Post-Conflict Rights: Utilising Vacant Land Belonging to Forcibly Displaced Absentees

The Syria Report is publishing a series of articles titled “Post-Conflict Rights,” highlighting major violations of housing, land, and property rights during the rule of  the Assad regime, particularly in the period following the 2011 uprising and concluding with the regime’s fall on December 8. The series also proposes potential solutions to address these violations under a transitional justice framework in the post-conflict phase.

Since 2021, the Bashar Al-Assad government implemented a systematic process across the governorates of Hama, Aleppo, Raqqa, and Idlib to utilise land belonging to forcibly displaced absentees who fled to opposition-controlled areas in northwest Syria. This was achieved by offering the land for investment through public auctions. Over time, the process evolved institutionally, with committees formed and official laws and decrees introduced to legitimise it. While the primary aim was to generate revenue for the regime, this practice posed significant risks to the ownership rights of these lands, many of which are classified as Amiri properties (state-owned land that reverts to government ownership if abandoned for over five consecutive years).

The process began with local committees – tally and survey committees – established at the local or regional level. These committees included representatives from government institutions, such as agricultural directorates, local administrative units, and land registries, working in coordination with security agencies to identify vacant land. Their primary objective was to locate land owned by forcibly displaced individuals or absentees and classify it as vacant, making it eligible for auction-based investment or allocation.

To achieve this, the committees conducted field visits to identify uncultivated or abandoned land, referencing property records held by agricultural directorates and land registries. They categorised the land (e.g., agricultural, orchards, fisheries, or barren) with a particular focus on high-value plots such as pistachio and olive orchards. The committees also collected information from remaining local residents about the land, including ownership status and the absence of its owners.

The committees issued public notices urging landowners to prove ownership or demonstrate that they were not absent. If no response was received within a specified period, the land was classified as vacant. For instance, in July 2021, the Hama Agricultural Directorate gave pistachio landowners a one-month deadline to submit ownership documents to avoid inclusion in auction listings. Based on these committee findings, thousands of hectares across Hama, Aleppo, Idlib, and Raqqa were listed for investment through public auctions.

In Idlib alone, over 10,000 hectares (in the part of the government under regime control) were identified for auction. On May 28, 2024, Idlib’s local authorities issued Announcement No. 276, requesting pistachio orchard owners to submit proof of ownership to exclude their land from auctions for the 2024–2025 season. If no documents were submitted, the land would be auctioned for investment by others. 

Similarly, the Hama Agricultural Directorate issued urgent calls for landowners to prove ownership, resulting in thousands of hectares being classified as vacant and offered for investment through public auctions. These auctions included high-value cultivated land (e.g., pistachios, olives, figs) as well as uncultivated barren land intended for seasonal crops or grazing. Announcements for auctions were made through governorate offices, administrative offices, and occasionally via official social media accounts. The process involved centralised bidding events held in designated venues, with representatives from the governorate and agricultural directorates present.

Investors were required to submit specific documentation, including investment applications, technical files, ownership proof, financial clearance, and security approvals. Auctions established a minimum bid amount based on land type and expected yields. Successful bidders paid an initial deposit (a set amount per hectare) and a final deposit representing 10 percent of the winning bid. Following the auction, the winning bidder signed an official agreement to take possession of the land and committed to adhere to the agricultural plans set by the Ministry of Agriculture.

The process allowed residents in regime-controlled areas who were relatives of displaced landowners to invest in the land under two categories:

• First-degree relatives (parents, spouses, children) could directly invest in the land without participating in auctions, provided they presented inheritance documents, family records, or civil registry extracts proving kinship, along with security approval and payment of an investment fee set by the governorate.
• Second- and third-degree relatives (grandparents, siblings, cousins) required a mutual agreement among relatives to determine the investor. The agreed-upon individual could then invest at the final auction price, with a 10 percent discount on the last bid amount.

This approach often led to disputes among relatives, especially over jointly owned land. Economic hardships pushed many displaced individuals to request their relatives in regime-controlled areas to invest in their land and share the profits.

In 2022, the cabinet extended this practice to other regime-controlled regions, aiming to manage and regulate agricultural land investment, particularly high-value crops like pistachios and olives. Cabinet Decision No. 12011 of 2022 outlined the framework for first-degree relatives investing in vacant land, including auction procedures and application requirements. The decision also drew on inheritance laws, even requiring inheritance documents for landowners who were still alive.

While this initiative generated substantial revenue (SYP 32 billion from displaced absentee land auctions in Hama in early 2024) it raised significant concerns about ownership rights. Many of the lands were Amiri lands, with ownership rights at risk under Article 775 of the Civil Code, which stipulates that ownership is forfeited if the land is not cultivated for five consecutive years, allowing the state to reclaim it.

Any future Syrian government will face significant challenges in addressing housing, land, and property rights violations from the past decade. Resolving the issue of vacant land will require mechanisms to compensate displaced absentee owners and current investors upon restitution of land to its rightful owners. Local reconciliation efforts will also be needed to resolve inheritance disputes and ownership conflicts among relatives.

Revising laws on Amiri lands, particularly Article 775 of the Civil Code, is essential to prevent the arbitrary seizure of land from displaced owners. The principle of Article 379, which protects rights for absent or legally incapacitated individuals, should be upheld in all conflict zones, including those with forcibly displaced Kurdish populations.

By addressing these issues, transitional justice mechanisms can provide a path to restoring housing, land, and property rights while fostering reconciliation and stability in post-conflict Syria.