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Home1 / HLP2 / Green Tabu3 / Reconstruction and the Right to Housing in Syria: Toward a Transitional Policy that Protects Property and Reduces Real Estate Investment Risks4
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Reconstruction and the Right to Housing in Syria: Toward a Transitional Policy that Protects Property and Reduces Real Estate Investment Risks

05-10-2026/in Green Tabu, Policy Briefs /by Mazen Ezzi

Written by: Main Kafa

 

Executive Summary

This paper concludes that reconstruction in Syria cannot be managed as an urban planning or investment matter separate from housing, property and return rights. With millions of Syrians still displaced or living abroad as refugees, a large portion of the housing stock damaged, and the cost of reconstructing residential buildings reaching levels beyond the state’s current capacity, any reconstruction process undertaken before rights are established and property disputes addressed risks producing a new wave of exclusion. The problem, therefore, lies in the possibility that urban planning and external financing may become mechanisms for redistributing property, reducing the rights of original residents, or making those affected bear the cost of reconstruction through shares and deductions. 

The plans proposed in some Damascus neighbourhoods, particularly Jobar and Qaboun, show that the risk lies in an investment model that may precede the establishment of rights and place investors ahead of homeowners. While some residents are calling for a clear regulatory framework, such as Planning and Urban Development Law No. 23 of 2015, the model of financing reconstruction through companies and deductions from future allocations raises concerns that return could be turned into a real estate deal. The transitional administration therefore needs a transitional housing policy that begins with establishing property rights, recognising alternative documents, regulating debris removal, supporting repair and self-construction, and involving local communities before launching zoning plans or incorporating destroyed areas into real estate investment calculations. 

First: The policy problem

The transitional administration in Syria faces reconstruction within a highly complex housing and rights context. The issue extends beyond rebuilding destroyed homes or repairing infrastructure and involves 3 interconnected problems: a severe shortage of housing, widespread difficulties in proving ownership and housing rights, and a major need for external or investment financing amid the state’s limited resources. This overlap risks turning reconstruction into a new source of property and social conflict unless it is preceded by a clear rights-based framework. 

Waves of return that began in late 2024 have started to reveal the limits of the current approach. Return is not achieved simply by opening roads or issuing administrative decisions. Returnees need habitable homes, the ability to repair their homes, the opportunity to prove their rights to them, or fair alternatives. With millions of Syrians still displaced or living abroad as refugees, a large part of the housing stock damaged, and reconstruction costs rising, housing has become the first practical condition for any safe and stable return. 

The problem becomes more complex in informal settlements, semi-urban areas, and areas classified as agricultural despite having been used for housing for decades. In these areas, many residents do not rely on formally registered title deeds, but on unregistered contracts, financial and judicial documents, powers of attorney, local testimonies, or facts of long-term occupancy. Relying on the Land Registry alone as the standard for proving ownership rights may exclude wide sections of the population, especially displaced people and refugees who have lost their documents or are unable to access them.

At the same time, the cost of reconstruction places considerable pressure on the transitional administration and pushes it to seek financing arrangements that depend on investors and companies. Introducing investment into the reconstruction process before residents’ rights are established creates a double risk: destroyed neighbourhoods may become subject to rezoning and deductions, while the rights of owners and residents may be converted into shares or compensation that does not guarantee their return to their original locations. 

These risks are clearly visible in the ongoing discussions around the reconstruction of some Damascus neighbourhoods, particularly Jobar and Qaboun. The dispute does not revolve around the principle of urban planning itself, but around the model that will govern it. Will planning be carried out as a tool to establish rights and integrate damaged areas into the formal urban fabric, or as a mechanism for financing reconstruction through broad deductions from owners’ rights and by prioritising companies over rights-holders?

On this basis, the basic policy problem is the absence of a clear transitional housing policy that precedes investment and zoning plans. Reconstruction requires a different order of priorities: establishing rights before removing debris, recognising alternative documents before redistributing ownership, involving residents before adopting plans, and defining fair financing mechanisms before making those affected pay the cost of reconstruction from their future shares. Without this framework, reconstruction may turn from an entry point for return and reparation into a tool for redistributing property and producing new grievances. 

Second: The scale of the housing and return crisis

Indicators of destruction, displacement and return reveal that the housing crisis in Syria goes beyond urban planning or traditional real estate financing. According to a United Nations Development Programme report issued in February 2025, around 325,000 homes were completely destroyed during the war, while between 600,000 and 1 million homes sustained partial damage, leaving 1 in every 4 Syrian households without adequate shelter. This means that a large part of the housing stock is now out of use or requires repair and rehabilitation before residents can return. 

This gap in housing supply coincides with renewed population pressure. According to World Bank data updated in July 2025, Syria’s population reached around 24.67 million people in 2024, compared with 22.87 million in 2011, an increase of around 1.8 million people. Although these estimates rely on a broad population definition that usually includes refugees who are not permanently settled in countries of asylum, they suggest a cumulative housing demand resulting from natural population growth during the years of war, in addition to the needs of returnees and displaced people.

Data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) also indicate that displacement and refugeehood remain widespread. As of December 2025, there were 4.3 million registered Syrian refugees in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt. On June 4, 2026, UNHCR estimated that around 1,672,052 people had returned since December 8, 2024. It also reported on April 21, 2026 that around 5.5 million people remained internally displaced inside Syria, despite the return and resettlement of more than 1.8 million internally displaced people since December 2024. This means that the housing sector is simultaneously facing the pressures of continued displacement and actual return. 

The crisis deepens in informal settlements and semi-urban areas, where housing and property were already precarious before the war. According to 2010 estimates, unlicensed housing or informal settlements accounted for between 30 percent and 40 percent of all housing in Syria. A 2013 academic study showed that informal housing areas accounted for around 40 percent of total residential land in Damascus, Aleppo and Hama, and around 66 percent in Lattakia and Daraa, while the area of informal housing in Raqqa was more than 4 times the area of planned housing. The World Bank database, based on UN-Habitat data, also indicates that around 27 percent of the population lived in informal settlements before the war, rising to around 41 percent by 2022. 

These figures have a direct significance for return policies. A large proportion of displaced people and refugees come from informal or semi-urban areas or from neighbourhoods that suffered widespread destruction, where it is difficult to prove ownership or obtain compensation through the Land Registry alone. Therefore, increasing the housing stock or reducing rents is not enough to address the crisis. The housing file needs a direct link between return, proof of rights, rehabilitation of infrastructure, and the provision of alternatives for people who cannot repair their homes or prove their ownership through traditional methods.

The cost of reconstruction reveals the limits of the state’s and the market’s ability to address the crisis without a clear policy framework. According to World Bank estimates issued on October 21, 2025, the cost of reconstructing residential buildings alone amounts to around USD 75 billion, out of a conservative total reconstruction cost estimate of USD 216 billion. Compared with Syria’s nominal gross domestic product, which reached around USD 20 billion in 2023 according to World Bank data, the cost of reconstructing residential buildings alone represents around 3.75 times annual GDP. The total reconstruction cost amounts to nearly 10 times the expected GDP for 2024. 

The housing crisis poses a double policy dilemma. On the one hand, the state lacks sufficient resources to rebuild the damaged housing stock or absorb waves of return. On the other hand, the market alone cannot produce affordable and fair housing for the groups most affected by war and displacement. Therefore, relying on investment without prior safeguards to protect rights may turn the financing crisis into a new entry point for reducing residents’ rights, instead of being a tool to support their return and stability.

Third: Risks in the legal and institutional framework

The legal risks in the housing sector begin with the question of proving rights. After years of displacement, forced displacement, destruction and property seizures, many residents find themselves required to prove a housing or property connection that the war severed both materially and administratively. When official bodies rely on the Land Registry alone or treat alternative documents as secondary evidence, the burden of the war is shifted onto rights holders themselves, and return is transformed from a right into a complex evidentiary process that many displaced people and refugees cannot navigate. 

This problem takes on a broader dimension in informal settlements, semi-urban areas and areas classified as agricultural, where housing and property relationships were often based on unregistered contracts, powers of attorney, financial and judicial documents, service and tax receipts, or local testimonies. In these cases, the Land Registry alone does not reflect the actual landscape of rights. Restricting proof to official deeds therefore excludes broad groups from protection despite their actual and continuous connection to the land or home. 

The accumulation of legislation related to housing, land and property has worsened this risk. The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic stated in its January 21, 2021 report that at least 40 laws related to housing, land and property had been issued since 2011. This accumulation created a complex legal environment in which confiscation, seizure, expropriation, urban planning and the de facto takeover of properties belonging to absent and displaced people overlapped. The transitional phase therefore requires a comprehensive approach to property rather than scattered procedures that address individual cases while leaving the underlying legal structure unrevised. 

The transitional administration has taken some steps in this direction. These include Decree No. 16 of 2025 concerning the cancellation of precautionary seizure decisions issued between 2012 and 2024 under the directives of the security services, in addition to later decisions lifting some precautionary seizures. These measures are an important entry point for addressing some of the effects of using property as a punitive tool during the Assad regime. But they remain limited if not accompanied by a unified national mechanism for receiving property claims, examining alternative documents, settling disputes, and protecting the rights of absent people, refugees, women, and heirs.

Local mechanisms have also emerged to address some cases of property seizure, such as committees examining clear cases of property extortion, meaning the obvious and overt seizure of property without legal grounds. These committees are useful when the usurper and the rights holder can be clearly identified. They remain insufficient to address the broader body of complex housing rights, particularly in areas where common property, unregistered contracts, long-term occupancy, lost documents and damaged records overlap. In this sense, these committees reveal the need for a broader institutional framework rather than the partial treatment of only the clearest cases. 

The same risks emerge in the issue of debris removal. Removing rubble is not a neutral technical or service operation, because it may erase features that help residents prove their ownership or possession, such as the remains of houses, property boundaries, and the features of neighbourhoods, streets and alleys. Therefore, launching debris removal before documenting rights, features, and alternative records weakens the ability of residents, especially holders of unregistered or shared property, to prove their connection to the place later.

Protecting rights, therefore, requires a multi-source institutional approach. This approach includes the Land Registry, judicial and financial records, notary archives, private contracts, powers of attorney, service and tax receipts, and local testimonies, subject to clear safeguards for verification and the prevention of forgery or exploitation. It also requires a freeze on any large-scale debris removal or the launch of zoning plans in damaged areas before residents’ original rights are documented. Without this condition, reconstruction measures may become a new mechanism for weakening property rights and the right of return rather than a means of reparation.  

Fourth: The Jobar and Qaboun Model — The Cost of Reconstruction and Who Pays It?

The proposed plans for reconstructing Jobar and Qaboun provide a tangible model of the risks that may result from introducing investment into the reconstruction file before rights are established. The issue in these two neighbourhoods is not residents’ rejection of the principle of urban planning, but their rejection of a financing model based on bringing in foreign companies to implement the project and its infrastructure in return for receiving a large percentage of the project area.

According to reports from a meeting held at Damascus Governorate on March 13, 2026, the proposed share for foreign companies could reach 50 percent of previously zoned areas and 70 percent of informal settlements built on land classified as agricultural. This means that the cost of reconstruction would not only be financed through investment but would, in practice, be deducted from the rights of owners and affected residents by converting a large portion of the future project area into a share for the implementing companies. 

By contrast, some actors from Qaboun issued a statement on March 29 entitled “Towards Fair Reconstruction that Preserves Land and Dignity,” calling for the adoption of Planning and Urban Development Law No. 23 of 2015 as the framework for rezoning, while granting owners the right to partition, establish joint-stock companies and choose contractors. The importance of this position lies in its distinction between urban planning as a tool for establishing and redistributing rights within a legal framework and urban planning when it becomes a cover for imposing an investment model on rights holders. 

The sensitivity of this model increases in areas that fall outside formally zoned areas or on land classified as agricultural, despite having been used for housing for decades. In these cases, handling land according to its administrative classification alone may reduce residents’ rights, lower their future shares, and ignore the value of existing buildings and the reality of long-term occupancy. In addition, multiple owners or heirs in a single property may turn the original ownership into small shares that are insufficient to obtain alternative housing.

The case of Jobar and Qaboun raises a central policy question: who pays the cost of reconstruction? If the project is financed through broad deductions from owners’ rights, reconstruction turns from a path for reparation into a process of property redistribution. But if planning is carried out after rights have been established, and within clear mechanisms for valuation, distribution, and objection, it can become a tool for reintegrating destroyed neighbourhoods into the urban fabric without pushing original residents out.

Fifth: Public policy options

The transitional administration needs a transitional housing policy that precedes investment and zoning plans and treats housing as a condition for return rather than as a delayed outcome of reconstruction. This policy can be based on 6 interconnected options. 

1- A housing policy for the most vulnerable groups: Housing policy should begin with families that cannot return or repair their homes using their own resources and that lack bargaining power in the real estate market. This includes displaced families, returnees to destroyed or uninhabitable homes, female-headed households, older people, persons with disabilities, heirs and absent persons. Prioritising them requires transparent criteria and the linking of housing support to the condition of the original home, the degree of damage, and the family’s legal and living conditions. 

2- Support for regulated repair and self-construction: Residents’ initiatives to repair their homes using their own resources have demonstrated a viable social pathway for return. This pathway can be transformed from an emergency response into a regulated option through technical, engineering and legal support provided by municipalities and the competent authorities. This includes structural-safety guidance, facilitating temporary or phased licences, and providing small grants or concessional loans to families able to undertake repairs, thereby reducing the need to wait for major reconstruction projects that may take years. 

3- A multi-source mechanism for proving ownership: Protecting rights requires moving beyond exclusive reliance on the Land Registry. Property and housing in many areas, especially informal settlements and semi-urban areas, are based on alternative documents or facts of long-term occupancy. Therefore, a verification mechanism should be adopted that combines the Land Registry, judicial and financial records, notary archives, private contracts, powers of attorney, service and tax receipts, and local testimonies. This allows the protection of rights-holders who lost their documents or whose ownership was not duly registered.

4- Involving municipalities and neighbourhood committees: Municipalities and neighbourhood committees have local knowledge that is necessary for identifying original residents, assessing damage, and understanding patterns of ownership and occupancy. They should therefore be involved in documenting rights, reviewing plans, setting service priorities, and monitoring implementation. This involvement must take place within controls that prevent the monopolisation of local representation or its use to exclude absent people, refugees, women, and marginalised rights-holders.

5- Controlling real estate speculation: The post-war period creates favourable conditions for consolidating property holdings and purchasing damaged properties at low prices, especially when owners or displaced people are forced to sell because of financial need or fear of losing their rights. The real estate market therefore requires tax and regulatory instruments that limit speculation, monitor large-scale property sales in destroyed areas, and prevent reconstruction from becoming an opportunity to exclude original residents from their neighbourhoods. 

6- Suspending Urban Planning and Debris Removal Until Rights Are Established: Establishing rights is a precondition for any large-scale debris removal or the launch of zoning plans in damaged areas. Removing rubble may erase physical markers that help prove ownership or possession, while undertaking urban planning before rights are verified may convert existing ownership into unfair shares or compensation. Properties, physical markers and alternative records must therefore be documented, objections must be permitted, and rights holders must be identified before destroyed areas are incorporated into urban planning or investment projects. 

Sixth: Implementation recommendations

1- The transitional administration should issue a temporary national framework for housing, land, and property, linking any reconstruction project to the establishment of rights first, and setting clear rules for proving ownership, debris removal, compensation, objection, and the representation of absent people, refugees, women, and heirs.

2- The relevant ministries and central bodies should suspend any zoning or investment plans in destroyed areas until the initial documentation of rights and property boundaries and features has been completed. They should also open a local claims register that allows rights holders to submit official and alternative documents and local testimonies through a clear verification mechanism. 

3- Municipalities and administrative units should establish local housing and property centres responsible for collecting documents, providing administrative guidance, registering objections, coordinating debris removal and repair work, and ensuring the participation of neighbourhood committees without excluding absent people or weaker groups.

4- Donors and international organisations should direct part of their funding to direct programmes for housing repair and regulated self-construction, instead of limiting support to major infrastructure projects, while linking funding to standards for protecting rights and preventing secondary displacement.

5- Legal and engineering organisations should support joint local clinics that provide residents with free or low-cost advice on proof of ownership, structural-soundness inspections, damage assessment, the pursuit of objections, and the documentation of rights before rubble removal or replanning. 

6- The transitional administration and municipalities should introduce temporary instruments to control real estate speculation in destroyed areas, including monitoring large-scale property sales, restricting purchases made under duress, and documenting property waivers. These measures should prevent economic need and fear of losing rights from becoming drivers of property consolidation and the exclusion of original residents. 

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https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png 0 0 Mazen Ezzi https://hlp.syria-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Logo-300x81.png Mazen Ezzi2026-10-05 12:48:052026-10-05 13:08:13Reconstruction and the Right to Housing in Syria: Toward a Transitional Policy that Protects Property and Reduces Real Estate Investment Risks

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