Land Ownership Dispute Emerges over Damascus’ Informal Mazzeh 86 Settlement

On June 10, a group identifying itself as the “Neighbourhood Committees of the Mazzeh Area” circulated a statement describing the Mazzeh 86 informal settlement as being built on “extorted land seized by force and through weapons and power, using the tools of the defunct regime, its security apparatus, and militias, without legal grounds or any formal title deeds.” The statement continued: “This area … was, until the 1970s, a natural forest and orchards belonging to the residents of Mazzeh.” It added, “we affirm that the existing buildings in District 86 are unregistered … and are violations of all engineering standards,” concluding with, “Therefore, we, the sons of Mazzeh, through the neighbourhood committees, hereby announce that we have begun taking legal and social measures to reclaim these lands and return them to their rightful owners whose rights were confiscated for decades. Rights do not expire with time, and a usurper, no matter how long he holds on, has no legitimate claim to the land nor the trust of the people.”

The statement, published on the Facebook page “Mazzeh Coordinations,” alarmed and concerned residents of the Mazzeh 86 informal settlement. It is unclear who comprises the  “Neighbourhood Committees of the Mazzeh Area.” Each area in Mazzeh already has its own established committee — for Kiwan, Sheikh Saad, the Villas, and Mazzeh 86. These committees were formed under Local Administration Law No. 107 of 2012 and were active in service-related issues. They fall under the jurisdiction of the Mazzeh administrative district, which is part of the Damascus Governorate, one of 16 such districts within the governorate, and are therefore affiliated with the Ministry of Local Administration and Environment. After the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, the committees were revived, and some were restructured to take part in arms collection efforts, coordination with the transitional administration to apprehend wanted individuals, and maintain public order, especially following the massacres of Alawite citizens on the coast in March 2025.

Mazzeh is one of the largest districts in Damascus and includes affluent zoned neighbourhoods such as Eastern and Western Villas, which were home to senior government officials, security and military leaders, and businessmen under the Assad regime, as well as other residents with no political affiliation, including professionals and middle-class families. It also includes large informal settlements like Mazzeh 86, which began emerging in the late 1970s. The settlement was established on public property, some of it appropriated by the Ministry of Defence, near Battalion 86 of Brigade 42, which belonged to the Saraya al-Difa’ (Defence Brigades) militia led by Rifaat al-Assad, a powerful figure in the regime at the time. Most residents of Mazzeh 86 are poor Alawite migrants from the coastal region to Damascus, many of whom are members of the security and military apparatus.

According to long-time residents, the land was undivided communal property, rocky and unsuitable for agriculture. The state expropriated it in the 1960s. The first homes appeared soon afterward, built informally among the forested slopes of Mount Mazzeh. The initial settlers were members of Battalion 86 who began constructing homes close to the artillery and tank emplacements of their unit, taking advantage of the absence of oversight or urban planning and the atmosphere of fear instilled by the Defence Brigades. Early houses were rudimentary — a single room and a kitchen — built with primitive materials, lacking foundations or basic infrastructure such as sewage or electricity, typical of most informal settlements.

After a decade of slow growth, the area became more attractive in the mid-1980s due to its proximity to Damascus and low housing costs. Multi-storey buildings began to emerge, built by private contractors who undertook the informal planning of streets and residential plots. This peaked in the late 1990s and early 2000s as the area became densely populated.

In the early 1990s, individuals would claim a piece of land by marking it with stones and laying foundations, without any official documents — either to build a home or to sell later. These sales were not considered legal transfers of ownership, but rather a sale of the “effort” spent preparing the land — a common practice in informal settlements around Damascus. By the late 1990s, the Damascus Governorate proposed a zoning plan for Mazzeh 86, including green spaces and public facilities, but it was never implemented.

Despite the absence of official ownership deeds, many residents paid what is locally known as al-turabiya, fees paid to the financial authorities for occupying the land. These payments did not grant legal ownership but became an informal reference in eviction or planning cases. For example, in the Marota City project (also known as Al-Razi Orchards), those who had paid al-turabiya received financial compensation or planning shares, whereas those who had not were excluded. This precedent has led Mazzeh 86 residents to view the payments as potential leverage in future planning negotiations.

Despite the haphazard nature of Mazzeh 86’s development, the legal status of the land is not entirely unclear. According to sources in the neighbourhood, some Damascene families held or owned small shares in the area, but these were later subjected to official expropriation orders issued by the Prime Minister’s Office for public benefit, along with compensation.

A legal expert told The Syria Report that most of Mazzeh 86’s land is recorded in Damascus’ property registry as “State – Public Property.” This classification presents a major obstacle to any current claims for the restitution of private ownership, as the classification cannot be contested without documented legal proof. Therefore, the claim made by the Mazzeh Area Neighbourhood Committees to reclaim these lands based on historical occupancy or informal sales must be supported by documents and evidence. To escalate the matter to court, the committee would need legal standing, representative status for the plaintiffs, and proof of original individual ownership. To verify the legal status of Mazzeh 86 lands, the legal expert recommended reviewing the archives of the State Council, which holds the old expropriation rulings.

While the statement by the Mazzeh Area Neighbourhood Committees adopted a legal-political tone, its timing and content reflect deeper shifts that go beyond a simple land dispute. Reopening the Mazzeh 86 file after decades of silence or tacit acceptance highlights attempts to reclaim land that was not only expropriated by the state but also turned into a settlement housing tens of thousands of people. Although the statement uses seemingly legal terminology such as “official deed” and “invalid sale,” the broader social and political context suggests that the issue is not solely about land ownership but also reflects underlying tension among local groups — between those who see themselves as the original landowners and the residents who have settled there over the past decades.

This tension coincides with wider shifts in the power structure, adding a political dimension to the urban-social background of the land dispute: the complicity of state institutions under the Assad regime encouraged the rise of informal settlements, while the renewed focus on property claims today reflects an attempt to redefine “original rights” within emerging power dynamics that go beyond strictly legal considerations.