Pro-Government Factions Seize Farmlands in Eastern Lattakia Region

Since the military campaign carried out by the Ministries of Defence and Interior in March, the eastern Lattakia countryside has witnessed a series of sectarian violations, ranging from killings, looting of properties, and widespread seizure of agricultural lands. These violations were concentrated in Alawite villages and carried out by armed factions loyal to the transitional government, whose members returned to the area after the Assad regime’s fall.

Some of the land grabbers rely on old ownership claims dating back to before the issuance of the Agrarian Reform Law of 1958, while in practice these lands have, for decades, been registered in the names of beneficiaries. The original claimants insist that their lands were unjustly confiscated in the 1950s and 1960s, while current beneficiaries argue that they have acquired rights through long-term registration and investment in the land.

Amid the current weak trust in state institutions and fear of retaliation, many affected individuals are unable to reclaim their rights or file complaints. The Syria Report contacted the Ministry of Agriculture in the Transitional Administration to inquire about the status of these lands and the ongoing dispute over them, but received no response.

In the eastern Lattakia countryside, there is sectarian diversity and intermingling between Sunnis and Alawites in mixed villages. At the beginning of the conflict, the Sunni areas revolted against the Assad regime and were subjected to severe repression, which culminated in June 2012 with regime forces storming the predominantly Sunni city of Al-Haffa, leading to the displacement of most of the city’s residents and those from surrounding villages with similar demographics. After the fall of the Assad regime, the displaced from Al-Haffa returned, including fighters and leaders of the armed opposition, among them extremist Islamists. This fuelled a wave of sectarian violence in March, including collective violations against Alawites, such as killings, kidnappings, looting, and seizure of properties and agricultural lands.

Although obtaining precise figures is difficult, cross-referenced testimonies gathered by The Syria Report indicate that leaders of these Sunni factions seized hundreds of hectares, particularly in the Haffa subdistrict, forcibly evicting owners under threat of arms.

The Alawite village of Al-Mukhtaria in the Haffa subdistrict witnessed one of the largest violations during the March military campaign. One resident told The Syria Report that his five sons were killed and that he lost his land, his sole source of livelihood. He received threatening messages from those who seized his land, in which they claimed to have “reclaimed what was rightfully theirs and would not back down.”

In the neighbouring village of Jabrioun, another witness spoke of a faction leader from the Haffa area seizing his farmland and the house he had built on it. “We did not seize any property that wasn’t ours. I inherited this land from my father, who inherited it from my grandfather. There is no legal basis for what they have done. They simply threatened us with weapons and expelled us from our land and our only source of income,” the witness said, adding that  residents receive no support from state institutions and do not dare file complaints for fear of retaliation, which could subject them to the same violence they faced last March.

Faction leaders justify their land seizures, according to conversations leaked to the original landowners, by claiming that these lands historically belonged to their families before the issuance of the 1958 Agrarian Reform Law. However, these lands were later registered in the names of their beneficiaries after 20 years of utilisation, becoming legally registered properties within the Land Registry.

Agrarian Reform Law No. 161, issued in 1958 during the era of Syrian-Egyptian unity, was the first law to impose ceilings on agricultural land ownership. According to the law, the state seizes any holdings exceeding the legal ownership limit, providing compensation. The state becomes the owner of the seized surplus lands and distributes usufruct rights to small farmers. The benefiting farmer is required to pay for the land over a period of 40 years. Thus, the state retains ownership of the land’s title, while the farmer has usufruct rights only. The beneficiary farmer is prohibited from transferring the land until its full price has been paid. The law allowed beneficiaries of the land redistribution process to register these lands in their names in the real estate records, after obtaining approval from the Agrarian Reform Institution, provided they had held usufruct rights for twenty years.

Fear of retaliation and the futility of legal pathways push many affected individuals into silence. Many who have lost their lands or were forcibly evicted under threat do not trust the neutrality or fairness of current state institutions and fear that filing a complaint could expose them to retaliatory acts, bringing them back to the climate of violence experienced during the March military campaign. During the official press briefing presenting the final report of the investigative committee into the events of Syria’s coastal region, there was no mention of the seizures of homes and agricultural lands, nor was there any recommendation to provide fair compensation to the affected and displaced individuals.

Asaad, from the village of Barashbo, managed to reach “a high-ranking officer” from the armed faction that seized his land and presented him with official documents proving his ownership. Asaad said that the officer told him “these matters are decided by the Sheikh,” without providing any further information. Asaad stated that “the Sheikh” has become the de facto authority in the area, intervening in everything from land ownership disputes to issuing official death certificates for those killed in recent massacres.

Witnesses interviewed by The Syria Report spoke about the Sheikh’s extensive authority and mentioned what they described as a “War Loot Committee” affiliated with Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), which oversees the distribution of seized lands among faction leaders controlling the area.

Instead of resorting to legal channels to resolve current land disputes, the armed factions rely on force and employ religious and military figures parallel to the state, such as “the Sheikh” and the “War Loot Committee.” While the newly affected individuals face legal incapacitation and social fear, there are no signs of official intent to address the violations.