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Trend: Demolishing Buildings that Violate Code

13-01-2021/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by admin

The final months of 2020 saw an unprecedented rate of demolitions targeting so-called “building violations” in the form of an organised campaign that began in Hama governorate, and then expanded to Damascus Countryside, Quneitra, Suweida and Deir-ez-Zor. Even during the winter holidays, provincial councils mobilised and continued to demolish buildings into New Year’s Eve, implementing what pro-government websites described as “strict orders” from a high-level political authority.

The campaign coincided with the dismissal of former Damascus Governor Alaa Ibrahim and the arrest of a number of mayors. The executive office of the Qudsaya suburb in Damascus Countryside was transferred to the judiciary, while the heads of the municipal council’s technical offices for Al-Tal, Kisweh and Al-Nabek were removed from their positions. Meanwhile, the mayors of those same cities, as well as the city of Zabadine, were transferred to the Damascus Countryside governorate’s Directorate of Internal Oversight for investigation.

The governorate also removed the mayors of Zamalka, Dhahret Artouz, Al-Husseiniyeh, Mnein, Al-Hafir, Wadi Barada, Jaramana, Dhahiyet Youssef Al-Athmeh, Al-Mleiheh and Al-Ghazlaniyeh from their positions, referring a number of them and their municipal council members to the public prosecutor. Often, charges were brought against both those arrested and removed related to their failure to suppress building code violations or to implement the provisions of Decree No. 40 of 2012 that deal with demolishing such buildings.

Quoting official government bodies, pro-government media outlets reported that the campaign was undertaken to implement the relevant laws and decrees, claiming that actors in the construction business, as well as the corrupt employees in league with them, were behind the targeted building violations. 

It is not clear why the campaign was launched at this time, especially given the flexibility that the regime has appeared to show in recent months by allowing residents of some destroyed areas to return to their homes, albeit only to repair partially damaged properties. It is difficult to find any link between the launch of the government’s latest campaign to demolish buildings that violate code to any current economic, political or social events – whether the fallout of the Caesar Act sanctions, the outbreak of Covid-19 or repercussions of the financial crisis in neighbouring Lebanon.

The current campaign may not be designed to actually combat building violations and corruption, but rather to serve as a new strategy for the regime to monopolise the real estate sector following the significant shrinking of many other business sectors in recent years. The regime may be taking control of and monopolising the real estate market by restricting it to reconstruction projects in zoning areas, or through social housing projects that are supervised by the Ministry of Public Works and Housing.

The continuous decline in value of the Syrian pound and high inflation are among the economic challenges that have generated increased demand for safe investments such as land and real estate. This has caused a general rise in real estate prices, especially for properties licensed in zoning areas, accompanied by complex bureaucratic procedures to obtain building permits in such zones. While this appears to be a method used by influential municipal and governorate council employees to collect illegal commissions, it may also reflect an unspoken policy to limit the ability of individuals to construct licensed buildings, while facilities are provided to investors – including real estate developers and construction companies – to set up large housing projects in the name of “reconstruction” as defined by the controversial Decree No. 66 of 2012 and Law No. 10 of 2018.

The delay in issuing new organisational plans, especially in areas of Damascus Countryside that faced destruction, has led to most new buildings in those areas being considered violations and therefore requiring demolition. The current demolitions campaign coincided with stricter practices by municipal authorities in refusing to settle the statuses of some building violations, in accordance with Law No. 40 of 2012.

Building violations have increased in recent years due to growing housing needs in light of the severe destruction suffered by many areas, especially in Damascus Countryside, and because government authorities have prevented internally displaced people from some areas from returning to their homes. The ban on repair work in some areas was another factor for the growth of non-compliant construction. These issues contributed to the growth of the illegal real estate market, especially given the low purchasing power for a wide swathe of the populace. Illegal construction became a common solution for fixed-income earners whose savings had collapsed in recent years.

Source: Suwar Al-Sham website

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Delayed Rent Allowance Payments for Marota City: Is Covid-19 the Cause?

13-01-2021/in HLP, News /by admin

In recent weeks, the Damascus governorate has resumed paying late rent allowances for 2020 and part of 2019 to residents entitled to alternative housing in the Marota City construction project, following a long interruption in payments. The governorate blamed the delayed payments on the Covid-19 pandemic, despite the fact that the latest delay was not the first of its kind in recent years.

The Damascus governorate’s director for implementing Legislative Decree No. 66 revealed that the governorate had paid a total of more than SYP 13 billion to 5,516 people eligible for alternative housing in the Marota City and Basilia projects, as a rental allowance for 2015 to the present. The director added that the total annual payments were more than SYP 2 billion, distributed via checks to the stakeholders. He affirmed that the governorate would continue making the rental allowance payments on time until the alternative housing units were handed over.

Legislative Decree No. 66 was issued in 2012 with the aim of establishing two zoning areas within Damascus: Marota City and Basilia City. The decree granted owners with official documents who were evicted from the two areas the right to buy a housing unit within these two projects, provided they paid for it at the price set by the governorate. Owners were compensated for their expropriation by receiving shares in plots in the project.

The alternative housing was meant to have been finished by 2016 under Decree No. 66, but then Decree Law No. 10 of 2018 extended the deadline to four years after the date the residents of the zone were expelled in 2015. This deadline expired in 2019, according to the law, but alternative housing has yet to be provided to eligible residents. 

In October 2020, the General Housing Establishment (GHE), which is affiliated with the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, called on residents eligible for alternative housing to sign up for housing units between 18 December 2020 and 14 January 2021. Those who are eligible must make their first payment to the Real Estate Bank, after which they will receive payment ledgers. The first payment for alternative housing, according to the housing unit’s total area, is to be SYP 2.2 million to SYP 6.6 million, with subsequent monthly installments of SYP 11 million to SYP 33 million, as well as large payments upon allocation of the housing and signing of the housing contract. Neither the Damascus governorate nor the Ministry of Housing have set the final housing prices.

The GHE’s Director of Social Housing said in December 2020 that the rising costs of construction materials would cause an increase in the monthly installments for people who have signed up for the alternative housing units.

The Technical Studies Department of the Damascus governorate has estimated the total cost for funding construction of alternative housing in Marota City at SYP 285 billion. It is unclear if Damascus governorate is able to finance the alternative housing project. Despite eight years having passed since its inception, the governorate is still offering tenders for building the first two of the planned 38 residential towers set aside for alternative housing.

The Damascus governorate previously denied reports that alternative housing blocks would be constructed in a new district of Qudsaya, called the Qudsaya Expansion – Qudsaya is located west of the capital city – and confirmed that alternative housing for those who are eligible from the Marota City project would be located within Basilia City. In other words, the governorate transferred alternative housing for Marota City to Basilia City, which is farther from the city centre and has a lower monetary value, in violation of the terms of Decree No. 66.

In most cases, the rental allowances do not cover more than one third of the rental prices currently being paid at the market rate by people who have signed up for alternative housing. Meanwhile, 2,700 families from the Marota City area were barred from rental allowances and alternative housing, as they were unable to prove their prior real estate ownership.

The long delay in implementing alternative housing has created parallel markets, most importantly a market for eviction notices. Eviction notices received by occupants of properties slated for demolition in 2015 are the only documents proving a resident’s right to alternative housing. Due to high real estate prices and the inability of many people to make the down payment for alternative housing, a market for the eviction notices has developed. The price of one notice is currently between SYP 40 million and SYP 50 million, depending on the housing unit’s total area, with an average rate of around SYP 400,000 per square metre.

Decree No. 66 had banned the trading of such notices for Marota City, although subsequent administrations permitted the matter on the condition that they be obtained after signing up for alternative housing – provided that the GHE collects five percent of the housing unit for every sale or housing assignment that occurs due to the eviction notices. In other words, the GHE entered into the eviction notices trading market as a speculative partner. The prices of the eviction notices are calculated as part of the value of the housing unit, with the buyer pledging to continue paying the monthly installments on time. People who are entitled to alternative housing lose their right to receive rental allowances when they buy a fake eviction notice.

Source: Damascus Cham Holding Company

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Northern Daraa Countryside: Destruction Hinders Return

06-01-2021/in HLP, News /by admin
Six years have passed since residents of the northern Daraa village of Kafr Nasej were displaced from their homes, yet many of them have been unable to return because of the damage to their homes.

Before 2011, 3,000 people lived in Kafr Nasej. Opposition forces took control of the village, holding it from 2013 to 2015. Afterwards, regime forces and allied Iraqi militias recaptured it in 2015, banning residents who had fled the fighting from returning home.
 
After a series of Russian-sponsored settlement agreements were reached between the opposition and the regime in southern Syria in August 2018, residents were permitted to return to Kafr Nasej on the condition that those wanted by security forces undergo “settlement of status,” which is a temporary security pardon for people living in formerly opposition-held areas.
 
Settlement comes after an extensive investigation by more than one security branch, including scrutinising any actions that the person in question took while living under opposition control. The settlement process is compulsory for all men, although it sometimes includes women as well. Oftentimes the result of settlement, for men, is a short period of time before compulsory military service.
 
However, a large share of residents remain displaced because their homes are greatly damaged and they are unable to make repairs because they don’t have the financial means. Kfar Nasej has no municipal council of its own and is administratively part of the neighbouring municipality of Deir Al-Adas, which is itself located within the Sanamein District.
 
Khaled, a displaced person from Kafr Nasej, lives with his family near the town of Kisweh outside Damascus, in a rental home. The rent consumes half his monthly income. Still, he feels that this solution is cheaper than returning to Kafr Nasej and rebuilding his damaged home. Khaled pays SYP 30,000 in rent, and estimates that rebuilding his house would cost around SYP 3 million, even before taking into account the latest increases in prices of construction materials.
 
Khaled told a correspondent for The Syria Report that his home was damaged by artillery shells fired by regime forces as they advanced on the village several years ago. However, in mid-2018, he signed official documents in the municipal building, saying that “terrorist groups” had damaged his house. Khaled’s signature effectively meant that he had recognised regime forces were not responsible for the damage after local officials pledged to compensate him. But more than two years later, nobody has reached out to Khaled about compensation for the damage.
 
Faysal is another former resident of Kafr Nasej. He now lives in the countryside outside Damascus after his home was blown up by a regime military engineering unit during fighting in 2015. Faysal has been unable to rebuild his house because of the high costs of construction materials. He also lost his sole source of income: the more than 200 olive trees he owned, which he says were burned down by regime forces.
 
Faysal’s father signed official documents on his behalf blaming armed groups for damaging the house. Like Khaled, he has not yet been compensated. No compensation has yet been made to residents of Kafr Nasej by any governmental or non-governmental body, despite multiple promises made by local officials.
 
 
Source: Kafr Nasej News page
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Residents Displaced from Mayadeen’s Al-Tamo Neighbourhood: “Like Refugees in Our Own City”

06-01-2021/in HLP, News /by admin

After the Islamic State was expelled from the city of Mayadeen in the rural eastern part of the Deir-ez-Zor governorate in 2017, Iraqi and Afghan militias affiliated with Iran’s Quds Force took over the Al-Tamo neighbourhood. Residents displaced by the fighting are still barred from returning to their homes.

Mayadeen came under opposition control in 2012, and remained in rebel hands until mid-2014, when the Islamic State (IS) captured the city and made it the capital of their so-called “Al-Kheir State”, the administrative district established by ISIS in the area of Deir-ez-Zor, opening a court and administrative offices. In late 2017, militias loyal to Iran captured Mayadeen, making it one of its main hubs in eastern Syria.

The Abu Al-Fadel Al-Abbas Brigade, the Fatemiyoun Brigade, the Zeinabiyoun Brigade and the Grand Zeinab Forces are all deployed in Mayadeen, each with their own military headquarters and sites designated for housing their members.

Abu Omar, a resident displaced from the Al-Tamo neighbourhood, told The Syria Report’scorrespondent in the area that residents formed a delegation of 10 people. Before the end of 2020, the group met with militia leaders in control of the neighbourhood, demanding that residents be permitted to return to their houses. The militia leaders rejected the request, telling the delegation through an Iraqi translator – many of these leaders are Iranians – that the fighters had “come to the area to perform the sacred duty of jihad”, and that “residents must embrace those undertaking jihad.”

According to Abu Omar, none of the residents were allowed to return to the neighbourhood to inspect their properties. A portion of them were to rent homes in other areas of the city, or to move to other cities.

Around 1,500 people lived in Al-Tamo before 2017, according to unofficial local estimates. They are all Sunni Muslims, and most are from the Al-Mashahdeh tribe. The neighbourhood is home to spacious, multi-storey houses surrounded by fruit orchards, making the area ideal for concealing the movements of militia fighters.

Mohammad, a resident who was displaced from the neighbourhood, said that he has no option but to rent a home in a neighbouring area of Mayadeen at a monthly price of SYP 50,000. “I feel like I’m a refugee in my own city,” Mohammad told The Syria Report. “I can’t live in my house, and I use almost my entire monthly salary on rent.”

Beyond Al-Tamo, there were several other cases of home confiscation in other parts of Mayadeen. According to media reports from late 2020, Iranian militias confiscated 11 homes on Al-Jaish Street and nine homes on Al-Arbaeen Street, converting them into headquarters. Additionally, the Iraqi Haidariyoun Militia seized 10 homes on the main street of the town of Mahakan, which falls within the Mayadeen municipality, in order to secure a route for pilgrims coming from Iraq and Iran.

Source: Mayadeen Today page on Facebook.

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Explained: Removing “Building Violations” under Decree No. 40 of 2012

06-01-2021/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by admin

The most recent law concerning the removal of so-called “building violations” is Legislative Decree No. 40 of 2012, which has been increasingly relied upon in recent weeks in campaigns carried out by local administrative units and municipalities to demolish buildings in violation of the construction code.

Before this decree, three laws concerning the removal of building violations had been issued since 1960. The four laws do not differ greatly from one another, except in terms of various fines and penalties, and their provisions coexist without completely cancelling out the others. This is due to the link between the building violations in question and the date of their building, and as follows, the provisions of the law to be applied to them during the period of the violation’s occurrence.

What are building violations?

Legislative Decree No. 40 of 2012 determined that buildings will be demolished if a building violation occurs within approved zoning plans, or on public property such as roads and public squares, or on properties belonging to administrative units, or within areas included in expropriation decrees, or in development zones, or if the structural integrity of the building is endangered.

Settlement

In all cases mentioned above, the buildings require removal; the legislative texts that were in force when a given violation was committed will be the ones applied to it. As for other violations, Decree No. 40 authorised administrative units to settle them under certain conditions.

For instance,  some violations can be settled if it can be proven that they occurred before the law was issued, if the building does not “distort” the general look of the area, it is structurally sound and connected, the imposed fine has been paid, and a technical report has been approved by the Order of Engineers proving that the building can withstand the loads of its own storeys, to be licensed according to building regulations.

Decree No. 40 also allows for the settlement of building violations for exceeding the total permitted building percentage within a property.

The 2012 law also permits the settlement of informal neighbourhood violations, provided that they are rehabilitated and the statuses of existing properties within such neighbourhoods are settled, and that such areas are included in formal zoning plans after collection of fees from the violation perpetrator.

Decree No. 40 authorised the Supreme Council of Local Administration to issue decrees determining the types of building violations acceptable for settlement that were committed after the date of the law’s issuance. The council, was created according to the Local Administration Law No. 107 of 2011, and includes the prime minister as its head, the minister of local administration as deputy, and the head of the Planning and International Cooperation Committee, governors, heads of provincial local councils, the head of the Regional Planning Committee and the deputy minister as members. The deputy minister also serves as rapporteur.

Building violations that cannot be settled include those committed before Decree No. 40 came into effect, as well as those that caused total or partial structural collapse, or violated the terms of structural safety.

Demolition

According to Decree No. 40, an administrative unit’s police force is responsible for seizing the violating property, and presenting it and the violators to the judiciary. The administrative unit then sends a letter to the State Cases Administration to follow up on the case and submit a personal claim in its name. Under Law No. 40, the head of an administrative unit has the right to issue immediate decrees for demolishing violating property.

Trial

The trial takes place before a criminal court in accordance with the criminal category of the building violation. The crime is considered a misdemeanor if it includes one of the violations that is not acceptable for settlement; it is a felony if the building has partially or completely collapsed.

If the crime is a misdemeanor, the Court of First Instance is in charge of examining it. Felonies, however, are considered by the Criminal Court, in accordance with the legal principles stipulated by the Syrian Criminal Courts Rules Law No. 112 of 1950. 

Source: Suwar Al-Sham web page.

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Could Displaced Residents Soon Return to Ayn Al-Fijeh?

06-01-2021/in HLP, News /by admin

For the first time since regime forces recaptured the Wadi Barada area west of Damascus in 2017, the government permitted displaced residents to visit the area in December 2020 to inspect their properties in the towns  of Ayn Al-Fijeh, Basimeh and Ayn Al-Khudra.

Regime forces allowed residents to enter the towns for two hours each day from December 17 to 21. The visits were restricted to people whose names were included on special lists held by security forces, and were granted on condition that visitors hand over their identity cards to the security points stationed at the entrances of the three towns, and that the local mayors supervise the visits.

Ayn Al-Fijeh is located about 15 kilometres west of the Damascus city centre, and its spring is the main source of drinking water for the capital and part of its surrounding countryside. Regime forces previously demolished homes and entire residential neighbourhoods in Ayn Al-Fijeh, in accordance with Law No. 1 of 2018, which established a closed off zone surrounding the spring. The same process was repeated in Basimeh and Ayn Al-Khudra. Regime forces have prevented the towns’ displaced residents from returning since 2017. Most of them now reside in towns near Wadi Barada, and in Damascus.

Pro-government media outlets recently published videos appearing to show groups of displaced Ayn Al-Fijeh residents chanting in favour of the Syrian president at the entrance of the town. They were led by the mayors of Ayn Al-Fijeh, Basimeh and Ayn Al-Khudra, as well as some members of reconciliation committees and Baathists from Wadi Barada villages. The demonstrators chanted at the request of an officer from the Republican Guard, an elite unit in the Syrian Army, which controls the area, to thank the Syrian leadership for allowing them to visit their homes.

The Damascus Countryside governorate had entered into a contract in August 2020 with the General Company for Engineering Studies (GCES), which is affiliated with the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, to prepare the detailed, organisational and zoning plans for the planned “Wadi Barada Suburb”. The suburb is meant to serve as alternative housing for residents whose properties were expropriated under Law No. 1 of 2018, as well as for those whose homes were destroyed due to fighting in the area. Law No. 1 resulted in the expropriation of around 165 hectares of land, entirely surrounding the Ayn Al-Fijeh spring. Previously, the closed-off zone around the spring was only seven hectares. Some 45 hectares of land surrounding the spring previously belonged to Ayn Al-Fijeh, while the remaining 120 hectares are located within the boundaries of neighbouring villages. All occupants of the land were removed.

Residents who visited the towns last month estimated that the buildings and infrastructure in Ayn Al-Fijeh and Basimeh had sustained around 70 percent damage, according to a correspondent in the area.

However, the new approach of allowing residents to inspect their properties could mean that plans for the construction of the Wadi Barada suburb have been postponed for the time being, albeit with no indications that expropriations around the spring will be reversed.

Similar returns are also happening in towns at the eastern entrance of Damascus, and in the Yarmouk refugee camp, after delays in implementing new local zoning plans. These developments all come at a time when the Syrian government lacks funding to implement large-scale reconstruction projects and faces pressure for internally displaced people to return to their hometowns.

Meanwhile, the Damascus Countryside governorate has made new promises to displaced people that in 2021 it will begin work to rehabilitate infrastructure in Wadi Barada towns, as well as remove rubble and demolish homes at risk of collapse. In an interview with the Al-Watan newspaper on 17 December, the head of the Municipal Councils Directorate at the Damascus Countryside Governorate linked the return of residents to Ayn Al-Fijeh, Basimeh and Ayn Al-Khudra to conclusions made at the International Conference on the Return of Displaced People, held by the Syrian government in November 2020 with Russian sponsorship.

Residents gather at the entrance of Ayn Al-Fijeh.

Source: social media

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Afrin: Opposition Factions Fight Over Properties of Displaced Residents

23-12-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

Fighting broke out on 10 December between opposition factions in the Jandares district of Afrin in northern Aleppo governorate due to a dispute over a house located in the town.

Fighters from the NourEddine Al-Zanki group, which is part of the National Liberation Front (NLF), detained a displaced person from East Ghouta who refused to evacuate a house that he had occupied in Jandares. In response, fighters from the Cham Liberation Army, which includes men from East Ghouta, attacked a NourEddine Al-Zanki military base. NourEddine Al-Zanki includes fighters who were forcibly displaced from the rural western part of the Aleppo province in early 2019 by the hard-line Islamist Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham group.

The dispute quickly developed into armed clashes between the two sides, leading to the deaths of four fighters. The fighting did not stop until forces from the National Army intervened, forcing the two sides to cease fire. The National Army operates in northern Aleppo, while the National Liberation Front operates in Idlib. Both are funded by Turkey and represent an umbrella of various factions.

Infighting between rebel factions is common in Afrin, mostly due to disputes over the homes and properties of Kurdish residents from the area who have been displaced. Those homes are now occupied by people displaced to Afrin from other parts of Syria. The factions’ harassment of the current occupants, and attempts to seize the homes, do not specifically target displaced people from East Ghouta, but rather represent a policy that extends to all current residents of Afrin—whether they are from East Ghouta or elsewhere.

All the factions have economic offices to manage the properties of residents displaced from Afrin, especially those belonging to people affiliated with the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), or those who cooperated with them. These economic offices have taken stock of and invested in the properties of displaced Kurdish residents, compelling the current occupants of these properties—who are themselves displaced from other areas of Syria—to pay monthly rents. Usually, the factions impose monthly rents of 100-200 Turkish liras, or the equivalent amount in SYP. Occupants who refuse to pay and do not vacate the property are faced with arrest.

The Turkish-backed rebel factions took control of Afrin in 2018 as part of the Operation Olive Branch military campaign. The area was divided into different zones of influence. The faction in charge of each zone oversees that area’s security and civilian affairs and is involved in providing public sectors and intervening in the work of local aid organisations and municipal councils. Each faction in charge of a zone has its own administrative, economic and security offices.

Administratively defined by the Syrian government,Afrin is one of the largest areas in the rural parts of the Aleppo governorate. It includes Afrin city and around 340 towns, villages, and farms, which are divided along administrative areas into six districts. Most people displaced to Afrin from East Ghouta live in the sections under the control of Failaq Al-Rahman and Jaish Al-Islam, while fighters from NourEddine Al-Zanki are concentrated in the Jandares district.

The Sultan Suleiman Brigades group, which is part of the National Army, dominates the centre of the Sheikh Al-Hadid district. The group is led by Muhammad Al-Jassem, nicknamed Abu Amsha, who has been accused of carrying out various rights violations against local residents. Displaced people from rural northern and eastern Hama province also live in this area. Meanwhile, Afrin city, where a mixture of displaced people live, is divided between the Jabhat Al-Shamia, Firqat Al-Hamza and Sultan Murad groups.

The result of clashes over a house in Afrin

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Halfaya: Municipality to Compensate Damaged Homes, But Only for Loyalists

23-12-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

There is talk among residents of Halfaya, a city north of Hama, that owners of homes damaged by the war may receive compensation of SYP 6 million. It is unclear where the funding for the compensation may be sourced, or which body would be responsible for distributing the money.

Halfaya is located north of Hama city, in a fertile agricultural area. It served as an industrial area for the northern Hama countryside before 2011 and was home to around 35,000 people. Rebel factions held Halfaya for several years before regime forces recaptured it in 2017. The city remained a military zone from 2017-2019, with a base for Russian forces established nearby.

Only around 240 families now live in Halfaya after regime forces allowed them to return in December 2019. The city still suffers from poor public services. Drinking water is sold from large tanks, electricity networks are not running, and the roads need full maintenance.

In recent days, a list has circulated among residents containing the names of 20 individuals, representing 20 families, who are said to be the only people entitled to compensation, to be used to refurbish their damaged homes. The 20 individuals were reportedly requested to visit the Halfaya City Council to complete their files with a new real estate registry record. The list was leaked from a private WhatsApp semi-official group in the city. It was reportedly prepared by a former commander in the regime’s National Defence Forces (NDF), who now serves as an official in the Halfaya City Council. All the names included on the list appear to be those of residents who are loyal to the regime, some of whom are involved in the military or security forces.

According to a correspondent for The Syria Report in the area, the official responsible for drawing up the list told residents who had objected: “Compensation is not for the poor, but for the honourable,” meaning those known to be loyal to the regime.

That is, out of 240 families now living in Halfaya, only 20 families so far are considered by the security forces as loyal to the regime. This vetting helps serve a small network of local beneficiaries who have come to monopolise the few aid supplies and public services that have been provided to the city. This applies to the distribution of fuel, seeds, and fertiliser, and even household water tanks.

The head of the Hama governorate’s military and security committee issued a decree on 11 August that banned the ploughing of Halfaya’s agricultural lands until the committee formed by Administrative Order No. 3077 finishes taking stock of the properties belonging to former Halfaya residents who have been displaced to opposition-held territories elsewhere.

This was followed by the Military Security’s seizure of properties belonging to displaced residents who are wanted by security forces. The word “confiscated” was then written on their seized homes and shops. As for the properties of displaced residents who were not wanted by security, they were offered in October for investment in a public auction.

The leaked list

 

Source: The Syria Report correspondent

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Fraudulent Power of Attorney: Easiest Path to Unlawful Seizure of Property

23-12-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

The head of Syria’s Forgery and Counterfeits Branch, Col. Wassim Maarouf, revealed last week that the agency had caught a network using fraudulent power of attorney to sell real estate belonging to Syrian expatriates and others who had left the country. The Forgery and Counterfeits Branch is part of the Criminal Security Department of the Ministry of Interior.

Three judges, and a number of lawyers and clerks were involved in the network, according to Mr Maarouf. Investigations revealed that the judges could earn up to SYP 1.5 million per unit of property sold. The justice minister confirmed to the pro-regime newspaper Al-Watan in November that there were ongoing trials—and others to take place soon—of judges accused of transferring real estate properties to others based on fraudulent power of attorney.

One of the easiest ways to seize real estate is to forge power of attorney documents to sell real estate. The power of attorney for selling such properties is issued by the client, giving the agent the right to sell the property to himself or to anyone else who wants it. The client may not terminate or cancel the power of attorney without the consent of the agent. That is, the real estate selling power of attorney is not subject to removaland is considered a final sale under Article 681 of the Syrian Civil Code.

Pro-regime media reported in late November that a judge had been arrested in Aleppo for his involvement in transferring real estate via forged documents. The judge could overlook a defect in one of the lawsuit proceedings confirming the sale of the property. For example, the judge could neglect to verify the authenticity of the documents, including the sales power of attorney.

According to a judicial source from the Ministry of Justice, the year 2014 alone saw the discovery of around 25 counterfeit powers of attorney to sell real estate per day. There were 15 daily in 2015, 20 daily in 2016, and five per day in 2017. In 2013, according to an official statement, there were 15 cases of fraudulent real estate ownership discovered daily in Damascus and Damascus Countryside governorates alone. The statement affirmed that, at the time, there was a high rate of forgery for personal documents, and that many gang members were placed on trial under this charge.

Power of attorney fraud became widespread after 2011, with an increase in arrests, forced displacement and disappearance. In August 2015, the Prime Ministry issued Circular No. 463, directed at the Ministry of Local Administration, which adds real estate sales to cases that must obtain prior security approval. Such approval requires detailed security investigations of both the buyer and the seller. According to pro-opposition news sites, this indicates the security apparatus’s involvement in the process of fraudulent real estate power of attorney used to sell off properties belonging to people who are opposed to the regime, including detainees and displaced people.

If the property is sold to just one party, the owner must go to the civil or criminal court to file a lawsuit to invalidate the sale or demand compensation. In cases of multiple sales of a single property, called a buyer’s dispute, the original owner only has the right to request compensation, without recovering the property. With this in mind, fraudulent power of attorney resort to selling a single property more than once in order to mislead and prevent the original owners from reclaiming their property.

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Q&A: What Is the Role of Women in HLP Rights?

23-12-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

The following is an interview with Sawsan Abou Zainedin, a Syrian architect and urban development planner. She works as a researcher on addressing the challenges of Syria’s reconstruction and recovery with a number of organisations including with the Syrian Centre for Policy Research and the Syrian Women’s Political Movement.

What challenges do women face in HLP rights?

I think that paying attention to HLP rights and its issues is a relatively new phenomenon in the Syrian case, and so is the inclusion of women’s rights, which are easily neglected. HLP includes urban, legal, economic and media dimensions, and they became clearly visible since mid-2012, when the regime began to adapt the urban system as a strategy within the war. On the other hand, and according to what previous conversations have taught us, feminism is a mode of thinking that has been demonised, or at best it is considered the product of women who have special privileges, and who have the luxury of discussing things with a gender lens.

The Syrian war has highlighted many challenges tied to HLP rights, especially the problematic reality for women within this issue. In this sense, the war revealed the role of women, after the absence of men. Here, a change has occurred to the stereotypical gender roles within the family. Syrian women became responsible for the family after arrests and forced disappearances focused on men. This gave additional responsibilities to women, but also brought them in direct confrontation with rights issues: family properties, in most cases, are registered in the names of males who are now gone or being pursued by security forces, and there is no way for women to deal with these properties—that is, if these family-owned properties were not already confiscated under the provisions of the terrorism court.

This issue is not related just to laws directly concerning HLP issues, but also to the overall set of regulations and customs that have drastically impacted women’s rights since before 2011. For example, Syrian women do not have the right to pass on their nationality or surname to their children. This became a very complex problem during the war, amid the widespread phenomenon of women marrying foreign fighters or men of unknown descent, whether by force or voluntarily. Children [of such marriages] have been deprived of even a surname. Can a child be considered the descendent of a father known only as Abu Al-Qaaqaa? This matter has automatically reflected on issues of inheritance and ownership.

So, it seems that we are facing an overlap of two rights issues—HLP rights and women’s rights—at a time that has radically changed the nature of gender roles within the Syrian family.

In truth, HLP rights are a direct dimension, in which the exclusions that women face in the Syrian context are reflected or manifested under the control of numerous de facto powers. The most important aspect of this issue is the overlap of discriminatory structures against women that were present prior to the Syrian revolution, and the change in stereotypical gender roles due to the war. Women have come to the fore in everyday life, in the sense of their responsibility and sustenance of the family, accompanied by a real clash with legal and social discriminatory structures.

What is needed is to widen the gulf between these two poles—meaning to prevent, through legal pathways and societal efforts, a return to the discriminatory structures of pre-2011. That is, to refuse to reproduce the same system that brought about the current devastation. This is done by requiring any legal efforts for social justice to not place women’s rights second, but rather to consider them an essential part of solving property rights issues in their broadest sense. This must be accompanied by work to change the exclusionary social practices against women and building on the increased societal awareness taking place on the ground after Syrian women took on the position of production and responsibility within the family institution.

How can, as a strategy, HLP issues be given a feminist dimension?

The presence of women, in a gendered sense, within any group will contribute to highlighting feminist issues, as the experiences of women in various issues—with their diverse array of affiliations and privileges—differ from the experiences of men. This makes women more capable of understanding the discriminatory structures that govern their experiences, and of highlighting them.

The female presence within any platform reflects on its dynamics in one way or another, and discussions become more focused around rights issues—without falling into the trap of hierarchy in which women’s rights issues are typically low among the priorities. Over time, the presence of some cliches will be diminished, such as: “There are thousands of forcibly displaced people, whose lost rights must be addressed before we address women’s issues”. This decrease will also be linked to a shift in focus from those who have legitimate and documented HLP rights within the legal structures that already exist in Syria, and their legal means of defence, to mainstream discussions around the right to housing, right to land, and right to secure tenure, with a focus on the rights of marginalised groups and those most vulnerable to exclusion—that is, introducing concepts of social justice, and not being limited to general legal rights.

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Southern Aleppo Countryside: Public Auction to Invest in Displaced People’s Lands

16-12-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

The head of the Security and Military Committee in Aleppo, Major-General Salim Khalil Harba, formed a committeeto hold a public auction to lease agricultural lands belonging to people who were forcibly displaced from 11 villages in rural southern Aleppo.

On November 22, the committee held a public auction at the headquarters of the Agriculture and Agrarian Reform Directorate in Aleppo. Attendees could make offers to develop these lands on the basis that they commit to planting wheat for one season. A similar auction happened in the countryside of Hama and Idlib a few weeks ago.

Offered at the auction were 350 hectares of agricultural lands south of Aleppo. Regime forces and allied Iranian militias captured the area in early 2020 during military operations along the M4 Aleppo-Damascus highway. These villages were heavily damaged by bombing and battles due to their location along the frontlines between rebel and regime forces between 2015 and 2020. Virtually all residents of the area were displaced before regime forces took control and headed towards displacement camps near the Turkish border in the north-western Idlib governorate.

Only a small number of regime loyalists now live in the 11 villages after returning from regime-held areas in the countryside of Al-Hader in southern Aleppo governorate. The Security and Military Committee employed a number of “guides” from the area to work with Air Force Intelligence and determine which lands are owned by displaced, pro-opposition former residents.

The lands offered in the auction are currently under the control of the Security and Military Committee, according to a former local council president who spoke with The Syria Report. At the same time, large areas of rural southern Aleppo fell directly under the control of Iranian militias, which also seized the homes and shops of forcibly displaced residents.

The Iranian militias typically use the proceeds from agricultural lands and real estate seized in rural southern Aleppo to finance their groups, which are deployed in large numbers near the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-run Jabal Azzan base. The militias have carried out some service projects, such as rehabilitating schools and water networks, to win over the area’s remaining residents. Meanwhile, revenues collected by the Security and Military Committee are used to support the families of regime soldiers who died in action.

A view of the town of Zeitan

 

Source: Pro-opposition website Baladi-News

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How is the Dismissed Damascus Countryside Governor Connected to Recent Building Violation Demolitions?

16-12-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

The Damascus Countryside governorate last week launched a campaign to demolish what it calls “building violations” in various parts of rural Damascus. The campaign included buildings in Darayya, Jdeidet Artouz, Sahnaya and Harasta, though official pro-government media only focused its attention on the demolition of buildings in the town of Al-Sabboura that had not been constructed according to building regulations.

The start of the demolition campaign came just one day after Alaa Ibrahim was removed from his post as governor of Damascus Countryside on December 02, in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 325 of 2020. Ibrahim was also subjected to a provisional seizure of his assets, as well as those of his wife and children, under Decree No. 2941 from the Ministry of Finance on December 03.

The demolition campaign targeted building violations licensed through exceptional decrees granted by the municipal councils and approved by the governorate while Ibrahim was still in office. Immediately after Ibrahim’s dismissal, the governorate cancelled the exemptions previously granted to owners of buildings that were in violation of code, without providing any justification. According to sources who spoke with The Syria Report, it appears that a large number of violating buildings in various parts of the rural areas outside Damascus had received exemptions from the governorate in recent years in return for bribes to the governor.

On December 03, the Central Demolition Committee (CDC) in the Damascus Countryside governorate began demolishing and removing building violations in the town of Al-Saboura west of Damascus. Officials from both the governorate and the municipality were present, as were law enforcement, in accordance with the provisions of Legislative Decree No. 40 of 2012 on Building Violations. The properties targeted for demolition included four residential buildings, each consisting of six storeys. CDCs were formed separately in each governorate, in accordance with instructions provided by Legislative Decree No. 59 of 2008 regarding the removal of building violations. The CDCs are aimed at providing support and counsel, and to carry out the demolition or transfer using both public and private sector capacity.

A violating building is a building constructed without obtaining a permit, or one whose builders violated the terms of the licence, according to Building Violations Law No. 1 for 2003. Meanwhile, Decree No. 40 of 2012 stipulates that the building be completely removed, regardless of its location, and that a fine and imprisonment be imposed on the perpetrators, as well as for contractors and hired workers who constructed the building. All construction equipment in their possession at the site of the violation must be confiscated, the building demolished, and the rubble removed at the owner’s expense.

Cases exempted from those measures include building violations that occurred before Decree No. 40 of 2012 went into effect, or those that could not be removed due to the potential dangers to surrounding buildings. In this case, the owner of the violating building must be charged a fee equal to twice the earnings he made from the building. In 2017, the governorate permitted legal settlement of some of the violations that occurred before 2012, provided that the owners submit an engineering report confirming the building’s structural integrity, and that the building does not disrupt the general appearance of its surrounding area.

However, during its current campaign, the governorate refused to conduct legal settlements in similar cases, without providing any justification as to why. Such settlements are permitted in some cases, according to Legislative Decree No. 59 of 2008, provided that there is no “change in the construction system according to specified controls and fines imposed on the violator, whether that is the owner of the building themselves, or the investor.”

Demolition work in Al-Saboura

Source: SANA

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Why Did Damascus Governorate Keep the Qadam Industrial Complex?

16-12-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

The industrial complex for repairing cars in Damascus’s Qadam neighbourhood remains only partly functional, despite claims by the government that it has been rehabilitated. The fate of the complex is unclear in light of the government’s intentions to restrict all car-related occupations to a car expo centre complex under construction in Al-Dweir, northeast of the capital city.

The car repair complex extends over four hectares of land within the Qadam neighbourhood at the southern entrance to Damascus. Construction began in 2000, with the aim of removing car repair shops and associated businesses from the city centre and restricting them to one centralised location. The land used for the complex was expropriated for the state and was rented out for unlimited terms as per Syrian rental laws. This type of rent contract is called “furough” in Arabic  There were 450 small and medium facilities within the complex, all focused on various aspects of car repair.

The “furough” contracts allow a tenant to waive his right to invest to others, in exchange for an allowance, with ownership of the property remaining as it was—in the case of the Qadam complex, in the hands of the state. With the issuance of Tenancy Law No. 10 of 2006, the “furough” lost the possibility of automatically extending the lease contract against the owner’s will. However, the right to “furough” still includes stores leased before 2006, and applies to the Qadam complex.

The complex went out of service more than five years ago, after opposition factions took control of it and the area became a frontline between rebels and regime forces. The regime forces recaptured the complex in April 2018. It had suffered large-scale damage, as well as looting on multiple occasions, as various different armed groups captured it.

Former Damascus Governor Bishr Al-Sabban took a tour of the repair complex in 2018, when he announced that facilities would begin to be handed over to their owners on the condition that they pledge to begin work within six months. Otherwise, they would be closed and sealed with red wax. In return, Al-Sabban pledged to rehabilitate the complex as quickly as possible.

Since then, the Qadam municipality has only managed to remove rubble and open roads in the complex, despite more than 50 percent of the facilities and infrastructure having been destroyed, according to a correspondent for The Syria Report in the area. Damascus governorate has linked rehabilitation of the complex, as well as repairs to the infrastructure such as water and electricity, to the return of business to the car repair shops there. Al-Sabban said in his previous visit to the complex that “the state has paid billions [of pounds] to retake industrial zones from the terrorists, and the least that can be done to return the favour is to restart business in them.”

Before 2011, the complex employed around 4,000 workers, but now that number is no more than 500 people. A number of shop owners and workers were forcibly displaced along with the opposition convoys that left the area because they were wanted by regime security forces for participating in anti-regime activities.

Most of the workshop owners have rehabilitated their shops in the complex, fearing that they may lose the right under the “furough” system”. They also fear a fate similar to that of the demolished car market at the northern entrance to Damascus, whose store owners were forced to switch to the Al-Dweir car expo.

A portion of workshop owners from the Qadam complex also moved their businesses in recent years to within Damascus city, setting up shop on sidewalks. The businesses became known as sidewalk workshops. Despite the partial refurbishment of the Qadam complex, some of these sidewalk workshops are still operating, in exchange for bribes paid to governorate police to turn a blind eye. The Damascus governorate, however, has issued an order requiring these workshops to return to Qadam.

But poor services in the complex, almost permanent electricity outages, a scarcity of fuel to run generators and the difficulty of access for cars, has made the complex unattractive for business. All these problems are in addition to the security restrictions on workshop owners in the complex, as removal or entry of machinery requires prior approval from the Military Security Branch in charge of southern Damascus.

The main reason for keeping the Qadam complex in place appears to be aimed at keeping all small car repair businesses in Damascus in one place, owned by the state and monopolised by the lessor model. This means that the state has come to control the car market over the entire city of Damascus, from the Al-Dweir centre to the Qadam complex.

A car repair workshop in the Al-Qadam industrial complex

 

Source: SANA

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Explained: Real Estate Development Zones

16-12-2020/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by admin

According to the Real Estate Development and Investment Law No. 15 of 2008, so-called “real estate development zones” include properties both within and outside zoning plans. The properties needed to set up a real estate development zone are secured either from state property, from the properties of the local administrative unit, the private properties of development companies or from the properties of private individuals.

The Commission

The real estate development zones are chosen by the Real Estate Development and Investment Commission (REDIC), through a study that it conducts in coordination with the relevant administrative units. The REDIC is an administrative body; it enjoys its own legal status as well as financial and administrative independence. It is linked to the Minister of Public Works and Housing, and headquartered in Damascus, with branches in various governorates.

Law No. 15 of 2008 assigned administration of REDIC to a board of directors chaired by the Minister of Public Works and Housing, with the aim of preparing policies and general plans for real estate development and investment and following up on their implementation. The board of directors also submits proposals for new real estate development zones to the prime minister after conducting a survey with the relevant administrative unit.

Expropriation

Properties located within the area slated for real estate development that belong to individuals are expropriated for the benefit of the local administrative unit. This expropriation file is submitted to the REDIC board of directors, which in turn submits it, as well as a draft of the decree, to the Ministry of Local Administration. It then sends the file to the Prime Minister’s Office, to issue an expropriation decree.

After issuing the decree, the local administrative unit must take the necessary steps to estimate the payment for the expropriation. The expropriated real estate is then registered in the name of the local administrative unit, by decree from the prime minister.

Real estate development zones

The instructions for implementing Law No. 15 of 2008, issued by the Prime Minister’s Office through Decree No. 5410 of 2009, divide Syria’s governorates into real estate development zones as follows:

  • The first region includes Damascus, Aleppo, and Damascus Countryside governorates. Real estate development zones here must not be smaller than 25 hectares.
  • The second region is divided into two categories: the first includes Homs and Hama, where real estate development zones must not be smaller than 20 hectares; the second includes Lattakia and Tartous, where real estate development zones must not be smaller than 15 hectares.
  • The third region is also divided into two categories: the first includes Daraa, Idlib, Quneitra and Suweida, where real estate development zones must not be smaller than 15 hectares; the second includes Deir-ez-Zor, Hassakeh and Raqqa, where real estate development zones may be set up regardless of their total area.

As for informal housing areas, they can be established as real estate development zones regardless of total area, which can be done through a memorandum justifying the move, and with the approval of the Prime Minister’s Office.

The total number of real estate development zones in Syria reached 23 in 2018, with a total area of 4,228 hectares. Works have not begun in any of these zones, but they are eventually expected to host around 176,000 total housing units, able to accommodate around one million people. The 23 zones are distributed as follows: eight in Damascus Countryside, eight in Aleppo, four in Homs, and one each in Hama, Deir-ez-Zor and Suweida.

Real estate developers

According to Law No. 15 for 2008, projects to invest in real estate development zones must be carried out by licensed real estate developers who are registered with the REDIC. The law aims to hire private companies (real estate developers), which carry out construction of infrastructure and services within the development project, as well as secure alternative housing for impacted residents.

There are currently an estimated 57 companies licensed by REDIC, although this number constantly changes as new companies receive a licence and others lose it. In October 2019, for instance, there were 63 listed companies. Within the public sector, the General Housing Establishment (GHE), the Military Housing Establishment (MHE) and the Military Construction Establishment (MCE) are real estate development companies.

According to pro-regime news sites, the director of the REDIC said in October 2020 that amendments would soon be issued to Law No. 15 of 2008, including facilities to encourage real estate development companies and preserve the rights of those who have subscribed to real estate development projects.

In the government’s view, the need to amend Law No. 15 stems from justifications related to giving priority to the real estate developers in dealing with informally built housing areas, and granting them extra facilities and benefits, such as sales off plan property and lower rates to ensure proper implementation.

Law No. 23 for 2015

According to the Planning and Urban Development Law No. 23 of 2015, zoning plans are issued independently of the existence of implementing bodies (real estate developers), whether public or private. Their issuance is not tied to a specific time limit for their completion. The administrative bodies are not required to have a certain level of ownership within the zoning plans. They are also not required to have a minimum amount of land area.

The commercial area in Adra Industrial City

Source: REDIC website

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A New Zoning Plan for Damascus?

09-12-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

The city of Damascus has seen three zoning plans: the first issued in 1937, followed by another in 1968 and another in 2001. Since 2015, there has been talk of issuing new zoning plans yet again.

This year marks nearly two decades since the last zoning plans were issued for Damascus. The 2001 plans included zoning programmes to determine the city’s future needs, based on the population size and density. Planners had expected the population of Damascus to reach around seven million people by 2020.

The plan was prepared by the General Company for Engineering Studies (GCES), which is affiliated with the Ministry of Public Works and Housing. It included 205 housing complexes and covered an area of 30,000 hectares, expanding the city limits of Damascus into parts of the immediate surrounding countryside known as the Damascus urban belt. The built-up areas of the city in 2001 reached 5,200 hectares, of which 4,800 hectares were residential zones.

However, the estimates set out in 2001 were not achieved. The administrative limits of Damascus still extend over only about 10,000 hectares, with a population of 1.7 million people, according to semi-official estimates from 2019.

Although the war that followed the 2011 uprising halted implementation of the 2001 zoning plans, previous plans also suffered from disruption, poor implementation, and a lack of population studies. Issuance of the 2001 plan was itself delayed by 17 years. Previously, the plans drawn up by French engineer Michel Ecochard and issued in 1968 took into account a projected population increase only until 1984. The Ecochard plans proposed distributing additional housing in zoning areas that were being prepared. They also proposed areas for expropriation for the purpose of building low-income housing but did not specify the locations. Ecochard also added areas for future expansion both within and outside the administrative limits of Damascus.

Preceding the Ecochard plans were the first public zoning plans for Damascus, issued in 1937 during the French mandate period and drawn by the French engineer Henry de Jouvenel. Two years later, in 1939, the first building code based on the plans was issued. Decree No. 97 for 1948 set up a new construction system based on modifications introduced during the WWII era, themselves based on the 1939 system and the 1937 Jouvenel plans.

Urban expansion in Damascus, 1932-2020

 

Source: Fabrice Balanche

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Explained: The Mechanism for Issuing Zoning Plans

09-12-2020/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by admin

Zoning plans transform makeshift, informally built neighbourhoods into organised areas—that is, from zones with building violations where construction is not legally permitted into areas where builders can obtain construction permits, allowing for services to be delivered. Zoning plans are the mechanism through which the laws and decrees of real estate development and zoning are implemented, and informal residential areas are eliminated.

Legislative Decree No. 5 for 1982, known as the “Urban Planning Law”, clarified the main concepts that should accompany zoning plans, including: The foundations of urban planning, which are the unified principles that regulate the process of planning residential areas. They include the steps and stages that must be followed when preparing a zoning program, which in turn determines the immediate and future needs of a residential area based on population, population density, the type and number of services and the public construction needed.

From the foundations of urban planning, a general zoning plan should be put in place that clarifies the future vision for the residential community and its expansion by determining the urban boundaries, main road network and all uses of the land within it. While the detailed zoning plan is based on the zoning program, it specifies all the details for the main and secondary road networks, pedestrian pathways, public spaces, and other details for development of lands according to their decreed usage.

The process of developing and approving both general and detailed zoning plans goes through the following phases, according to Legislative Decree No. 5 for 1982: First, the Ministry of Public Works and Housing sets the foundations for urban plans to meet the population’s needs within the capabilities of the comprehensive regional plans for the country, which takes into account the geographical dimension of the development process in all governorates. Then the administrative unit (governorate council or municipal council) sets a zoning program within the scope of the urban planning foundations.

This means that the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, through the regional planning process, determines that a governorate needs to be expanded by a specific area based on the increase in its population. Then, the administrative unit begins to produce initial conceptions of the general zoning plan, based on the area proposed for development. Decree No. 5 for 1982 did not specify a mandatory timeline for the administrative units; the process may take years.

The completed general zoning plan is submitted to the Ministry of Public Works for approval, or to receive requests for amendments.

After that, the administrative unit prepares the general and detailed draft plans, then announces them together via its town hall, without being bound by a timetable, as Decree No. 5 did not delineate the need for one. People are then notified in person or through newspapers, and they may raise objections to the plans within 30 days from the date of their announcement.

Residents then submit their objections to a regional technical committee formed and headed by the governor and composed of eight members representing various relevant bodies, such as the governorate’s director of technical services, the director of antiquities and the roads official within the Directorate of Technical Services.

While the administrative unit is responsible for developing the general zoning plan in accordance with Decree No. 5, the General Company for Engineering Studies (GCES), which is affiliated with the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, is responsible for developing the detailed plans, according to Law No. 12 for 2019. However, given that the task is greater than the company can handle, it is customary for it to hand over the responsibility to private, licensed engineering offices at a flat rate, on the condition that those offices include engineers from all disciplines.

The Minister of Public Works and Housing must be given a copy of any general or detailed zoning plan within 15 days from the date of its release by the administrative unit. The minister then has 45 days after recording the decree to halt its implementation in cases where it violates the principles of urban planning. If those 45 days pass with no objection from the minister, then the decree becomes final. If there is an objection, it is deliberated by the Council of Ministers.

Consequently, general zoning plans for cities are issued by decree from the Minister of Public Works and Housing, based on a proposal from the Governorate Executive office where the city is located. Again, there is no timeline set for implementation of the plan.

The zoning plans should then be announced again one year after they are first issued, with objections allowed once again. If the plans are not implemented, they are subsequently announced again once every three years, with objections allowed once more. The administrative unit may make amendments to the plans in line with the public interest.

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Hama: Large-Scale Demolitions Ostensibly Target Building Violations

09-12-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

Hama governorate is carrying out a major demolition campaign against what it calls “building violations” in various parts of Hama city. The campaign has targeted housing, warehouses, and factories whose rubble was seized while the owners of the properties were transferred to the judiciary.

The demolitions have taken place in several neighbourhoods, most significantly in Al-Naqarneh, Kazou, Wadi Al-Joz and Mazraa Al-Dhahiyeh under directions from Hama Governor Mohammad Krishani, who personally supervised the demolitions in Al-Naqarneh. Krishani justified the demolitions to pro-government newspaper Al-Watan on November 30 by saying that the targeted buildings in Al-Naqarneh “belong to traders who deal in buildings that are in violation of code on a large scale, and do not belong to impoverished residents”. He emphasised the organised nature of the demolitions, which are supported by the police command and the Central Demolitions Committee, which was formed under Decree No. 59 for 2008 and focuses on informal housing.

Krishani added that 14 factories that served “traders of informal buildings” in Al-Naqarneh were sealed with red wax and seized. He stressed: “Al-Naqarneh is a green area where construction is banned,” and that “after today, violations are completely banned in Hama; any violation of Decree No. 40 of 2012 will be dealt with according to its stipulations”.

Legislative Decree No. 40 of 2012 focuses on building violations. It stipulates the removal of violating buildings, starting from the date of the decree’s issuance, and “whatever the [building’s] type and location, imposes fines and imprisonment against all those proven responsible for the violation, including administrative workers who have neglected their duty to prevent the violation”.

Al-Naqarneh was first built as a makeshift neighbourhood on what used to be agricultural land just south of Hama city that was expropriated for the municipal council in 1983. The expropriation was carried out in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 880 of 1983, which in turn was based on Expropriations Decree No. 60 of 1979.

The neighbourhood covers 500 hectares of land, part of which underwent a study by the governorate to be converted into a real estate development area. The governorate requested that the Ministry of Public Works and Housing approve the inclusion of the area into the city’s zoning plans to prepare detailed plans for it and determine which part would be appropriate as a real estate development zone.

In 2008, the Hama City Council announced the zoning plans for the expropriated lands in Al-Naqarneh, granting construction licences to housing cooperatives to build 1,724 housing units within an area of 104 hectares. But in September 2018, the governorate decided to demolish the entire neighbourhood, including buildings built by the housing cooperatives, claiming that they were against code. The demolitions continued for an entire week. Owners of the expropriated properties were promised alternative housing through the housing cooperatives once construction was complete, but this has not yet come to fruition.

Al-Naqarneh is not the only district to face demolition in recent years. The governorate demolished the informal Wadi Al-Joz neighbourhood in September 2013, displacing 25,000 people. Wadi Al-Joz was one of the largest informally built neighbourhoods in Hama before it was demolished by the governorate following the withdrawal of opposition forces. The General Housing Establishment (GHE) was assigned to expropriate properties in the neighbourhood on an urgent basis in 2013, due to the many building violations there and on the pretext of the massive destruction inflicted on the neighbourhood during the war. The expropriation was aimed at later constructing residential towers and imposing a new zoning plan for Wadi Al-Joz in accordance with Legislative Decree No. 5 for 1982 and its amendments. No compensation was paid for residents whose properties were expropriated. With an area of 30 hectares, the neighbourhood was added to the list of real estate development areas, according to Prime Minister’s Decree No. 2318, passed in August 2014.

The Hama governorate also demolished the informal Al-Arbaeen neighbourhood in September 2012. Mashaa Al-Arbaeen is located in north-eastern Hama city, and was home to 30,000 people. Human Rights Watch estimated its area to extend over 40 hectares, adding that political and military motives were behind the demolition, in contrast to statements made by Syrian officials, who said that the demolition was part of multiple organisational and development projects.

For years, the demolitions have dominated news on the Hama City Council, which justifies the campaigns as fights against building code violations. In April 2020, 59 buildings were demolished in Al-Naqarneh, the Abi Al-Fadaa suburb, the Al-Arbaeen Roundabout, the informal Al-Muamalat area, the Aleppo Highway Roundabout, and the entrance of Al-Dhaheriyeh. Owners of the targeted properties were transferred to the judiciary, according to statements made by officials. August 2020 saw the governorate announce the demolition of eight more buildings in a number of areas, including Al-Naqarneh and the Abi Al-Fadaa suburb.

Demolitions in Hama

Source: Hama Governorate

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Determining Ownership of Properties in Jabal Aqeil: A Prelude to Return of Displaced Residents?

09-12-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

The opposition-affiliated city council for Al-Bab in northern Aleppo governorate announced on November 9 that a committee tasked with surveying properties in the city’s Jabal Aqeil district would soon finish its work. The council called on real estate and landowners in the district to review the survey by no later than December 9 in case they have objections.

Jabal Aqeil, which overlooks Al-Bab, has been considered a military zone since opposition and Turkish forces carried out the “Euphrates Shield” operation in 2017 to expel Islamic State fighters from the area. The Turkish army then established one of its largest military bases in rural Aleppo on Jabal Aqeil, which has prevented displaced residents from returning to the area.

Residents protested the district’s conversion into a military zone in 2017, accusing the Turkish army of demolishing their homes and preventing their return. Protesters demanded that the Turkish army compensate them or find alternative housing for them and their families.

Jabal Aqeil faced massive destruction as various armed forces fought over its control. From 2012 to 2014, the opposition controlled the area, which faced continuous artillery fire and barrel bombing by regime forces. IS seized control in 2014, setting up a centralised operations room. The group also converted the National Hospital there into an ammunition depot and built tunnels and engineering fortifications on the slopes of Jabal Aqeil’s hill. The area faced concentrated aerial bombardment from Russian forces while under IS control, which lasted until 2017. During the Euphrates Shield operation, Turkish forces focused on bombing Jabal Aqeil because it contained IS’ most complex fortifications in the area, and because control of the area meant control of Al-Bab.

Land and real estate in Jabal Aqeil are split between private ownership and public ownership, the latter of which is affiliated now with the Al-Bab Directorate of Endowments, itself part of the city council. Between 2005 and 2010, the district saw an expansion of construction, which spilled onto lands owned by the Syrian government’s Directorate of Endowments, which turned a blind eye in exchange for an annual rental fee. At the time, the directorate was affiliated with the Syrian government’s Ministry of Endowments.

The district presents a dilemma, given the widespread destruction it has suffered, the lack of official documents and maps, and the fact that the Turkish army is preventing residents from returning, as the borders between private and public properties have been lost. The committee set up by Al-Bab’s city council drew up a preliminary plan for Jabal Aqeil on the basis of re-distributing properties to all owners, and determining which properties belong to the Directorate of Endowments. In most cases, Jabal Aqeil residents will be allowed to return and restore their properties. However, the city council has refused to comment on future plans, indicating that the committee’s task was limited to determining property ownership.

Part of Jabal Aqeil, visible from the rural Aleppo governorate city of Al-Bab.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 admin https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png admin2020-12-09 23:40:002021-07-14 15:33:07Determining Ownership of Properties in Jabal Aqeil: A Prelude to Return of Displaced Residents?

Could Russia Be Investing in the Dimas City Project?

02-12-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

On November 20, a delegation from Russia’s Ministry of Construction, Housing and Utilities visited a new large-scale residential development under construction in the western Damascus countryside. Accompanying the Russian delegation were representatives from the Syrian Ministry of Public Works and Housing and the General Housing Establishment (GHE).

The site visited by the Russian group belongs to the youth housing project in the new city of Dimas, which sits 20 kilometres northwest of the Damascus city centre, and just east of the Damascus-Beirut highway. The project is surrounded by residential suburbs, most of which are relatively new, such as the Assad Villages, the Diplomatic Quarter, and the Yaafour Plain Zoning Suburb.

In a previous visit to the site in June 2019, Syria’s Minister of Public Works and Housing affirmed that local construction companies could fully implement the project. Three months before that, in March 2019, the GHE denied reports that it had signed a contract with the Russian company Stroyexpert Middle East to build housing units in Dimas using rapid construction technology.

However, the Russian delegation’s visit may indicate the possibility of Russian investment to complete the project, which has been stalled for years. “They can learn from us what district zoning plans should look like, and how the houses must stand,” Russia’s deputy minister of construction, housing and utilities said during the visit, according to a translation of pro-government news reports.

The new city of Dimas is planned to cover 600 hectares of land and, according to the plans, will feature 350 residential towers, with a total of 26,000 housing units. Of those units, 12,000 are designated as alternative housing for expropriated real estate owners, according to previous official statements. It is not clear what exactly is meant by “expropriated real estate owners”, or whether those expropriated properties include areas other than Dimas. There is no information on the number of alternative housing units that have been completed, nor when work on the units began.

The project also includes 14,300 youth housing units, of which only 1,000 have been completed. Subscription for the units ended in 2004, and the complete housing was promised to be ready by 2016. The youth housing is one of four government housing programmes launched in the governorates since 2002 under the banner of social housing. The other three are: housing for workers, saving funds for housing, and government housing.

The director of the Dimas housing project, Mohammad Al-Alan, said in 2018 that the population of the new city would be 130,000, according to the zoning plants. He added that the expropriations carried out for the project were completed in accordance with Law No. 20 for 1983, and that alternative housing subscription was available for occupants of informal housing on the slated land area. The GHE granted equity shares to owners of expropriated properties who hoped to obtain alternative housing, which would allow them to subscribe to housing within the Dimas project. It also granted the right to purchase plots within the project for those who did not wish to obtain alternative housing.

All those working on the construction of Dimas so far are affiliated with the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, as the GHE manages the project. The towers are being implemented by the General Company for Building and Construction southern branch and the General Company for Roads and Bridges’ Damascus branch. The Ministry of Defence’s Military Construction Establishment has been tasked with implementing infrastructure for the project, while some private sector entities have been contracted to contribute work on the residential towers.

The GHE blamed delays in the project on high prices of building materials, fuel, and labour, as well as poor financial allocations and the need to resolve contract issues with some of the partners, as well as several contracts being withdrawn.

Zoning plans for Dimas

 

Source: Ministry of Housing

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Regime Moves to Make Khan Sheikhoun Administrative Centre of Idlib

02-12-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

Since it regained control over wide swathes of the southern Idlib countryside in late 2019, the Syrian government has deliberately transformed the city of Khan Sheikhoun into an administrative centre for Idlib governorate, while the opposition maintains control over Idlib city.

In mid-November, the secretary of the Baath Party branch in Idlib inspected a school in Khan Sheikhoun that was undergoing work to be converted into a temporary party headquarters for the city, which is now empty of most residents.

Khan Sheikhoun is the third largest city in Idlib governorate after Idlib city and Maaret Al-Numan. It is located along the border with Hama governorate, and the M5 Aleppo-Lattakia highway cuts through the centre of the city. Regime forces captured the city on August 23, 2019, displacing around 30,000 people from their homes. They fled to northern Idlib, where the opposition is still in control. Currently, around 100 families live in Khan Sheikhoun’s eastern neighbourhood, after returning to their homes from regime territory.

The Baath Party’s choice of a school building to house its Idlib branch suggests that it is unlikely that displaced students, and their families, will return to the city in the foreseeable future.

Since the end of 2019, the government has released official statements saying plans are in place to establish a government complex in Khan Sheikhoun that includes all the departments and public institutions for Idlib governorate.

However, private property seizures continue for the purpose of setting up headquarters for state institutions. The home of one former resident, Rifaat Sarmani, has served as a police headquarters since April. Likewise, a traffic police headquarters, a water department and a water unit were set up in civilian homes that had been seized. All these official departments are still inoperational, as the city has yet to receive electricity and water service.

Despite the presence of approximately 30 government buildings and old schools in Khan Sheikhoun, regime forces have converted about 50 additional homes into military bases, mostly on the outskirts of the city. As for the houses that were not taken over by the regime, they were looted, similarly to what happened in Saraqib and Maaret Al-Numan.

Pro-regime militias divided up Khan Sheikhoun. Iranian militias made their headquarters in the western neighbourhood, while the 25th Division, loyal to Russia and led by Brigadier General Suheil Hassan, took over properties along the M5 Aleppo-Lattakia highway.

Baath Party officials touring Khan Sheikhoun

Source: Facebook Page of Baath Party branch in Idlib

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Read also

  • A New Classification for Housing Cooperatives: Between Project Completion, Dissolution and Liquidation
  • Decree No. 66 of 2012: Objections and Judicial Proceedings Following the Reparation Package
  • Reconstruction Through Reduced Engineers’ Fees: Engineering Fee Exemptions Fall Short of Enabling Displaced People to Return to Their Areas
  • Rising Rents in Damascus and Its Nearby Suburbs: Demand Pressure and Limited Supply
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