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Home1 / HLP2 / Green Tabu3 / Yazidi Villages in Hassakeh: Protracted Displacement and Property Seizure4
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Yazidi Villages in Hassakeh: Protracted Displacement and Property Seizure

05-10-2026/in Green Tabu, Updates /by Mazen Ezzi

Following Türkiye’s launch of Operation “Peace Spring” on 9 October 2019, Turkish forces and Turkish-backed Syrian armed factions took control of Ras Al-Ayn and its surrounding countryside in Hassakeh Governorate. Since then, the area’s Yazidi villages have become almost entirely empty of their original inhabitants, after most residents fled to other parts of Syria or abroad. Their displacement resulted from both the military operations and an accumulated fear of armed Islamist factions following a series of religiously and ethnically motivated violations and threats in Ras Al-Ayn, Afrin and Sinjar. 

The Yazidis are a Kurdish-speaking religious community whose presence in northern Syria and Iraq extends back centuries. They practise Yazidism, a non-proselytising esoteric religion whose principal temple is at Lalish in Sheikhan District, Nineveh Governorate, northern Iraq. Yazidis have historically lived in Syria’s Jazira and Afrin regions, and many worked in agriculture and livestock farming. The former Assad regime subjected Yazidis to personal status legislation derived from Islamic Sharia, while allowing them to practise their religious rituals. The Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration also recognised Yazidism in the Social Contract adopted in 2014. 

Yazidis historically lived in villages located south, east and west of Ras Al-Ayn, known in Kurdish as Serekaniye, and in the city’s Zardasht neighbourhood. According to a survey conducted in 2012 by the Yazidi House, an institution that looks after and organises Yazidi affairs, approximately 15,000 Yazidis lived in Syria’s Jazira region, including around 3,000 in the Yazidi villages around Ras Al-Ayn. According to Green Tabu’s field reporting, only around 15 families from these communities now remain elsewhere in Syria, mainly in Qamishli, Hassakeh and Amuda, while most of the others have emigrated to Europe or Türkiye. 

Following their displacement in 2019, dozens of homes and agricultural lands belonging to displaced Yazidis remained under the control of fighters and families associated with armed factions. Other properties were looted, damaged or forcibly exploited, while no effective process was established to guarantee residents’ return or restore their control over their property. Although Syria’s transitional authorities have spoken since early 2025 of transitional justice and the protection of private property, fighters and commanders from factions accused of these violations have been incorporated into the new official military and security structure. This has deepened displaced people’s sense of insecurity and made the prospect of return increasingly fragile. 

The situation in the Yazidi villages around Ras Al-Ayn shows how forced displacement can become a long-term mechanism for reshaping control over land and population through religious fear, property seizure, the prevention of return and the repurposing of abandoned property within a local economy based on unrestricted appropriation. It also highlights the limits of official discourse on transitional justice amid the absence of accountability and the continued influence of armed structures associated with displacement and property violations since 2019. 

Empty Villages and Property Left Open to Seizure 

Following the launch of Operation Peace Spring on 9 October 2019 and the subsequent takeover of Ras Al-Ayn and its countryside by Turkish forces and Turkish-backed Syrian armed factions, the area’s Yazidi villages experienced mass displacement that emptied most of them of their original inhabitants and left much of their property open to de facto seizure. Before the operation, the area had a diverse population of Arabs, Kurds, Christians and Yazidis. Displacement primarily affected Kurdish residents, including Yazidis, while many Arab residents remained and some Muslim Kurds gradually returned in the following years. The Yazidi villages, however, remain nearly empty of their original inhabitants. 

Hamid, a native of the village of Java, told Green Tabu that all the village’s residents fled after Turkish-backed armed factions took control of the area in 2019. He added that the village had approximately 40 families who owned an estimated 8,000 dunams of agricultural land. Although he has reached Germany and obtained asylum there, he remains unable to visit Java or inspect his home and land. He said that an Arab family now lives in his family’s home, while other people cultivate his agricultural land. 

The violations extended beyond the occupation of homes and agricultural land to the reuse of displaced villages within the area’s new military structure. According to testimonies collected by the Union of Syrian Yazidis, which was established in 2020 with support from the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, some homes were converted into military headquarters and bases, while residents were prevented from entering their villages or inspecting their property.

Local groups associated with the armed factions also leased homes and shops belonging to displaced Yazidis in Ras Al-Ayn’s Zardasht neighbourhood, despite the continued absence of their original owners. Witnesses in Qamishli told Green Tabu that the local council formed after the factions’ takeover had managed and unlawfully rented out some of these properties. 

These practices were accompanied by the widespread exploitation of agricultural land belonging to displaced people. The cultivable agricultural land in the Yazidi villages is estimated at approximately 4,400 hectares, most of which is now outside the control of its original owners.

Salma, who was displaced from one of the Yazidi villages, told Green Tabu that she now rents a furnished flat in Qamishli and relies on assistance sent by her brothers in Sweden to pay the rent. Meanwhile, her agricultural land is being cultivated by a man from Deir-ez-Zor without her receiving any proceeds from it. “Our villages have become a desolate place,” she said. She added that many displaced people were prepared to accept any arrangement guaranteeing that they would not be targeted because of their religion. “Even if we were required to pay jizya, the important thing is that we are not harmed because of our religion.”

The situation in these villages reflects a transformation extending beyond war-related displacement towards the reproduction of control over the area by emptying it of its original population and repurposing abandoned property under new security and economic arrangements. Although years have passed since the area’s major military operations ended, most Yazidi villages remain outside the control of their original residents, while their properties remain subject to realities imposed by the forces controlling the area since 2019. 

Fear as a mechanism of permanent displacement

The Yazidis’ reluctance to return to their villages around Ras Al-Ayn is connected to the loss of homes and agricultural land and to an accumulated fear formed through years of religious and ethnic targeting. For many displaced people, the displacement of 2019 was an extension of a long series of killings, threats and declarations that Yazidis were infidels, both inside Syria and in neighbouring Iraq. 

On 17 August 2013, Jabhat Al-Nusra, then Al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria, and allied factions attacked the predominantly Yazidi village of Al-Asadiya, south of Ras Al-Ayn. The attack killed Yazidi civilians, including the brothers Murad and Ali Sa’ado, burnt homes in the village and drove its remaining residents into displacement. Less than 1 year later, the massacre committed by the Islamic State against the Yazidis in Sinjar, northern Iraq, in 2014 deepened fears among Syrian Yazidi communities, amid the rise of armed Islamist factions in northern Syria that declared Yazidis to be “infidels”. Violations against Yazidis in Afrin after armed factions took control of the area in 2018 further reinforced a widespread belief among the Yazidis of Ras Al-Ayn that remaining under these factions’ authority could expose them to similar violence.

Hamid said that the residents of his village, Java, had previously been displaced in 2013 following an attack by Jabhat Al-Nusra, but returned later after the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) took control of the area. Following the takeover by Turkish-backed factions in 2019, however, the situation changed yet again. According to him, residents now “do not dare to return” after receiving direct death threats. He added that current fear is connected not only to the presence of armed men in the villages, but also to the absence of any genuine guarantee of protection if residents return.

Suad Hasso, head of the Union of Syrian Yazidis, told Green Tabu that some displaced people who merely attempted to inspect their property received direct threats. Others were asked to pay between USD 2,000 and USD 10,000 to have the current occupants vacate their homes. Some were also promised that their property would be returned and their safety guaranteed in exchange for declaring their conversion to Islam. Hasso said she considered any discussion of an actual return unrealistic unless the armed factions began vacating civilian homes and an internationally supervised mechanism was established to organise the return and protect residents. 

Even after displacement, some Yazidis continued to face discrimination and hostility in places of refuge. Hamo Khodr, a Yazidi displaced from the village of Lazka, told Green Tabu that he had to leave Washokani camp, west of Hassakeh, after being harassed and attacked because of his religion. The attacks included slashing his tent, tampering with its contents, and stealing heating supplies, personal belongings and food. “In their eyes, I am an infidel and deserve any attack,” he said, explaining that the camp administration allowed him to leave while keeping his name on its register of displaced people. 

This climate has created a general feeling among many displaced people that return entails entering a space where their religious presence is itself perceived as a threat, alongside recovering a home or land. For many Yazidis, property is therefore connected first to the possibility of living safely in their villages, rather than to a purely legal right to land or housing.

For many Yazidis, displacement has also involved dual targeting based on their religious and ethnic identities. Most identify ethnically as Kurdish in a region where extensive demographic changes after 2019 affected Kurdish villages and communities in the Ras Al-Ayn countryside. Their non-Muslim religious identity made them still more vulnerable to armed Islamist factions.

An Economy Built on Seizing Displaced Villages 

The displacement of Yazidis from the villages around Ras Al-Ayn came alongside a broad system for exploiting and repurposing abandoned property for economic and military uses. After Turkish-backed armed factions took control of the area, fighters’ families were housed in Yazidi homes, while agricultural land was cultivated by people arriving from other parts of Syria. Some villages became open spaces for looting and the redistribution of local resources. Some homes and land in the abandoned villages were also converted into military headquarters and factional positions, directly integrating part of the private property into the area’s new security and military structure.

According to Suad Hasso, almost no category of property escaped violations, including homes, shops, land and agricultural equipment. The violations included looting household contents, cutting down mature trees for heating fuel, stealing pumps and generators used to irrigate agricultural land, and seizing tractors and combine harvesters. The Union of Syrian Yazidis noted that some of this equipment is legally classified as “appurtenance real estate” under Syrian civil law, meaning that it is legally attached to the agricultural land it serves. 

Many homes were also partially dismantled and their contents sold in local second-hand markets. Hamo Khodr said he had recently learnt that his home in Lazka had been looted after his displacement. The doors, windows and iron staircase leading to the roof had been removed and sold cheaply in the second-hand market. He estimated that the cost of repairing his home and the value of his agricultural losses exceeded USD 15,000, but said that, for now, he demanded nothing more than a safe return. 

These practices were accompanied by attempts to give the administration of displaced people’s property an official appearance. Witnesses inside Ras Al-Ayn told Green Tabu that the local council formed following the takeover by Turkish-backed factions rented out homes and shops belonging to displaced civilians in the Zardasht neighbourhood, which had been home to approximately 30 Yazidi families before the displacement. These properties remain rented out without their original owners’ consent. 

The mechanisms established to address property disputes have failed to regain displaced people’s confidence. In 2020, Turkish-backed opposition factions established a body called the “Committee for the Restitution of Rights to Their Owners” in the Tal Abyad and Ras Al-Ayn areas. Only a very small number of Yazidis submitted complaints to it. Lawyer Zaki Haji told Green Tabu that this was due to the committee’s limited independence and the continued intervention of armed factions in the area. According to Haji, only 1 Yazidi, as far as he knew, had recovered agricultural land in the village of Al-Asadiya through mediation involving German and Turkish parties. Most other displaced people have limited themselves to presenting their ownership documents to human rights or documentation organisations without entering local judicial proceedings.

This situation created an economy based on exploiting displacement itself—properties left behind by their owners became sources of housing, income, and influence for the controlling forces. The continued absence of the original residents also contributed to consolidating new realities in the villages, making the restoration of property dependent not only on proving legal rights but also on dismantling the military and administrative networks established over these properties in 2019.

Property without protection, delayed justice

Article 16 of the Constitutional Declaration issued on 13 March 2025 states that the right to private property is protected and may not be expropriated except for the public benefit and in return for fair compensation. This principle has yet to be reflected in the situation of Yazidis displaced from Ras Al-Ayn. 

The factions accused of property seizures and widespread violations against Kurdish and Yazidi civilians were formerly components of the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army. Their fighters and commanders have since been incorporated into the Syrian Armed Forces under the transitional Ministry of Defence, despite the involvement of some of these factions in serious abuses. This has further weakened confidence in the possibility of genuine accountability or the restitution of property to its owners. 

Berivan Abdul Karim, an administrator at the GAV Relief and Development Organisation in northeastern Syria, told Green Tabu  that the absence of any accountability for factions involved in property violations since 2019 meant that discussions of return were closer to political promises than to a genuine process operating in practice. She also noted that promises by officials in the Syrian Interim Government to return residents or organise return convoys had not yet been implemented.

The case of displaced Yazidis concerns their legal and religious status in the new Syria alongside the restitution of their property. Article 3(2) of the Constitutional Declaration states that freedom of belief is protected and that the State respects all “divine religions”. This wording has raised concerns within Yazidi communities because Yazidism is not classified within that category, particularly given the community’s long history of religious persecution. 

Syrian domestic legislation does not expressly criminalise forced displacement or forcible transfer as standalone offences. Many of the violations committed in the Yazidi villages nevertheless remain criminal offences under existing legislation. Under Article 723 of the Syrian Penal Code, taking possession of all or part of an immovable property held by another person without a title deed or document authorising disposal constitutes property extortion. Article 768 of the Civil Code provides that the owner alone has the right to use, exploit and dispose of their property within the limits of the law. Aggravated-theft provisions also criminalise looting carried out by force or by breaking into properties in their owners’ absence. 

Lawyer Zaki Haji explained that the property records for the Yazidi villages remain preserved at the Cadastral Affairs Directorate in Hassakeh, meaning that proving legal ownership is not the main problem. He noted, however, that the armed factions’ continued control of the area has led many owners living abroad to limit themselves to issuing powers of attorney to manage their property or collect its proceeds rather than returning personally. Haji added that some owners appoint acquaintances or intermediaries from outside the Yazidi and Kurdish communities to manage their property, while any effective solution remains dependent first on evicting unlawful occupants. 

Under international humanitarian law and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, some acts documented in the Yazidi villages may, depending on their circumstances and connection to the armed conflict, constitute war crimes. These include pillage and the destruction or seizure of property when not imperatively demanded by the necessities of the conflict. The conversion of civilian land and homes into military sites requires a case-specific legal assessment and cannot automatically be classified as a war crime.

Human rights organisations including the Kurdish Organisation for Human Rights in Syria (DAD), Synergy Association for Victims and Syrians for Truth and Justice have also attributed part of the responsibility to Türkiye, citing its support for the controlling factions and alleged direct violations by Turkish forces, including the establishment of military positions on privately owned agricultural land and attacks on civilian homes. Accountability inside Syria remains highly complicated by the strength of current political relations between Damascus and Ankara, leading some legal advocates to place their hopes in proceedings filed abroad under the principle of universal jurisdiction.

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https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Mazen Ezzi https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Mazen Ezzi2026-10-05 12:43:112026-10-05 13:08:46Yazidi Villages in Hassakeh: Protracted Displacement and Property Seizure

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