North Sakka in Raqqa: Urban Planning and the Threat to Residents’ Rights
Written by: Batool Alshekh
The North Sakka area in Raqqa risks extensive urban transformation following eviction notices and initial demolitions affecting some homes and structures—amid local reports of a poorly communicated, opaque development project that would remove some 4,000 housing units on the grounds of eliminating encroachments on state property and rezoning informal settlements.
Three dynamics intersect in this case: (1) usufruct rights and local transactions that developed on land within the Al-Raed Project; (2) a long-term urban transformation that shifted the area from agriculture to housing; and (3) a new investment project that presents the land as a space for replanning and profit.
The risk lies in how urban planning is defined and implemented. When planning is separated from the history of the land, existing housing and the documents accumulated by residents, it changes from a tool for regularising a complex urban situation into a mechanism for redistributing land and real estate. In this sense, the North Sakka case tests how the new authorities will deal with the existing urban fabric, between regarding it as a space of rights and services and treating it as an obstacle to new investment value.
The issue centres on which party has the right to define “violation”, “urban planning” and “public benefit”. Residents present urban planning as a process of classifying rights, distinguishing established housing from recent encroachments and improving services in place. The official process, as reflected in verbal promises of compensation, the opacity surrounding investors and discussions of extensive replanning, shifts the dispute away from residents’ right to remain and have the area regularised in place towards accepting relocation or compensation within a project whose criteria, boundaries and beneficiaries remain unclear.
From a land reclamation project to a complex legal area
Documents collected by residents of North Sakka and obtained by Green Tabu show that the land within the Al-Raed Project did not reach its current situation through a single process. It began as a state-managed land reclamation and irrigation project in the Euphrates Basin, before some of the land was distributed to beneficiaries under distribution decisions and handover records. It was subsequently transferred between different individuals through sale agreements, assignments and powers of attorney. This background makes the current dispute broader than a matter of unlicensed construction on agricultural land, because it concerns land whose legal and administrative status was itself largely produced by the state.
The Al-Raed agricultural project dates back to the early 1970s and is one of the oldest land reclamation and irrigation projects in Raqqa Governorate. Implementation began in 1970, and the project became operational in 1974 over an area of approximately 24,000 hectares north of Raqqa. Its purpose was to reclaim agricultural land and establish modern irrigation and drainage networks, as well as to rehouse and compensate some residents affected by the formation of Lake Assad following the construction of the Euphrates Dam. State farms and model farms administered by the General Organisation for the Investment and Development of the Euphrates Basin were created as part of the project.
Over time, the project’s state farms began to incur financial losses. An article published in Tishreen newspaper on January 22, 2001, entitled “The Decision to Distribute State Farm Land to Farmers Ended Their Losses and Preserved Their Workers’ Rights, stated that the farms had suffered losses of SYP 277 million over 5 years. Baath Party Regional Command Resolution No. 83, issued on December 16, 2000, subsequently approved the distribution of the land of “unstable” state farms under the applicable laws and regulations, with an estimated allocation of 3 hectares of irrigated land or 8 hectares of rainfed land per family. The resolution also provided for the recovery of reclamation and irrigation costs from those eligible for distribution, the sale of existing farm housing to some beneficiaries, and the retention of public infrastructure, including schools, mosques and health centres, by the relevant public authorities.
Part of the Al-Raed Project’s land was distributed under the usufruct system. Under Syrian Civil Code No. 84 of 1949, usufruct is a real right granting its holder the authority to use and exploit an asset while actual ownership, known as bare ownership, remains with another owner. A beneficiary may therefore use the land, benefit from its proceeds and dispose of the usufruct right in accordance with legal conditions without owning the underlying property. This arrangement gave beneficiaries a legal basis for using the land, while keeping its use tied to agricultural production and to irrigation and reclamation requirements.
This sequence appears in a temporary handover record dated March 27, 2012, concerning the handover to Issa Ali Hammoud of 30 dunams of agricultural land at Hattin Farm, in field /2-2/ on canal NR6. The handover was based on Baath Party Regional Command Resolution No. 83 of December 16, 2000, the schedules approved by the General Organisation for the Investment and Development of the Euphrates Basin, and the schedules issued by the committee formed by the Governor of Raqqa. The record states that the recipient undertook to cultivate the land in accordance with the agricultural plan and not to object to demands for payment of reclamation and irrigation costs.
Some residents of North Sakka later relied on these documents when challenging demolition decisions. In a petition submitted by Mohammed Nasser Al-Marei Al-Hassan to the Governor of Raqqa on April 6, 2026, he stated that on September 24, 2025, he had purchased a plot of land from Dali Ati bin Hanadi under a final sale contract deposited with the Raqqa branch of the Bar Association under serial number 305 of 2025. He said the seller had obtained the land from the beneficiary Issa Ali Hammoud under the attached usufruct document concerning field /2-2/ on canal NR6 within Hattin Farm.
He added that the land was among those formally distributed before 2011 by the Land Distribution Committee within the Al-Raed Project, which falls under the Raqqa Directorate of Agriculture. On it, he constructed a prefabricated warehouse consisting of 2 hangars for the trade and distribution of foodstuffs and cleaning products, at a cost of over USD 500,000.
In the same petition, Mohammed Nasser distinguished between land belonging to the Al-Raed Project, meaning formally distributed land, and municipal property or undistributed public property. He said that the land he occupied lay outside the zoning plan of Raqqa City Council, belonged to the Raqqa Directorate of Agriculture, and had been formally distributed through the Al-Raed Project’s Land Distribution Committee.
He also referred to Raqqa Governor’s Decision No. 583, issued on March 8, 2026, which established a technical committee to inspect field /2-2/ on canal NR6 at Hattin Farm, establish its legal and current status, and prepare a report on rights supported by a sketch map and real estate documents. According to the petition, after conducting an on-site inspection and comparing the handover records, the committee concluded that several beneficiaries had formally received their land. These included Issa Ali Hammoud, listed in item 10 of the committee’s report as the beneficiary of an undivided area of 30 dunams under Document No. 257.
The beneficiaries’ dossier, submitted to the Central Authority for Supervision and Inspection in Raqqa, was compiled in April 2026 and signed by hundreds of affected residents. It presents a collective account from residents of North Sakka. The dossier speaks on behalf of a group of residents and states that the area contains more than 3,000 homes, which have provided shelter for people on limited incomes. It says that some mosques and prayer halls, as well as some eastern parts of the area, were built more than 50 years ago, before the area later developed into a settlement containing facilities, factories and warehouses.
The dossier describes the land’s legal status as originally private property that was expropriated under Decree No. 20 of 1972 for the benefit of the General Organisation for the Investment and Development of the Euphrates Basin, before being distributed to eligible beneficiaries following Baath Party Regional Command Resolution No. 83 of 2000.
These documents place North Sakka within a complex legal and urban situation. Residents do not rely solely on physical occupation, but on distribution decisions, handover records, usufruct rights, and subsequent contracts. At the same time, some of these rights remained attached to agricultural land outside the urban plan before the land gradually shifted to residential and economic use as agricultural activity declined. Residents’ documents are therefore a central element in the discussion of demolition, but they also reveal the limits of the legal settlement that the state failed to complete before the municipality returned today to treat its consequences as violations.
From demolition notices to an investment project
The North Sakka area extends along the northern and northeastern outskirts of central Raqqa, between the city’s urban expansion and the agricultural areas towards the northern countryside. It includes the Andalus neighbourhood, the area around Hazima Roundabout, the vicinity of Al-Andalus School, the Agricultural Airport grounds, the outskirts of the Rumaila neighbourhood, and Al-Saqiya Street. Over the past 2 decades, the area has developed into a densely built urban mass containing thousands of residential plots and housing tens of thousands of residents, as part of rapid expansion that remained outside zoning plans and adequate service provision.
At the beginning of March 2026, unexpected notices appeared on the walls of some buildings near Hazima Roundabout, ordering occupants to vacate within 72 hours. The notices coincided with demolitions carried out by machinery operated by Raqqa Municipality, affecting some built-up plots and structures in what is known as the Palm Forest area. This caused widespread fear among residents, particularly because of the conflicting answers they received when consulting different service institutions and local authorities. Some sources said the area was facing comprehensive demolition and clearance, while others denied that any clear decision to that effect existed.
Faced with this uncertainty, residents launched simultaneous public and legal action. Sit-ins and protest gatherings brought together affected women, men and children, while residents began searching the Official Gazette and records of presidential decrees and government decisions for documents proving their rights. At that stage, residents treated the matter as a legal dispute over ownership and usufruct, before later discovering that the governorate was dealing with the area as part of a broader replanning project.
Media coverage of the protests prompted Raqqa Governorate to form a technical committee under Decision No. 583 of March 8, 2026. The committee was tasked with establishing the legal and current status of field /2-2/ on canal NR6 at Hattin Farm and preparing a report on rights accompanied by a sketch map and real estate documents.
On March 29, 2026, the committee completed its report following an on-site inspection and comparison of the beneficiaries’ handover records. According to residents’ documents, the committee acknowledged that the land had been distributed under official usufruct decisions issued by the Al-Raed agricultural project and that, under Syrian custom and law, beneficiaries are legally treated in the same way as owners—that is, as usufructuaries in the position of owners. This acknowledgement did not, however, halt the demolition process, shifting the issue from the question of documents to the question of which authority had the right to decide how the land would be treated.
The case of Hajj Mohammed Nasser Al-Marei Al-Hassan emerged as an example of this contradiction. At the beginning of March 2026, Hajj Mohammed received a notice ordering him to vacate the warehouses and structures situated on his land in field /2-2/ on canal NR6 at Hattin Farm. He had purchased the land on September 24, 2025 from Dali Ati bin Hanadi under a final sale agreement deposited with the Raqqa branch of the Bar Association under serial number 305 of 2025. On the land, he constructed a prefabricated warehouse consisting of two hangars used for the trade and distribution of foodstuffs and cleaning products, at a cost he said exceeded USD 500,000.
Hajj Mohammed submitted an urgent formal complaint to the governorate’s registry, relying on the purchase contract, usufruct documents and handover records associated with the land. According to his letter to the governor, the committee that had been formed recognised the validity of his documents and the legality of his real estate ownership and the associated usufruct right. Despite this, bulldozers and machinery belonging to Raqqa City Council demolished the 2 hangars, accompanied by armed reinforcements and internal security personnel. The civil engineer who supervised the design, construction and fitting out of the facility testified that the demolished building was an existing and fully equipped economic facility, rather than merely an isolated encroachment on state property.
The demolitions were not limited to Hajj Mohammed’s facility. A further 4 homes and 6 walled plots were demolished at the end of the Agricultural Airport road near the university grounds, following the withdrawal of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the takeover of Raqqa by the transitional administration’s forces in January 2026. The official justification was that these were recent structures constituting encroachments on state property.
This began to reveal the overlap between relatively recent buildings, potentially genuine encroachments, and older rights connected to the land of the Al-Raed Project and its local transfer.
The case of Tawfiq Al-Abdullah reveals another aspect of this overlap. On November 18, 2025, Al-Abdullah, born in Raqqa in 1999, purchased an 8-dunam agricultural plot within Hattin Farm for USD 20,000 from Bassem Al-Basir. The accompanying documents show that the seller dealt with the land under a power of attorney certified by the Raqqa branch of the Bar Association on September 18, 2022, and based on earlier handover records.
According to Al-Abdullah, he paid USD 1,500 to employees of the Violations Department of the People’s Municipality during the period of SDF control in order to overcome obstacles to obtaining a residential building permit and avoid demolition orders. After the change of authority at the beginning of 2026, those employees remained in their administrative and supervisory positions before later approving the demolition of the same building they had previously overlooked, Al-Abdullah said. The violation thus does not appear solely as an individual act, but as the product of a local administration that accepted or benefited from the existing reality and then returned to use it as a justification for demolition.
The demolitions and notices prompted residents to expand their campaign. Activist Malik Al-Khader, head and spokesperson of the North Sakka Neighbourhoods Committee, led the opposition movement. A page opposing the demolitions was launched, amid calls for protests at Hazima Roundabout and in front of the governorate building.
Protesters carried slogans including: “My home is my future—do not demolish it” and “This is my right, and I will not give it up”. One speech delivered during a protest addressed the local authorities as follows: “We know that you want to turn Raqqa into the Paris of the East, but Paris was built on land; it was not built on the ruins of people’s homes and their displacement. Development begins with people, not with expelling them.”
As the protests expanded, Governor Abdul Rahman Salama arranged a meeting with a delegation representing the neighbourhood. A 6-person representative committee was formed from local dignitaries and prominent figures. Its members included engineer Jassem Al-Askar, director of the Al-Raed Project in Raqqa, who joined to provide the delegation with technical and legal support. During the meeting, held in the governor’s office at the end of May, residents discovered a situation different from the one they had initially understood. The dispute was not, as they had first believed, merely a matter of ownership or usufruct, nor simply the removal of recent violations, but part of a broader investment project to replan the area.
Al-Khader recounted that the governor displayed modern engineering plans on a digital screen showing the complete removal of the North Sakka neighbourhoods to make way for investment-oriented residential complexes to be constructed by Arab and international companies. Basil Mustafa Al-Basir, one of the landowners in the area, said that the neighbourhood delegation had gone to the governorate carrying documents because it believed that the dispute concerned the underlying ownership of the land. The delegation was surprised to discover that “the issue concerned a new investment project” and that governorate employees were, according to him, not interested in residents’ documents or ownership rights.
The governor attempted to ease the delegation’s anger by making verbal promises that residents would receive full compensation and be transferred to modern housing complexes and replacement flats delivered before any demolition or eviction. These promises, however, collided with residents’ lack of trust and the country’s general economic situation. Malik Al-Khader asked him: “How will you provide us with homes and secure alternative housing complexes when the government is unable to pay public-sector salaries?” The committee informed the governorate of a unified position: residents did not want compensation or replacement flats, but wished to remain in their homes and have services and infrastructure improved, including roads, sewage, electricity, schools and health centres.
At the end of the meeting, the governor attempted to negotiate with residents outside the framework of the unified committee, announcing that he preferred to meet families separately in order to consult and negotiate with them individually. The meeting had nevertheless moved the case into a new phase. It began with notices and the demolition of violations, then became a dispute over usufruct and sale documents, before emerging as an investment project to reshape an entire area of the city. From this point onwards, the issue was no longer limited to the validity of residents’ documents or the recent construction of some buildings, but concerned whether urban planning would address an existing situation or use it as an entry point for clearing the land and reinvesting it.
From an Agricultural Belt to Residential Blocks
The North Sakka case is not limited to the legal dispute concerning usufruct and sale documents. It also includes the long-term urban transformation of Raqqa’s northern outskirts. The area, once part of the agricultural belt surrounding the city, gradually developed into a densely built residential and economic extension amid declining agriculture, damaged irrigation networks, displacement, weak planning and successive changes in controlling authorities. Describing the area today as one of recent encroachments does not explain the process that produced this urban fabric, nor does it distinguish between homes established for years and more recent commercial facilities or plots in specific locations.
Using Hazima Roundabout as a geographical reference point, three stages can be identified in the transformation of North Sakka. Between 2004 and 2013, agricultural land in the northwestern sector along the agricultural airport road and the northeastern sector in Al-Andalus neighbourhood began to undergo early changes in the form of dirt roads, grid-like subdivisions and low-density construction. This means that the initial transition from agriculture to urban development preceded the war.
Construction accelerated during Islamic State control between 2014 and 2017, amid declining administrative planning and internal displacement, and became more established after the SDF took control in late 2017. During this period, construction density increased and the area came to include not only homes but also commercial and industrial facilities.
The outskirts of North Sakka were thus transformed from agricultural land surrounding Raqqa into an existing urban and economic mass, but without recognition in zoning plans or adequate infrastructure.
Abu Abbas, a resident of the area, explained part of this transformation by referring to the fate of the Al-Raed agricultural project itself. During the war, pumping stations and irrigation canals were destroyed, causing water supplies to stop and drought and desertification to spread across the surrounding agricultural land.
According to his testimony, this agricultural paralysis pushed small landowners and farmers to sell their land as residential plots in order to secure their livelihoods, and the purchasers then constructed homes on them. The conversion of part of the land to housing was therefore connected to the collapse of agriculture in an area dependent on irrigation and drainage networks that no longer functioned properly.
Abu Abbas added that the owners of these homes possess title deeds and legal documents, and that the actual encroachment is concentrated in the Palm Forest area, where Raqqa Governorate recently demolished existing structures and plots. This distinction is fundamental to the case because it separates a stable residential area formed over many years from newer encroachments or structures that can be addressed as a separate matter. Treating North Sakka as a single mass of violations, by contrast, allows specific encroachments to be used as a justification for removing entire neighbourhoods without distinguishing between occupied homes, walled plots, commercial facilities, recent construction and homes in which families have lived for years.
Residents of North Sakka therefore do not reject the principle of urban planning itself. Their objection concerns the type of planning proposed and whether it aims to improve housing conditions in the area’s existing location or empty it and reinvest the land.
Activist and residents’ committee member Malik Al-Shahada proposed an alternative based on municipal replanning of the area in its present location rather than its removal. The proposal includes widening existing streets by 1 metre on each side and clearing and demolishing only those structures located on sites designated for public facilities and services, such as schools, hospitals and public parks. Those affected by these specific removals would be compensated in the nearby Al-Taamir area.
Al-Shahada also said that residents were prepared to contribute approximately USD 10 million towards financing infrastructure projects, to be allocated to rehabilitating sewerage networks, opening and paving roads, and installing electricity lines and other essential services. Residents are therefore proposing an alternative based on regularising the area’s urban and service conditions in place, rather than relocating them to replacement complexes whose terms, financing and guarantees remain unclear.
This process demonstrates that North Sakka requires urban planning, but that the dispute concerns the nature of that planning. The model proposed by residents is based on distinguishing between different cases, widening roads, providing services and compensating specific affected people. Planning through removal, by contrast, turns the crisis of planning and services into a means of reshaping the entire area and relocating its residents elsewhere.
Investment instead of regularisation
In late May, Raqqa Governor Abdul Rahman Salama said in an interview with Syria TV that the proposed North Sakka project was in residents’ interests and aimed to regularise informal settlements in the area. Residents, however, also report that he used the expression “turning Raqqa into Dubai” while discussing the removal of encroachments and the area’s reorganisation. This expression reinforced their fears that the plan was closer to an investment project than to an urban and service-related regularisation process. The governor said that the committee formed by residents had not conveyed the situation accurately and that everyone would benefit and be satisfied.
Salama had previously told SANA in early April that the plan would extend over 2 to 4 years and have an estimated cost of approximately USD 250 million. This financial scale places North Sakka within a broader vision for reconstructing Raqqa and attracting investment, rather than within a limited municipal response to building violations. According to official statements, the plan is based on launching major investment projects to be implemented and managed by Chinese and Saudi engineering and construction companies, with North Sakka identified as the focal point for implementing these projects. The plan also includes relocating some economic and industrial functions from inside the city to areas outside it, including industrial activities, livestock markets, the wholesale fruit and vegetable market, and slaughterhouses, to the nearby open area of Sahl Al-Banat, alongside recreational projects on the banks of the Euphrates.
In other words, the project concerns not only North Sakka, but also the redistribution of the city’s functions between a centre whose density is to be reduced, the outskirts reorganised to accommodate relocated activities, and other sites offered for investment. The problem lies in the gap between the plan’s scale and the limited information disclosed about it. A search for the investors or companies sponsoring and developing the North Sakka planning project revealed no clear financial disclosures, explicit names of implementing bodies, contracting mechanisms, or criteria for selecting investors in official statements issued by the governorate council.
This uncertainty also extends to the criteria for compensation and alternative housing. The governor’s promises to residents remained verbal, with no documents specifying who would qualify for compensation, how the value of homes, facilities and land would be assessed, when replacement flats would be delivered, and whether they would genuinely be provided before demolition.
Some residents, including Abdo Al-Khoja, have also raised questions about Governor Abdul Rahman Salama’s background in the contracting sector and whether his company—Al-Raqi Construction Company, which was established in the city of Sarmada in Idlib in 2020 and was widely accused of monopolising the contracting and reconstruction sector under the rule of the Salvation Government affiliated with Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham—has any direct or indirect connection to the project.
There is no evidence supporting such a connection. However, the lack of disclosure concerning the implementing companies and contracts keeps the question of a conflict of interest open, particularly when a local official with a previous background in construction leads an urban and investment project of this scale.
In this sense, the North Sakka case extends beyond the fate of 4,000 threatened housing units. It reveals a pattern in the administration of urban areas following the transfer of power to the transitional administration, in which the future of land is determined by the governorate and investors, while residents are asked to accept compensation or relocation without written guarantees, meaningful participation in the decision, or a precise distinction between different rights and circumstances.
The central issue becomes whether urban planning will begin by regularising the status of the existing neighbourhoods, enabling their residents to remain and improving their services, or by transforming the land into a new real estate market under the heading of removing encroachments and attracting investment.
A test of fair planning
The North Sakka case reveals the interaction of three central dynamics. The first is legal: residents rely on layers of usufruct rights, handover records, contracts, and powers of attorney, while the municipality reduces the situation to a violation on agricultural or public land. The second is urban: the area is no longer an empty agricultural belt, but has become a residential and economic mass formed over years of agricultural decline, the breakdown of irrigation networks, displacement and the absence of planning. The third is investment-related: the planning project appears to be part of a broader vision for reshaping Raqqa and attracting companies rather than a plan for regularising residents’ rights in their existing locations.
The dispute, in this sense, is not about the need for urban planning. North Sakka requires the classification of rights, a distinction between established housing and recent encroachments, improved services, wider roads, and compensation for specifically affected residents. The disagreement concerns which party has the authority to define the nature and direction of planning.
If planning begins with investment maps and verbal promises of compensation, the cost of moving from disorder to regulation will be borne by residents who lived in an administrative and service vacuum created by successive authorities. If it begins instead with a publicly accessible register of rights, written compensation criteria, and disclosure of investors and contracts, it could become an entry point for a fair settlement.
The significance of North Sakka extends beyond Raqqa. In many Syrian cities, reconstruction projects will encounter existing neighbourhoods, rights that are difficult to document, and residential histories formed during war and the absence of the state. The measure of fairness in urban planning therefore becomes the ability of residents to remain decision-making participants in the future of their areas, rather than merely recipients of compensation or relocation.
Without this condition, the regularisation of informal settlements may become a new name for removing low-income families, small landowners and usufruct holders from sites whose value has increased, and reintroducing the same land into a real estate market whose conditions they cannot meet.
