Properties of Former Regime Officials Seized in Rural Damascus

Within days of the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, the seizure of properties from former security and military officers, especially Alawites, quickly became widespread across the Rural Damascus governorate.

This phase was marked by the rise of the influence of Salafi clerics appointed by Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) to manage the affairs of these areas in practice, holding authority over daily decisions, including approving or preventing property seizures. This occurred as the role of the existing judiciary and the new official institutions continued to decline. Additionally, some areas saw the establishment of formal offices specialising in identifying and seizing properties, including numerous homes, even if their owners were not directly affiliated with the former regime.

Muhannad, an officer from the Lattakia countryside, owned a house in a suburb of Damascus, which he purchased with money borrowed from his father in 2003. After the regime’s fall on December 8, a group of armed men claiming affiliation with HTS, responsible for the suburb, arrived at his home for inspection. The group members used sectarian slurs and accused Muhannad of benefiting from privileges granted by the Assad regime due to his rank. They deemed his continued service until the regime’s collapse an act of treason, justifying their seizure of his house. Muhannad was given a week to leave with his personal belongings, excluding furniture, while a group of gunmen remained stationed at the building entrance, causing considerable anxiety for his family.

Subsequently, Muhannad attempted to appeal to the armed group’s leaders, emphasizing that he was merely an administrative officer, without any weapons outside his office, and had not participated in any military operations since 2011. He failed to convince them. He said one of the leaders told him he should be grateful that they hadn’t planted weapons in his house during the search to falsely accuse him of possession.

Muhannad quickly filed a complaint with the police, but the officer reprimanded him, stating that merely mentioning his “high military rank” in the report was incriminating. Nevertheless, the complaint was accepted, and Muhannad sought assistance from former regime-affiliated civil servants still in office. These employees contacted the Ministry of Interior, which issued a recommendation to the sheikh responsible for the suburb. The sheikh subsequently ordered the armed group to vacate Muhannad’s house.

HTS has initiated a series of unofficial appointments of clerics adhering to the Salafi jihadist ideology, granting them authority over various sectors and regions. There are no clear legal frameworks defining the powers of these clerics, but numerous cases suggest they wield significant influence over municipalities, armed factions, and the police.

The armed group was dissatisfied with the decision, issuing threats and asserting they did not recognise the government’s authority. The sheikh advised Muhannad to temporarily leave the area for his and his family’s safety until the security situation improved. Consequently, Muhannad and his family traveled to Lattakia, deciding to abandon the suburb entirely and sell their house once the economic situation stabilised.

In another example, Marwa, a government employee, lived with her husband and children in a suburban Damascus home they owned. The family fled to a coastal town on the night of the regime’s fall, fearing retaliation since Marwa’s husband had worked as an agent in one of the regime’s security branches. After the situation somewhat calmed, they returned to the suburb, as they had no other residence. When she returned to work, Marwa faced repeated questioning from her newly appointed superiors from the transitional administration about her husband’s role.

Shortly afterward, HTS appointed a sheikh in charge of the suburb, who authorised the seizure of properties belonging to former regime officials. Among the seized properties was Marwa’s family home, which was empty at the time. Marwa approached her manager for help, but he informed her that nothing could be done to prevent the factions from taking the house. The factions claimed to have found military equipment inside the house, though Marwa’s denials had no effect.

Marwa also attempted to contact the sheikh responsible for the area, but her efforts were in vain. She tried to involve notable figures from the community, yet no progress was made. Notably, her husband was never summoned for interrogation, nor was he pursued legally or subject to an arrest warrant. This indicates a significant issue related to property seizures without any legal or criminal justification.

A second example illustrates a new mechanism emerging in the region. Local sources reported the formation of an official “Seizure Office” in one of the Damascus countryside towns, tasked with confiscating the homes and properties of former regime officers or officials. The office also seized vacant homes regardless of the owners’ affiliations. So far they have seized an estimated 150 homes, including one that had been occupied by a group of sisters. The justification for seizing this house was that their brother had been a regime-affiliated official. The brother, who had died years prior, was a member of a pro-regime militia. The house was neither owned by him nor registered in his name.

News of property seizures in Damascus suburbs quickly spread to displaced people in northern Syrian camps. Many began flocking to municipal offices in the Damascus countryside, seeking accommodation in the seized homes. At least one municipality started allocating these properties to newcomers from the north.