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Daraa: Leasing Confiscated Real Estate

28-10-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

In an unprecedented move, the government has started renting out confiscated properties to their original owners in Daraa, in cases of executive seizure, if the original owners are still occupying them.

Rent is collected formally, on a month-by-month basis. The amount owed is determined based on the nature and location of the property, with non-irrigated agricultural land yielding the lowest cost, and is most often leased on a yearly basis and priced according to the total land area. Higher on the list is retail space, followed by residential houses.

Mohammad, a resident of rural northern Daraa governorate, said he was officially informed earlier this year that an executive seizure had been placed on his movable and immovable assets, as well as assets belonging to his first-degree relatives, by order of the Terrorism Court. The seizure extended across retail space, homes and agricultural land owned by Mohammad and his relatives, some of which had been planted with trees, and others cultivated seasonally.

A few months after he was informed of the property seizure, Mohammad was forced to pay rent so that he and his family members could continue occupying their properties, he told a correspondent for The Syria Report in Daraa. He paid the monthly sums to the Financial Directorate of the Daraa Governorate, which then issued a receipt containing a date and number. That is, the rent is an official payment. The state considers these properties as its own, and claims the right to lease them. Resulting revenues are considered state treasury funds.

In Mohammad’s case, he and his family members must now pay a monthly sum of SYP 7,000 for each residential home and SYP 16,000 for each retail space or shop. The annual rent per hectare of seasonal agricultural land ranges from SYP 10,000 to 15,000.

Failure to pay automatically leads to the confiscated property being placed for sale or leased to others via a public auction. Authorities then remove the original owners from the property. Fear of removal has forced Mohammad and his family to pay rent on their properties, especially as there is no judicial authority that would intervene to protect them.

Confiscation of Mohammad’s and his family’s properties comes after the Terrorism Court charged him with “funding terrorism”, “harbouring armed groups” and “working with Arab and foreign bodies,” general charges that the court places on most people who are put on trial. Resulting property confiscations have impacted thousands of Syrians.

Regime forces had arrested numerous residents of Daraa governorate after recapturing it in 2018, subsequently issuing decrees to seize their properties. Among them was Radwan Rizq Sarour, who was from the city of Sheikh Miskeen, and died under torture. His body was returned to his family in April 2020. Afterwards, authorities seized his properties, which were estimated to include more than 13 hectares of agricultural land and a residential home.

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Aleppo’s Terra Sancta Returns to Its Owners, After 17 Years of Stalling by the Baath Party

28-10-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

A nearly two-decade-old decision by the Supreme Administrative Court has finally been enacted to return the Terra Sancta school and monastery in Aleppo to its original owners, the Franciscan Order of the Latins community, giving the Syrian regime another opportunity to present itself as a defender of minorities.

A few weeks ago, it was announced that a decision by the court to return the Terra Sancta property to the order would finally be implemented following a meeting between representatives from the order and the Syrian president in late 2019. The announcement was followed by a rush of official statements and expressions of gratitude from bishops and priests from the monastic order.

The presence of Franciscan monks in Aleppo dates back to the Ayyubid dynasty. In accordance with a 1233 agreement between the Ayyubid prince of Aleppo, Al-Aziz Mohammad, and Pope Gregory IX, monks were sent to care for crusaders held captive in Aleppo’s citadel. Afterwards, the monks settled down in Aleppo, moving from one location to another in the city, including in the Bab Antakya and Khan Al-Qasabiyeh districts.

The Terra Sancta school dates back to 1942, when the Franciscan order bought land in Aleppo, in the Al-Farqan area. There, they built a monastery, as well as the school, which opened its doors in 1948, and later became one of the city’s most important secondary schools.

Two decades later, in 1968, the Minister of Education issued Decree No. 1625 to seize private schools across Syria, in step with the widespread nationalisation policy launched by the Baath Party after its coup in 1963. The policy impacted both Syrian and foreign companies, factories and educational institutions.

In Aleppo, authorities seized the Terra Sancta School, the Frères Maristes Champville Institute, the George Salem Industrial School and the Jeanne d’Arc School, as well as others. After the takeover, the Baath Party used the Terra Sancta school property as a party headquarters. In Syria’s real estate registry, Terra Sancta, which had been listed as Property No. 11543 in Aleppo’s fourth real estate area, was newly listed under “Treasury of the Syrian Arab Republic – Seizure”.

The Franciscan order subsequently filed a lawsuit before the State Council and won with the issuance of the Supreme Administrative Court’s Decree No. 307 for 2003, which annulled the state’s seizure of the property.

The case then entered a maze of judicial complications, circulars issued by the Council of Ministers and various surprise actions by the Baath Party. Less than 10 years after the 2003 decision, the Baath Party’s Aleppo branch raised a contract for sale of part of the property to the Agricultural Directorate. The Latin Bishop of Syria then intervened with the prime minister, who, for his part, requested that the Baath Party hand the property back over to the Franciscans.

However, in 2014, the party branch placed a sign prohibiting disposal of the property, then raised a complaint to the Agricultural Directorate in Aleppo to confirm its purchase of its share of the property. A committee of experts issued a decision, and in 2017, Aleppo’s Civil Court of First Instance confirmed that the Baath Party had purchased a share of the property. The Aleppo branch of the Baath Party then suddenly called for the Franciscans to vacate both the monastery and the church, because they had become the party’s property.

At this point, Melkite Greek Catholic Archbishop of Venezuela Isidore Battikha, originally from Aleppo, intervened, reaching out to elite Tiger Forces commander Suheil Hassan, a prominent figure in the Syrian regime, to stop the eviction. It is unclear why Battikha intervened, except for indications that personal relationships may have prompted the Franciscan monks to reach out to him, as he is known to have connections with Hassan.

Afterwards, the Franciscan order filed a new case with the Supreme Administrative Court, which then decided to prohibit the Baath Party from dealing in its share of the property. 

The endless delays prompted the Franciscans to request Bashar Al-Assad, Secretary-General of the Baath Party, to intervene and solve the issue in 2019.  In other words, Bashar Al-Assad intervened to enforce a court decision issued 17 years ago, which was itself delayed by the Baath Party that he heads.

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Explained: How Law No. 23 of 2015 Authorises Property Seizure During Zoning

21-10-2020/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by admin

Numerous studies have provided in-depth analysis on Decree No. 66 of 2012, which created two zoning areas within Damascus Governorate, as well as Law No. 10 of 2018, which allows for the creation of one or more zoning areas within the general zoning plans of administrative units. However, there has been less interest in Law No. 23 of 2015, which concerns the implementation of zoning and urbanisation, despite the legislation being no less important regarding the confiscation and expropriation of private properties under the pretext of zoning.

Officially named the Planning and Urban Development Law, Law No. 23 of 2015 was issued with the goal of clarifying the vision for the future of residential communities and their expansion through drawing new urban boundaries and main road networks and outlining how land within those boundaries would be used, according to the text of the law.

To achieve this, the law grants administrative units, such as municipalities and governorates, the right to deduct land, free of charge, from private properties located outside zoning areas. In return, the law offers the “benefit” obtained by adding the rest of the property to the zoning areas.

Law No. 23 also allows administrative units to expropriate informal housing areas located within zoning areas. Informal housing areas cannot be licensed because they are located in sites not designated for housing according to the general zoning plan.

More specifically, 40 percent of the total area of the property may be deducted, free of charge, from sites outside provincial centres, while 50 percent may be deducted from properties within those centres. Such deductions are meant to be for public benefit.

If the deducted area of the property exceeds the previous percentage, the owner can do nothing but request compensation for the extra deducted area. This is done before a Preliminary Appraisal Committee formed in accordance with Law No. 23, and whose decisions are issued definitively. The size of the compensation payment is based on Expropriations Law No. 20 of 1983.

For its part, the Administrative Court, which handles administrative grievances, limited its role to examining how proportionate the compensation was for extra deducted areas, as is stated in its Decree No. 243 of 1977, in accordance with an earlier law for zoning and urbanisation, Law No. 9 of 1974. The rule of the court is still valid for Law No. 23 of 2015. The court justified this decision by reasoning that property deductions exceeding the previously determined percentages must be “necessary” to implement a given construction project. However, the court did not clarify what “necessary” means.

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In East Ghouta City of Arbeen, Reconstruction Halted Until Further Notice

21-10-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

There is currently a halt in accepting requests to restore damaged buildings in East Ghouta’s Arbeen. This suspension does not appear to be tied merely to administrative matters, as official statements would suggest. Rather, the issue appears more complicated, given the large number of lost and damaged real estate records, and the Syrian government’s refusal to recognise real estate purchases and other transactions that occurred during the period of opposition control from 2012 to 2018.

In late September, the head of Arbeen’s City Council issued an administrative order to stop receiving requests to restore damaged buildings in the city until further notice, with the exception of buildings that had sustained severe damage and needed to undergo studies from the Engineers Union. The City Council president said at the time that the halt was temporary, in order to schedule and finish processing requests that had previously been submitted.

But the suspension may prove not to be temporary, as a large number of real estate records in Arbeen have been lost, according to official statements from 2019. This loss presents a major roadblock for the City Council in determining property ownership and restoring real estate records.

Arbeen is witnessing a number of disputes over real estate, due to purchase and sale contracts made during opposition control, according to a correspondent for The Syria Report in East Ghouta. After regaining control over the area, the Syrian government did not recognise such contracts, and required the presence of both contractual parties to confirm the documents in relevant government departments. However, such meetings are impossible for most people, as many residents were forcibly displaced to opposition-held northern Syria when the regime recaptured East Ghouta in 2018.

Arbeen is one of the most damaged cities in East Ghouta, due to its location along a frontline between rebels and regime forces. Airstrikes on the city destroyed entire neighbourhoods.

An estimated 25,000 people live in Arbeen today, in contrast with the 50,000 who lived there before 2011. Massive damage to the city has prevented many residents from returning home since the regime recaptured the area, as well as the forcible displacement north of some 6,000 people who had refused to settle their statuses with the regime, as occurred in other formerly rebel-held areas retaken by regime forces.

Last year, the Ministry of Local Administration and Environment issued Decree No. 5 of 2019, in accordance with directives laid out in Law No. 33 of 2017 calling for the redrawing of real estate documents. After the issuance of Decree No. 5, the General Directorate of Cadastral Affairsformed a committee for that purpose. After collecting the necessary documents, the committee is expected to issue a decree to approve the new records. Should the committee not finish gathering the documents, the issue will be referred to the judiciary, which will issue the necessary decrees, which will be published in the Official Gazette. Then the decrees can be contested if there is a mistake in listing ownership. The contestor must submit documents proving the validity of his complaint before they are referred again to the court.

The process appears to be moving slowly, as security forces intervene to determine which properties were owned by opponents of the regime, with the aim of placing executive seizures on them and confiscating the properties in accordance with exceptional laws issued by the Terrorism Court.

Restoration of damaged properties is a lucrative market in East Ghouta and has seen a number of developments since regime forces took control two years ago. At first, influential regime officers would bring construction materials into East Ghouta and maintain control over restoration work themselves, in light of the official ban on such materials entering the area. Some of Arbeen’s wealthiest individuals have succeeded in both constructing new buildings and restoring damaged ones through this method. The situation continued until elections were held for the municipal councils across East Ghouta at the end of 2018. Administrative work subsequently began for organising restoration, albeit under the supervision of state security and regime forces.

Recent months have seen the real estate market stagnate due to security forces’ increased efforts to determine the identities of property owners, as well as the collapse of the Syrian pound. Poor financial conditions pushed many owners to put their properties up for sale, even if they do not possess the title deeds or other records to prove their ownership. Still, some of the wealthiest and most influential residents in Arbeen are constructing or restoring buildings illegally, thanks to their relationships with regime officers and security forces.

Meanwhile, Arbeen’s City Council president issued another directive in mid-September requesting all those who had obtained restoration licences to write a statement that includes the number and date of the licence, as well as the name of the company licensed for importing building materials, and the name of the construction company to carry out the restoration job. The administrative order also stipulated that the council’s president must approve, in writing, the new written permit before allowing the licence holder to continue their restoration work. In other words, the original restoration licence itself is no longer sufficient.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 admin https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png admin2020-10-21 23:50:002021-07-07 13:05:25In East Ghouta City of Arbeen, Reconstruction Halted Until Further Notice

Aleppo City Council Imposes Fees, Rather than Compensation, on Permits to Repair Properties

21-10-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

Aleppo’s City Council earlier this month issued Decree No. 55 for granting licences to restore damaged and endangered buildings, as well as the decree’s executive instructions. It is assumed that residents of eastern Aleppo city, whose homes sustained large-scale destruction from heavy regime airstrikes throughout the war, will benefit from the decree.

The council will grant what it calls “damage licences” to property owners so that they can repair and restore properties that were either partially or fully damaged, as well as buildings that pose a danger to public safety. The decree stipulated that the targeted building must be located within areas that had undergone detailed zoning studies within Aleppo’s general zoning plans. Properties built by state institutions are considered to be licensed regardless of their location.

The “damage licence” allows for restoration of damaged buildings to their former state as put forward in the original building permit.

According to the decree, the Urban Licensing Department within the Ministry of Local Affairs and Environment’s Technical Affairs Directorate will be in charge of checking the required documents and issuing the licences after applicants pay certain fees. The fees are to be determined based on the amount of damage, the location of damage of the building, and the total area and specifications of the property. The Council has yet to announce howit will calculate the fees for each property.

Licence applicants must provide a large number of ownership documents that are often difficult to obtain, effectively barring many residents and property owners from obtaining permission to repair their buildings as their properties are not formally documented or licensed to begin with. Among the documents required for the “damage licence” are proof of ownership or certified agency, in addition to a real estate registry statement, a cadastral plan, boundary records, a site plan, financial clearance from the City Council, and either a copy of the applicant’s ID or proof of legal inheritance. Copies of the original building permits, engineering plans and many other documents must also be provided.

Decree No. 55 also attempts to address some legal issues that have cropped up amid restoration of Aleppo’s damaged buildings. Among them are issues related to damages within jointly owned properties, or to common areas of buildings such as entrances, stairwells and cellars. In such cases, the decree stipulates that one of the building’s co-owners may apply for the “damage licence.”

However, the decree did not make such repairs mandatory, making the issue of structural safety subject to administrative transactions. The issue is also related to inherited properties in which the process of inheritance has not yet been completed.

Much of east Aleppo has remained in ruins since regime forces recaptured control of the area in late 2016 and forcibly displaced residents to opposition-held areas of Idlib Governorate. The general zoning plan for Aleppo was issued in March 2018, but the detailed zoning plans were not completed until after regime forces took control of neighbouring rural areas north and west of the city in early 2020, explaining the delay in granting “damage licences.”

Decree No. 55 did not grant owners of code-violating properties in official zoning areas, or properties in the ashwa’iyat informal housing areas, the right to obtain “damage licences”. Rather, these properties and areas are to be completely demolished, according to the detailed zoning plans, which were not announced publicly although they are availablein the city council records.

The decree is also imposing fines for licensing at a time when residents are waiting on compensation for damages to their private properties, as promised by the government in 2017. Residents reportedly submitted more than 21,500 registered and documented applications to the City Council’s Committee for Compensation of Damages since then. Only 2,000 requests were processed before compensation payments halted in 2018. The values of the compensation were related to the scope of damage. Before the halt, the highest compensation paid was SYP 10 million, regardless of the property’s condition.

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Leasing Real Estate to Public Entities: A Legal Nightmare for Most Property Owners

21-10-2020/in Analysis & Features, HLP, News /by admin

Leasehold continues to be among the main sources of legal disputes in Syria, especially with properties leased to the public sector and political bodies.

The issue has returned to the fore as the expiration date approaches for an extension system for real estate rented by public institutions. Expiration is on January 1, 2021, provided no new extension is issued, as is usually the case.

The extension system involves lengthening the rental period listed in the contract, regardless of the lessor’s desires. The first mention of such extensions appears in Syria’s oldest leasing law, Decree No. 111 of 1952. Extension of the rental period usually comes at the expense of the lessor’s rights, in contradiction with the fundamental principle of law that “agreements must be kept,” as delineated in Article 148 of the Syrian Civil Code.

The public sector bodies in question include the National Progressive Front and Baath Party, as well as municipalities, government departments, public and joint sector institutions, popular organisations, unions, charities, educational institutions and schools. Thousands of real estate properties are estimated to be leased to such bodies, and are mostly located in important parts of Damascus, as well as city and town centres elsewhere in Syria. Their owners consider the properties to be “dead properties” which they cannot dispose of.  These properties were leased out at various points in time, especially in the period following the Baath Party’s ascension to power in the 1963 coup. Leases then increased in the early 1970s, as the Baath Party and allied National Front parties—as well as popular organisations and other public institutions—set up a rising number of headquarters.

Tenancy Law No. 20 of 2015, set January 2018 as the expiry date for lease extensions for public bodies and institutions. However, two years later, Law No. 42 of 2017 was issued to extend the expiry date for another three years, set to end in 2021.

Article 12 of Law No. 20 explicitly states that educational institutions and schools leased to government ministries are exempted from the expiry, unless the concerned ministry decides that the property is no longer needed.

Law No. 20 followed in the footsteps of Law No. 10 of 2006, which was issued to amend Tenancy Law No. 6 for 2001 by subjecting any new leasing of real estate to public institutions to the will of the contractors. However, this amendment does not apply to any properties leased before the implementation of Law No. 10 of 2006, which remain subject to the provisions of the extension.

Law No. 20 stipulates that if the extension ends, then the property owners may request an end to the rental relationship, as well as recovery of the property in exchange for compensation to the lessee, in an amount equivalent to 40 percent of the current property’s value.

However, the law listed 20 specific cases where the judiciary must be consulted in instances of eviction, and under complex and intertwined conditions. In these cases, even if the landlord wanted lessees to vacate the property, the court would not even hear the case until one year after the lessee was first notified of the eviction request.

Likewise, Law No. 20 allowed public bodies and institutions to tighten the screws on lessors, even in cases where lessors had obtained an official eviction decree. Article 15 of the law punishes anyone who evicts official bodies from their property, and does not occupy the property or start construction on it within three months from the date of eviction, or does not occupy the property continuously for at least two years. In addition to imprisonment and fines, the law obliges the landlord to compensate the tenants in these cases.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 admin https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png admin2020-10-21 23:20:002021-07-14 15:38:54Leasing Real Estate to Public Entities: A Legal Nightmare for Most Property Owners

Salvation Government to Collect Rent from Camp Built on Public Properties

14-10-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

The Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), which is affiliated with hardline Islamist group Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham, is reportedly trying to collect rent money from a displacement camp built on land that belongs to the Syrian state. It is unclear whether SSG intends to provide any services in exchange for the money. 

Last month, the SSG’s agricultural office in the northern Idlib town of Deir Hassan demanded that displaced people living in the Al-Deir camp in Jabal Al-Sheikh Barakat pay rent on the land where the camp had been built. 

Most people living in Al-Deir camp come from the town of Kafr Sijneh in rural southern Idlib governorate, now under the control of regime forces. The camp is built on mixed-ownership land: some of it is private property, such as real estate plot no. 701, while the rest is land publicly owned by the Syrian state. The area on which the camp was first established is considered an archaeological site. There, both private and public ownership is restricted by the Archaeological Law included in Legislative Decree No. 222 of 1963, as well as subsequent amendments. 

Article Four of Decree No. 222 affirms that all movable and immovable antiquities, as well as archaeological sites are public state property. There are two types of antiquities, according to the law: those that are immovable and fixed to the ground, and those that are movable. 

Article Four does not consider fixed antiquities to be state property if the owner of the land is able to provide proof of ownership with official documents. However, according to Article Six, ownership of the land does not give owners the right to dispose of antiquities located on that property or adjacent properties. This does not mean that the owner of the property cannot impose rent on the occupants, but rather restricts occupants’ disposal of the property. 

A second problem with the camp’s land is related to the owner of plot no. 701, a Christian from rural Idlib who bought the land in 2008. SSG authorities confiscated the property under the pretext that the owner resides in government-held areas. The SSG often confiscates real estate owned by people now living in government areas, with a particular focus on members of regime forces, who often have large properties. 

The SSG now considers itself the owner of the camp’s land. Land previously owned by the Syrian state automatically fell under the ownership of the SSG, which further confiscated privately owned lands.

In July 2020, the SSG’s Ministry of Agriculture released a circular prohibiting informal construction and establishment of camps on both privately and state-owned agricultural lands. The measure also called for adherence to zoning plans laid out by local councils. In a second circular issued in September, the Ministry of Agriculture demanded that displaced people not purchase state-owned lands from any individuals or other parties. The circular included a threat against those selling state-owned lands as private property, adding that punitive measures would be taken against them. 

The Deir Hassan agricultural office sent lease contracts to the manager of Al-Deir camp, requesting that residents sign. Some 153 families live in the camp, about 750 people. They are spread across 110 tents. The agricultural office has charged a sum of 50 Turkish liras per year for each tent. 

Camp residents have refused to pay and returned the contracts unsigned. Subpar living conditions in the camp, as well as many residents’ difficult financial situations, mean they are unable to pay rent. The SSG, meanwhile, is not providing any services to justify its intent to collect rental payments on the camps, which are located on rugged unpaved roads with no sewage networks or public sanitation. Only the IYD, a Turkey-based Syrian NGO, has provided camp residents with water via tankers, about one year ago. 

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Explained: Property Extortion

14-10-2020/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by admin

In contrast to expropriation and private confiscation, which were legislated by the Syrian constitution to confiscate private property, the Syrian Penal Code considers any other forms of seizure targeting privately owned real estate to be extortion. Property extortion, according to Syrian law, is the seizure of properties without the owner’s consent, or seizure without any legal basis for ownership or any other legitimate reason.

In cases of extortion, Syrian law does not stipulate that coercion must have taken place; a lack of legal justification for the property seizure is sufficient. Articles 723 and 724 of Syria’s Special Penal Code clarify that punishment for the crime of property extortion is imprisonment for up to six months for anyone who does not carry a document of ownership or disposition and seizes either property in whole or in part. The penalty doubles to one-year imprisonment if the crime is accompanied by a threat or coercion against the targeted property owner. Prison time increases to three years if the extortion is committed by a group of two or more armed people.

While expropriation and private confiscation are carried out by public bodies or institutions, extortion, as defined by the penal code, is only done by individuals. While Syrian judiciary procedures appear tied to expropriation and private confiscation, property extortion cases fall on the shoulders of the ordinary judiciary through possession tenure claims.

Here, it is important to clarify the difference between extortion and tenure. Tenure and extortion appear to be similar, in that both occur when property is seized without any legal basis. However, in cases of tenure, unlike extortion, there is a legitimate reason for the seizure.

The legal difference between ownership and tenure must also be clarified. Ownership implies perpetuity, and that the owner of the property has proof of ownership. Meanwhile, tenure is mostly temporary, and it suffices that there is a justification or legitimate reason for seizing the property. Property is safeguarded and protected by law, and cannot be taken from its owner except in accordance with tenets laid out in the constitution. Tenure does not necessarily mean that the holder is the owner of the property, and it is therefore possible to claim in a court that the property should be recovered, or restituted, from that holder.

In cases of possession tenure claims, the holder of the property demands protection of their right of possession in response to requests that they return the extorted property. In restitution lawsuits, in un-delimitation and census lands, the plaintiff must have had tenure of the property for a period of one full year or more, and they must file their claim for restitution of that property within one year of losing it. As for delimitation and census lands, their owner may file a lawsuit for restitution of tenured properties without being bound by previously set conditions.

Legislative Decree No. 107 of 2011, which is also called the Local Administration Law, permits governors to remove apparent extortion on a certain property under certain conditions, and only in exceptional cases. Article 45 of the law states that if an apparent misuse occurs on an extorted property, then the governor may decide to return that property to the legal status it was in before the extortion. The law stipulates that the governor, in order to exercise his power to reverse an extortion, must prove that there has been a clear misuse of the property. Measures then taken by the governor remain in effect until they are cancelled or amended by a decree from authorities, or until a final decision is issued by judicial authorities on the origins of the dispute.

The governor’s decision to cancel the extortion of a property is not irrevocable, and he may be challenged. Those with an interest in the property or those who may have been harmed by the extortion can challenge the governor before the judiciary.

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In Destroyed Damascus Suburbs, Arrests Show Dangers of Requesting to Return Home

14-10-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

UPDATED on November 26, 2021: The estimate for the number of inhabitants of Al-Hajjar Al-Aswad before 2011 has been corrected to around 500,000, from 200,000 in the original version of the article.

Security patrols arrested dozens of young men in the town of Babila south of Damascus earlier this month under the pretext of searching for opposition sleeper cells and drug dealers, according to pro-opposition news site Sowt Al-Asimeh. Out of dozens of arrests, 12 targeted Palestinian men displaced from the neighbouring city of Al-Hajjar Al-Aswad. The 12 men were likely targeted for arrest deliberately, after they reportedly underwent security checks as part of their applications to return to their homes in Al-Hajjar Al-Aswad.

The arrests illustrate the dangers of formally requesting to return home to areas such as Al-Hajjar Al-Aswad. Particularly at risk are those who security forces suspect of being opposition sympathisers, and who remained in former rebel-held areas after the regime retook control.

For those wishing to return to their houses in such districts, they are usually required to submit a formal request to municipal authorities, as well as obtain a security permit and possess valid home ownership documents.

According to Syrian state media, 38,000 families displaced from Al-Hajjar Al-Aswad have expressed a desire to return home, but it was unclear whether these people had filed any formal requests yet.

Al-Hajjar Al-Aswad sits just south of Damascus, adjacent to Yarmouk, Syria’s largest Palestinian refugee camp. The city belongs to Damascus Countryside governorate and takes up 536 hectares of land, most of which is built up with informal ashwa’iyat housing. Many of Al-Hajjar Al-Aswad’s residents came to the town from the Golan Heights and Quneitra after the 1967 war saw Israeli forces seize the area. Upon arrival in the town, they built largely informal ashwa’iyat on what was once farmland.

Syria’s most recent census in 2004 counted more than 80,000 people living in Al-Hajjar Al-Aswad, including residents whose origins lay in several governorates across the country. However, other estimates placed Al-Hajjar Al-Aswad’s population around 500,000 people in 2011 according to official media, due to the city’s proximity to Damascus proper, and low rental costs in the ashwa’iyat. 

Opposition forces took control of the town in late 2012. Residents were displaced multiple times, especially after the Islamic State seized control in 2015. The town was virtually emptied of its residents in 2018, amid battles that saw the regime recapture control from the Islamic State.

Residents have yet to return, although Al-Hajjar Al-Aswad’s city council has estimated that 80 percent of housing in the town is still habitable. The government has promised multiple times since 2018 that residents will be able to come home. However, rehabilitation efforts did not begin in Al-Hajjar Al-Aswad until June 2020, coordinated by the Damascus Countryside and Quneitra governorates. Workers began removing rubble and rehabilitating some neighbourhoods. The cooperation between the two governorates is due to the large number of displaced people from Quneitra in Al-Hajjar Al-Aswad.

Authorities in the Damascus Countryside governorate recently announced that they had finished repairing Al-Hajjar Al-Aswad’s main roads and removed 6,000 cubic metres of war-related debris. Still, residents are not yet allowed to enter the city. Only workers are permitted inside to remove remaining steel and other metals from buildings destroyed in the fighting. In August 2019, teams managed by the elite Fourth Division led by Maher Al-Assad demolished some remaining buildings with explosives to harvest building materials, according to opposition media reports at the time.

Al-Hajjar Al-Aswad’s zoning plans date back to 1987, but they have been neither implemented nor amended since then. The city has expanded to several times the size zoned for it in the 1987 plan, in the form of large ashwa’iyat neighbourhoods that attracted low-income Syrians arriving to search for work in Damascus from elsewhere in the country.

In March 2020, the Damascus Countryside Governorate said it was working to prepare the area within the 1987 zoning plan as part of an effort to begin repairing infrastructure and provide utility services before allowing residents to return. It is possible that authorities have continued to prevent residents from returning in order to issue a new zoning plan for Al-Hajjar Al-Aswad that will include the surrounding ashwa’iyat areas, similar to other areas on Damascus’s outskirts, such as Qaboun, Qadam and Yarmouk camp.

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Housing Cooperative Members at Risk of Losing Properties After General Union Dissolved

14-10-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

One year on from the dissolution of the General Union for Housing Cooperative, the Ministry of Public Works and Housing is continuing to dissolve more housing cooperatives. Members of dissolved cooperatives may be at risk of losing opportunities to obtain housing. It is not yet clear how much real estate the ministry has seized from the hands of the union and its branches in various governorates, as well as from local housing cooperatives.

Earlier this month, Minister of Public Works and Housing Suheil AbdulLatif threatened to dissolve housing cooperative associations that do not have current construction projects, or to merge them with other cooperatives. The ministry’s director of housing cooperatives meanwhile revealed that hundreds of such cooperative associations had been dissolved.

However, according to official statements released by the director earlier this month, there are still 2,500 housing cooperatives registered with the Ministry of Public Works and Housing. The director warned that  cooperative associations that had yet to purchase real estate or establish their main office, or those that had less than 100 members, would be immediately dissolved, invoking Legislative Decree No. 99 for 2011, which regulates the work of housing cooperatives.

The ministry says that it is reorganising housing cooperatives through such measures. In recent official statements, it said that it had worked to address the status of 219 housing cooperatives, while 368 such cooperative associations had already been disbanded. The ministry justified such measures by saying that the cooperatives had obtained land and had not yet begun constructing housing units, or that they had begun construction but did not finish. Cooperatives were also included if they were established decades ago and had yet to acquire land or to gather funds from their members.

Since the start of 2020, the Official Gazette has included announcements of dissolution, liquidation, and mergers of housing cooperatives in accordance with decrees from the Minister of Public Works and Housing. To liquidate a housing cooperative, the minister appoints a committee that consists of a president, an inspector, and other members. A reading of the Official Gazette makes it clear that, in every governorate, the same names are repeated as members of the liquidation committees.

The ongoing liquidations and mergers come after Legislative Decree No. 37 of 2019 dissolved the General Union for Housing Cooperative (GUHC), 58 years after the union was established. Decree No. 37 transferred the duties and functions of the union and its properties, both movable and immovable, to the Ministry of Public Works and Housing. The measure also dissolved housing cooperative unions in governorates.

In an official memorandum issued in late 2019, the GUHC described draft Decree No. 37 as unconstitutional, as the measure included the confiscation of funds owned by cooperatives, as well as transfer of these funds to the Ministry of Public Works and Housing. The union backed up its claim with Article 15 of the Syrian constitution, which prevents public confiscation of funds, and preserves both privately and collectively owned property.

Media reports published since the passage of Decree No. 37 painted a picture of authorities seizing non-governmental funds and properties and warned about increased government control over civil society organisations. Financial deposits owned by the General Union for Housing Cooperatives are estimated to be around SYP 80 billion, which were deposited with the Real Estate Bank free of interest. These deposits have reportedly come under the custody of the Ministry of Public Works and Housing.

The General Union for Housing Cooperatives was established in 1961, while its organisational structure just prior to dissolution was in accordance with the Housing Cooperative Societies Law No. 13 of 1981. After the law passed, the union’s mandate expanded, and it established regional branches in governorates across Syria that included local housing cooperatives. The union’s duties centred around proposing a general policy for housing cooperatives and participating in preparing laws and regulations for the housing cooperatives sector, as well as providing statistics and data related to this sector. The union also managed the Associations Lending Fund and the Cooperative Social Security Fund.

According to government statements, authorities decided to dissolve the union in order to prevent the duplication of having two housing administrations in each governorate: namely, the General Union and the Ministry of Public Works and Housing. The ministry has said that Decree No. 37 gives it a supervisory role over housing cooperatives, while those who make decisions are the board of beneficiaries and the public bodies in cooperatives that choose their boards of directors.

Over the past several decades, cooperatives have contributed to securing tens of thousands of housing units for their affiliates, with large facilities and a low cost. According to the Director of Housing Cooperatives in the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, there are 1,074,544 cooperative members.

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Residents Displaced Again from Flashpoint Suweida Village Near Former Rebel Stronghold

07-10-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

Residents still living in the village of Borid in the rural southern part of the Suweida governorate were driven from their homes yet again last week, as they fled the latest clashes between armed groups from Daraa and Suweida.

Borid sits some 40 kilometres south of Suweida city, and was home to only 400 residents before 2011, including Druze and Bedouin tribespeople. The village is between the town of Busra Al-Sham in rural eastern Daraa Governorate and Qarayya in southern Suweida. The two towns have witnessed an escalating civil conflict since the start of 2020.

The crisis began earlier this year, when fighters from the Russian-backed Eighth Brigade of the Fifth Corps, stationed in Busra Al-Sham, advanced into Suweida, where they set up dirt berms and military points within the lands of Qarayya. The Eighth Brigade refused to withdraw from land it had advanced on, despite clashes with armed Druze groups in March 2020. As a result, regime forces and local Druze factions had stationed themselves in Borid.

The Eighth Brigade is led by Ahmad Al-Odeh, former commander of the rebel Shabab Al-Sunnah faction, and a local figure at the forefront of the Russian-backed reconciliation drive with the regime as Damascus recaptured southern Syria in 2018. The terms of reconciliation included the creation of the Eighth Brigade to absorb former rebel fighters into the regime’s fold.

During last week’s fighting, Eighth Brigade forces shot mortar shells at Borid and Qarayya, causing civilian casualties. Regime forces and Druze fighters retreated from Borid, allowing the Eighth Brigade to advance and take control. Remaining residents fled for safety.

Continued control over the village by the Eighth Brigade may deter Druze residents from returning to Borid due to the lack of trust between the two parties. And although Odeh expressed his desire for civil peace through a video clip posted on YouTube on October 2, he made no steps to withdraw, including from the new sites into which his forces advanced.

The tensions over Borid began in early 2012, when opposition factions seized control of the rural eastern parts of the Daraa governorate, preventing Druze farmers in the village from accessing their farmland, as they feared harassment and kidnapping by some gangs affiliated with the rebels. Since then, residents of the village have gradually moved to nearby Qarayya. Bedouin residents of Borid were also hurt by an inability to cultivate their wheat and barley. They were also reliant on raising livestock for income and were pushed to flee.

Then in 2015, regime forces withdrew from Busra Al-Sham as rebel factions, led by Odeh’s Shabab Al-Sunna group, captured the town. Regime forces subsequently used nearby Borid as an observation point to monitor the area and built other military points amid civilian homes. As a result, rebel forces in Busra Al-Sham often fired mortar shells on Borid, damaging homes and pushing residents to flee for safety.

After rebel-regime reconciliation in Daraa in 2018, some residents returned home to Borid, and the local primary school was reopened. Fewer regime forces were stationed in the village. However, extensive damage, lack of services and cut-offs of water and electricity deterred many residents from returning.

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More Than Two Years After Recapture, Regime Forces Still Burn, Damage Homes in Daraa

07-10-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

Regime forces are demolishing and setting fire to properties owned by pro-opposition residents in rural Daraa, even though more than two years have passed since the reconciliation agreement that saw the area return to government control.

Most recently, in mid-August, a local militia aligned with Daraa’s Military Security Branch carried out a raid in the town of Umm Walad in the rural eastern countryside of the Daraa governorate, during which they burned homes.

Since 2011, regime forces have burned homes in the Daraa region to persuade their owners to stop participating in anti-government protests. Later, regime forces deliberately destroyed dozens of homes in areas under their control in Daraa in response to military operations launched by opposition factions.

Then, regime forces destroyed property owned by pro-opposition residents in the so-called “Triangle of Death” area of northern Daraa governorate after they regained control of the zone in February 2015. The area, located along the borders of the Daraa, Quneitra and Damascus Countryside governorates, received its name after regime forces recaptured it with assistance from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps through bloody battles with the opposition. After recapturing it, regime forces blew up some 120 homes belonging to alleged opposition sympathisers in the villages of Deir Al-Adas and Kafrnasej in the rural northern countryside of Daraa, and in Deir Maker, Al-Danaji and Al-Habariyeh in the western part of the Damascus Countryside Governorate, according to The Syria Report’s correspondent in the area.

The demolitions are often supervised by teams of regime military engineers, who receive orders from the security apparatus. Nevertheless, papers are released afterwards that blame “armed terrorist groups” for the destruction. The Syria Report obtained a copy of one such paper, and confirmed its authenticity. The documents are issued by local municipal councils under the purview of the Ministry of Local Administration and Environment and are then sent to the Daraa governorate council’s Subcommittee on Damages, where a mayor and two witnesses sign them.

Regime forces continued burning and destroying homes in rural Daraa even after they regained control of the governorate in mid-2018, pushing many residents to flee and barring others from returning home to their villages following reconciliation agreements.

The Yarmouk Basin area along the Syrian-Jordanian-Israeli borders, which was under the control of an Islamic State-affiliated militia, saw similar operations, where regime forces and the so-called “reconciliation factions” targeted homes of local extremist fighters after recapturing them.

Overall, these demolitions prevented many residents from returning to their hometowns. Many families who lost their homes are still displaced elsewhere in rural Daraa, or in neighbouring countries such as Jordan and Lebanon. A lack of funds has prevented those with damaged homes from repairing them.

A Syrian government-issued document holding “terrorist groups” responsible for destroying a house in Deir Al-Adas.

Source: The Syria Report

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Eastern Hama Villagers Flee their Homes as Pro-Regime Militias Comb for ISIS

07-10-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

The pro-regime, Iran-backed Fatemeyoun Brigade, which includes Afghan fighters among its ranks, attacked the village of Al-Fasedeh in northeastern Hama governorate on September 29, despite the village being under regime control.

The attack killed and wounded at least 14 residents. Attackers also burnt homes in the village, which relies primarily on livestock grazing, and stole and killed a large number of sheep.

The attack occurred as a convoy of Afghan militias were being transferred from their headquarters near Palmyra in the Badia desert area of the Homs governorate to rural desertous regions of the Aleppo governorate, according to a source from the pro-opposition Hama Media Office. The source added that the massacre pushed remaining villagers to flee Al-Fasedeh for safety.

Ongoing military operations in eastern Hama could prevent displaced residents from returning home out of fears for their safety. Military movement in the area suggests a possible desire by pro-regime forces to empty eastern Hama of residents, and thereby form a safety belt of land separating regime territory from areas of Syria’s eastern Badia, where the Islamic State still maintains a presence.

Last week’s attack on Al-Fasadeh is not the first such incident in northeastern Hama governorate’s Al-Saan district. Pro-regime militias also attacked the villages of Al-Khafiyeh, Berman, Mareijib and Afu Liffeh this year, destroying homes and pushing many residents to flee. Most of the displaced have found refuge in the nearby town of Al-Saan, as well as northern Hama, the Ghab Plain and areas west of Salamieh in the eastern part of the Hama governorate.

Fighters from the Russian-backed Palestinian faction Liwa Al-Quds are stationed in the town of Al-Saan, while Fifth Corps forces, also backed by Russia, have stationed themselves in a Russian military base in the village of Juweiad, northeast of Al-Saan.

Since the beginning of 2020, pro-regime militias have carried out military and security operations in the Al-Saan and Salamieh areas of the Hama governorate, extending northwards towards the Khanaser area of rural northern Aleppo. The operations are ostensibly part of an effort to drive out remaining Islamic State cells, which have reappeared in the region.

In June, Liwa Al-Quds requested military reinforcements to comb the area and were subsequently joined by large groups of Christian militias from the Hama governorate towns of Mhardeh and Suqalbiyeh. These operations pushed many remaining residents of remote eastern Hama desert villages to flee their homes.

Their flight is only the latest wave of displacement from eastern Hama. First, in 2017, residents fled battles in the area between opposition, regime and Islamic State forces. Villages in the area changed hands often amid the fighting, causing massive damage to infrastructure. Some villages were almost completely destroyed by Russian airstrikes targeting opposition fighters, before the regime finally took control of the area in late 2017. Many residents who fled the area at the time headed towards opposition-held areas of Idlib and rural Aleppo.

Then, in 2018 and 2019, pro-Iranian militias in the area spurred residents to flee yet again, this time towards areas under the control of the majority Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces in northeastern Syria

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Alternative Housing for Marota and Basilia City: Will It Actually Happen?

07-10-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

After a delay of more than eight years, it appears that the project to build alternative housing for former property owners at the Marota City and Basilia City areas in Damascus is gaining traction, with the past few days seeing numerous official statements about implementation.

Under Legislative Decree No. 66 of 2012, the government created two zoning districts in Damascus, Marota City and Basilia City to be built atop former informal housing neighbourhoods damaged during the war.

Former homeowners who lost their property were to be provided alternative homes. The housing is not granted for free, but sold at cost. Payment can be made in interest-bearing instalments.

Decree No. 66 requires the Damascus Governorate to secure alternative housing for eligible residents within four years from the date of issuance of the decree. However, Law No. 10 for 2018 amended this rule, changing that time period to four years from the date of eviction, which took place in stages starting in 2015.

While the project had been put on hold for years, last week saw the Ministry of Public Works and Housing announce that the General Housing Establishment (GHE) would take on administering the alternative housing project and that the Military Construction Establishment (MCE), a company affiliated with the Ministry of Defence that conducts civilian construction works, would start building the first two residential towers in the alternative housing project for Marota City. The MCE is also negotiating to build two more construction towers. The ministry added that the General Company for Engineering Studies (GCES) would supervise construction of the alternative housing units. Both the GHE and the HCES are affiliated with the ministry.

Last week, the GHE announced that it had made a list, certified by the Damascus Governorate, of 5,516 people eligible for housing in Marota and Basilia. The Establishment called on those eligible to sign up between December 18, 2020 and January 14, 2021.

Alternative housing recipients must verify their names, other personal data and the areas entitled to them before making a down payment to the Real Estate Bank. Afterwards, they will be given ledgers recording the dates and amounts of monthly payments.

The announcement did not specify where the housing would be located, the timeline for construction or an approximate price per unit. Instead, it set the down payment for those entitled to alternative housing at SYP 55,000 per square metre, with monthly instalments of SYP 275 per square metre. The units are expected to range from 40 to 120 square metres, meaning the down payment would be between SYP 2.2 million and SYP 6.6 million. Monthly payments would be between SYP 11,000 and SYP 33,000.

The process, however, does not constitute an initial public offering. Rather, this method of payments is one way that public sector institutions in Syria collect funds to carry out construction projects without converting each project into a company or giving official shares to those eligible for the resulting real estate units.

Under these conditions, underwriting is considered to be a form of compliance contract in which the General Housing Establishment dictates the full terms, and can cancel the contract if those terms are violated. The General Housing Establishment is not responsible for any material, time or moral obligation related to the contract, and has the power to change the terms to suit its interests.

However, in addition to legal and administrative issues, the alternative housing projects in Marota and Basilia have suffered delays due to a lack of liquidity. Damascus governorate authorities had previously announced, in July, that it did not have sufficient funding for alternative housing in Marota City, a project that was estimated at SYP 285 billion. 

There are no precise statistics on the number of residents who used to live in the largely informal neighbourhoods where Marota and Basilia are now being constructed, although that number is almost certainly higher than the 5,516 people listed as eligible for alternative housing.

In 2015, the Minister of Housing and Urban Development issued Decree No. 112, related to the principles of allocating alternative housing and determining who would be eligible. Those listed as eligible were the last occupants of a certain housing unit in place before the issuance of Decree No. 66 in 2012. 

In accordance with Decree No. 66, the issues of establishing tenants’ ownership and legitimacy were relegated to the “inventory and labelling” committee. However, the committee was marred by reports of bias against property owners, who were seen as pro-opposition. Many former properties had also been informally owned and were not recorded in legal contracts. In some cases, more than one family were residing in one home. Many families also lost their ownership documents due to the war.

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Explained: Private Property is Protected by the Constitution — with Exceptions

30-09-2020/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by admin

The Syrian constitution considers private property to be inviolable. However, there are two ways permitted to compel property owners to forfeit their property: expropriation, and what is called “private confiscation”. The latest constitution, adopted in 2012, gives certain parties the right to remove property through these two means, in accordance with specific rules and measures.

Article 15 of the constitution states that private property, whether collectively or individually owned, is protected — that is, it is forbidden to compel owners to forfeit this property except in cases of so-called “public benefit.” This is defined as expropriation. The Syrian Civil Code defines expropriation as forfeiting for the public benefit through administrative procedures and in exchange for monetary compensation. Expropriations must be completed through a decree issued following the proposal of an authorised administrative body, according to Expropriations Law No. 20 of 1983. Expropriation is considered a privilege granted to administrative bodies to achieve public benefit.

Article 15 of the constitution also prohibits public confiscation, although it allows private confiscation by judicial order for the needs brought on by war and disasters. Private confiscation is forcible removal of assets or real estate from an owner, and adding those properties to state ownership without compensation. Private confiscation via judicial order is considered a form of legal punishment for certain crimes.

The most notable recent example of private property confiscations were those carried out under Anti-Terrorism Law No. 19 of 2012. Article 12 of the law states that “in all crimes stipulated, the court shall rule, by conviction, for confiscation of movable and immovable assets, as well as their proceeds, and all materials used or intended to be used for carrying out the crime”. The law also provides for dissolution of the terrorist organisation, if it exists.

However, expropriations are limited to real estate, although private confiscations of movable assets are permitted. Administrative bodies are granted the right to expropriate, while the judiciary is in charge of private confiscations.

The procedures for cancelling such confiscations differ from those of cancelling expropriations. Under Syrian law, it is extremely difficult to cancel an expropriation, even if the concept of “public benefit” is no longer applicable to the property. Private confiscations, meanwhile, must be cancelled by the same body that issued the confiscation decree. They can also be cancelled by appealing the original court ruling.

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Homs Park Project, Stalled for Decades, Now Open for Investment

30-09-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

The Parks Directorate at the Homs City Council announced last week that it had opened sections of land allocated to build the so-called “People’s Park” for investment. The Directorate did not clarify what kinds of investment it was hoping to attract to the park project, which has been stalled since it was first announced in 1994.

The land set aside for the park sits along Nizar Qabbani street in western Homs across 46 hectares of orchards in the city’s sixth designated real estate zone. More than two decades ago, the area consisted of agricultural land and houses, and was home to 1,500 people — a large portion of whom owned their own properties.

Authorities expropriated the land through the Council of Ministers Decree No. 5047 of 1994, for the stated purpose of “public benefit,” based on Urban Expansion Law No. 60 of 1979. The decree was the result of a previous study prepared by the Homs City Council, which originally included an idea for constructing concrete blocks and creating investment projects, in addition to the public park.

The decision to base Decree No. 5047 on Law No. 60 of 1979 was a mistake, according to objections from property owners and investors at the time, as the real estate listings for that area already belonged within the Homs urban expansion zone. This prompted some owners and investors to appeal the decree before the Supreme Administrative Court, demanding that authorities cancel the expropriation.

It seems that the expropriator confused Law No. 60 of 1979 and Expropriation Law No. 20 of 1983 — though from a legal standpoint, articles from any of these laws may apply to the area slated for acquisition, regardless of whether it is inside the zoning plans or not, according to Syrian lawyer Muhammad Al-Sattouf. In 2004, the court found no reason to cancel the expropriation, and changed the legal attribution of Decree No. 5047 to Law No. 20 of 1983.

In effect, Law No. 60 had itself been amended by Law No. 26 of 2000, as some articles from Law No. 60 were transferred over to terms of reference of Law No. 20.

Three years later, towards the end of 2007, the City Council evacuated the orchards that were slated for the construction of the People’s Park, and bulldozed wide swathes of agricultural land. Large protests ensued, with demonstrators gathering in front of the Homs governorate building and the Presidency of the Council of Ministers in Damascus. Construction was meant to start the following year. It has remained ink on paper ever since.

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Return Unlikely as Regime Forces Convert Maaret Al-Numan Homes, Civil Infrastructure into Military Bases

30-09-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

Regime forces have seized a number of public and private properties in the city of Maaret Al-Numan in Idlib governorate, converting some into military bases and dashing displaced residents’ hopes of returning home in the near future.

Maaret Al-Numan is located in Idlib’s southern countryside, and is the second largest city in the governorate after Idlib city. It sits just west of the M5 highway that connects Damascus and Aleppo, which was reopened in May 2020 based on the Russian-Turkish agreement reached in March 2020.

Long held by rebel forces, Maaret Al-Numan was recaptured by the regime in January 2020 following a nearly year-long aerial bombing campaign that saw nearly all the city’s residents flee for safety. The government has prevented displaced residents from returning, even if they now live in areas controlled by Damascus.

Only four families are thought to live in Maaret Al-Numan today, and are reportedly relatives of regime soldiers. The city’s population in 2010 was about 90,000 people, dwindling to 60,000 in 2019, according to estimates by former local council members who spoke with The Syria Report.

The Syrian government’s Airforce Intelligence agency in recent months seized 15 houses belonging to Maaret Al-Numan residents who had been forced to flee to the displacement camps in northern Idlib for safety during the fighting earlier this year and last year. Airforce Intelligence then made some of these homes into bases. Others were converted into housing for personnel.

It is unclear exactly why Airforce Intelligence chose these houses in particular, although all the seized homes are relatively large and undamaged, and are located in strategic areas of the city. The Syrian army’s 11th Division also seized a privately-owned car repair shop in the center of Maaret Al-Numan, according to The Syria Report’s correspondent in Idlib.

Although it has been months since Maaret Al-Numan’s capture by regime forces, looters are still removing reusable materials from the city’s abandoned homes—as well as in the nearby city of Saraqib. Workshops contracted by regime forces are reportedly extracting metal cables from electrical and telephone installations.

In addition to private homes, regime forces have also seized six public buildings in Maaret Al-Numan. The 25th Special Mission Forces Division, better known as the “Tiger Forces”, took over the Maaret National Museum, as well as the municipal water well in the city’s northwest to build a parking area for its tanks and military vehicles.

Photos circulated on social media in September that appeared to show a group of Tiger Forces soldiers undergoing military training on the grounds of the AbdulFattah Qaziz School in Maaret Al-Numan. The elite military division is led by Brigadier General Suheil Hassan, who is close to Russian forces. In a picture dated 10 September and confirmed by The Syria Report’s  correspondent, the school appears to be empty of furniture and has no windows or doors (see picture below). 

Maaret Al-Numan’s National Hospital has also been converted into a military medical point for regime soldiers wounded while stationed at the perimeters of rebel-held Idlib governorate. The soldiers are treated in Maaret Al-Numan before transfer to hospitals in Hama and Aleppo.

The Syrian army’s 9th Tank Division also took over the city’s Civil Defense headquarters, which had previously been the office of the Maaret Al-Numan’s Agriculture Directorate. Meanwhile, the NDF militia seized the local Baath Party building. 

Source: Social media

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Q&A: Comparing Beirut’s Solidere and Damascus’s Marota City

30-09-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

It has been called “Syria’s Solidere”. What was once the informal Damascus neighbourhood of Basateen Al-Razi is today being ostensibly “reconstructed” as Marota City, a luxury real estate development financed by figures close to the government. The main company behind the project is Damascus Cham Holding, established in 2016 to finance Marota City.

The project bears some similarities to downtown Beirut, rebuilt from the ground up by Solidere, a joint stock company set up in the 1990s by Rafic Hariri. He later became the largest shareholder. The result of the project: a sanitised, high-end redesign of what was once Beirut’s central district before the destruction wrought by the 15-year civil war.

Some lessons can be drawn from comparing the two, writes Noor Hamadeh, a lawyer and non-resident fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP) in a recent article. The main question, she says, is “who stood to gain” from either project. “Who benefitted in the end?”

The Syria Report spoke with Ms Hamadeh about unequal reconstruction in Syria’s urban districts, and the lessons that can be drawn from Solidere. This conversation has been lightly edited for flow.

Why did you initially approach the case of Solidere when trying to understand unequal reconstruction in Syria? What wisdom did you hope to gain from this comparison?

I had read a lot comparing the two [projects] and identifying similarities, and I had seen a number of reports calling Marota City “Syria’s Solidere”.

That’s how I decided to look into Solidere to understand reconstruction in Syria. In terms of what we can gain from looking at a project like Solidere, I think the main thing is who stood to gain from this project. Who benefitted in the end?

In both situations, they are projects that are put forward as methods of reconstruction for the public good. But when you look at who really benefited, on a physical level, or an infrastructural level, it ended up being a form of gentrification. Populations were shifted because the developments that came out of the Solidere project were so high-end that only certain wealthy populations could benefit. And the shares system that was used to compensate people for their properties was not sufficient.

What started out as a project to reconstruct Beirut for the populations that were living in those [destroyed] areas ended up being a method for wealthy elites to benefit from the situation.

When you look at Marota City in Syria, sort of the same thing is happening. Populations are being shifted to make room for wealthier elites to benefit from property that can be used strategically, as Marota City is near the center of Damascus.

For me that’s the main takeaway from looking at Solidere when comparing it with Marota City.

Can you talk a bit more about what this “shares” system was with Solidere? How do we see echoes of this in Marota City?

When it comes to Solidere, the idea was to streamline the reconstruction process to mitigate any HLP disputes that would come out of it. Because of the conflict and the number of informal properties that were present, a lot of HLP disputes would have arisen. So to avoid that, [planners] gave property owners two options. The first was to sell their property to Solidere for a price that was much lower than market value. The second option was to have their property expropriated but then be compensated with shares in the future Solidere development.

A very similar thing is happening in Marota City. I don’t know quite as much about Solidere as I do Marota City, but essentially what’s happening is that with Marota City they’ve categorised different types of property ownership. Properties are expropriated, and then based on the type of ownership, shares are issued within Marota City project.

However, the problem with that is that the shares are pretty low value, and not enough to compensate people for their properties. This makes it difficult for them to obtain new property, whether in Marota City in the future or elsewhere.

So this “shares” system is a way for the Syrian government to say that they are providing an alternative for people whose properties are impacted by the development, in order to legitimise disenfranchising these people.

Yes, that is exactly right. It’s a way for the government to say that they’re compensating people without actually compensating them.

There are other ways that they’re doing this — but like I said, it really depends on what kind of property ownership they have [regarding] different types of compensation. So some people get shares, for other people it’s alternative housing. For others, it’s monetary compensation for the property.

But it’s extremely difficult to get those [forms of compensation], whether alternative housing or compensation for the property. Most people haven’t. I think only a very small number of Basateen Al-Razi residents have access. The main reason for this is that the Syrian government just doesn’t have the funds.

Places like Basateen Al-Razi in Syria were mostly low-income and informally built urban neighbourhoods, whereas Solidere was constructed over what was formerly Beirut’s central district. How might the informal nature of Basateen Al-Razi make it easier for the Syrian government to dispossess people there, compared to in downtown Beirut? How does that dynamic play out?

Sites like Marota City are deliberately planned over “ashwa’i” informal settlements and neighbourhoods that are perceived to be primarily [pro-]opposition. I think that’s what differentiates Solidere from Marota City. There’s sort of a reprisal or punishment aspect to projects like Marota City, as opposed to Solidere.

In Marota City, there are two things happening. One: it’s a way to punish those opposition communities. Those communities were involved in protests [and are] perceived to be opposed to the Syrian government, so they are targeted for these methods of reconstruction.

But then there is also the informal nature of a lot of the properties or tenancies in Basateen Al-Razi and these informal settlements — the fact that they’re informal means that people there have fewer rights in general.

Someone who has full property ownership is [the most fortunate] in this situation. For everyone else, they have lower and lower levels of property rights, and are less able to prevent the government from taking their properties. And so then the government has a sort of justification within the legal system, which is that “this property is informal, but we’re still doing this good thing, which is compensating them even though they don’t necessarily have these rights under the law.”

It is easy for the government to violate their rights, because people don’t have the rights that someone with a formal property document would.

One other apparent difference between Solidere and Marota City is that in the latter, the government seems much more blatant in its aim to displace a very particular sector of the population. Is this a fair assessment?

That’s definitely an understanding I had as well. In Syria the government is very intentionally hoping to displace a particular population, which is impoverished and mostly appearing to be pro-opposition, or at least against the current Syrian regime.

There is also the idea of “destructing with the intent to reconstruct”. The Syrian government claims to be reconstructing these areas, firstly because of their informal nature, and secondly because of the destruction caused throughout the conflict since 2011. There have been numerous reports of certain locations being targeted by aerial bombardment with the intent to destroy those areas so they can use them as a justification to reconstruct them into projects like Marota City.

What about the structures of the Solidere and Cham Holding companies has also proven harmful? Can you compare the two?

In the case of Lebanon, the government agency that was tasked with orchestrating reconstruction was the Council of Development and Reconstruction (CDR). They were contracting the main companies, and were primarily staffed by people who were close to then-Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. Hariri had bought, I believe, $125 million in shares in Solidere. He was the majority shareholder of Solidere. And so very quickly it became clear that he was the main beneficiary of the project.

In the Syrian case, when it comes to Damascus Cham Holding, the Syrian government allowed governorates throughout Syria to create holding companies. In Damascus, the holding company that the governor created was the Damascus Cham Holding company. It allows reconstruction to be a cross between public and private [responsibility].

Damascus Cham Holding is contracting a number of private entities to engage in the reconstruction of Syria. A lot of the companies that are being contracted are owned by people who are very close to the Syrian government, for example the likes of Rami Makhlouf.

The people who are behind what reconstruction will look like are those who participated in the conflict and are the perpetrators of a number of human rights abuses. Multiple people involved in Marota City were sanctioned…for their involvement in the project, and also for their close ties to the Syrian government, for their financing of the government’s human rights violations and international crimes.

Finally, are there any positives we can find here? What organisations or initiatives are working to improve the situation of property rights for those in Syria impacted by projects like Marota City?

Two initiatives that are really valuable are The Aleppo Project and Syrbanism. The Aleppo Project works with different stakeholders — Syrian refugees as well as academics and policy experts to identify different ways to rebuild Syria post-conflict. That includes identifying issues with the way the Syrian government is going about reconstruction, and what it should look like instead, and how reconstruction can happen in a way that promotes the return of refugees and a post-conflict life for Syrians generally.

Syrbanism is also a great initiative that aims to identify and work toward a socially just reconstruction in Syria. They are highlighting and raising awareness about projects like Marota City and why they are problematic. Syrbanism is particularly important because they are trying to target the average Syrian in some of their videos.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 admin https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png admin2020-09-30 23:55:002022-07-18 14:39:59Q&A: Comparing Beirut’s Solidere and Damascus’s Marota City

Years On, Displaced Madaya Residents See Their Property Ownership Slip Away

23-09-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

Three years afterregime forces recaptured the formerly rebel-held town of Madaya in the western Damascus Countryside, the seizure of absentee properties continues. Those seizing these properties are mostly local townspeople affiliated with regime forces.

A former mountain resort town, Madaya sits along the Syrian-Lebanese border. Regime forces, backed by the Lebanese group Hezbollah, held the town under a suffocating siege from 2015 to 2017. Madaya returned to regime control under the so-called “Four Towns Agreement,” which saw more than 1,000 rebel fighters removed from the town. The agreement also included neighbouring Zabadani, as well as the majority-Shia sister towns of Al-Fuaa and Kafraya in rural Idlib, which had been surrounded by rebel forces. The fates of the four towns were tied together by the agreement, which stipulated evacuations and other measures in each pair of towns in exchange for similar actions in the other pair. Final evacuations were completed in stages, negotiated by opposition forces and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, and included Turkish and Qatari sponsorship.

Today, Madaya is home to 6,000 people. Control of the town is split between Hezbollah, Military Security, and the elite Fourth Armoured Division, commanded by Maher al-Assad.

Mohammad, a 45-year-old man from Madaya, told The Syria Report that a Fourth Division volunteer from the town had seized his house and refused to give it up. Mohammad has been living in Turkey for several years. He requested a pseudonym for safety reasons.

According to Mohammad, the man first contacted him via WhatsApp in early 2020 to inform him that he would take up residence in the house and that he would repair damages wrought by artillery shelling in 2015. The man did not ask permission to take the house, Mohammad said.

Then, in June 2020, Mohammad’s brother, who had recently returned to Madaya, asked the Fourth Division volunteer to leave the house so that he could live in it. The volunteer refused and threatened to blow up the house if the brother attempted to involve any local mediators in settling the dispute. Mohammad said he decided to cut off communications with the volunteer, to protect his brother from retaliation.

Mohammad’s story is one of dozens of similar cases in Madaya, where well-connected residents are seizing the properties of those who have fled. Most people who left the town fled Syria for Turkey and Lebanon, or went north to Idlib Governorate, and are not necessarily affiliated with the opposition. There are no precise statistics on the number of homes in Madaya that have been seized by regime personnel, as most of the victims have preferred to remain silent about their stories to protect their property, and to prevent retribution against relatives still living in Syria.

The property seizures are not limited to homes. People connected to regime forces are also taking over farmland belonging to displaced residents and then cultivating, harvesting, and selling crops without compensating the owners. In some cases, these same people were renting out the land through verbal agreements without informing or consulting the original owners, according to The Syria Report’scorrespondent.

Rabab, a woman from Madaya, told The Syria Report that she lost ownership of a multi-storey building in Madaya in July after the leader of a local militia affiliated with Military Security scammed her. The commander, who is also from Madaya, pressured Rabab to allow him to invest in her property and transform it into a shopping mall.

He then pushed her to fingerprint papers that she could not read — Rabab is illiterate, she says, and did not realise that the contract was to sell the property in the militia leader’s name. He threatened her to prove the contract in court and to say falsely that she accepted the sale at SYP 50 million. Days later, police arrived at Rabab’s home and ordered her to leave.

A human rights source from Madaya told The Syria Report that these types of property takeovers are not legally valid, as the original owners were coerced into handing over their properties due to threats and intimidation. The source added that it would be difficult to take measures against these property seizures due to ongoing security chaos, as well as the support that “buyers” receive from their commanders.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 admin https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png admin2020-09-23 23:55:002021-07-14 15:40:22Years On, Displaced Madaya Residents See Their Property Ownership Slip Away

Conditional Return for Tadhamon’s Inhabitants

23-09-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

The Damascus Governorate has finally allowed some displaced people to return to the capital city’s southern Al-Tadhamon district, although the Governorate is still only permitting certain people who have obtained security clearance.

The district, once controlled in part by rebel forces, was heavily damaged over the course of the war. Tens of thousands of residents fled as their homes were damaged or destroyed.

Starting on 14 September, the Damascus Governorate began allowing some 50 people to return each day, according to Damascus Governor Adel Al-Olabi, who conducted a tour of the district the previous day. He called on displaced residents to provide the necessary paperwork to the “relevant authorities” in the area, so that they could obtain approval to allow their return home.

Accompanying Al-Olabi on his tour of Al-Tadhamon was Fadi Saqr, head of the youth section at the Baath Party’s Damascus branch. Saqr was previously the commander of the National Defence Forces in Damascus and is from Al-Tadhamon. His name was included in a US sanctions list released in August.

Officials who participated in the tour of Al-Tadhamon on 13 September said that residents would need no more than two weeks to obtain security clearance to return, as long as their papers were completed and they had no security “issues”. Homes would be handed back over to their owners after they signed documents acknowledging that they had received the houses, with signed dates and addresses. 

However, the Damascus Governorate has imposed an additional set of complex conditions on displaced Al-Tadhamon residents who wish to return home. Returnees must bring documents proving their ownership of their properties and remove any remaining rubble at their own expense within the first two months of receiving their homes. They must also provide a document proving that they have no debt and that their financial record is clear, and then pay outstanding electricity, water, and telephone bills. Returnees also must assume full responsibility for the structural integrity of their properties. This includes obtaining a restoration permit from the municipality of the neighbouring Al-Midan district before undertaking any reconstruction work.

Al-Tadhamon sits some six kilometres southeast of the city centre and is known as the southern entryway to Damascus. The neighbourhood largely sprouted up after 1967, when thousands of people fled encroaching Israeli forces in the Golan Heights and Quneitra. Those who fled built informal neighbourhoods, known in Arabic as ashwa’iyat, on farmland in the Al-Tadhamon area of Damascus.

The low rent and cheap real estate in this informal district later attracted many newcomers to Damascus from the countryside. Their home villages, towns and ethnic origins are reflected in the unofficial names of Al-Tadhamon’s neighbourhoods: Al-Shawam, meaning Damascenes; Al-Adalbeh for people from Idlib; Al-Turkman for Turkmens; and Al-Druze for the Druze community. Nisreen Street, another neighbourhood named after its main road, is also home to many Alawites.

Some 200,000 people were estimated to live in Al-Tadhamon before 2011, amid poor services and inadequate housing conditions.

Many residents rose up against the Syrian government in 2011, with opposition forces taking control of the southern part of the district in 2012. Regime forces then besieged and bombed Al-Tadhamon, causing massive damage. The opposition-held section of the district came under Islamic State control in 2015, pushing most remaining residents to flee. The regime recaptured the area three years later.

Both rebel and regime forces dug tunnels beneath Al-Tadhamon during battles there, damaging the land and threatening the buildings above them with collapse, a former Free Syrian Army commander in the district told The Syria Report.

Bishr Al-Sabban, a former Damascus governor, formed a committee in 2018 to apply Law No. 3 of 2018, which dealt with removal of rubble. The measure would include the southern part of the district, where authorities would remove and recycle debris, and determine which buildings were still habitable. The head of the committee, Faysal Srour, who was also a member of Damascus Governorate’s executive office, said in October 2018 that the committee had concluded there were only 690 habitable homes residents could return to until Al-Tadhamon in its entirety had been re-zoned according to Law No. 10 of 2018. The law stipulates that authorities can establish one or more zoning areas within general zoning plans.

Srour did not clarify in his statement whether the 690 habitable homes were spread across Al-Tadhamon or were only located within the formerly rebel-held, besieged southern neighbourhoods.

The announcement that Al-Tadhamon would be re-zoned sparked discontent among some residents. They protested along Nisreen Street, demanding that they be allowed to return to their homes and denouncing Governorate plans to draw up new zoning charts for their district. Compared to areas of Al-Tadhamon that were under rebel control, the Nisreen Street neighbourhood did not see large-scale displacement. The area remained under government control over the course of the war, serving as a major stronghold for the National Defence Forces and pro-regime Palestinian militias.

The National Defence Forces, which now control all of Al-Tadhamon, supported the protesters’ demands to return, as they considered the area a popular support base for their group. In response, the militia formed a committee that met with Damascus Governorate officials, sometimes with Fadi Saqr, the Baath party youth official and former National Defence Forces commander who toured the district with governor Al-Olabi in September.

In return, the governorate promised in late 2018 that there would be a speedy rehabilitation of the district, with houses evaluated to see which were suitable for living and allowing “honourable” residents who could prove their real estate ownership to return under the supervision of the local mukhtar.

Governorate officials then divided Al-Tadhamon into three sectors — A, B and C — in order to study the technical conditions of properties in the district. It counted 2,500 liveable houses, and then numbered and stamped them with red wax. As a preliminary count, authorities said there were 1,000 uninhabitable houses across areas A and B. Area C took up the district’s southern neighbourhoods, which officials concluded were highly damaged and uninhabitable.

Then, in May 2020, Al-Olabi issued Decree No. 3191, which determined nine areas of Al-Tadhamon that would be restored so that residents could return home. In a statement at the time, he said that the south-eastern part of the district was mostly expropriated and destroyed by terrorist activity.

Pro-government newspaper Al-Watan later reported that Al-Olabi had been alluding to the district’s south-eastern Al-Tabbab neighbourhood, which had been seized by the Military Housing Establishment. It was unclear exactly when and why the area came under the Military Housing Establishment’s seizure.

https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 admin https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png admin2020-09-23 23:54:002021-07-14 15:40:29Conditional Return for Tadhamon’s Inhabitants
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Read also

  • A New Classification for Housing Cooperatives: Between Project Completion, Dissolution and Liquidation
  • Decree No. 66 of 2012: Objections and Judicial Proceedings Following the Reparation Package
  • Reconstruction Through Reduced Engineers’ Fees: Engineering Fee Exemptions Fall Short of Enabling Displaced People to Return to Their Areas
  • Rising Rents in Damascus and Its Nearby Suburbs: Demand Pressure and Limited Supply
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