility of managing and investing the confiscated properties. The ministry was also assigned this task by Council of Ministers Letter No. 9310, issued on 4 June 2015. Martial orders are issued in the event of war, which disrupts ordinary laws and the constitution, and restricts individual rights and freedoms. Such orders are issued by the executive authority represented by the martial governor, rather than by the legislative or judicial authority.

In order to complete the confiscation process, the Ministry of Finance’s Directorate of Confiscated Assets circulates the corresponding court ruling to public authorities, in order to request any relevant information. For example, if the convicted defendant owned real estate, then the Land Registry would send a list of record numbers to the Finance Ministry directorate in the governorates where the defendant’s real estate is located. The directorate then takes stock of the confiscated properties and coordinates with the Real Estate Services Directorate to transfer their ownership to the state. Afterwards, the properties are managed by the Ministry of Finance through the Directorate of Confiscated Assets and its subsidiary departments across Syria.

Cassation and appeals

Articles 5 and 6 of Law No. 22 for 2012 contradicted normal conduct for a judiciary, as they affirmed that the Counterterrorism Court issues and finalises rulings in absentia, and does not accept any type of appeal, retrial, annulment or dropping of sentences.

The law only allowed appeals before a special circuit established by decree in the Court of Cassation. Consequently, judgments issued by the Counterterrorism Court do not accept substantive appeals. That is, it does not reconsider the merits of the case, because the appeals chamber formed in the Court of Cassation is a court of law only, and only examines the validity of the Counterterrorism Court’s application of Terrorism Law No. 19 of 2012.

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Harjaleh: A Residential Suburb for Returnees?

25-11-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

On November 15, the Minister for Local Administration and Environment Hussein Makhlouf told the pro-regime Al-Watan newspaper that his government had taken measures to facilitate the return of Syrian refugees, including securing housing units to shelter those whose homes had been temporarily damaged.

The Russian delegation that took part in this month’s “International Conference for the Return of Refugees”—organised by Damascus with Russian sponsorship and held from November 11-12—also made a visit to the Harjaleh shelter, in an indication of the facility’s importance. The delegation examined the Harjaleh medical point and school complex and helped distribute aid supplies.

The Harjaleh shelter centre is located near the town of Harjaleh, on the Damascus-Daraa highway, 20 kilometres from the Syrian capital. Administratively, it sits within the Kisweh district. The head of the Harjaleh municipality, AbdulRahman Ali Al-Khatib, who also serves as director of the Harjaleh shelter centre, was elected to the People’s Council in July 2020.

Alaa Ibrahim, the governor of Damascus Countryside, said that Syrian refugees could be received in clusters if the sanctions on Syria were lifted, according to the pro-regime Syriandays news website.

According to Ibrahim, the governorate has “gathering points” in Harjaleh and Adra in Damascus Countryside that will receive a number of returning families until preparations for infrastructure in their original areas of residence are completed. On a tour of the Harjaleh centre, Ibrahim said that the facility has undergone maintenance, and that work was underway to convert the centre into a residential suburb serviced by infrastructure, schools, and medical facilities.

UNICEF, UNHCR, the Red Crescent and the International Medical Corps have been contributing to supply the Harjaleh centre with food and medical supplies, while Damascus Countryside governorate oversees its service and logistical matters, such as electricity, water, and road networks.

Since 2013, the government has designated the shelter centre in Harjaleh to receive displaced people from opposition-held areas surrounding Damascus. The centre underwent an expansion in 2016 to accommodate displaced people in accordance with various reconciliation and expulsion agreements, as was the case with people displaced from Darayya and Moadamiyeh Al-Sham. It was later used to accommodate people displaced from East Ghouta in February-April 2018. The centre received tens of thousands of people over time before the number of its residents decreased as they were allowed to return to their hometowns.

The centre currently consists of about 200 prefab hangars, each with an area of 50 square metres, with large sandy yards separating them. Nearby are several buildings that originally served as public schools before the Damascus Countryside governorate acquired them.

The Harjaleh municipality recently provided seven hectares of land to Damascus Countryside to start implementing the residential suburb project, according to a correspondent for The Syria Report in the area. The total area designated for the suburb will span 200 hectares, but it is unclear whether the entire area will belong to the Harjaleh municipality, or if additional private properties will be expropriated for construction. The old zoning plans for Harjaleh included constructing a residential suburb in the same area where today’s shelter centre now sits. That suburb was planned for completion in 2007.

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A Return to the Yarmouk Camp, Under Certain Conditions

18-11-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

The Damascus Governorate Council has begun receiving requests for returns to the Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp south of the capital after the governor made a visit to the camp last week to take stock of conditions on the ground. He observed ongoing rehabilitation work of the electricity and water stations and announced there was a need to expedite preparations of the camp’s infrastructure, as well as removing rubble.

Yarmouk reflects the regime’s latest policy of allowing internally displaced people to return to their damaged homes in Damascus. Permission to return to Yarmouk comes after similar return operations in the Barzeh, Qaboun and Jobar neighbourhoods of eastern Damascus in recent weeks. It is not clear why the government is now allowing these return processes after so many years preventing people from returning and putting various obstacles in their way, including expropriations, destruction of buildings and new zoning plans. In any case, though, conditions for return set by the government ensure that only a few former residents will be able to return.

The Damascus Governorate Council entrusted a committee to follow up on its decision to hold off on announcing the new zoning plans for Yarmouk. That committee decided to allow residents of the camp to return under three conditions: that the buildings are structurally safe, and that returnees provide proof of title deeds and that they obtain the necessary security approvals.

According to the official Tishreen newspaper, the requests for return have no particular deadline. The newspaper added that, in addition to the three conditions set out by the committee, property holders hoping to return to Yarmouk must present a family civil registration extract, as well as a water and electricity clearance.

The pro-opposition news site Sowt Al-Asimeh reported that Damascus Governorate had imposed a new process for return: submit an application at an office in the camp, provide ownership documents and pay SYP 8,000 before transferring the file for a security check. In addition, those hoping to return must submit an application to the municipal council so that they can send a technical inspection team to the building and assess the damage.

The Damascus Governorate decided in August to hold off on releasing the new zoning plans for the Yarmouk camp due to objections the plans faced from camp residents and Palestinian political figures both inside Syria and abroad. Last September, 28 civil society, political and legal Palestinian organisations sent a legal memorandum to the UN special envoy for Syria, Geir Pedersen, warning of the dangers of the new zoning plans for Yarmouk. According to the memorandum, the new plans would strip camp residents of their property rights and change the camp’s identity.

Meanwhile, the three conditions set for residents who wish to return are considered very difficult, as it is easy to tamper with the structural safety reports and reports on the scale of damage, which is happening in Aleppo. Proof of ownership is not easy to obtain for Palestinians from Yarmouk, many of whom only hold “residence permits” issued by the Syrian government’s General Authority for Palestine Arab Refugees (GAPAR). In addition, the state itself owns the land on which the camp was built. The third condition, which requires a security background check, is seen as the most difficult, as it makes return possible only for regime loyalists.

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Afrin: Property Violations Go Beyond Simply Taxing Trees

18-11-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

The Syrian National Army, which is affiliated with the opposition Syrian Interim Government, issued a decree in mid-October banning its armed factions from imposing taxes on fruit-bearing trees in the border areas that were captured in Turkish military operations, including the Afrin area northwest of Aleppo city.

The decree comes after a series of committees to respond to grievances were established in mid-2020 at the suggestion of Syrian judges and sheikhs, which earned Turkish support. The committees are present in various areas of northern Syria now under the control of Turkish-backed factions and are following up on the complaints of local residents concerning violations of their rights by armed groups.

Still, there has not been a solution to land rights violations. Sherwan (not his real name), a Kurdish resident of the Sheikh Hadid area of Afrin, told The Syria Report that he transferred the ownership of his land to a relative residing in Europe. He fears that he could be forced to surrender the property. Also, Sherwan thought that transferring the land ownership could protect him from having to pay taxes on his olive trees. He thought he could evade tax if he was working on land that he didn’t own. Sherwan’s land extends over 30 hectares, cultivated with thousands of olive trees.

The tax in Sheikh Hadid is around USD 2 (or the equivalent in Turkish lira) per olive tree, though the amount differs from one district to another in Afrin, according to military forces in charge of the area. In the last week of October, a group from the Sultan Murad Division imposed thousands of dollars of taxes on Sherwan because he had transferred ownership of his land, which the fighters considered a form of tax evasion. Sherwan was able to reduce the new taxes imposed on him after local mediation with the Sultan Murad Division.

The Sultan Murad Division oversees the Sheikh Hadid district. It is a faction within the Syrian National Army and is composed of mostly Turkmen Syrian fighters. The group has strong relations with Turkish institutions and agencies involved in Syrian affairs.

Their violations do not stop at imposing taxes on olive trees. Armed factions have also expropriated the properties of displaced former Afrin residents, including houses and agricultural lands. They have also placed taxes on olive presses, and on transport for harvested crops.

Many Kurdish residents of Afrin fled the area after Turkey’s so-called “Olive Branch” military operation there in January 2018, against the majority-Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), which Ankara sees as a branch of the PKK. Armed factions affiliated with the Syrian National Army and Turkish-backed National Liberation Front now control Afrin. Meanwhile, many people displaced from Idlib, as well as areas of Homs and rural Damascus recaptured by the regime arrived in Afrin, settled at random in the empty homes of displaced residents. They had an urgent need for housing, and there was no official policy in place for absorbing these new arrivals while preserving the rights of the original homeowners.

Around 600 of the 1,300 Kurdish families who had been living in Sheikh Hadid before 2018 fled the area, while 700 new families arrived. Most of them were displaced people from Idlib, who soon took up residence in the empty homes of Kurdish families who fled.

There appear to be widespread discriminatory policies in place against remaining Kurdish residents of Afrin, and they cannot be attributed solely to members of the armed factions in charge. It may be difficult for the grievance response committees to redress the violations inflicted on residents, due to Kurdish residents’ lack of trust in the factions.

For his part, Sherwan did not approach one of the grievance response committees to raise his case because he feared how the Sultan Murad Division may respond, and he had no confidence in the committee to bring him a solution.

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The Dweir Car Expo: A Forced Subscription

18-11-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

Prime Minister Hussein Arnous approved a contract in November between the Damascus Countryside Governorate and the General Company for Building and Construction— part of the Ministry of Public Works and Housing—to implement the road networks into a car expo centre outside Damascus two years after his predecessor laid the foundation stone for the complex.

The complex will be located 15 kilometres from the Damascus city centre, in Al-Dweir, which belongs administratively to the Douma district. Spreading over an area of 200 hectares, the land is originally owned by the Douma City Council and sits adjacent to the M5 Damascus-Aleppo International Highway. According to official statements, the aim of building the expo centre is to regulate the car trade in Damascus and Damascus Countryside governorates and prevent car trading outside the new centre. The two governorates are working to limit all activity related to car sales and manufacturing to one location.

Former Prime Minister Imad Khamis laid the foundation stone for the project at the end of 2018, after a joint administration was created by the Damascus and Damascus Countryside Governorates. The plan for the expo centre includes a government administrative office for car ownership registration, a test track, a driving education track, maintenance centres, a traffic police department, a single-window centre for sales and an official office for the Transportation Department.

The two governorates also agreed in 2018 on a joint administration to rehabilitate the northern entrance to Damascus, as well as to demolish areas containing informal settlements and tear down the old car market in Harasta. Until 2011, the market, which sat within Harasta along the Damascus-Aleppo Highway, was under the tutelage and protection of Assad’s cousin, Zulhima Shalish, who appears to have lost his influence in recent years. The Harasta market was destroyed during battles and bombardment while the area was under opposition control from 2013 to 2018.

According to a correspondent for The Syria Report in the area, the expo centre’s joint administration forced car dealership owners in Harasta to pledge not to request any compensation for their demolished show rooms, and to subscribe at the Dweir expo centre if they want to continue working in the car trade. A warning was also sent to all car dealership owners in the areas slated for demolition along the northern entrance to Damascus, informing them that they must register at the new expo centre.

To encourage car dealership owners to subscribe at Al-Dweir, Damascus and Damascus Countryside Governorates have spent the past two years running campaigns against local car dealership offices, formally closing many of them with red wax. The governorates also informed owners of car-related businesses that they must immediately close down shops, or switch to a different industry altogether.

The director of the new car expo centre indicated last August that the zoning plans for the complex had been completed in accordance with Urban Zoning Decree No. 5 of 1982 and its amendments, and that infrastructure was underway and work had begun on the first stage, to be built over 80 hectares of the land slated for the project. He added that an order to build infrastructure, including water and sewage networks, had been granted to the General Company for Building and Construction.

The expo centre’s joint administration opened its doors to subscription from May 19 to June 27, 2019, but it then extended registration to August 2019, and then to October 2020, and finally to the end of 2020. The joint administration was forced to reduce the price per square meter from SYP 215,000 to 135,000 due to the low number of subscribers.

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Al-Ghassaniyeh in Idlib: Christian Village Faces Exploitation by Jihadist Groups

18-11-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

In mid-2020, hard-line Islamist group Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) started pressuring the Hurras Al-Deen group to leave the Christian village of Al-Ghassaniyeh in the countryside west of Jisr Al-Shughour, in the Idlib governorate. This pressure came amid a campaign by HTS to secure the passage of joint Russian-Turkish military patrols on either side of the M4 Aleppo-Lattakia Highway.

HTS managed to force Hurras Al-Deen to withdraw from homes and properties in Al-Ghassaniyeh, including the St. George Orthodox Church. The village is now under the administrative control of the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), which is affiliated with HTS. SSG control of the town has not resulted in the return of its residents, most of whom fled from 2012 onward.

The SSG has meanwhile seized local properties and real estate belonging to displaced residents. It has also followed in the footsteps of other jihadist groups in dealing with Idlib Christians, including placing taxes on those who remain, which has limited their ability to invest in agricultural lands, forcing them to lease the lands to Muslim residents of neighbouring villages.

Al-Ghassaniyeh was the largest Christian village in the Jisr Al-Shughour area before 2011, with around 10,000 mostly Orthodox residents. The village was also home to many monasteries and churches.

Rebel factions captured Al-Ghassaniyeh in 2012. Most residents fled towards regime-held areas of Idlib, leaving behind their homes and agricultural lands. They fled out of fear of the regime’s airstrikes, as well as the Islamist nature of some rebel factions. Regime aerial bombardment struck the village, including the St. George Church.

Since 2013, Al-Ghassaniyeh and other Christian villages in Idlib have attracted jihadist organisations due to the large number of empty houses, belonging to residents who have fled. These groups have worked to settle the families of fighters into the empty homes, as well as invest in agricultural lands and shops belonging to former residents.

The Islamic State (IS) seized control of the village in 2013. One IS leader, known by the nom de guerre “Abu Ayman Al-Iraqi,” converted St. George church into a mass detention centre. When rebel factions expelled IS from the village in early 2014, they discovered a mass grave in the church containing the bodies of around two dozen Free Syrian Army fighters.

Shortly after the expulsion of IS from Al-Ghassaniyeh, control of the village was contested between a handful of other jihadist groups, most notably Hurras Al-Deen, the Turkestan Islamic Party and HTS. The families of fighters from these groups took over the empty homes of displaced residents from the village.

With Hurras Al-Deen forced to withdraw from the village in mid-2020, The Turkestan Islamic Party still maintains a presence, albeit under HTS supervision. Meanwhile, HTS has taken over organising housing in the village, and now controls the properties and homes of displaced residents. Most likely, HTS will force out remaining jihadist groups from Al-Ghassaniyeh, including from the homes and properties of absent Christian and pro-regime residents, and then rent out the properties for the benefit of its treasury, as it has done in other areas it controls in Idlib governorate.

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What Is the Need for a Second Industrial Zone in Jableh?

11-11-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

In the predominantly Alawite coastal city of Jableh, in the Lattakia Governorate, the City Council announced last week that it had completed all preparations for launching a new industrial zone project within the city, despite the existence of another industrial zone on its outskirts.

The council’s head announced that all work and preparations had been completed to begin carrying out the new industrial zone project, which will specialise in light and medium manufacturing. He added that the council will provide alternative housing for those impacted by the land acquisition for the new industrial zone, in cooperation and agreement with the Ministry of Defence’s Military Construction Establishment, which will start building the housing in early 2021.

The City Council is promoting the project, saying that it will play a large role in advancing economic growth, and that it will provide employment opportunities and contribute to the provision of services and goods to residents. The council also touted the project’s environmental benefits, as it will rid residential areas at the heart of the city of the pollution and noise caused by industrial facilities.

The new industrial zone will be located inside Jableh city, north of the new yarn factory, and will occupy 13.1 hectares of agricultural and real estate land. In 1995, the Jableh City Council placed a sign for expropriation on the properties, and then in 2001 it issued a decree to expropriate the land. The expropriation decree was issued in 2011 in favour of the Ministry of Local Administration.

The City Council formed a committee in 2015 to appraise the initial value of the expropriated real estate, which the body then appraised at SYP 392-873 per square meter of land. This caused property owners to object to what they said was massive prejudice in the appraisal. In 2017, the Lattakia Governorate decided to form a committee to reevaluate the initial estimate, which ended with a decision to keep the prices unchanged.

Then, in 2018, the council issued a warning to those occupying the expropriated properties to vacate immediately, before it finalised paying compensation. The council began legal proceedings in May 2020, transferring ownership of the expropriated properties and referring the file of the expropriated area to the Ministry of Public Works and Housing’s General Company for Studies and Technical Consultation, to prepare the necessary engineering studies.

The City Council announced that the total amount set aside for compensating owners of the expropriated properties, including housing, trees, greenhouses, and artesian wells, is SYP 123 million.

Residents also objected to the appraisals of the alternative housing offered to them, which were set according to current market prices, while compensation for their expropriated properties was made at the 2015 prices. In addition, they objected to the quarter of the real estate that would be taken without compensation in accordance with the Expropriation Law No. 20 of 1983.

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Deir Dama Village in Suweida: Why Won’t Residents Return?

11-11-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

Residents of Deir Dama, a village in rural north-western Suweida, have been displaced from their homes since 2014. Despite massive destruction wrought on the village by military confrontations, their failure to return is also linked to local conflicts between Druze and Bedouins who live in the area.

The governor of Suweida visited Deir Dama in August 2020, accompanied by the directors of the state’s electricity and water utilities and members of the governorate’s Executive Office, to tour the devastated village, which is still empty of residents.

The governor promised to try allocating a budget sufficient to reconstruct the village and its infrastructure, and asked residents to return to Deir Dama in its current condition, promising to supply drinking water from neighbouring villages after people start returning.

Deir Dama is a small village located on the outskirts of the rocky Al-Lajat desert area separating Suweida from the neighbouring Daraa governorate. Before 2011, its population was estimated at around 500 people. The village was occupied in 2014 by groups of Bedouins loyal to the hard-line Islamist group Jabhat Al-Nusra. The attack resulted in the deaths of six village residents, including children, and the kidnapping of seven others whose fates remain unknown. The attack displaced the entire population of the village.

Residents and local Druze factions supported by regime artillery retook the village during a counterattack in 2016. But Deir Dama had been completely destroyed after Jabhat Al-Nusra lit fire to many homes, and after artillery shelling during the counterattack destroyed remaining houses, as well as the village’s only school and water well.

Since then, residents have been displaced to neighbouring villages with no hope of return, despite civil initiatives to make peace between local Bedouins and Druze. The most prominent of those initiatives was launched by Druze notable Jamal Hunaidi in 2017, to rehabilitate the village and repair Bedouin homes that were burned in a nearby village in retaliation for the attack on Deir Dama. The initiative was aimed at reducing tensions in the area and encouraging civil peace.

The initiative sparked discontent from the Military Security Branch in Suweida, which is the most powerful security apparatus in Syria’s southern region. The branch threatened Hunaidi to halt his initiative, likely to invest in the civil rift between local Bedouin and Druze residents, and to take advantage of the tension to threaten both sides. Hunaidi later stopped his initiative. Military Security, which is loyal to Iran, has meanwhile been working to recruit, organise and arm Bedouins in the Al-Lajat area since 2017, in order to counteract what they called “armed Druze gangs,” as well as to limit the influence of the Russian-backed Fifth Corps in the nearby Bosra Al-Sham.

The destruction of Deir Dama did not stop in the 2016 counterattack. Regime forces returned to the village in 2018, using it as a launching point for military operations in Al-Lajat, leading to retaliatory bombardment on the village. Regime forces then settled in Deir Dama after the end of the battles and did not leave until late 2019.

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Opposition in Rural Aleppo Take State Property and Rent it Out

11-11-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

The local council in the northern Aleppo city of Al-Rai held a public auction at its headquarters in mid-October, with the participation of 20 farmers, to rent out agricultural lands managed by the opposition-run body.

The council stipulated that those wishing to participate in the auction pay 100 Turkish liras as a subscription fee, in addition to a 1,000-lira deposit that could be refunded if the applicant did not succeed in the auction.

The agricultural lands included in the auction are spread out across the city of Al-Rai, as well as eight villages that are administratively affiliated to it, with a total area of 72 hectares. The lands were originally owned by public institutions and agricultural cooperatives affiliated with the Syrian government in Damascus.

Al-Rai’s opposition-run local council was founded in early 2013, shortly after armed rebels took control of the rural northern areas of the Aleppo governorate. At the time, rebel factions took over many lands, facilities, and public service departments in the area, to benefit from their financial revenues in supporting and arming fighters.

Then, in late 2014, the Islamic State (IS) took over Al-Rai, controlling the local agricultural lands for more than two years. Lands originally owned by the state in Al-Rai and its surrounding villages were administered by IS emirs, often given as gifts or rewards to the extremist group’s leaders.

After armed opposition groups retook control of the rural northern and eastern parts of the Aleppo governorate during the Turkish-backed “Operation Euphrates Shield” campaign in 2016-2017, a new pattern of local councils began to appear in the area, benefitting in part from Turkish administrative support. These councils, including the council in Al-Rai, were able to recover most Syrian state properties from the grip of armed factions, making them into publicly owned properties. Revenues from the properties were then used to support the services that the council provided to residents, such as water installations and road networks.

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Explained: Informal Settlements, Between Laws of Development and Urban Planning

11-11-2020/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by admin

To address real estate issues in informal settlements, legislative authorities in Syria issued the Real Estate Development and Investment Law No. 15 of 2008 and the Urban Planning and Urbanisation Law No. 23 of 2015, which are similar yet differ in a number of aspects.

Objectives and scope of application

Real Estate Development and Investment Law No. 15 of 2008 was issued to attract investments in the real estate development process, which includes “supplying the housing sector with integrated urban building complexes, and securing the housing needs of those with a limited income, as well as establishing integrated new residential cities and suburbs and urban communities.” The process also would include “addressing informal housing areas.” The law would be applied in real estate development areas—that is, real estate and parts of both public and private properties, built or not, inside or outside the zoning plans.

For its part, Urban Planning and Urbanisation Law No. 23 of 2015, was issued to achieve a number of goals: either to get rid of areas with informal housing located within zoning plans and enter them into the zoning areas, or to rehabilitate areas that have witnessed disasters or wars, or to implement zoning plans via expropriation in accordance with Expropriations Law No. 20 of 1983, or to build residential areas in accordance with Law No. 15 of 2008. That is, Law No. 23 for 2015 gives administrative authorities a choice of what steps to take if there are areas with informal housing within approved zoning plans: Either apply its provisions, apply the provisions of the Expropriations Law, or apply Law No. 15 of 2008.

Legal documents

Law No. 15 of 2008 considers a legal document for creating a real estate development zone to be a decree issued by the prime minister, based on a proposal submitted by the board of directors of the Real Estate Development and Investment Commission, which is affiliated with the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, as well as to take into consideration the opinion of the local administrative unit (municipalities and governorates) where the zone is to be created.

Meanwhile, according to Law No. 23 of 2015, a decree issued by an administrative unit or municipality can serve as the legal document needed for incorporating an area into zoning plans, if there are spots within the zoning area that include informal settlements.

Percentage of expropriations

If a real estate property is expropriated by the administrative unit in accordance with Law No. 15 of 2008, then compensation to its owners should be made according to the provisions of Expropriations Law No. 20 of 1983. That is, there is no specific percentage for expropriation or deduction, as the administrative unit may expropriate real estate properties or parts of properties from individuals for the purpose of creating real estate development zones, in return for “fair compensation”. Law No. 15 of 2008 obliges the administrative unit to allocate 40 percent of the residential floor area (plots) for sale to the owners of the expropriated properties, each according to the percent of total area expropriated from their property.

In Law No. 23, the administrative unit has the right to take 40 to 50 percent of the total area of the property when it includes it into the zoning plans, without compensation. The law considers that the real estate will earn interest through being serviced and will gain purchasing value after being included into the zoning plan—this justifies the large deduction rate and lack of compensation. If the administrative unit is compelled to take more than 50 percent of the property, then it must compensate the owner only for the excess deduction.

Routes for implementation

Real estate development operations that are in accordance with Law No. 15 of 2008 can take place in two ways: through the administrative unit expropriating properties located within real estate development zones, or through an agreement between property owners in the area and the real estate developer.

Meanwhile, zoning can occur in two ways, according to Law No. 23 of 2015: either according to the zoning process for the administrative unit to implement the approved plans, or according to the division process carried out by the owners through dividing the land into zoning sections with the intention of constructing buildings and facilities on them.

Alternative housing

As stipulated in the two laws, real estate development work—or planning and division—leads to the eviction of the owner from his property. In both cases, legislators did not attempt to secure alternative housing from the administrative unit for evicted owners.

Law No. 15 of 2008, however, obliges the developer to secure alternative housing for occupants, or pay them cash compensation based on an agreement between the two parties.

Return of rights holders

Regarding the possibility of real estate owners returning to their areas after the completion of construction work, Law No. 15 of 2008 stipulates that owners of expropriated properties be allocated residential units in the real estate development zone, which they can purchase back.

At the same time, Law No. 23 of 2015 mandates the formation of a Compulsory Distribution Committee, which must aim “to the extent possible” to give all the rights holders their shares, whether on the same location as their old property, or nearby.

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Planned Suburb North of Damascus Receives Construction Licence

04-11-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

The Syrian government approved a request at the end of October to construct a new residential suburb north of Damascus, 12 years after a request for permission was first submitted.

The Eamar Syria Joint Association (ESJA) obtained the licence for a residential suburb in the Dummar expansion zone in accordance with Urban Zoning Decree No. 5 of 1982 and its amendments. ESJA has said that it will be the first housing association in Syria to implement a comprehensive residential suburb.

In an apparent justification for the delay, the official Al-Thawra newspaper reported that the approval came after the ESJA completed procedures for licensing the project and obtained the necessary permissions from the Damascus Countryside Governorate. Meanwhile, the ESJA said delays in approval for the project were due to general conditions in Syria, as well as delays in obtaining official approvals. On its website, the group listed 12 prior approvals that it had obtained within the framework of licensing the project. They included approvals from six government ministries, including the Ministry of Defence.

The Dummar expansion zone is located within the administrative boundaries of the Dummar area, although outside the zoning plans of the so-called Dummar project, a modern and relatively upscale residential suburb northwest of Damascus. The area set aside for the project extends over 53 hectares of land, reaching south of the Qudsaya suburb in the Damascus Countryside Governorate. The project will see 39 towers constructed, with a capacity of 5,000 housing units, provided that the maximum land over which they can build is 12 percent of the total land.

The ESJA was established in 2007, in partnership between the Sons of Syria Association and the April 17 Housing Association, in accordance with Cooperative Housing Law No. 17 of that same year. The law was later repealed by Legislative Decree No. 99 of 2011, concerning housing cooperatives. In both laws, articles pertaining to joint associations have not changed, stipulating that a joint association has the right to purchase land and equip it with facilities and service buildings to construct housing for the benefit of its participant associations.

While the scope of a housing association’s work is confined to its administrative area, the joint association may purchase lands outside the zoning area to construct residential suburbs, so long as the area of those lands is not less than 25 hectares, according to Decree No. 16 of 2007 issued by the prime minister.

The ESJA first announced its Dummar residential suburb project in 2008, adding that it had contracted to purchase the necessary land, without specifying from whom they bought the land rights. Later, the group announced that it would break ground on the project in 2013, as soon as approvals were completed. It added in 2012 that housing units would be ready for subscribers two years after the start of construction.

The ESJA had collected SYP 500,000 from each subscriber as a down payment since its first announcement of the project. It is not clear whether the association had, at a previous stage, stopped receiving new subscribers for the project, but in 2018 the ESJA announced that it was opening the door for subscriptions yet again. Currently, the down payment is SYP 2 million.

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Tartous: Will Phase Two of Youth Housing See the Light of Day?

04-11-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

The General Housing Establishment (GHE) has announced the preparation and delivery of the first round of homes in Tartous’s Youth Housing Project, a full 15 years after the project launched.

The GHE, part of the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, launched the youth housing project across Syria in accordance with Prime Minister Decree No. 1940 for 2002. The project aimed to secure 65,000 small housing units for young Syrians in all cities. Those who wished to sign up for the housing had to comply with just one condition: that they not own another house already recorded in the real estate registry.

The youth housing project was launched successively in various governorates across Syria and was to be completed in two implementation stages in each region. Those who signed up for housing in the first phase would receive it five years after the date of subscription. Phase two recipients would receive their housing after seven years.

The project was launched in Tartous in 2005, and was set to be completed in two phases. But it was not until October 2020—that is, ten years late—that the GHE announced that it had completed and handed over the first round of housing, which included just 400 apartments.

The first phase of the project was implemented on land in the Al-Bassel Suburb area near the Al-Ahlam Beach south of Tartous city. The GHE purchased the 3.8-hectare property in 2006 from its main owner, the Social Military Establishment (SME).

Meanwhile, preparations for phase two, which is set to include about 2,400 apartments, have yet to be completed. The GHE announced in July 2020 that it had signed a contract with other official institutions to build five housing blocks in the Sheikh Saad complex north of Tartous city, although the location for the rest of phase two is still under study.

Delays with the second phase are due partly to problems with expropriating the land for the housing units. The Tartous City Council acquired 45 hectares of agricultural land south of the villages of Abu Afseh and Al-Anabiyeh, within the city limits but outside its zoning plans.

However, residents, as well as the General Farmers Union, rejected the expropriation decision amid administrative and financial disputes between the GHE and the Tartous City Council over project implementation, responsibilities, and shares. All this led to a suspension of the expropriation in 2016.

In the search for alternative land to construct phase two of the project, the GHE chose properties in the Sheikh Saad complex that had been expropriated in 2010 for public, cooperative and savings housing projects. The total area expropriated is 27 hectares, of which 35 plots were set aside for youth housing without specifying its area. In 2017, the former prime minister laid the foundation stone for the second phase of the project, for which construction remains stalled.

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How Many Buildings in Aleppo Are at Risk of Collapse?

04-11-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

Aleppo’s City Council is moving ahead with its campaign to demolish damaged and collapsing buildings, which number more than 3,000, according to an estimate by the Council’s Public Safety Committee. Most of the threatened buildings are in the eastern neighbourhoods of Aleppo, which was under rebel control from 2012 to 2016, and suffered heavy damage during clashes and airstrikes.

September and October of this year saw a concentrated campaign of demolitions in eastern Aleppo, implemented by the Aleppo City Council and the Ministry of Defence’s Military Housing Establishment. The demolitions also targeted many buildings that were in violation of the construction code, in accordance with Decree No. 40 of 2012 on building violations. These buildings were not damaged or collapsing and were built after 2016.

According to reports from the Public Safety Committee, the campaign started in September in the Bustan Al-Qasr neighbourhood, and included removal, transport and demolition of concrete slabs and roofs that had collapsed and posed a danger to the streets below. The neighbourhood, which faced heavy air bombardment with barrel bombs between 2014 and 2015, saw many buildings demolished during the campaign. In mid-September, the demolitions extended to the Sukkari neighbourhood, where buildings were knocked down after residents evacuated. October then saw the demolitions reach the neighbourhoods of Seif Al-Dawleh, Al-Ansari and Al-Ameriyeh.

Many of the demolished buildings were still partially occupied by residents, who were forced to evacuate without any alternative housing provided for them. They either rented other housing or moved in with relatives, depending on their living conditions.

The number of collapsing buildings shared by the Public Safety Committee is not final, according to city council sources who spoke with The Syria Report. Building inspections are ongoing, and the number that was announced only reflects the buildings for which safety reports were prepared and were slated for demolition.

The actual number of buildings that are at risk of collapse is likely much higher than what has been announced. There are many factors that may contribute to more buildings being included on the list, including leakage in the water and sewage networks, and damage to foundations. The government still has not addressed damage to water and sewage networks in eastern Aleppo, despite regime forces having taken over the area four years ago, at the end of 2016.

Aleppo’s city council in recent weeks formed a central committee to manage counting and evacuation of at-risk buildings, with the mission of determining the most dangerous areas due to several factors in order to evacuate residents. This move likely comes after numerous accusations of corruption directed at the Public Safety Committee by residents, who believe that the body’s corrupt practices have led to the collapse of several buildings. Residents have also complained that the city council leaves behind the rubble of some of the buildings it demolishes. City council members prefer not to bear the costs of removal, instead hoping that residents themselves will transport the debris elsewhere at their own expense.

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Q&A: Can There Be a Just Reconstruction of Aleppo?

04-11-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

Four years ago, Aleppo was the site of one of the Syrian war’s most brutal urban assaults, as regime forces and their allies were in the final stages of recapturing the city’s besieged eastern neighbourhoods from rebels. That December, they succeeded.

The result was what Alhakam Shaar, a researcher and native of Aleppo, calls a “semi-ghost town,” neighbourhoods now largely empty of residents, their apartment blocks in ruins, and debris still strewn across the streets years after the battle ended.

Reconstruction has been slow and many residents remain cut off from their homes and unable to carry out repairs without stacks of documents that are difficult to obtain.

What would a just reconstruction of Aleppo look like, and what parts of the urban fabric of the city must be preserved during that process? Shaar has attempted to tackle these questions as part of The Aleppo Project, a group of researchers and scholars based, until recently, at Budapest’s Central European University. The initiative aims to document the destruction of Aleppo, as well as the more intangible part of the city’s fabric that must be preserved amid reconstruction.

“It’s more about the social structure,” says Shaar. “Not just the physical environment, but the experiences of people in their homes, how these communities ruptured.”

 

Can you tell me about what The Aleppo Project does? What issues of reconstruction justice do you focus on?

The Aleppo Project started in 2015, hosted at Central European University [in Budapest] until October 2020—now it is independent.

The idea was to try to make sense of what is happening to the city with an outlook to the future. How can we rebuild, and not just physically? We never proposed planning for the city, for example, but rather it’s more about the social structure of [Aleppo], trying to document some of the destruction—again not just of the physical [environment], but of the experiences of people in their homes, how these communities ruptured and what can bring them back. What is important to bring back? What are some of the factors that everybody thinks are important for people to return?

The problem when we talk about reconstruction, including in places like Beirut or Kabul, we see that there is no consultation with those who are most impacted. Why? Because [oftentimes] they are no longer present. Now, there is involvement from multiple UN agencies and multiple international organisations such as the Aga Khan Trust. And they are building despite the displaced, not for the displaced.

There are ways where this [reconstruction] is important, such as rebuilding monuments, because they do give people a sense that they are going back to a city with infrastructure, with a face.

But it is not just the face of the city [that was destroyed] but also people’s homes, their workshops.

The Aleppo Project tries to highlight these issues, and also to write an account of what life in the city was like before the war, and how life changed during the war, what’s preventing people from returning, what their views are on the future of the city, etc. We have hosted blog entries by people from Aleppo, and by both Syrian and non-Syrian specialists. We highlighted some of the key changes as they happened. We have hosted conferences about these issues, and we have done surveys as well.

Today, how would you characterise what the reconstruction process is looking like in east Aleppo’s more informal neighbourhoods? Is it a fair assessment to say that most rebuilding is done by residents themselves, at their own expense, as opposed to areas of Old Aleppo that are maybe seeing more organised assistance?

There is little of that, very little. The contrast with the souq [of Aleppo’s old city] is that many of these shops were high-value real estate. They were owned by wealthier people who lived in west Aleppo. Then they have this institutional backing from the local council, while in east Aleppo you do not have that. So, it was really left to people, who had even worse means to travel, such as for those in Turkey, where, if they left, they might not be able to come back at all.

What that is translating into is that it is sparsely populated, unlike before when it was a very dense part of the city. It is half of the city. Now it is a semi-ghost town. Until now, there are many streets that are strewn with rubble.

You do not have a Marota City [project]. I think it is in large part related to Aleppo not being the capital. It is a city of equal size and importance, but it is away from the eyes of the people in power.

To what degree do you think there is a desire or even an ability for east Aleppo residents and property owners to repair their properties? How many people are either willing or able to obtain so-called “damage licences” in order to carry out these repairs? Can such a process, which involves documents that are difficult to obtain, even be considered part of a “just” reconstruction?

I believe that this might be what I was talking about, that the municipality allowed people, giving them permits to repair damage if people in the upper floors can prove it. The issue for this specific detail is that it requires a certain minimum of people who are not just present but also willing to shoulder this burden.

Not only do you have a damaged apartment building in an abandoned neighbourhood, whose price is incredibly low, but you also have to go and, at your own cost, support the structure to be rebuilt. That’s a huge task. Yes, many people will find it convenient, they will find it better than waiting for the municipality to pull it down, in which case you have lost your property forever, and so have your neighbours. This ties in with the problem of those who are outside the country, how they can even do such paperwork. Technically, they can, through Syrian embassies and consulates. In Turkey that would be the Syrian consulate in Istanbul. For Syrians, it would cost an arm and a leg to go to Istanbul and then return to wherever they live, and to do the paperwork. And then there are actual fees.

So, it is a costly task, and this is something we often do not pay attention to.

Construction driven by the owners, directly or through relatives, with oversight from the municipality, is the best idea. And that is the kind of reconstruction that is very much not there in most of east Aleppo.

What would a “just” reconstruction of east Aleppo then look like, in more detail?

First off, lift the obstacles, lift the barriers for people to return. There is active power [in place] to prevent them. Other countries need to cooperate as well, to allow Syrians some freedom of movement.

Secondarily: compensation. People have the right to be compensated for what was destroyed. This can take the shape of a collaborative [process] where residents identify their needs, they are visited by consultants from the government, and there could be something like microfunding. The Syrian government should rebuild infrastructure, which is happening currently at a very shy pace.

A third issue, interestingly on the subject of infrastructure, the Syrian regime did destroy a lot of facilities such as schools, hospitals, including the Al-Quds Hospital in east Aleppo. The Syrian regime rushed to rebuild this hospital, and the reason is that they wanted to erase any evidence of their [crimes].

Here we see the regime actively trying to erase the evidence, and this ties in with the issue of pulling down these destroyed buildings. It is out of sight, out of mind. This is an issue of memory, moral justice, and financial justice.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 admin https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png admin2020-11-04 15:53:482022-07-18 14:39:59Q&A: Can There Be a Just Reconstruction of Aleppo?

Imminent Return? What Barzeh, Qaboun and Jobar May Have in Common

28-10-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

President of the Damascus Provincial Council, Khaled Al-Harah, has visited the neighbourhoods of Barzeh, Qaboun and Jobar in recent days, announcing that residents may return after the structural integrity of local buildings is ensured. Al-Harah added that he had assigned engineers to prepare a rapid and exclusive study of the buildings that are acceptable for rehabilitation so that they can be handed back over to the governorate as quickly as possible.

Although the three neighbourhoods together form the northeastern belt of Damascus, it is unusual to group them together, as they have different organisational statuses. The detailed zoning plan for Qaboun No. 105 was released in June 2020. Meanwhile, Jobar is waiting for its own zoning plan to be announced.  As for Barzeh’s zoning plan, there are reportedly risks that it may not be issued altogether.

Opposition forces held control of these three neighbourhoods, which were linked via tunnel to the East Ghouta suburbs, between 2014 and 2018. The neighbourhoods faced heavy damage amid fighting, as well as from regime airstrikes and artillery fire.

Residents of the three neighbourhoods are still prohibited from returning to their homes, which are now under the control of various regime military units. Authorities are regularly demolishing buildings in the three neighbourhoods under the pretext that they pose a danger. However, the apparent purpose of the demolitions is to remove the rubble for usage elsewhere.

Most of the people displaced from these three neighbourhoods now live in Damascus proper, as well as the surrounding countryside. The main push factor for returning to Barzeh, Qaboun and Jobar—even if those neighbourhoods are largely destroyed—is the poor living conditions that displaced residents now face, as well as high rent prices they now pay. As for the government, authorities likely have insufficient finances to rebuild these three neighbourhoods and may have little choice but to allow residents to return.

The Syrian regime has so far relied on a strategy of preventing the return of people to the devastated areas of Damascus and its surroundings pending their reconstruction based on new zoning plans. That strategy, legally framed by decrees and laws 66 of 2012, 23 of 2015 and 10 of 2018, deliberately expelled the poor and residents of informal areas, and expropriated their properties with the aim of establishing new cities and communities. However, the lack of funding and the government’s inability to implement any of its zoning projects in recent years may force it to accept the return of the people of some of these devastated areas.

In Qaboun, Detailed Plan No. 105 was meant to be issued after fielding objections from local residents and others with the rights to raise complaints. However, the zoning plan now appears unlikely to be issued soon, as the governorate received a large number of objections, including complaints that would allow residents to be granted alternative housing or rent compensation—similar to measures taken for the Marota City project in what was once the neighbourhood of Basateen Al-Razi.

Jobar is the most destroyed of the three neighbourhoods, as it was the closest to Damascus and sat along the frontline of major battles. In addition, the neighbourhood faces a serious engineering problem, as large networks of tunnels were dug beneath it by both opposition and regime forces during various battles, making reconstruction potentially complicated and costly.

And although the Damascus Governorate has repeatedly said that it will soon announce zoning plans for Jobar, they have not yet been released. Just this October, the governorate announced that it had completed rehabilitating the Abbasid Square-Zamalka road, which passes through Jobar. Only small vehicles and shared servees taxis would be allowed to use it, while larger trucks would be mostly prohibited.

Residents who want to check on their houses and other properties in Jobar must pay bribes to regime personnel, who have closed off the area. They pay SYP 10,000 for every 10 minutes of their visit and are not allowed to bring cell phones or cameras with them, or to take anything from their properties.

The situation is even more complicated in Barzeh. There, majority Alawi residents of the two informally built areas of Ish Al-Warwar and Hayy Tishreen have refused any new zoning plan that include their areas. It is possible that residents of the two areas fear that any alternative housing plans brought forth by the government may take a long time to implement or may simply not be achieved. In addition, residents of the two areas often lack formal property ownership documents. Unlike other informally bult slums, the Alawi residents of Ish Al-Warwar and Hayy Tishreen, through their family and kinship relationships with some security officers, could convince the governorate to overlook the Full Barzeh Zoning Plans.

A Russian delegation visited Barzeh recently, inspecting several schools and other public facilities. The exact purpose of the visit was unclear. However, provincial council president Al-Harah visited the neighbourhood days after the Russian delegation and spoke about the return of displaced residents, one indication of possible Russian pressure to allow people to go back to their homes under current circumstances.

The government’s lack of funds to implement even the broad outlines of general zoning plans, as well as the inability of residents themselves to pay for the reconstruction of their houses according to detailed zoning plans, may soon combine to allow people to return to the ruins that were once their homes.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 admin https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png admin2020-10-28 23:55:002021-07-14 15:37:21Imminent Return? What Barzeh, Qaboun and Jobar May Have in Common

Hama and Idlib: Farmlands Owned by Displaced Residents Go Up for Auction

28-10-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

In accordance with Administrative Order No. 4400, which was issued by the head of Hama’s Security and Military Committee in August 2020, several farmer leagues announced that public auctions would be held for investments in olive orchards for a period of one season in government-controlled rural northern Hama and southern Idlib governorates.

The administrative order explicitly stated that the lands belonged to individuals who reside outside state control and are in territories under the authority of “armed terrorist groups,” in reference to Idlib.

The announcements had originally set the auctions for October, to be held at the headquarters of the Farmer Leagues and Cultural Centres. The dates for the auctions were later postponed for unclear reasons and are now set for November.

Each auction participant must present a certificate proving they have not been convicted of a crime and a copy of their ID and pay a SYP 5,000 advance fee for every hectare they plan to bid on.

Baath Party members in the area are actively discussing how to lease and invest in agricultural lands that belong to residents who have been displaced further north to Idlib governorate by recent fighting, for the benefit of the Martyrs’ Families Support Fund, according to a correspondent for The Syria Report in Hama. It is unclear to whom exactly the proceeds would go, but previous auctions to invest in Hama’s pistachios saw proceeds go to the Martyrs’ Families Support Fund, which is affiliated with the Baath Party branch in Hama.

The latest scheduled auctions come with the start of the olive harvest season in areas whose residents were displaced from their homes by regime military operations early this year. Regime forces are now prohibiting residents from returning and consider the area a military zone. An estimated 230,000 hectares of farmland were seized by regime forces from the opposition in rural Hama and southern Idlib at the start of the year.

According to Syrian lawyer AbdulNasser Houshan, the administrative decision is unconstitutional and illegal, and constitutes a violation of the rights of property owners to dispose of their properties, as stipulated in Article 768 of the Civil Code. The measure grants the owner alone, within the limits of the law, the right to use, benefit from and dispose of their property. Article 770 of the Civil Code gives the owner the right to all the products of their property.

Within the same context, the Farmer Leagues in Idlib and the nearby city of Maaret Al-Numan announced they would hold public auctions to invest in lands owned by “members who are indebted to the Agricultural Bank” The announcement included 108 villages, towns and farms, covering most of the areas of rural southern Idlib governorate that are now under regime control. It was unclear exactly how many properties would be up for investment in the auction, their land areas and locations, and the number of debtors to the bank. People displaced to areas of Idlib that are still under opposition control have not been able to pay back loans from the Agricultural Bank, as they are de facto wanted by the regime’s security forces, deterring them from making any contact with official Syrian state institutions.

In addition to their unconstitutionality, these announcements issued by the Farmer Leagues contradict Article 15 of the Agricultural Cooperative Bank Law, which specified the methods through which the bank may collect its debts in accordance with the Public Funds Collection Law. Article 9 of the law, which authorises the Ministry of Finance to make and implement property seizure decisions, not Farmer Leagues.

The announcement of the public auctions to invest in lands of farmers displaced to Idlib comes just days after the issuance of Legislative Decree No. 23 of 2020. The measure exempts those impacted by the forest fires on the Syrian coast from the interest of loans granted to them by the Agricultural Bank, and to schedule the payments of their debts after excluding interest and fines. The decree also allowed those impacted by the fires, even if they were in debt, to borrow again from the bank.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 admin https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png admin2020-10-28 23:50:002021-07-14 15:37:31Hama and Idlib: Farmlands Owned by Displaced Residents Go Up for Auction
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Read also

  • A New Classification for Housing Cooperatives: Between Project Completion, Dissolution and Liquidation
  • Decree No. 66 of 2012: Objections and Judicial Proceedings Following the Reparation Package
  • Reconstruction Through Reduced Engineers’ Fees: Engineering Fee Exemptions Fall Short of Enabling Displaced People to Return to Their Areas
  • Rising Rents in Damascus and Its Nearby Suburbs: Demand Pressure and Limited Supply
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