Rising Rents in Damascus and Its Nearby Suburbs: Demand Pressure and Limited Supply
The rental crisis in Damascus and its nearby suburbs is expanding across distinct housing markets that share dollarisation and weak purchasing power but differ in the nature and location of each area and the extent of damage to its housing. In some Damascus neighbourhoods, high rents reflect the area’s location within the city and proximity to services, markets and employment opportunities, while in others, such as Al-Zahira and Al-Midan, the crisis is evident in the widening gap between actual incomes and the rents being demanded. In nearby suburbs in Rural Damascus Governorate, such as Moadamiyeh and Darayya, rental costs intersect with the difficulties faced by many displaced people and refugees who returned after the fall of the Assad regime but remain unable to go back to their damaged or destroyed homes.
These groups are entering a market with limited supply, where the available flats are insufficient to absorb rising demand, while dollarisation and depreciation of the Syrian pound push the cost of rent in pounds to levels detached from local purchasing power. Stagnation in real estate investment and the limited number of urban development projects are making it more difficult to produce new habitable units, while expectations surrounding urban and administrative projects are placing pressure on some nearby suburbs before those projects have produced actual housing.
Damascus Neighbourhoods: Between Peak Rents and the Income Gap
Within Damascus, the rental crisis differs from neighbourhood to neighbourhood. Rents in Al-Malki and parts of Mazzeh represent the upper end of the market because of these areas’ location and proximity to services, markets and main roads. Older and relatively less expensive areas, such as Old Al-Zahira and Al-Midan, reveal another aspect of the crisis: rents exceed the means of broad sections of people seeking housing even in neighbourhoods that are not part of the city’s highest-priced market.
In Old Al-Zahira, rents range from USD 300 to USD 500 per month, depending on the size of the home, the standard of interior finishing and the floor on which it is located. Rents are usually higher on lower floors than on upper floors: a 1st-floor home generally rents for more than a comparable home on the 3rd or 4th floor, often because power cuts affect the operation of lifts.
In Al-Midan, close to Al-Zahira, rents range between USD300 and USD400 per month, although most of the buildings in the area are old. These figures show that rising rents in Damascus are not limited to neighbourhoods classified as high-priced property markets, but also affect areas with older urban fabric and a broader stock of lower-cost housing.
In Mazzeh, the price varies by location. Rents can reach approximately USD1,000 per month, particularly for properties located on the Mazzeh motorway, where proximity to the main road and services increases demand. In Al-Malki, one of the most expensive neighbourhoods in Damascus, rents reach approximately USD3,000 per month. These figures do not explain the crisis facing people returning to damaged or destroyed homes, but they establish the upper limit of the rental market within the city and illustrate the scale of the gap between local income levels and housing prices in the areas with the highest demand.
Abu Mohammed, the owner of a real estate office in Al-Zahira, told Green Tabu that the number of homes being rented had fallen sharply because few properties were available to rent and rents had increased by 100 percent this year. He added that an entire month might pass without his office signing a single lease, which he considered an indication of limited supply in the area.
Moadamiyeh and Darayya: Nearby Suburbs Pressured by Return, Destruction and Investment Expectations
The rental crisis in Moadamiyeh Al-Sham and Darayya, both administratively part of Rural Damascus, differs from the crisis in neighbourhoods located inside Damascus. Prices here are not determined solely by location, proximity to services, and employment opportunities. They are also affected by the return of displaced people and refugees to areas that suffered varying levels of damage, the inability of many people to live in their damaged or destroyed homes, and expectations connected to urban and administrative projects that have not yet resulted in actual housing.
In Moadamiyeh Al-Sham, close to Mazzeh, rents have risen to between USD 200 and USD 300 per month, compared with between USD100 and USD 150 in 2025. This represents an approximate doubling of both the minimum and maximum rent levels within 1 year.
Part of the pressure on the city is due to rising demand and statements concerning plans to build an administrative city on nearby land. The project was announced on 12 May 2026 and is to be implemented in cooperation with the Emirati side, with a view to relocating state institutions there. Moadamiyeh is also seeing construction activity involving modern, licensed buildings in zoned areas, particularly around Al-Alam Roundabout.
Moadamiyeh combines two apparently contradictory factors. On the one hand, its proximity to Damascus encourages some people seeking housing to consider it a less expensive alternative to neighbourhoods in the capital city proper. On the other hand, expectations of future projects and modern construction activity are pushing prices upwards before this development has produced a sufficient supply of flats available for rent. The city is shifting from being a less expensive housing alternative into a market under pressure in its own right, particularly as purchasing power declines and buying a home becomes increasingly difficult.
In nearby Darayya, the effect of destruction is more evident. Although a large part of the city was damaged in the war, demand for rental housing has remained high, recently pushing rents to between USD150 and USD300 per month, depending on the area and the size of the home.
This variation shows that destruction does not necessarily reduce demand. It may instead increase pressure on the habitable part of the city, particularly when displaced people and refugees return to an area whose available housing cannot accommodate them.
Samer Sbeiha, a real estate appraiser at the Real Estate Finance Oversight Commission, told Green Tabu that rising rents were linked to the return of large numbers of displaced people and refugees after the fall of the Assad regime, whether from northern Syria or abroad, to destroyed or damaged areas. He said that the inability of many people to live in their damaged homes had pushed them to search for rental housing in Damascus and some nearby suburbs, contributing to rents reaching unprecedented levels.
Mohammed, who owns a real estate office in Moadamiyeh, told Green Tabu that pressure in the nearby suburbs was linked not only to demand but also to limited supply. He said that rents in the area had increased substantially over the previous two months and that few flats were available to rent, while the properties listed through real estate offices were predominantly flats for sale at very high prices. He added that some owners were asking tenants to vacate their homes so that the properties could be rented again at higher prices, increasing pressure on people with limited incomes.
In this sense, Moadamiyeh and Darayya reveal a different aspect of the rental crisis surrounding Damascus. Nearby suburbs are no longer merely a less expensive outer margin of the capital but have become markets in which return, destruction, limited supply, project expectations and owners’ efforts to bring lease terms into line with new market rates all intersect.
Dollarisation, Security Deposits and Stalled Investment: A Crisis the Market Cannot Solve Alone
The differences between neighbourhoods in Damascus and its nearby suburbs intersect with broader dynamics placing pressure on the entire rental market. The 1st of these is that rents are generally priced in US dollars, while most people seeking housing receive their incomes in Syrian pounds. Sbeiha linked owners’ use of the dollar to determine rents to inflation and the depreciation of the Syrian pound, particularly over the previous two months. He said that rents in Syria may appear low compared with many other countries, but weak local incomes place them beyond Syrians’ ability to pay.
Dollarisation turns the decline in the exchange rate of the Syrian pound into a direct factor increasing housing costs. The problem lies not only in the value of the rent itself, but also in its detachment from the purchasing power of people seeking housing and in the transfer of currency-fluctuation risks to the tenant. Monthly rent, therefore, becomes an indicator of a monetary and cost-of-living crisis as much as it is an indicator of a property crisis.
The initial cost of renting is further increased by some landlords demanding large security deposits before signing a lease. Khaled, who owns a real estate office in Al-Midan, said that many owners of homes offered for rent demanded a security deposit equivalent to six months’ rent and sometimes one full year’s rent. He added that many tenants could not afford these sums, while some owners insisted on receiving the entire amount. People seeking housing therefore enter the market not only through the monthly rent but also through an advance payment that may exceed their means before the tenancy has even begun.
The crisis extends beyond the relationship between landlord and tenant to the limited production of new or habitable housing. Sbeiha linked rising rents to weak investment in real estate development, which remains at minimal levels because Arab, foreign and local real estate development companies are reluctant to enter urban development projects in the country. He attributed this to two main factors: political instability and the crises surrounding Syria, and the local market’s slow response to sanctions relief. According to Sbeiha, these factors have made companies wary of committing capital to large projects, despite the launch of some projects that are insufficient to address the worsening housing crisis in Damascus.
Sbeiha proposed reducing rents and property prices by amending zoning plans in several areas of Damascus and Rural Damascus Governorate and modifying the Building Code to allow vertical expansion and the construction of towers. He argued that this would provide investors with a profit margin while allowing homes to be offered at reasonable prices. At the same time, he said that discussions of changing zoning plans and constructing residential towers, particularly in destroyed areas, remained little more than plans on paper, even where memoranda of understanding for housing projects had been signed.
Sbeiha also proposed rent-to-own housing projects because purchasing a home has become difficult amid current prices, weak purchasing power and inflation. This proposal reflects a crisis that is no longer confined to the rental market: home ownership has become inaccessible to broad sections of society, forcing them to remain in the rental market for longer periods.
Real estate expert Ammar Youssef told Green Tabu that amending laws governing real estate development was an essential condition for encouraging companies to invest and giving them a sense of security when committing capital in Syria.
Youssef also proposed redeveloping some informal settlements in Damascus and replanning them with high-rise towers, while stressing the principle of fairness between investors seeking profits and citizens seeking housing. He said that such projects could help reduce rents by lowering property prices, provided that replanning did not become a tool for producing housing that low-income families could not afford.
Youssef estimated that, given inflation and weak purchasing power, a Syrian would need 40 years to obtain a home of their own. He added that the current market was characterised by high demand for rental housing, limited supply and high rents. This description summarises the limits of the proposed market-based solutions. Increasing the number of apartment blocks or amending zoning plans may theoretically expand supply, but these measures alone would remain insufficient if prices, dollarisation and payment conditions remained detached from the actual means of people seeking housing.
In this sense, the rental crisis in Damascus and its nearby suburbs reveals a broader problem of housing access. Neighbourhoods differ in the reasons behind rising rents, including location, services, destruction, return, and expectations surrounding construction projects. The crisis nevertheless converges around common factors: weak incomes, dollarisation, high deposits, limited supply, and stalled investment in the production of habitable and affordable housing.
