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Explained: Security Approvals and Infringements on Property Rights

23-09-2020/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by admin

Some of the circulars and decrees released by the Syrian cabinet in recent years directly contradict property rights as they are outlined in the 2012 constitution.

For example, in February 2018, the minister of justice issued Circular No. 14, which prohibited public auctions unless they had obtained security approval. This had an impact on operations related to the cancellation of common shares and to property distribution, which is often requested by heirs receiving an inheritance. Common share cancellation means ending the ownership of a property by multiple people by grouping all shares in the hands of just one person, or by dividing up the communal property between partners. Circular No. 14 exempted public entities from having to obtain security approval to sell by public auction.

Before that, the cabinet issued Decree No. 4554 in August 2015, addressed to the Ministry of Local Administration. The measure contained Circular No. 463, which stipulated that real estate sales, leasing vacant homes and shops, would also require security approval. The circular was leaked to the media at the time, despite being labelled as “confidential and urgent.” According to the leaked document, the goal of the measure was to “protect the legal and security rights of citizens, as well as those wishing to sell their properties or pass them on to others.”

In Syria, real estate sales, inheritances or transfer of ownership require clearance from the Ministry of Finance. With the issuance of Circular No. 463, obtaining this clearance requires obtaining security approval. Often this is done by submitting a request to the Political Security branch in charge of the area where the real estate is located. In cases where the prospective buyer or seller is wanted for security reasons — such as anti-regime activities, having not done mandatory military service, having previously committed a crime or having been sentenced to prison — authorities will not grant the approval.

Many Syrians have resorted in recent years to more informal real estate sales in order to avoid having to subject themselves to security clearance. They use witnesses and written contracts that are not officially certified in government real estate records. This practice puts those involved at risk of losing their properties, as there is no formal documentation.

Then in 2018, the Ministry of Interior released Decree No. 2744, which cancelled the requirement to obtain security approval in order to make lease contracts. However, the new decree did impose several security measures that would have to be followed when leasing. Involved parties are required to register the rental contract with an administrative unit such as a municipal council. Copies of the contract must then be sent to local police to check the legal status of the tenant and see if they are wanted by security forces or the judiciary. Then, police must send a copy of the contract to the local Political Security branch in charge of the area to conduct a security background check.

In practice, Decree No. 2744 did not really remove the security approval requirement for leasing, but rather tied the process to the police.

Decrees and circulars released over the past several years related to property management are not a direct product of the Syrian revolution. Rather, this system has been imposed since the 1970s through a series of similar decrees. Most importantly, measures banned the sale of land and properties along border areas located outside official zoning plans, without obtaining prior security approval. These measures are not based on legislative or constitutional principles, but instead were contained in confidential notices issued by security services. In the notices, security services defined the areas in question as lands within a depth of 15 kilometresalong the borders.

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Security Checks and Construction Permits: HTS-Affiliated Governing Body Seeks to Regularise Real Estate in Idlib

23-09-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

The Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), associated with the Islamist extremist group Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), is beginning to regularise the real estate sector in areas under its control in north-western Syria. The group is counting properties, organising construction, and banning slum housing. This new policy is also a potential source of revenue.

The SSG has started expanding and developing the work of the General Directorate of Real Estate, which is a part of the group’s so-called Ministry of Local Administration and Services. The group is also setting up technical offices, such as the Contract Documentation Office and the Licensing and Complaints Office, to handle real estate legal matters. The SSG then staffed these offices with employees, engineers and technical observers who were mostly hired in June, according to The Syria Report’s correspondent.

In September, the General Directorate of Local Councils, which is part of the ministry, requested that the Idlib Engineers Syndicate cooperate with its technical offices in regulating real estate. The SSG’s president and the minister of local administration both visited  Administrative Area centres across Idlib to meet with local council officials and discuss the need for real estate regulation, as well as the preparedness of the authority’s licensing offices. Area administrations are new administrative divisions confined to large cities in Idlib. Each administration includes notables, military commanders, and civil activists, and sometimes performs legislative functions.

The SSG has not yet announced details of the new steps required for regulating real estate. However, a notice posted by the Sarmada Area Administration, on 12 September stated: “It is strictly forbidden to construct any residential or commercial building or execute any infrastructure project…without a review from the Directorate of Local Administration and Services to obtain a work permit, written approval or license…at risk of prosecution.”

The SSG licensing regulations appear to be focused on residential areas in northern Idlib, which have seen unprecedented construction in recent years — especially the towns of Sarmada, Harem and Dana, as well as in central Idlib city. Meanwhile, the Idlib governorate’s southern countryside is still largely empty of residents, as the towns there are close to the frontlines between rebel and regime forces, along the strategic M4 highway linking Aleppo and Lattakia.

Construction licences issued by the SSG will be priced in Turkish liras, local sources told The Syria Report, with prices determined according to the total area of the property to be built. Each square metre will cost TRY 3, in addition to other sums that the owner of the property must pay in order to obtain documents required by the licensing offices, such as security approval and the title deed.

The licensing process is a potential source of income for the SSG, especially amid increased construction in Idlib city since the latest Russian-Turkish ceasefire in March 2020 brought some degree of respite from the bombardment of last year and the first months of this year. New regulations are also working to control demographic distribution in the area after a large number of people were forcibly displaced to the rebel-held northwest from other areas of Syria, by encouraging people to move from camps and temporary housing to more permanent properties, especially along the Turkish border.

Along those lines, the General Directorate of Real Estate now requires property owners to obtain security approval from the body’s surveying department. The approval must include confirmation that the owner had no affiliation with parties that are hostile to the SSG and HTS, such as the Islamic State and the Syrian government. Without security approval, the property owner cannot obtain a building permit.

The security check process appears to be central to the SSG’s plans for regulating real estate in Idlib. In recent weeks, the body granted itself provisional claims over properties originally owned by regime employees, soldiers or security and administrative officials. The SSG’s Ministry of Justice announced in June that it rejected all agencies or parties that appeared to be working with the regime, including those who periodically visit regime-controlled areas to receive their salaries. The SSG has not yet taken any measures to acquire claimed properties. 

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Explained: Do Owners Get Their Properties Back After Cancelled Expropriations?

16-09-2020/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by admin

In Syria, the process of expropriating private real estate for the public sector is surrounded by a strict legal framework, making cancellation and return of the properties difficult — even if the so-called “public benefit” that authorised the expropriation in the first place is no longer applicable.

Expropriation Law No. 20 of 1983 states, in Article 7, that “expropriation occurs by decree…which includes statement of the presence of public benefit,” adding that “the expropriation decree shall be final, and no method of appeal or review will be accepted.”

However, the Administrative Judiciary Court has in some cases authorised cancellation of expropriations, Syrian lawyer Muhammad Al-Sattouf told The Syria Report. The Administrative Judiciary Court is authorised to settle disputes between individuals and official administrations, as well as between public institutions.

The Administrative Judiciary Court has issued decisions in previous cases (such as Decision 32/2 in Case No. 950 of 1998, and Decision 992/2 in Case No. 2413 of 1997) to cancel expropriation in the following situations:

  • First, if the construction project planned for the expropriated property is abandoned, the expropriation loses its legitimacy.
  • Second, if the construction project is not carried out within 30 years, then the idea of “public benefit” is absent, and it is possible to request cancellation of the expropriation before the Administrative Judiciary Court.
  • Third, if it is proven that the project for which the property was expropriated does not need a specific piece of land, then the owner of that property can appeal to cancel the expropriation.
  • And finally, appeals for cancellation can be made if the expropriating party has made an error in transcribing the property’s number — for example, writing Property No. 30 instead of Property No. 40.

However, finding that public benefit is not present does not mean that the properties are then simply returned. Article 35 of Law No. 20 of 1983 explains that “if real estate is acquired for public benefit…and then that public benefit is no longer applicable to the acquired properties, that real estate is subsequently considered property of the state, and is recorded in the real estate registry, under the name of the expropriated public entity.” Still, previous rulings of the Administrative Judiciary Court indicate that property owners have the right to demand restitution of their real estate if public interest is no longer applicable, and if they have not received alternative housing or compensation for the expropriation. But if compensation has been paid, or if it has been deposited in one of the state-owned banks, then the expropriation is considered final. No method of appeals, even if public interest no longer applies to the property, is accepted, according to Article 32 of Law No. 20.

Paragraph Two of Article 32 gives priority to the original owner in re-purchasing the property, but only if the expropriated property was agricultural land and the public benefit no longer applies. Priority purchase also requires the original owner to accept the price determined by the expropriating party.

In all cases, the cancellation of an expropriation is not linked to non-payment of compensation to the original owner of the property — even if decades pass without payment. Article 25 of Law No. 20 stipulates that if the expropriating party delays compensation for more than five years, then they must pay a legal annual interest rate to the property owner of six percent for the duration of the delay. This interest rate increases to eight percent after five years have passed since the property’s seizure.

Sometimes, an expropriation decree may be approved, after which years pass before the expropriating party actually seizes the property. As a consequence, it is not possible to appeal for cancellation of the seizure simply on the basis of the fact that the expropriating party has not paid or provided compensation.

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Displace and Dispossess: How Property Laws Ensure Those Displaced by War Can’t Return

16-09-2020/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by admin

The past several years have seen Syrian regime forces recapture pocket after pocket of former opposition-held territory, usually by besieging and bombing those areas in an all-out blitzkrieg — an intense military campaign intended to bring about a swift victory — to force rebels to surrender.  Afterwards, most residents are displaced, leaving behind vast city blocks of homes and businesses damaged by the fighting. Some areas are little more than rubble. ِAnd now, how is the Syrian government ensuring that those bussed out from former rebel-held districts don’t return?

The answer lies largely in a series of government decrees released since 2011. These measures are designed to legally — ostensibly legally, at least — drive out Syrians perceived to be pro-opposition, ensuring the government’s survival, scholars Emily Stubblefield and Sandra Joireman argue in an article published late last year in Land, the open access journal.

“It is not a forcible displacement of one ethnic group or a singular episode of expropriation, “the authors argue. “Instead, the Syrian regime has carefully and bureaucratically enacted a series of legislative decrees over the course of the conflict, each of which undermines the property rights of certain Syrian citizens.” Adding further harm, average Syrians lack secure access to their property documents, as they may have lost such papers while fleeing violence, or civil registry offices containing important files have been damaged or destroyed. Digitised copies do not exist. As a result, people are vulnerable to measures directly aimed at dispossessing them.

Among the most widely-cited such laws in recent years are the Anti-Terrorism Act (Law No. 19) of 2012, which set a broad definition of terrorism and established punitive measures such as freezing assets and seizing property. “Critics of the Anti-Terrorism Act have noted that the Counterterrorism Court (CTC), created under Article 2, is a poorly masked attempt at imprisoning members of the opposition and confiscating their property,” Stubblefield and Joireman write.

Also in 2012 came Decree No. 66, a measure ostensibly intended to “redevelop areas of unauthorised housing and informal settlements [slums]” — areas that in general have been opposition-held strongholds during the war. The decree effectively allowed for large-scale legal eviction of residents after the dust had settled in battles to recapture rebel-controlled districts.

The government passed Law No. 10 in 2018, which expanded on Decree No. 66 and allows re-zoning of properties damaged in the war for reconstruction purposes. According to the authors, among the most “troubling” aspects of the law is the stipulation that owners or their relatives must appear in person to provide proof of ownership. They write: “Reports indicate that roughly 17% of refugees have brought property documents with them after displacement, and the number who have civil documents, which are also required, is much lower. With Syria’s reliance on informal and customary transfer of property, it is also plausible that documents confirming property ownership simply may not exist.” Requiring security clearance in order to register property could also deter those who fled Syria due to fears of political persecution, whether for perceived or actual opposition ties.

Former opposition-held districts, such as Qaboun in Damascus, have already been slated for redevelopment under the law.

Ordinary Syrians have few avenues to resist dispossession. Ownership and civil status documents are difficult to obtain or keep safe for those who have fled abroad. Women are particularly at risk, including married women who may be widowed or separated from their husbands due to conscription, imprisonment and other reasons, and whose homes and other properties are registered in the husband’s names.

Comparisons can be made between Syria and Iraq, where various decrees put in place before 2003 deliberately legalised the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Kurds — seen as opposed to the Baathist state — from their homes.

However, the authors argue, Syria’s usage of legislation and bureaucracy is less blatant than Baathist-era Iraq, in its targeting of certain social groups for dispossession. “Syria’s Law 10 uses the premise of urban planning,” for example.

The result, write Stubblefield and Joireman, is long-term demographic change in the government’s favor: “Property losses will negatively affect the economic well-being of those who return after the conflict and may prevent some people from returning at all.”

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Who Started Syria’s Forest Fires?

16-09-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

The past two weeks have seen fires devour large areas of forest and farmland in coastal Syria, forcing some residents to evacuate their homes and raising fears that influential figures may be considering seizing some of the affected land.

Fires often break out in Syria during the heatwaves that come with the dry season in August and September. But this year’s fires were faster and more widespread, devouring hundreds of hectares of land in five neighbouring governorates. This area includes the Arz and Shuh nature reserves between Lattakia and Hama — “arz” means cedar and “shuh” means fir — as well as parts of Hama’s Ghab Plain and Masyaf, and forests in Tartous. The fires reached as far as Wadi Al-Nasara in Homs governorate, as well as opposition-held areas in Idlib.

Lattakia’s Agriculture Directorate estimated that around 220 hectares of land in the governorate had been burned in the fires, including 100 hectares of farmland. The fires also damaged 150 hectares of land within the extension of the Arz and Shuh reserves in neighbouring Hama governorate.

According to local media, firefighting helicopters did not intervene until the fires approached a regime military base where Russian officers were also based, near the village of Al-Haylouneh in rural Hama. Several days after the fires started to spread, the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform published photos of Syrian army helicopters and Iranian aircraft helping to fight the blaze.

By September 10, most of the fires were under control as the heatwave subsided. Two days later, on September 12, Prime Minister Hussein Arnous led a government delegation that visited the areas impacted by the fires in Hama, and voiced his assurances that the government would do what it could to compensate for the losses to nearby forests. The government would also appraise the amount of damage to private property in order to compensate residents, he said.

The Ministry of Interior announced on September 11 that it had arrested six people for causing the fires in Tartous and referred them to the judiciary after investigations reportedly showed that they had set fire to their own farmland. The announcement came after the Lattakia Fire Brigade said on September 6 that most of the fires had been caused by people burning weeds in order to clear their land or setting fire to nearby forests in order to expand their farms. The Ministry of Agriculture said three days later, on September 9, that the fires in Hama’s Ayn Al-Kroum district had been started deliberately, and that it had confiscated five vehicles transporting lumber. Investigations showed that the fire in the Shuh reserve started due to negligence of a local resident, the ministry added. As for the fire in Masyaf, it reportedly lit up after a resident burnt agricultural waste on his land, allowing the blaze to spread to a nearby forest.

Most forestland in Syria is owned by the state and cannot be expropriated. No administrative authority can change those lands’ legal specifications, according to Forestry Law No. 6 of 2018. Article 14 of the law explicitly prohibits land titling or leasing of state-owned forests that have been burned or damaged, no matter the cause of the fire and whether the area is registered as state-owned or not. The law also stipulates that the land be immediately reforested.

However, Article 14 does allow transfer of forestland ownership to administrative units (local governing bodies), provided that the Council of Ministers has issued a decree based on a proposal from the Ministry of Agriculture that the change of hands is for “the public interest”. Article 47 of the same law also allows exchanges between privately owned forestlands, and between state-owned forests, by decree from the Council of Ministers. Effectively, the law permits the transfer of state forests from state ownership to administrative units and private ownership.

A human rights source in Lattakia close to the governorate council told The Syria Report that local gangs along the coast were behind some of this year’s forest fires. The groups, he alleged, are working to seize forestland and sell it to Russian investors. The fires were happening in a systematic manner, as Russian helicopters did not intervene to put out the blazes, despite their ability to do so and their proximity to the forest fires, the source added. The Syria Report cannot verify these claims.

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Five Decades After Expropriation, Amrit Area Yet to Host Tourism Project

16-09-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

Tartous’s Municipal Council announced in August that it was preparing to field investments in the area known as the “Tourism Area” just south of the coastal city, nearly five decades after the government expropriated the land.

It will not be the first time that the land has been opened for investment. Since 1975, when the area was acquired by government decree, virtually none of the handful of planned seaside resorts and public beaches have come to fruition. In the meantime, the land has suffered from neglect, with cow stables built on parts of the properties once slated for construction.

The Municipal Council last month contracted the General Company for Engineering Studies (GCES), a company affiliated with the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, to draft financial, technical, and legal conditions for studying the Tourism Area. The land expropriated for the benefit of the Ministry of Tourism extends south of Tartous’s coastal strip and takes up 480 hectares. The expropriation, carried out under Decree No. 2197 of 1975, includes 336 hectares dedicated to investment in the tourism sector, and an additional 144 hectares for constructing public housing.

Since around a year ago, demand for purchasing real estate around the area has grown, especially at the southern entrance of Tartous, according to The Syria Report correspondent. Brokers handling the land purchases are said to be working for parties in the city tied to influential government figures, although The Syria Report cannot confirm these claims.

The Ministry of Tourism has divided the expropriated land into six sectors to facilitate investment. However, one major obstacle preventing investment is that the area is considered an archaeological site and is therefore under the purview of the Ministry of Culture’s Directorate-General for Antiquities and Museums (DGAM).

The first sector of the site is home to the ancient ruins of Amrit, a Phoenician port city dating back to the third millennium BC. The ruins sit across from the Al-Ahlam beach (Dreams beach) some seven kilometres south of Tartous. The area extends over 27.8 hectares and runs along 920 metres of seafront.

The DGAM has allowed tourism investment in this sector, within certain conditions. The Ministry of Tourism, the Tartous Governorate, the Municipal Council and the GCES are reportedly preparing a zoning plan for that sector with the objective of attracting investment.

A contract was signed in 2011 to develop a project called Amrit Tourist Resort. Investment was to be conducted by Cham Holding, whose board of directors is chaired by Syrian businessman Rami Makhlouf, a figure close to the regime’s inner circle until recently. The project was to be built over an area of 35 hectares but stalled despite the completion of the engineering studies. In 2017, the project was revived; zoning plans were drafted and fees paid by Cham Holding. However, construction has yet to begin.

The Amrit Tourist Resort has been planned since at least the mid-1980s. Initially the project was a joint venture between the Ministry of Tourism; Transtour, a company owned by local businessman Saeb Nahas; and Shuaa Capital of Dubai. However, the project never materialised for various reasons, including a dispute between the partners over a capital increase. Shuaa and Transtour eventually divested from the company, which is now majority owned by Cham Holding (69.4 percent), while the Ministry still holds a stake of 25 percent.

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Ras Al-Ayn Countryside: No Return for Residents to Front Lines

09-09-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

Continued bombing and fighting in northeastern Syria between the majority Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) is preventing displaced residents from returning to their villages along the territorial dividing lines. Groups of SNA are also reportedly seizing some civilian homes on the front lines to fortify their positions.

In October 2019 opposition SNA factions, backed by Ankara, seized a strip of territory along the Syrian-Turkish border between the Syrian cities of Ras Al-Ayn and Tal Abyad as part of the so-called “Peace Spring” offensive. The incursion pushed tens of thousands of people to flee their homes.

The Muatasem Brigade, a group within the SNA, reportedly converted some Kurdish-owned houses in the village of Al-Daoudiyeh outside Ras Al-Ayn into military bases. The village sits on the Al-Darbasiyeh-Abu Rasein highway and was home to around 50 families before Peace Spring. Its residents fled after the village became part of the new front line.

The Syria Report’s correspondent met with several residents of Al-Daoudiyeh who had fled to Hassakeh. They said homes in the village had been converted into military sites and headquarters for the Muatasem Brigade. Other homes had reportedly been demolished or converted into military barricades on the dividing line between SDF- and SNA-held territory.

Displaced residents told The Syria Report that they had refused an offer of mediation from notables in Ras Al-Ayn to facilitate their return. Local notables from the family of Ibrahim Pasha Al-Melli, one of the largest landowners in the area, carried out the official mediation with Muatasem Brigade leaders, trying to persuade residents to return home. But residents demanded that the fighters withdraw from their houses in return and move to the outskirts of the village. The Muatasem Brigade refused.

Residents also said they cannot return home because they are unable to irrigate their crops. Al-Daoudiyeh has about 1,500 hectares of irrigated farmland planted with grains and cotton. To irrigate the crops, farmers relied on water pumps attached to wells, like in most other villages of rural Ras Al-Ayn. When military operations settled down, the pumps had disappeared — most likely having been stolen, according to former residents. The loss left them without their most important means of watering their farmland. 

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In Northern Idlib, HTS Property Confiscations Threaten Small Druze Community

09-09-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

Hardline Islamist group Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) has seized some Druze-owned properties in towns within the Jabal Al-Summaq, or Barisha, area in the northern part of the Idlib governorate.

Members of the Druze religious minority group historically live in 18 villages in Jabal Al-Summaq, the most important of which are Kaftein, Maarat Al-Ikhwan and Qalb Louzeh. Their villages are interspersed among majority Sunni Muslim villages in the rural northern Idlib province and neighbouring Aleppo province. Some 20,000 Druze people were estimated to be living in the area in 2015, although their numbers have now diminished to 10,000, according to estimates by local councils.

The oldest known mention of Druze people in the Jabal Al-Summaq region dates back 1,000 years. Since then, residents have left in droves, settling in present-day Lebanon and Suweida. Druze residents of northern Idlib have historically had peaceful relations with their Muslim neighbours, including after the start of the Syrian revolution in 2011. They rejected offers from regime forces to take up arms and fight on their side of the war. As the war progressed, local Druze villages saw an influx of displaced people from other parts of Idlib province. Meanwhile, regime and Russian warplanes repeatedly bombed the villages of Qalb Louzeh, Koko, Tal Dweir, Tal Teita and Kaftein. Some residents fled towards government-held territory in Idlib and Aleppo, as most of them are public sector employees.

When the Islamic State emerged in 2013 and 2014, Druze villages were subjected to killings, theft and kidnappings, pushing many residents to flee to government territory for safety. Since 2015, the various Islamist groups that were precursors to HTS have controlled much of the Idlib governorate, including Jabal Al-Summaq. June 2015 saw one such group, led by commander AbdulRahman Al-Tunisi, carry out a massacre in Qalb Louzeh, killing 30 civilians and causing yet more residents to flee the area.

Local councils in the Druze villages then took up management of the properties of those who had fled, using the proceeds to improve public services. But then in mid-2017, HTS began to seize the homes and farmlands of Druze villagers who had fled, using the captured homes to house the families of the group’s fighters, as well as internally displaced people who had been forcibly driven from the Damascus Countryside and Homs. Displaced people now make up the majority of residents of Jabal Al-Summaq.

The local councils of the 18 Jabal Al-Summaq villages united in 2016 and came to represent remaining Druze residents in the area. Members of the council regularly meet with officials from the HTS-affiliated Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), as well as HTS military figures and administrators, to solve disputes, including over confiscated properties. Local sources told The Syria Report that a large number of violations against property in the area had been committed by influential HTS members without the knowledge of their superiors. Many times, the properties were returned after residents lodged complaints.

HTS officials have justified confiscations by saying that the targeted properties belong to employees in the Syrian government’s security and military institutions, and that such procedures are also in force in other areas of Idlib that have seen residents flee to government territory. The SSG’s official policy of confiscations began at the start of 2020. A large share of the confiscations has been carried out by SSG administrators and influential HTS members, directly aimed at properties of Idlib villagers seen as still loyal to the Syrian government.

Still, confiscation of Druze properties in Jabal Al-Summaq does not appear to be organised. The SSG has not formally interfered in confiscation of properties there, impeding the process of transferring and selling them off to buyers, and limiting real estate investment in the area. This is largely due to HTS’s cautious approach towards the Druze minority in Jabal Al-Summaq, partially because of the widespread criticism of the hardline Islamic group since the Qalb Louzeh massacre.

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Looting of Iron in Saraqib: No Return for Residents?

09-09-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

Specialised crews are extracting and then selling iron rebar from demolished roofs in the city of Saraqib east of Idlib city, with protection from regime forces who took control of the area after virtually all residents fled earlier this year. The rebar extraction is rendering the targeted houses unsuitable for living, and vulnerable to collapse.

A video filmed on August 11, and confirmed by The Syria Report, appears to show three workers demolishing the roof over the home of Issa Al-Maaloul, a former resident in Saraqib’s Al-Halak neighbourhood. Al-Maaloul’s home is relatively newly built, and the iron rebar extracted from the house is still new, unlike in other buildings where the iron has become worn down, according to The Syria Report’s correspondent in Idlib.

Regime forces recaptured Saraqib in March 2020 after intense battles with rebels, who were afterwards forced to withdraw further north. Saraqib is a strategic transportation hub, situated at the junction of the M4 highway connecting Lattakia and Aleppo and the M5 highway that connects Damascus and Aleppo.

The demolitions are taking place under the supervision of the 25th Special Mission Forces Division, better known as the “Tiger Forces”, a pro-Russian militia led by Brigadier General Suheil Al-Hassan. The militia often contracts private workshops to extract iron, using large metal hammers to demolish rooftops. One ton of the untreated looted iron sells for about USD 65, mostly in markets in Hama and Aleppo, and is suitable for re-use after it is treated in diesel machines.

Most areas of Syria retaken by the regime in recent years have seen wide-scale looting of furniture and electrical appliances left behind by residents forcibly displaced from their homes. In some areas, specialised workshops have also looted metal rebar, such as in Yarmouk under the supervision of Fourth Armoured Division led by Maher Al-Assad. In most cases, looting of rebar takes place in areas where residents are banned from returning. Even in cases where they do return, their homes are more often than not unsafe for living.

The Tiger Forces’ method for extracting and selling the iron rebar does not appear much different from that of the Fourth Division. The business departments of the Tiger Forces and Fourth Division, also known as their economic offices, hire private workshops, run by various pro-government militias, as subcontractors to extract iron, copper, and sand from the rubble. The economic offices then supervise weighing of the materials, as well as pricing. Often the metals are melted down in special casting furnaces.

Saraqib is not the only city in the Idlib governorate to face iron rebar looting. The phenomenon has spread widely in the towns and villages east of Maaret Al-Numan, in southern Idlib. Several aerial photos have shown houses near the town of Maar Shourin from which the rebar has been removed. According to The Syria Report’s correspondent in Idlib, workers have removed iron rebar from some 300 houses in Maaret Al-Numan’s eastern countryside.

Aerial photo of a western neighbourhood of Saraqib, where roofs have been demolished

Source: Twitter

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Wadi Barada Housing Suburb to Resettle Forcibly Displaced Population

09-09-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

Studies have begun to build alternative housing for residents whose properties were damaged or confiscated in Wadi Barada, a river valley in the Zabadani area, northwest of the capital, possibly to resettle people from the nearby towns of Ain Al-Fijeh and Bassimeh, who are still barred from returning to their homes.

Wadi Barada is home to 14 towns and villages, the most important of which are Ayn Al-Fijeh, Bassimeh and Deir Muqaran. Ayn Al-Fijeh sits some 15 kilometres northwest of Damascus, and its spring serves as the capital city’s main source of drinking water. The spring facility was heavily damaged by aerial bombardment, causing a major drinking water shortage in Damascus for two weeks in January 2017. After regime forces retook control of the area through a reconciliation agreement, they evacuated all residents from Ayn Al-Fijeh and Bassimeh, levelling entire homes and residential neighbourhoods to establish a new facility.

Last month, the Damascus Countryside Governorate signed a SYP 450 million contract with the Ministry of Public Works and Housing’s General Company for Engineering Studies and Consulting to carry out preliminary studies for detailed zoning and executive plans for constructing the “Wadi Barada Suburb.” The planned suburb is set to be built on a site two kilometres east of Ayn Al-Fijeh.

AbdulRazzaq Dhmeiriyeh, Director of Decision-Support and Regional Planning for the Damascus Countryside Governorate, confirmed in a press statement in August that the planned suburb will serve as alternative housing for Syrians whose homes in Wadi Barada were damaged. Their lands and other properties would not be repossessed or otherwise threatened, he said.

Contrary to Dhmeiriyeh’s statements, however, the suburb will provide housing for owners of properties that were expropriated under Law No. 1 of 2018 to establish a protected zone around the Fijeh spring. Residents whose homes were destroyed by battles in the area will also be provided housing. The contract indicates a period of one year to complete the plans.

The suburb is set to take up 50 hectares of land and will include 900 homes for those whose properties were damaged and who wish to obtain alternative housing. Those who do not want alternative housing can obtain monetary compensation in accordance with the current system of expropriation laws. Implementing the housing project will fall on the shoulders of the Ministry of Water Resources.

Meanwhile, Law No. 1 of 2018 stipulates the construction of two protected zones, classified as primary and secondary, around the Fijeh spring, and the two water tunnels branching out from the spring to Damascus. According to the law, the primary zone consists of land surrounding the water source, allowing access for maintenance and to prevent pollution. The secondary zone is the land surrounding the land immediately adjacent to the water source, where certain activities are forbidden to prevent pollution or depletion of the water.

The law also determined the primary zone to include land within 10 metres on each side of the water tunnel, with the secondary zone to be within 20 metres on either side.

Article 3 of Law No. 1 of 2018 allowed expropriation of land within the primary zone, with compensation granted according to the real value of ownership. Article 5 prohibits any construction work within that zone.

The legislation resulted in expropriation of a new area of 165 hectares, compared to an old area of just seven hectares, within the primary zone. Some 45 hectares of the town of Ayn Al-Fijeh have been appropriated for the new primary zone, with all buildings that were in the way removed. Article 7 of the 2018 law amended the zoning plans for Ayn Al-Fijeh and Deir Muqaran, removing residential zones located within the new primary zone.

Residents of villages located within the secondary zone, meanwhile, were allowed only to repair and restore their existing homes. Syrian authorities have also allowed small numbers of Deir Muqaran residents to return to existing homes in the secondary zone.

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Yarmouk Camp’s New Zoning Plan Postponed after Residents Push Back

02-09-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

The Damascus governorate last week issued a decision to delay issuing the final zoning plan for the Yarmouk Palestinian district in Damascus, which was largely destroyed in recent years as various factions battled for control of it. The delay came after objections to the plan from local residents themselves, as well as from Palestinian political forces in Syria and abroad.

Following last week’s decision to postpone the release of the zoning plan, Damascus Governor Adel Al-Olabi formed a committee, with himself as chair, to study potential solutions for the Yarmouk camp. The delay was the result of a decision by the prime minister’s office, along with letters from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Authority for Palestinian Refugees in Syria (GAPAR), according to local media reports.

Ibrahim Diab, Director of the Damascus governorate’s Office for Zoning and Organisation, said on a radio show last week that the governorate received “the most objections to any zoning plan in the history of Syria.” The governorate did not officially announce the cancellation of the new zoning plan, although Diab indicated that the possibility exists.

The Damascus Governorate Council announced the new zoning plan for Yarmouk in June. The plan was compiled by the General Company for Engineering Studies and Consulting, which is affiliated with the Ministry of Public Works and Housing. The company based its plan on studying the amount of damage wrought by the war on the area, and consulting the previous zoning plan from 2004, according to media reports. The older plan, which was approved in 2013, was never implemented.

According to estimates published in local media, Yarmouk residents submitted more than 10,000 objections to the new zoning plan during the objections period that ended on August 9. Afterwards, the province’s local committee held a meeting, headed by Al-Olabi, to study the objections. If approved, the zoning plan was to be transferred to the provincial council’s Executive Office, which in turn would submit it to the Ministry of Public Works and Housing for final approval and issuance of a regulatory decree in accordance with Planning and Urban Development Law No. 23 of 2015.

Those wishing to submit an objection had to visit the Damascus municipal building in person, or send one of their relatives to at most the fourth degree, which include both paternal and maternal cousins, to prove ownership of property in the camp. The objector also had to bring an ownership contract or similar document, in addition to the real estate number, a utilities bill and a copy of their personal ID. The fee for submitting an objection was set by the municipal council at SYP 700.

The new zoning plan was based on Law No. 5 of 1982, which limits compensation for expropriations based on the total area of the property, regardless of its specifications, location, or the construction that went into it. Those most at risk amid the latest plan are Palestinian refugees who have so-called “housing permits” and do not possess ownership deeds for their homes, as their houses are built on land belonging to the Syrian government, to be used by GAPAR. Homes listed under “housing permits” cover about one-third of Yarmouk’s land area, according to a human rights source who spoke to The Syria Report. While still officially referred to as a “camp,” Yarmouk has for many years been an urban district with permanent housing.

Yarmouk residents have not been allowed to return since they were displaced. Today, only around 100-150 families still live in the area. Some 3,000 families from the camp submitted a request to the governorate on February 3, 2019, which was recorded in the registry under No. 10215, demanding that they be allowed to return, and pledging to voluntarily assist in reconstruction. Authorities responded by saying that more time was needed to remove the rubble and landmines, and secure basic utilities.

However, the government’s excuses for barring residents from returning to the camp appear to be inaccurate, according to a human rights source in the camp who spoke to The Syria Report. In the two years since the government retook the camp, residents have noticed construction crews working in coordination with regime forces to demolish roofs and extract iron to sell as scrap. This has only added to the number of uninhabitable properties, and increased the areas classified as having been severely damaged by the war.

According to details of the new zoning plan published by pro-government newspaper Al-Watan, the camp takes up to 220 hectares of land, which is divided into three sections. The first, at 93 hectares, is severely damaged. The second, at 48 hectares, has suffered medium damage. And the third, which covers 79 hectares, has only light damage.

GAPAR, which had formed a special committee to study the zoning plan and offer notes, released a statement on July 19 claiming that the scale of destruction in the camp had been exaggerated, adding that no more than 20 percent of the properties it had expropriated for the camp’s use had been destroyed. However, GAPAR did not include any figures for the destruction in the camp as a whole.

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Damascus to Grant Land to Russia for Expansion of Hmeimim Airbase

02-09-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

The Syrian government agreed to grant Russia eight hectares of land, as well as the same amount of coastal waters, in the Lattakia province, officially to establish healthcare facilities affiliated with the Russian Aerospace Forces.

Russia’s official Legal Information Portal published a document signed by representatives of the two countries. The Syrian government signed the document on July 21 after it was approved by the Russian government on June 30. The document states that the “Syrian Arab Republic agreed to transfer a plot of land and marine waters in Lattakia province to Russia.”

July’s agreement came within the framework of the “First Protocol Attached to the Agreement for Regulating the Russian Aerospace Forces’ Military Presence on the Territory of the Syrian Arab Republic,” reached between the two parties on August 26, 2015. This deal formally allowed direct Russian military intervention in the Syrian war.

The second clause of the protocol stipulates that Russia is not obligated to provide any compensation in return, and that the measure will remain valid as long as the main agreement for the Russian military presence is still in place.

According to the protocol, the area of land granted to Russia is to be eight hectares, adjacent to the Hmeimim airbase and its facilities. The land was determined by a map that was not published. Authorities also did not publish a map of the waters that are to be transferred to Russia, although it is referenced as being eight hectares in total off the coast of Lattakia with a width of 65 to 180 metres.

Damascus is not obligated to pay the costs of developing infrastructure in the area designated for the handover, including setting up electricity lines or any other construction needed for building on the plot of land. Russia reserves the right to contract Russian or Syrian individuals and companies to carry out construction.

Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, a pan-Arab newspaper based in London, reported that part of the protocol was not released to the public to avoid embarrassment for Assad’s government, and to ensure the confidentiality of some details. That includes the construction of a medical centre, which was not an issue of discussion when Moscow first drew up the document in 2015.

Syrian authorities may have avoided making certain details public and added the idea of the medical centre as an attempt to quell dissent from residents of the area being granted to Russia. The plot of land is likely to be expropriated from the Alawite village of Sharasheer, which lies within the administrative district of Jableh, a coastal city in the southern part of Lattakia province. The town sits adjacent to the Hmeimim Airbase, next to Martyr Bassel al-Assad Civilian Airport.

In November 2015, Syrian authorities evacuated dozens of homes in Sharasheer suddenly and without securing alternative housing or compensation for evicted residents, according to Saudi-owned broadcaster Al Arabiya’s website. The move was based on Decree No. 343, released by Jableh’s municipal council on November 12, 2015, to seize 40 properties. Most of the properties were agricultural lands containing residential buildings. At the time, Jableh municipal authorities suggested expropriating the properties according to the market prices for construction, which they called “the maximum prices” for the lands. It is unclear if residents received compensation for their expropriated properties.

Residents of Sharasheer have so far expressed opposition to the expropriations process. In an undated document directed towards the Civil Aviation Authority, residents wrote that if the issue was related to the public safety and obstruction of warplanes at the nearby airbase and airport, then they would have no qualms over removing problematic structures from their properties. However, the document added that expropriation of the properties is a massive injustice and will lead to displacement of the town’s residents if no alternative housing is provided. “Sharasheer is home to more than 100 martyrs”, the document went on to say. As such, owners of the properties in question must be allowed to be present during any studies or field surveys to avoid injustice or damage because of expropriation.

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Hezbollah Commander Confiscates Farmland Along Syrian-Lebanese Border

02-09-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

In June 2020, a Hezbollah commander informed residents of a handful of Syrian and Lebanese towns along the border between the two countries that this year’s harvest would be their last before their lands were confiscated.

Since 2014, the Lebanese Hezbollah group has been deployed along both sides of the Syrian-Lebanese border in the western Qalamoun region where the towns with confiscated lands lie. Hezbollah is accompanied on the Syrian side by Damascus’s Fourth Division, which is led by Bashar Al-Assad’s brother Maher al-Assad.

Hassan Diqqo, a Hezbollah commander, toured the Syrian towns of Rankous and Asaal Al-Ward, as well as the Lebanese town of Tufeil, under protection from Fourth Division and Hezbollah personnel. He ordered owners of agricultural lands along the stretch of borderland to harvest their crops for the last time and told them their lands would be confiscated.

According to The Syria Report’s correspondent, the area of land to be confiscated extends over 600 hectares of land cultivated with cherry, peach and apple trees and straddles the border between Syria and Lebanon. However, the largest portion of the confiscated land is within Syria’s borders and is under the Asaal Al-Ward and Rankous municipalities. Although the Lebanese town of Tufeil belongs administratively to Lebanon’s Breital district, the town’s very mountainous terrain makes it impossible to reach by land except through Syria. Accessing the town via Lebanon requires a helicopter.

According to The Syria Report’s correspondent, Diqqo, who holds both Lebanese and Syrian citizenship, claimed that he had purchased the lands for his personal benefit, and did not mention any relation to Hezbollah. He added that the lands were mortgaged to Banque du Liban (BdL), Lebanon’s central bank, and that he paid USD 350 million to the bank to release the mortgage and purchase the properties. Diqqo also claimed that the land originally belonged to the late Agha Assem Zeydan, a notable local figure from the nearby Syrian town of Yabroud.

For its part, BdL said in a statement published by Lebanon’s state-owned National News Agency (NNA) on July 21 that it had not sold these lands. Meanwhile, sources familiar with the situation told The Syria Report that Zeydan’s lands amounted to only 60 hectares, while the remaining confiscated properties belonged to local residents. In other words, it appears that Diqqo’s claims could be aimed at concealing that the land confiscations are for Hezbollah’s benefit.

Local residents and landowners also rejected the Hezbollah commander’s statements and staged small demonstrations in Asaal Al-Ward and Rankous. Fourth Division forces quickly arrested several protesters, and their relatives outside Syria received threats, according to The Syria Report correspondent.

Before residents finished harvesting their crops in July, construction vehicles believed to belong to Hezbollah entered the area from the Lebanese side and began building an earthen berm around the confiscated lands before erecting a Lebanese flag. Diqqo was present during the construction, as well as the mukhtar of Tufeil, Abu Sami Al-Shoum. After building the berm, construction vehicles were seen levelling the farmland and removing trees, and then building fortifications such as trenches.

When residents approached municipal authorities to complain, they were sent away with threats that the Fourth Division could get involved in the issue.

Residents told The Syria Report that they were angry over the confiscation of their lands, and feared that their former properties could be used to bury toxic substances due to the apparent secrecy surrounding recent construction work in the area as authorities bar residents from approaching the worksite. Residents also said they feared the area could be turned into a new Hezbollah military base, and that current construction was aimed at building underground fortifications suitable for weapons storage.

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Explained: Public Benefit in Syria’s Expropriation Law

02-09-2020/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by admin

The Syrian constitution considers private property to be a right and that it cannot be confiscated except through an expropriation law that derives its legitimacy from the concept of “the public benefit.” But who determines public benefit? And what happens when properties are expropriated, and public benefit is not achieved?

Article 15 of Syria’s 2012 constitution states: “Private property may not be expropriated except by decree in cases of public benefit, and in return for fair compensation in accordance with the law”. However, some articles of the Syrian Expropriation Law No. 20 of 1983, which still applies, contradict the constitution.

The 1983 law grants all public sector entities the right to expropriate without exception, stating in Article 2: “Ministries, administrations, public institutions, administrative bodies and public sector entities may expropriate real estate — that which has been built upon, and that which has not — whether they are private property, or owned by endowment, or burdened with an endowment right, to implement projects for the public benefit as stipulated in this decree.”

Article 3 of the expropriations law clarified what was meant by public benefit, identifying dozens of reasons. They included building roads, bridges, hospitals, schools, universities, military barracks, places of worship, cultural centres, and sports clubs, as well as oil, gas, water, and electricity facilities. It also included facilities belonging to the ruling Baath Party, as well as affiliated organisations, as for the public benefit.

Article 8 of the Syrian constitution of 1973 states that the Baath Party is the leader of both the state and society. The 2012 constitution removes this article. However, the definition of public benefit, as it is understood regarding Baath Party properties, has not changed since Law No. 20 of 1983 — this is considered to be in violation of the 2012 constitution, which granted a three-year period to settle all prior conflicting legislation.

The 1983 law further expands the definition of public benefit in adding purposes for property acquisition that relate to the military. Article 4 of the law permits the Ministry of Defence to expropriate real estate to construct military housing complexes, as well as housing to sell to military personnel, families of martyrs, and ministry employees.

On the other hand, if an expropriated property loses its public benefit, or if that benefit is never realised in the first place, for any reason, the ownership status of the specified real estate is not terminated. The expropriations law allows public entities to transfer properties to state ownership, should they acquire real estate and fail to use them for projects that have a public benefit. Law No. 20 gives these entities the right to sell expropriated real estate, according to Article 35.

Continued expropriation without real public benefit has opened the door to widespread corruption and collusion between influential figures and public institutions to expropriate certain real estate at low prices, and then abandon them for long periods of time before reinvesting them for purposes not originally intended. In other cases, the involved parties simply sell off the properties.

At the very least, authorities must reconsider some articles of the 1983 expropriation law that have since lost their legitimacy under the new 2012 constitution. Only one public institution at a time should have the right to expropriate real estate. A judicial decision must define the public benefit in each case of expropriation and lay out clear terms for delivering that benefit, stipulating that the property must be returned to the original owners if such projects are not carried out within a specified time period.

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Q&A: Nof Nasser-Eddin, Co-founder and Co-director of the Centre for Transnational Development and Collaboration

26-08-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

Nearly a decade into Syria’s war, returning home remains dangerous for refugees: there is the risk of arrest, disappearance and ongoing conflict.

But issues of gender, and how they intersect with property rights, have long been left out of the discussion, says Dr. Nof Nasser-Eddin, Co-founder and Co-director of the Centre for Transnational Development and Collaboration.

Nasser-Eddin co-authored a wide-ranging report published last month by SAWA for Development and Aid and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, on Syrian refugee women in Lebanon, and the factors complicating a potential return home to Syria. One key finding: women’s comparatively limited access to property rights, such as title deeds for homes and farmland in Syria, are playing into their decisions to remain in Lebanon, despite oftentimes difficult living conditions there.

As women build new lives for themselves in Lebanon years after fleeing home, can a lack of property rights back home keep them from returning? Though such issues are far from the only factors at play, they are still important in many women’s decision-making, says Nasser-Eddin.

“If they don’t have anything to go back to, why would they go back?”

It seemed clear from the report that many of the women interviewed did not have a clear understanding of their own property rights and how those rights–or lack thereof–might impact a theoretical return home to Syria. Can you talk more about what exactly is missing here?

Under systems of patriarchy, some women don’t get access to property rights because of issues of inheritance. They also cannot access information about this: they don’t know whether they can go back to Syria and claim their land or not, or whether they can come back [to Lebanon]. So there is a misunderstanding, or misconception, among women.

Second, because some women don’t actually claim their inheritance for certain reasons, including culture, traditions and class. Working class women or women coming from impoverished places [sometimes] think it isn’t within their rights to claim their inheritance capital.  So they don’t have access to information [about this]. Data also showed marital status can be a determinant whether women would ask for their inheritance or not. Women who are not married or who do not have kids are much more likely to pass it on to their brothers who have families and fathers.

And when looking at patriarchal societies, [oftentimes] these issues are considered men’s issues, or part of the ‘public’ sphere, whereas women are part of the ‘private’ sphere.

More research has to be done on this. But from the data available, I thought that this is really important to pick up on because the whole issue of return is not as straightforward. [It isn’t simply a question of] whether women want to go back [to Syria] or stay. There are issues hindering women from going back, and there are some issues which push them to stay in Lebanon.

And some of these property documents are with the state system itself, which women might not have access to. In addition, most of these houses are not in their own names–they are in the names of their husbands, or their fathers or brothers. So they aren’t accessible.

Even in the best of situations, what options are available to returning women, such as widows, for example, who want to prove their family’s ownership of properties registered under male family members’ names?

I’m not really sure about this to be honest. But remember that Lebanon is a very racist state. So a lot of these women who have residency permits [in Lebanon] think that if they go to Syria, they cannot then return to Lebanon. From my conversations with other people who work on these issues, some women don’t know that they can come back [to Lebanon], even if they do go to Syria. This kind of information is really missing. Hosting states and governments do not give information to refugees and I believe that this is on purpose, they do not give information about their rights- this lack of information is a form of control and power that states exercise on refugees.

I cannot directly answer your question but proving [ownership] within the state is very difficult because of patriarchy, because of the state system and how they treat women. When we think about the situation of refugees, and of women, we cannot think about just one structure of oppression. We must think about multiple structures of oppression–class, patriarchy, state systems–which put a lot of pressure on women over the decision of whether to stay in Lebanon. The issue is not straightforward. Things are connected, and you cannot separate the systems from each other.

It seems many of the women interviewed come originally from areas of Syria that are now under government control. How much of their potential inability to return home is tied to issues of property rights vs. other factors at play in government-held areas, such as various re-zoning measures that may threaten their homes?

Intersectionality is important when we look at these issues. We cannot say that one issue is more important than the other. That is what I was trying to say in the report: there isn’t a definite answer.

I will give an example: a woman who comes from a middle-class or upper middle-class family in Syria–usually those [individual] women are much richer than women coming from working-class families. Maybe, in her mind, going back to Syria makes more sense because she already has capital. So, class is an issue that factors into this.

There is an intersection between class and gender. Women coming from upper middle-class families may have some properties in their names. So, the idea of return is much more feasible than for working-class families.

So, I don’t have a definite answer here. We cannot think about this in only one way, or in a binary sense.

And you must remember that a lot of these homes are now occupied. They are taken by the state or occupied by internally displaced people. A lot of families returned and told their relatives who stayed in Lebanon that their homes are not theirs anymore, because they have been occupied by internally displaced people. The whole demography has changed.

We cannot only think about [gender-related] traditions, families–no, it is also about the state system [itself]. We must think about how legalities within the state have also had an influence. I am sure that a lot of men also cannot go back to their properties.

There is a whole structure of oppression that influences these issues, so we must always connect the dots to each other and think about how gender dynamics and patriarchy do not operate in vacuum and are influenced by other structures.

You mentioned in the report that lack of access to family inheritances was one major factor deterring women from considering a return back to Syria. Can you explain more about why exactly that is?

One of the main reasons that many women do not want to return [to Syria] is their economic independence–if they are working and or economically active, if they have jobs. A lot of refugee women who fled Syria and now reside in Lebanon or Turkey or Jordan, they were able to become economically active. A lot of these women do not want to go back, because when they go back, they lose their employment and/or their economic activities.

So, when women are economically empowered, let us say, they like this new change. They are independent. If they lose that, and if they do not have anything to go back to, why would they go back? We must think about whether they have any material resources to go back to, to support themselves.

One of the things that I mentioned in the report is that many men wanted to go back to Syria because they do not have jobs. The women were resisting that because they were working. Material resources are among the reasons that women want to stay in Lebanon. So, if they do not have any inheritance back home, why would they want to go back?

That is how gender dynamics differ. When families flee their countries, women are the ones who are usually more able to find work and be engaged in income generating activities. Men are staying at home, and they are also often seen as more of a [social] threat to the country where they reside. Women can manoeuvre those systems more easily. So, there’s a shift in the power dynamics and gender dynamics. Women find themselves responsible for the households, they find themselves as the providers. So of course, they do not want to lose that power, in a way.

More research needs to be done. When I received the data, I picked up on this issue because I found it important. But it was not a theme that was focused on in the questions. Thinking about property rights, capital and women is important.

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Lattakia Coastal Lands in Limbo Decades after Government Expropriation

26-08-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

The Lattakia Provincial Council sent a recommendation in July to the Ministry of Local Administration and Environment to cancel expropriations along most of the coastal strip, given that none of the planned projects have been implemented since the properties were seized 45 years ago. However, it is unlikely that the ministry will heed the recommendation or reverse the expropriations.

Most of Lattakia’s coastal strip saw massive land expropriations in 1975 to the benefit of the Ministry of Tourism, in accordance with Decrees 2196 and 2198. The decrees were meant to carry out tourism-related construction projects. The expropriated land extended from just south of Lattakia city to the town of Ras Al-Baseet, 35 kilometres north in a semi-continuous strip of coast with a width of some 1.5 to 3 kilometres and a combined area of 6,000 hectares — equivalent to 95 percent of Lattakia province’s coastline.

The Ministry of Tourism offered a number of expropriated sites within the coastal strip up for investment during tourism investment forums held between 2005 and 2011. The ministry also contracted a specialised office in 2009 to carry out a planning study in the Ras Al-Baseet area to invest in the area’s tourism potential. But no projects have been implemented on those properties, despite some being considered important tourism beaches, such as Al-Bassa, Al-Snoubar, Ras Al-Baseet, Wadi Qandeel, Burj Islam and Umm Al-Tuyyour.

The Higher Tourism Council also reversed expropriations of properties in two cases, in accordance with Decrees No. 777 of 1988 and 77 of 2003, as they were believed to have been acquired through favouritism and the personal connections of some property owners.

But popular and legal objections raised over the issue in recent decades have failed to change the situation for expropriated properties, or raise compensation payments and reduce the width of the expropriated lands extending westward from the coastline.

Expropriation procedures for the areas began in 1983, in accordance with Expropriations Law No. 20 of that year, some eight years after the decrees were originally released to acquire properties in the area. Compensation prices for the properties were subsequently laid out in successive decrees released in 1985, 1991 and 2000, varying widely from SYP 70,000 to 2.2 million per hectare of expropriated land. Some property owners refused to accept the compensation, while others are still waiting to receive theirs.

Government expropriation did not prevent the construction of informal housing in those areas, where in some cases entire makeshift ashwa’iyat districts were built. Most of the informal housing centers concentrated within the first 150 meters of land stretch from the beachfront, where public maritime property law technically prevents construction.

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Northern Hama’s Pistachio Farmers Restricted from Their Lands During Latest Harvest

26-08-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

Farmers in northern Hama are being restricted from accessing their farmlands in formerly opposition-held territory which was seized by regime forces in a military campaign early this year.

Syrian opposition groups lost a combined total of 230,000 hectares of farmland in rural north-western Hama and Idlib provinces to the government between the end of August 2019 and March 2020. At the same time, around a million people fled those areas towards remaining opposition-held territory in Idlib and neighbouring rural Aleppo province.

The Farmers’ Office of Hama’s Baath Party branch decided in June to confiscate thousands of hectares of pistachio fields in rural Hama and Idlib, referring to owners of the properties as “terrorists.” The office publicly released lists of the names of those whose lands were being confiscated, most of whom were farmers who had been forcibly displaced to Idlib. The lists were posted on the Hama Baath Party’s notice board. It is not yet clear on what basis officials were describing former owners of the confiscated fields as “terrorists,” though usage of the term allows judiciary police to carry out precautionary seizures of properties in accordance with Legislative Decree No. 63 for 2012.

Building off the decision of the Farmers’ Office, Hama province’s security and military committee released its own decree to conduct a public auction for one season on July 21, to invest in the pistachio fields that were confiscated in the towns of Latamna, Latmein, Kafr Zeita and Zaka in rural northern Hama. The province’s security and military committee includes the security branch and military leaders as well as Hama’s governor, the provincial Baath Party secretary and local police leader. The Hama committee’s head, General Ramadan Youssef Ramadan, who serves as commander of the 9th Tank Division, acts as Hama’s military governor. The proceeds from the public auctions will go towards the Fund for Supporting Martyrs, which is affiliated with the local branch of the Office for the Central Commission to Support and Monitor the Situations of Martyrs’ Families in Hama, which is in turn affiliated with the Hama branch of the Baath Party.

The security committee set the harvest period for the pistachios to start one month from the date that the winning contractors were given the order to start their work. The Hama Agriculture Directorate estimated the current season’s pistachio harvest for the northern part of the province to be 32,241 tonnes.

Previously, the security committee had allowed only agricultural landowners residing in Hama city who possessed title deeds and identity documents and were not wanted by security forces to return to and work on their lands in the northern part of the province. In other words, the committee prevented all farmers who aren’t considered “terrorists” from returning to their lands until they had submitted official requests, including the property numbers and areas of the lands they wished to invest in, provided that they pay taxes imposed by the Martyrs’ Support Fund — that is, they are permitted to invest in their lands in return for paying a tax set at 800,000 SYP per hectare.

By the end of June 2020, regime forces had deployed 60 military posts along the orchards in rural northern Hama and southern Idlib, each one consisting of 10-15 personnel. In addition to carrying out military tasks, soldiers stationed at the military posts are monitoring farmers and ensuring they commit to paying the money they owe to the fund, or, in some instances, collecting bribes to look the other way.

A human rights source based in Idlib told The Syria Report that personnel at the military posts were levying some of their own fees on the farmers. It appeared that disputes between those at the outposts over shares of the revenues, as well as disputes between the investors themselves, had led to arson, impacting some 200 hectares of pistachio fields in rural northern Hama.

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Sayyida Zeinab Shrine Property Site Doubled in Size as Construction Nears End

26-08-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

Construction work to significantly expand the Sayyida Zeinab shrine south of Damascus is nearly complete. The area of the shrine — a site of major religious importance to Shia Muslims, particularly from Iran —  has been doubled to three hectares.

The town of Sayyida Zeinab, where the shrine is located, sits some 10 kilometres from the Damascus city centre, near the airport highway. Most residents before 2011 were Syrian Shia Muslims, and the town later became an area of Iranian influence due to the Sunni-Shia polarisation over the course of the war. Shia Muslims have historically been a tiny minority in Syria, centred in rural Daraa, Aleppo and Idlib provinces, as well as in Sayyida Zeinab and around the Sayyida Ruqayya shrine in Damascus.

Hezbollah maintains a direct presence in Sayyida Zeinab, in addition to affiliated groups of Syrian Shia militants who, along with Shia Muslims from abroad,now represent a sizable portion of the town’s population. Although the town is heavily populated with civilians, Hezbollah has set up arms depots, intelligence centres, operations rooms and prisons there, while the Lebanese militia alone is in charge of protecting the shrine.

The expansion project in Sayyida Zeinab is focused on the real estate area Qabr Al-Sitt. The area under construction has 48 properties adjacent to the shrine, which were expropriated to the benefit of the Ministry of Endowments in accordance with Decree No. 995 of 1979. However, the Ministry of Endowments itself is not the sole authority meant to benefit from the expropriation. Rather, there is the Shrine Administration Committee, established by a Ministry of Endowments decree in 1964, as the ministry does not directly administer the affairs of non-Sunni Islamic sects.

The Ministry of Endowments mandated the Shrine Committee in 1980 to secure expropriation compensations, in order to pay off the original owners of the seized properties. At the time, the commission claimed that the Iranian embassy in Damascus had paid the expropriation compensations. The Qasioun newspaper, which is affiliated with a branch of the Syrian Communist Party close to the regime, subsequently revealed in 2004, via former Damascus Provincial Council member Adnan Darwish, that it was a Shia Kuwaiti businessman with private commercial projects in Sayyida Zeinab who had paid the expropriation compensations.

The commission continued its encroachment into surrounding properties that had not been expropriated by the Ministry of Endowment, constructing a local commercial market on real estate plot 239 in 2003. It also built a park, a parking garage and a restaurant on neighbouring properties at the expense of the Sayyida Zeinab municipality and the Ministry of Tourism. The park, garage and restaurant were later annexed to the commission’s properties by a decree from the municipal council, according to Mr Darwish. In 2005, the commission was able to add the properties it had acquired to the municipality’s zoning plan and allocate it to establish investment projects that contradicted the decree’s original goal of expanding the shrine.

The current expansion project is being conducted by the Reconstruction Organisation of the Holy Shrines (ROHS), an Iranian group that describes itself as a non-governmental, non-profit organisation with international reach, based in Tehran. The group, which works to restore and rebuild religious shrines, was established by order of Iranian leader Ali Khamenei after the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, with the aim of rebuilding Shia shrines in Iraq. It appears that the organisation has formed a new branch, the Committee for Reconstructing Holy Sites in Syria, headed by Ali Reza Akbari, an Iranian citizen. It is not yet clear how exactly the Syrian branch differs from the one operating in Iraq, although the US Treasury Department placed the Iraqi branch on its sanctions list in March 2020, describing the group as being under the authority of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’s Quds Force.

The expansion project on the Sayyida Zeinab shrine was announced in 2017. At the time, ROHS said that the project was coordinated with UNESCO, the UN’s culture and education agency, as the area is home to historic buildings. However,The Syria Reportcannot confirm this claim.

The Sayyida Zeinab shrine has gained traction in recent years as a religious destination for Shia Muslims from Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Lebanon, and has garnered attention from the Syrian government to stimulate religious tourism. The municipality, meanwhile, has taken advantage of wartime conditions to seize new properties, some of which belonged to the neighbouring town of Hujeira, where its residents were displaced and unable to return home.

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Kurdish-Led Administration: A Law to Protect Absentee’s Property or Confiscate it?

12-08-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

A popular backlash has pushed the Kurdish-led administration of northeast Syria to repeal a law regulating the management of properties owned by “absentees” just one week after authorities issued the text. Officials said they halted the implementation of the law following “misunderstandings and different interpretations of its articles.”

Thetext, called a “law” by the administration, hadraised very strong objections from the population but also frompolitical opponents who believe that it could be used to legalise confiscating displaced people’s properties.

The law was enacted last week by the General Council of the Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria (AANES), which serves as a legislative body in areas of northeastern Syria under the control of Kurdish-led authorities. The council has 70 unelected members who are appointed by the AANES.

Law No. 7 for the Protection of Absentees’ Property, as the text is called, appears to go against the basic principles of the AANES founding charter, which says that the right of property is protected for all individuals.

According to Article 1, to dispose of absentees’ assets, the AANES Executive Council will form a committee tasked with the inventory and management of absentees’ properties. The Executive Council is the executive arm of AANES.

The law stipulates that the committee will be composed of 11 people from all sects of society in northeastern Syria and will be supervised by two trustees appointed by the Executive Council who will monitor administrative and financial matters, as well as follow legal cases and complaints about the properties impacted.

The committee has the right to invest in and rent the absentees’ property as long as the individual has no remaining close relatives inside Syria. Any proceeds from the properties will go towards “community development” until the owners return. The committee has the power to seize any profits from an absentee’s property if, within a year, the original owner does not return and reside permanently in Syria. This procedure does not affect the ownership of the property itself.

The new text defines an absentee as any Syrian who has permanent residency outside of Syria, and no longer has any first- or second-degree relatives in Syria. Relatives are categorized as follows: the first degree includes an individual’s father, mother, children and grandfather. The second includes the grandmother, brother, sister and grandchildren. The third includes both paternal and maternal aunts and uncles, as well as nieces and nephews. The fourth includes paternal and maternal cousins. According to Law No. 7, an absentee who has no first- or second-degree relatives inside Syria must appear in person to prove ownership of their property.

Radwan Seidou, a Kurdish opposition lawyer and rights activist, toldThe Syria Report that the new law’s definition of an absentee contradicts other related Syrian property laws, which expand their definitions to include relatives in the third and fourth degrees. Seidou is a member of the legal committee on the Kurdish National Council (KNC), a coalition that includes parties opposed to the AANES. He said that the AANES’s newly introduced law violates property rights that had ensured absentees could dispose of their assets and choose whomever they see fit as their attorney.

Even before Law No. 7 was issued last week, the AANES’s judicial institution did not recognise attorneys of expatriate property owners, instead forcing them to appear in person to conduct their legal affairs. Law No. 7 also ignores other definitions of representation and recognises only a partial legal representation by relatives within the first and second degrees.

Article 19 of the law singles out Armenian and Assyrian Christians, granting them the right to form special committees to manage the properties of absentees from their communities. This is a form of legal discrimination that goes against the principles mapped out in the AANES’s founding charter. The law’s stipulation of a special committee for Christians may be related to widespread complaints from Christians against a similar text issued by the AANES’s Al-Jazirah Council in 2015. Opponents to that law feared it could impact Christians more than other groups due to widespread emigration within the Christian community.

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Aleppo’s New Zoning Plan Raises Concerns of Displaced and Former Residents

12-08-2020/in HLP, News /by admin

In recent weeks, as the date for the release of Aleppo’s new zoning plan approaches, the city’s council has stepped up monitoring in the destroyed eastern neighbourhoods. Municipal police are cracking down on construction sites and property owners who are trying to restore their buildings without permits.

The increased patrols come after the collapse of residential buildings, the latest of which was in Karam Al-Katerji neighbourhood on July 9, while workers were doing repairs. The building had been located amid other residential blocks that were destroyed by regime bombing on the area, part of formerly besieged and embattled east Aleppo. Conditions in Karam Al-Katerji (not named after prominent businessmen and war profiteers Hussam and Baraa Katerji) do not differ greatly from those in other neighbourhoods of east Aleppo, which was under opposition control from 2013 to 2016.

Since regime forces recaptured east Aleppo in December 2016, the city council has prevented any restoration efforts carried out without prior approval. Many obstacles also stand in the way of rebuilding. Rubble has not been removed, and the prices of building materials are high due to illegal demarcation taxes demanded by regime forces at checkpoints placed along entryways to the area.

Still, most residents are waiting until the details of the new zoning plan are released in the coming months to repair their properties in east Aleppo’s residential and commercial districts.

The existing zoning plan for Aleppo dates back to 1954. It was drawn up in a western style by a French planner and architect, Andre Gutton, with wide streets and multi-storey buildings. Then in 1974, Japanese urban planner Gyoji Banshoya mapped out a new zoning plan, but it was not approved or implemented, as it included parts of the old city centre, spurring objections. Syrian architect Yasser Dashwali then began work on a master urban plan in 2000, though its release was delayed until 2012.

The extent of damage in large swathes of Aleppo demanded reassessment of the 2012 zoning plan to monitor conditions in residential areas, including those with irregularly built housing, where some 30 percent of residents live. Aleppo is home to 23 areas with informal housing, extending over 2,905 hectares — some nine percent of the total zoning area of the city, distributed across both east and west Aleppo, according to statements from government officials.

Much of the damage to informal housing is concentrated in east Aleppo, which faced devastating regime airstrikes and artillery fire from 2013 to 2016.

In January 2018, then-Prime Minister Imad Khamis announced that authorities had finished evaluating the 2012 zoning plan. The plan is expected to be released publicly in the coming months, and is set to include demolition of large areas of east Aleppo, as well as the city’s western and southern suburbs.

Yahya Naanaa, head of Aleppo’s provincial council during opposition control, told The Syria Report that most of the informal housing is in the city’s formerly rebel-held eastern neighbourhoods, which were destroyed by bombing. He added that he fears the new zoning plan will give the government an opportunity to dispose of properties belonging to former east Aleppo residents, most of whom were forcibly displaced to Idlib and elsewhere. The new plan threatens large areas of the city with demolition due to the high level of damage, Naanaa warned, while former residents may not be able to prove their properties within the one-year time span given by most zoning laws.

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Read also

  • A New Classification for Housing Cooperatives: Between Project Completion, Dissolution and Liquidation
  • Decree No. 66 of 2012: Objections and Judicial Proceedings Following the Reparation Package
  • Reconstruction Through Reduced Engineers’ Fees: Engineering Fee Exemptions Fall Short of Enabling Displaced People to Return to Their Areas
  • Rising Rents in Damascus and Its Nearby Suburbs: Demand Pressure and Limited Supply
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