Investment of Vacant Lands Belonging to Displaced Alawites from Rural Hama

Ali is an Alawite resident from the village of Asila in the rural part of the Hama governorate. Like many Alawites from 12 villages and towns in the Ghab Plain and the northeastern part of the governorate, he lived in his home, built on land he inherited from his father, planted with olive and pistachio trees.

Between 2020 and 2024, these villages turned into a front line between Assad regime forces and opposition factions. This proximity to the front line made these towns and villages vulnerable to repeated attacks and mutual shelling with artillery and drones, resulting in the destruction of many homes and the devastation of agricultural lands.

These Alawite villages in the Ghab Plain border villages that were previously inhabited by Sunni residents, who were forcibly displaced by regime forces during their latest campaign in the region in 2020. Since then, their agricultural lands have been subjected to intensive investment operations, known as absentee auctions.

With the launch of the ‘Deterrence of Aggression’ (DoA) battle by Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) and allied factions at the end of 2024, life for the residents of these Alawite villages was turned on its head. In December 2024, opposition factions entered the area to find that most of the villages had been emptied of their Alawite residents. The residents of the 12 villages and towns, including Marioud, Al-Zughba, Al-Talisiyah, Maan, Al-Fan, and Abu Mansaf, had fled to safer areas like the Syrian coast, Masyaf, and Salamieh. Despite the displacement, the vacant properties of the Alawites in these villages were not spared from deliberate destruction by groups from the DoA forces, involving burning, looting, and seizure.

Ali says that hundreds of people fled his village of Asila and went toward Tartous. Those who were able to leave did so and rented in safer places. “The main problem is the absence of security and the fear among residents of moving around or engaging in any activities,” he said.

Nadia, from the village of Maan, was displaced with her family and most of the village’s residents after the launch of the DoA operation. The homes in her village “were looted, stolen, and then burned,” she told The Syria Report, adding that what matters to her today is not her burnt house but the recovery of her land, fearing that her trees might be cut down, as happened in many neighbouring villages.

Yasser, who was displaced from the village of Marioud, said that “the seizure of lands and sectarian harassment is targeting Alawites exclusively among the area’s communities.” He added that the Sunni residents (Bedouins from the Tuqan tribe) of those villages did not leave; only the Alawites did. “Some Sunni families remained, with whom we had good relations, and they became our main source of information about what was happening in our villages,” he said. According to Yasser, one of his Sunni neighbours informed him that local Alawite homes “were completely looted, crops were stolen, even the electric wires were ripped from the walls, wells were filled in, and solar energy projects financed by loans or long-term instalments were stolen.”

After the fall of the Assad regime, many of the displaced Sunnis , who had been forcibly displaced in previous years during the Syrian war, fleeing regime offensives, returned to their homes and lands in their abandoned towns in rural Hama and the Al-Ghab Plain, adjacent to the 12 Alawite villages. Many of these returnees reclaimed their lands individually, sometimes resorting to the Public Security Forces or the Ministry of Defence under the interim government to prove ownership and evict current occupiers.

The Al-Muwali tribe, many of whose members had previously fought alongside the armed opposition against regime forces and were forcibly displaced to Afrin in the Aleppo governorate, also returned to eastern rural Hama. Besides aligning against the Assad regime during the Syrian war, many members of Al-Muwali joined Jabhat Al-Nusra in 2013, which later rebranded as HTS in 2018, and returned with it as part of the DoA operation that led to the fall of Assad’s regime.

Some returning members of the Al-Muwali tribe did not return to their original areas in eastern rural Hama but instead moved into the 12 Alawite villages, where some seized vacant houses. Others preferred to live on agricultural lands, setting up tents and bringing livestock. This caused severe damage to the fruit trees, especially olive and pistachio trees, which are not easily replaced and require many years to bear fruit again.

A commander nicknamed Abu Khaled Al-Salafi, leader of a local militia from the Sunni town of Al-Samra in eastern rural Hama, returned to the region as part of the DoA battle. Al-Salafi, who previously pledged allegiance to ISIS before joining Jabhat Al-Nusra, inspected the situation in Marioud adjacent to Al-Samra after the fall of the regime. Eyewitnesses reported that Al-Salafi admitted there were difficulties in dealing with the Al-Muwali tribe, who had caused significant damage to crops in Marioud and other villages. According to eyewitnesses, Al-Salafi said that the tribespeople could only be removed if the original residents – meaning the Alawites – returned. He indirectly called on the Alawites to return. “If they return, we will protect them and their lands in exchange for a share of the revenues,” he reportedly said.

On the other hand, some leaders among the displaced Alawites agreed to appoint as “Emir,” Abu Moataz Al-Shaish, a notable from the Al-Muwali tribe, to mediate with members of his tribe, representatives of the interim government, and militia leaders allied with the Ministry of Defence to protect their vacant properties and prepare for the return of the displaced. However, this mediation yielded no results due to a lack of cooperation from representatives of the interim government. As in many similar mediation processes, no women were involved, despite the direct impact these issues have on displaced women.

Local sources told The Syria Report that a closed meeting took place in early April at the office of Younes Fares “Abu Al-Yaman,” a leader in HTS from the neighbouring town of Souran, who was appointed on January 17 as head of the District of northern rural Hama. The meeting discussed the “investment in Alawite lands.” It remains unclear what Abu Al-Yaman’s actual role entails, what the title ‘head of district’ signifies, and how a meeting addressing a sectarian issue could occur without any formal accountability.

However, there were also reports that an “economic committee” affiliated with the governorate was supervising the seizure of absentee Alawite properties. Sources from the governorate denied any involvement in the investment process, further deepening the ambiguity and lack of trust. It remains unclear whether this process is an organised and official measure managed by the Hama governorate under the new governor appointed by HTS, or merely an initiative by local de facto powers.

Additionally, some displaced Alawites told The Syria Report that they received messages from individuals claiming to represent Iktifaa Company for Agriculture Investment, offering them contracts to lease their lands for two years or sell them at USD 1,000 per dunum. The Syria Report obtained a copy of one of these contracts, stamped with the company’s name and sent via WhatsApp to one of the displaced individuals for the purpose of investing in their land.

These rapidly unfolding developments indicate a worrying trend of investing in absentee lands, indicating that some actors aim to take full advantage of what could only be a temporary displacement crisis – perhaps aiming to keep absentees away more permanently through apparently coercive contracts. This problem is exacerbated by the absence of any trustworthy authority working to reassure people and facilitate their return to their areas. This dynamic may be even more complicated for displaced women, who often have weaker legal ties to property ownership (for instance, when assets are registered under male family members’ names), making them more vulnerable to exploitation during efforts to reclaim their rights.