Qaboun: From Systematic Demolition to Urban Planning

After years of covering from afar for The Syria Report the destruction and rezoning of the Damascus neighbourhood of Qaboun, one of our correspondents was able to directly assess the situation there post-Assad and realised that the scale of destruction surpassed all his prior expectations, with entire residential areas completely wiped out.

The destruction is concentrated in four main zones that surround the neighbourhood and extend significantly within it:

1. The area stretching from the bus terminal to the Air Force Intelligence Branch near the entrance of Harasta.
2. The area extending from Al-Baala, adjacent to the orchards west of Harasta, to the Hwarneh Bridge in the centre of Qaboun.
3. The strip of land adjacent to the international highway, approximately 500 metres deep.
4. The area of Al-Nahr Street, from the Grand Mosque to the Municipality Roundabout.

Systematic demolition since 2012

Opposition factions controlled Qaboun from 2012 to 2017, prompting the regime to adopt a policy of systematic demolition, particularly due to the neighbourhood’s proximity to Abbasiyyin Square in the heart of the capital and the fear of it becoming a forward base for the rebels. Initially, the demolitions aimed to push factions away from Damascus by preventing them from using buildings for infiltration, positioning, sniping, or shelling the capital. Later, the demolitions expanded to widen strategic roads between Damascus and vital areas in the Damascus countryside and to secure supply lines.

Demolition began in July 2012, following the outbreak of the first battles, targeting around 2,000 homes and commercial properties. The operations stretched from the Air Force Intelligence Branch near Harasta to the new building of the Electricity Distribution utility and the Hijazi Petrol Station. In 2013, the demolitions temporarily halted after the opposition gained control of the industrial zone but resumed later that year after the regime recaptured the area. Subsequent operations destroyed remaining buildings, reaching a bus terminal and textile company.

The residential area known as “Above the Highway” suffered extensive destruction during battles in 2013, especially near the international highway, where the regime completely destroyed the Al-Muhannad sector. Between February and May 2017, the destruction escalated with renewed intense battles. The regime employed “Elephant” rockets and TNT hoses launched by Russian UR-7 mine-clearing vehicles, leading to near-total destruction of the districts of Al-Baala and the Alwan Project, and the strip adjacent to the Damascus-Homs highway.

In 2017, regime forces regained control of the neighbourhood through a reconciliation agreement and forced displacement. Approximately 130 families remained, while 400 families were displaced to Idlib. Thousands of others fled to Damascus, its countryside, or abroad.

Rezoning and planning

Following the opposition’s withdrawal, the Damascus Governorate initiated planning processes for rezoning the neighbourhood, while widespread demolition of the area continued. The planning targeted two main zones:

1. The industrial zone of Qaboun

On September 14, 2021, Decree No. 237 was issued to establish the Northern Entrance to Damascus Zoned Real Estate Area, under the provisions of Law No. 10 of 2018, which allows for the creation of one or more such zoned areas within the general master plan of administrative units. Decree No. 237 established the zone based on Detailed Plan No. 104 for the Qaboun industrial area, approved in June 2019. The new zone encompasses the Qaboun industrial area and 50 hectares taken from Harasta in the Rural Damascus governorate.

Decree No. 237 reclassified the area from industrial and agricultural to residential and commercial. Detailed Plan No. 104 granted Damascus Cham Holding, a public joint-stock company owned by the Damascus Governorate, the right to appoint one of its management companies to oversee, manage, and execute the rezoning of the Qaboun industrial area, including the signing of all necessary contracts.

2. Residential Qaboun

In June 2020, the Damascus Governorate announced the issuance of Detailed Plan No. 105 for the residential area of Qaboun, under the provisions of the Urban Planning and Cities Law No. 23 of 2015. The plan excluded the zoned residential area of Abu Jarash west of Qaboun, which remained under regime control during the war, and the informal settlement of Tishreen north of Qaboun, which suffered extensive wartime destruction.

The governorate approved the plan in July 2020 and opened a one-month window for objections. The objections were to be reviewed, and Plan No. 105 was expected to be approved and issued through a special decree, similar to the industrial Qaboun plan. However, this has not occurred and no justification has been provided for the delay.

Law No. 23 grants administrative units several options for rezoning informal settlements:

1. Applying the provisions of Law No. 23.
2. Applying the provisions of Real Estate Development and Investment Law No. 15 of 2008 (as amended) based on agreements between the real estate developer and property owners or the administrative authority.
3. Applying the provisions of the Expropriation Law to implement the zoning plan for the area.

Systematic demolition after displacement

Parallel to the planning efforts, organised demolition and looting began under the supervision of Ali Mahmoud Al-Amr, nicknamed “Al-Hout,” a former special forces fighter who participated in the Qaboun battles alongside the Fourth Division and the Republican Guard. After completing his military service in 2018, Al-Hout began working as a demolition and iron extraction contractor through agreements with officers of the Fourth Division.

With the evacuation of Alwan Project, Al-Baala, the highway strip, and Tishreen neighbourhood, these areas became primary targets for demolition and looting. Al-Hout supervised the use of heavy machinery to demolish buildings, employing specialised workers to extract iron from roofs and concrete columns. They collected iron at several locations, including Al-Baala near the the Electricity Distribution utility building, the central neighbourhood near Ugarit Institute, and by the international highway near the factory and offices of Syronics, a state-owned company.

They weighted the extracted iron at scales, and workers were paid based on weight, with Al-Hout offering SYP 500–1,500 per kilogramme. According to testimonies, trucks transported the iron to factories owned by Mohammad Hamsho for reprocessing in Adra Industrial City.

Despite contracts ensuring exclusivity to the Fourth Division, Al-Hout diverted some iron to the black market. Loading and transportation continued at a rate of two trucks per day until the regime fell, with the last two trucks leaving on the morning of December 7.

Conclusion

Qaboun is one of the areas most affected by the conflict, and underwent successive phases of battles, destruction, forced displacement, and controversial rezoning efforts. Questions remain about the ability of the original residents to return, the feasibility of rebuilding, and achieving social justice. Qaboun is not merely a geographical area but a complex story reflecting the trajectory of Syria’s war and its ongoing repercussions.