Decree No. 16 Lifts Security Seizures Without Dismantling the Exceptional Framework
On May 11, the head of the transitional administration Ahmad Al-Sharaa issued Decree No. 16, which cancels precautionary seizure orders issued between 2012 and 2024 by the Ministry of Finance upon the instructions of security agencies, in accordance with Law No. 63 of 2012 on the Powers of Judicial Police Authorities.
Decree No. 16 of 2025 does not include the cancellation of precautionary seizure orders issued by judicial bodies, such as the Antiterrorism Court, the Public Prosecutor, or the Investigating Judge. It only applies to orders issued by security agencies.
Law No. 63 of 2012 granted judicial police authorities the power to send written instructions to the Ministry of Finance to impose precautionary seizure on movable and immovable property belonging to individuals accused of terrorism or of crimes related to internal or external state security. The law is highly controversial, as it expanded both the range of authorities granted judicial police powers and the scope of cases in which these authorities could impose such seizures. Under the law, judicial police authorities came to include security agencies, investigating judges, and the public prosecutor at the Antiterrorism Court.
The investigating judge, who is part of the judiciary and responsible for investigating a case before it is referred to the criminal court, originally had no authority to impose precautionary seizure orders under the Syrian Code of Criminal Procedure. In contrast, the public prosecutor at the Antiterrorism Court is authorised under the 2012 Antiterrorism Law (Law No. 19) to freeze the assets of individuals accused of terrorism, in effect imposing a precautionary seizure.
It is important to clarify the relationship between security agencies and judicial police powers. Under the Assad regime, security agencies were granted broad and unchecked powers, often operating outside any legal framework. This enabled them to detain people without referring them to the judiciary. Law No. 63 of 2012 further expanded their powers by allowing them to instruct the Ministry of Finance to impose precautionary seizure on the property of detainees. This included those accused of terrorism under Law No. 19 of 2012, political opponents charged with crimes affecting state security, and offences listed in the 1949 Syrian Penal Code (Decree No. 148). Security agencies routinely accused regime opponents of terrorism or state security crimes without awaiting trial. Under Law 63 of 2012, they were granted the authority to impose precautionary seizure directly. Only after a terrorism accusation would the individual be referred to the Antiterrorism Court.
Decree No. 16 of 2025 does not address all these details. It revokes only the precautionary seizure orders issued by security agencies and does not redefine the scope of authorities granted judicial police powers or effectively curtail them. The decree could have annulled all seizure orders made under Decree No. 63 of 2012 rather than limiting the annulment solely to those based on security agency instructions.
Decree No. 16 instructs the Ministry of Finance, in coordination with the Ministries of Interior and Justice, to take the necessary executive steps to expedite the lifting of these seizures. As a result, joint meetings have been held between the ministries to form specialised committees tasked with preparing lists of individuals whose assets were precautionary seized, with the aim of addressing their cases.
In addition, Decree No. 16 did not address either the numerous cases in which seizure and confiscation of property were already executed. A portion of the precautionary seizure orders issued against the property of individuals detained by security agencies or tried in absentia had been converted into executive seizures by the Antiterrorism Court. This exceptional court consistently convicted individuals whose names were referred to it by the security agencies in terrorism-related cases. The court would then send its final decision to the Ministry of Finance, which would inventory the confiscated assets and coordinate with the Directorate of Cadastral Affairs to transfer ownership of immovable property to the state. After the ownership of the confiscated immovable assets was registered under the name of the state by judicial ruling, they were managed by the Ministry of Finance through the Directorate of Seized Assets and its regional offices.
Accordingly, the precautionary seizure orders that were converted into executive seizures through judicial rulings by the Antiterrorism Court do not fall within the scope of Decree No. 16 of 2025. The decree did not address the annulment of judicial decisions – even those issued by exceptional courts – meaning that individuals whose properties were confiscated by rulings of the Antiterrorism Court will not benefit from the seizure-lifting procedures.
Despite the symbolic and procedural significance of Decree No. 16 as the first attempt to lift precautionary seizure orders, it leaves wide areas of violations unaddressed. The decree focused exclusively on lifting precautionary seizures issued by security agencies, while a broad range of other seizure decisions remain untouched – including those issued by the Antiterrorism Court, investigative judges, and other authorities granted judicial police powers. Likewise, precautionary seizures that were converted into executive seizures through rulings by the Antiterrorism Court were not subject to any reversal or cancellation.
The decree also failed to address the expansive powers granted under Decree No. 63 on judicial police authorities, which enabled security agencies to interfere directly in matters of property without effective judicial oversight. Ignoring these legal pathways stands at odds with the commitments laid out in the Constitutional Declaration and with the principles of transitional justice that the transitional administration is expected to uphold.
What is needed today is not merely the lifting of seizures, but the restoration of rights through legal mechanisms that ensure the return of confiscated properties to their owners or provide adequate compensation, and that dismantle the exceptional framework imposed by the former regime in its treatment of property and collective punishment.
