Agrarian Reform Lands in Hassakeh: Landowners Reject Legalisation of Seizure

In the Hassakeh governorate, tensions between the original owners of private agricultural land seized by the state between the 1950s and 1970s and the beneficiaries of that land threaten to spark a crisis compounded by the absence of independent judicial institutions or specialised technical committees to resolve such historical property disputes.

Two types of public expropriation of private agricultural land exist in Hassakeh. The first was carried out under Agrarian Reform Law No. 161, issued in 1958 during the union between Syria and Egypt. This law set a maximum private ownership limit of 80 hectares for irrigated and cultivated land, and 300 hectares for rain-fed land. Any land exceeding these limits was seized by the state in return for compensation. The state became the owner of the confiscated land and distributed usufruct rights to small farmers. Each farmer’s share was not to exceed eight hectares of irrigated and cultivated land, or 30–45 hectares of rain-fed land, depending on rainfall levels.

Beneficiary farmers were required to pay for the allocated land over 40 years and could not dispose of it before making the full payment. As a result, the state remained the legal owner of much of the land affected by agrarian reform, since administrative and bureaucratic obstacles often prevented formal transfer of ownership, or the beneficiaries could not complete their payments. The land therefore remained under the state’s name. Through the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, the state continued to lease the land annually to beneficiaries.

The second type of expropriation in Hassakeh was carried out under the Arab Belt project implemented in 1974, which aimed to change the demographic composition of Kurdish-majority areas along the border with Turkey and Iraq. Usufruct rights were granted to Arab farmers from Raqqa and Deir-ez-Zor, whose lands had been submerged by Lake Assad after the construction of the Euphrates Dam. Known as the “Ghamr Arabs,” they were given these seized lands by the state under usufruct or rental contracts. However, original landowners view what happened as an unjust seizure of their lands, while many beneficiaries consider that they have acquired legitimate rights through their long-term use and continuous work on them.

In recent months, following the fall of the Assad regime in December, some beneficiaries or tenants began selling the land informally, without oversight. As a result, protest statements were quickly issued in Hassakeh by a number of original landowning families, whose properties had been seized either under agrarian reform laws or during the Arab Belt project, rejecting the sale or use of their lands without their consent.

For example, in the Amouda district, the Jouli and Wadi families issued separate statements in April warning against what they described as “the widespread buying and selling of Kurdish lands confiscated by the Syrian government in the 1970s and granted to the Ghamr Arabs,” stressing that such sales and purchase contracts were invalid.

A similar situation occurred in Malikiya, where the Miro, Qass, and Misti families issued separate statements in April and May, firmly rejecting the “legalisation of unjust and arbitrary expropriation” of their lands and opposing any sales or transfers of ownership before a legal solution restores the rights of the original owners. The Misti family’s lands are in the village of Bourza; the Qass family’s lands stretch between the villages of Sweidik and Hassaniya; and the Miro family’s lands lie in the villages of Mouzlan, Kerki Miro, and Kerki Mahmou.

Salar Miro told The Syria Report that the Agrarian Reform Law had reduced his family’s holdings to less than 10 percent of their total area, costing them more than 1,000 hectares. He confirmed that the family still holds ownership documents for the land. He added that the beneficiaries include Kurdish farmers from the area under the reform law, Ghamr Arab farmers, as well as several state farms.

Elias Qass, grandson of Hanna Qass, recalled that the seizure of his family’s lands began in 1965 with the confiscation of 800 dunums in the Hassaniya village. These were turned into state farms and then distributed to the Ghamr Arabs. Two years later, the governor of Hassakeh submitted a report to the Ministry of Agriculture recommending the reduction of large family estates divided among several heirs. On this basis, a further 6,663 dunums belonging to the Qass family in the Sweidik village, owned by his father and eight uncles, were confiscated. According to Mr Qass, a “riot control” force was present to supervise the confiscation, including the seizure of the harvested wheat. The family was unable to resist despite their public objections.

He added that the family filed a lawsuit and won favourable rulings from both the Court of Cassation and the Court of Appeal in Hassakeh in 1966, but these judgments were never enforced. The authorities later offered financial compensation, which the family refused, arguing that they had not given up the land voluntarily and that the state had not even honoured compensation agreements with those who had. For them, the right does not expire by prescription, and they continue to demand the return of their property.

The Qass family’s concerns grew after some local beneficiaries under the agrarian reform laws began selling their lands to investors establishing farms around Malikiya (also known as Derik). Elias Qass noted that sales were not limited to Ghamr Arab beneficiaries but also included those who had benefited under agrarian reform.

The dispossessed landowners argue that allowing beneficiaries to dispose of their lands through sales or investment, without resolving the original legal issue, entrenches past expropriations and creates the potential for new social tensions. They insist that any dealings with these properties must be preceded by fair judicial mechanisms that restore recognition of their violated property rights, acknowledge the political motives behind their expropriation, and recognise the injustice they have suffered.

On the other hand, many beneficiaries fear that their usufruct rights could be revoked and the land returned to its original owners. Some have already sold or invested in these lands, treating old usufruct contracts as ownership documents. Many no longer live in the area, have abandoned farming, and have sold the land for conversion into commercial or residential projects. These transactions are usually carried out through informal, unregistered contracts. In some cases, beneficiaries promote the idea that these lands are “state property” or “disputed lands” to facilitate disposal. This has further alarmed original owners and stoked tensions, especially in Kurdish and Christian majority areas such as Amouda and Derik.

According to lawyer Fahd Jankeer, the issue is not simply a property dispute. Rather, many families still hold original ownership documents that remain legally valid. He argues that any sale or investment of these lands by beneficiaries or their heirs is unlawful without the consent of the original owner. He said there are two categories of beneficiaries: some who exploit state-owned lands, and others who benefit from lands still documented in the names of their original owners. He added that the contradiction between existing ownership of seized lands and active usufruct rights, without judicial resolution, threatens to trigger local crises if either side attempts to impose a fait accompli by force, particularly in the absence of independent courts or specialised committees to adjudicate such historical property disputes.