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Explained: Distribution of State-Owned Land to Farmers in the Al-Ghab Plain

04-06-2024/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

The conditions for distributing state-owned agricultural land to farmers were established by Decree No. 166 of 1968, but the distribution of state-owned land to farmers in Al-Ghab Plain, Tar, Al-Ala, Al-Asharna, and Al-Rouj Plain was carried out under a special legislative decree a year later under Decree No. 66 of 1969.

These areas are considered extensions of Al-Ghab Plain and are administratively part of Hama Governorate, except for Al-Rouj Plain, which belongs to Idlib Governorate. These areas were originally swamps that were drained in the 1950s, transforming into fertile agricultural plains known for growing strategic crops such as cotton, sugar beet, sunflower, wheat, and tobacco.

Decree No. 66 of 1969 stipulated that the land distribution to farmers would be free of charge, provided the irrigated land does not exceed four hectares and the rain-fed land is not less than two and a half hectares. These areas are smaller than those distributed to farmers under Decree No. 166 of 1968, which was based on Article 13 of the Agrarian Reform Law No. 161 of 1958. Article 13 stipulated that the land area should not exceed eight hectares for irrigated or tree-planted land, and between 30-45 hectares for rain-fed land, depending on the annual rainfall rate.

Decree No. 66 of 1969 set conditions for distribution in Al-Ghab Plain, Tar, Al-Ala, Al-Asharna, and Al-Rouj Plain, including that the beneficiary must be a Syrian citizen, of legal age, primarily engaged in agriculture, and without sufficient income from other owned or invested agricultural land to support their family. These conditions are almost the same as those specified in Decree No. 166 of1968.

In addition to the above conditions, Decree No. 66 of 1969 prioritised distribution based on certain categories, giving preference to those licensed to benefit from agricultural land in those areas and the current tenants of state-owned land in the regions specified by the decree, who do not have another source of income.

Following this, the decree gave priority to “gardeners,” though it did not clearly define them, typically referring to those who care for trees. They are followed in rank by those who replaced absent licensees or worked on vacant lands, provided they have farmed the land for at least one agricultural season. Agricultural workers are at the bottom of the priority list.

Specialised committees appointed by the Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform are responsible for the distribution process in the specified areas. These committees include farmers among their members. Their decisions only become effective after approval by a higher committee chaired by the Minister of Agriculture. This higher committee also includes representatives from the General Union of Farmers, the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, and the Distribution and Survey Director of the General Directorate of Cadastral Affair.

Beneficiaries of the land distribution must cultivate the land themselves, adhere to the investment and production plans set by the Ministry of Agriculture, and reside in the areas designated by the ministry. Failure to meet these conditions results in the forfeiture of the land, which is reclaimed and re-registered in the state’s name, with no right to claim compensation for the beneficiary’s effort and expenses.

Beneficiaries are prohibited from transferring the land or establishing any property rights on it, such as usufruct or easement rights for others, under penalty of distribution cancellation. However, the beneficiary may mortgage the land in exchange for a loan from the Agricultural Bank.

If the beneficiary of the land passes away, their heirs may assume the right to use the land, provided they meet the aforementioned conditions. If the heirs do not meet these conditions, the right to use the land transfers to the cooperative association to which the farmer belongs in the area. However, the heirs will be reimbursed for any investments and improvements made by the deceased on the land.

The distribution deeds serve as legal documents enabling the farmer to register the distributed land in their name in the land registry, whenever the Ministry of Agriculture decides. This means that the right to use the land (usufruct) can become full ownership, contingent on a decision by the Ministry of Agriculture, without specifying a timeframe. Consequently, some farmers possess ownership deeds for their land in the area, while others still hold beneficiary status.

Under Law No. 61 of 2004, which amended the agrarian reform laws, beneficiaries become full owners of the land, whether it is state-owned or agrarian reform land. Ownership is retroactively effective from the date of land distribution and is recorded in the land registry based on a request from the Directorate of Agriculture in the governorate. This is not the case in Al-Ghab Plain, Tar, Al-Ala, Al-Asharna, and Al-Rouj Plain.

Decree No. 66 of 1969 required landowners in the decree’s jurisdiction, who were not beneficiaries of the distribution, to adhere to the agricultural investment plans set by the Ministry of Agriculture. This is seen as a restriction on the owner’s right to manage their agricultural property, particularly since they did not benefit from the distribution process.

Explained: Badia Lands

07-05-2024/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

After being approved by the Parliament in its session held on February 2, 2024, Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad issued Law No. 7 of 2024, amending certain articles of Law No. 62 of 2006 concerning badia (“barren” or “steppe”) lands. The amendments included an increase in the financial penalties imposed for the following violations of badia lands: grazing livestock, deforestation, farming and agriculture.

Law No. 7 of 2024 distributed the value of those fines collected as follows: 80 percent go to the general treasury, and 20 percent to personnel with judicial authority and employees of the General Commission for Badia Management, Development and Protection (GCBMDP).

Badia lands are subject to the management of the GCBMDP, established under Decree No. 78 of 2011, with the aim of developing, protecting, and enhancing the local community, resources, infrastructure, and coordinating with relevant entities to implement economic, social, environmental, and service development programmes in the badia.

The amendments included granting branches of the GCBMDP in the governorates the right to seize cultivated badia lands, farming tools and machinery, and crops and sell them by mutual agreement according to contract law, and deposit their value in the general treasury of the state.

According to No. Law 7 of 2024, the Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform can appoint personnel from the GCBMDP and its branches, empowering them with judicial authority after they take the legal oath before the Civil Court of First Instance. These personnel are responsible for enforcing regulations against those who trespass on prohibited lands for farming, cultivation, or grazing, and for seizing the tools and crops used. Violations are referred to the branch of the GCBMDP, which then submits them to the Public Prosecutor’s Office to initiate public prosecution against the trespassers.

These new judicial authorities are supported by local committees for badia protection formed by governors in their governorates, each chaired by the relevant district director, with membership from a staff member of the branch of the GCBMDP, a staff member from the Farmers’ Union in the governorate, and a land surveyor from the State Property Department.

Law No. 7 stipulates that the demarcation of badia lands is going to be done by decree based on the proposal of the Minister of Agriculture, including the fixation of badia land boundaries on maps and plans. Syrian media reports suggest that the area of badia lands is approximately 8 million hectares, out of 18 million hectares representing the entire area of Syria.

Previously, Law No. 62 of 2006 considered badia lands as state-owned properties. Consequently, badia lands are now subject to Law No. 252 of 1959, retroactively regulating the provisions of state-owned properties. Law No. 62 of 2006 prohibits the acquisition of rights to dispose of these lands due to possession, and prohibits occupation without a licence. This is confirmed by Article 2 of Law No. 62 of 2006, which does not allow encroachment on badia lands and does not recognise any rights for encroachers.

It is worth noting that Amiri lands are state-owned properties. The difference between them and badia lands is that the state grants individuals the right to dispose of Amiri lands, whereas it does not grant this right over badia lands.

Furthermore, those who encroach upon badia lands no longer have the right to claim compensation equivalent to rent if they are removed from the land they occupy. Compensation equivalent to rent is the value of renting a similar property in the same area, if it is leased or invested in regularly. Those who encroached upon badia lands before the issuance of Law No. 62 cannot acquire the right to be registered in the Land Registry if delimitation and census processes have been carried out on the land.

Law No. 62 exempted from the prohibition anyone who had previously acquired a proprietary right over badia lands by virtue of a judicial decision made before the issuance of the previous law for badia lands, Law No. 140 of 1970. This law had recognised rights of usufruct and disposal for badia lands prior to its issuance date, but it prevented the acquisition of any proprietary right over these lands after its issuance.

Additionally, Law No. 62 exempted those with registered rights on badia lands in the Land Registry before the mentioned date. The law also exempted lands expropriated under Law No. 161 of 1958, the Agrarian Reform Law. In fact, these rights do not need a provision to exempt them because their holders have obtained decisions or registered them.

Law No. 62 allowed the acquisition of certain rights over badia lands in only three cases: firstly, if the state sells them for the establishment of industrial, commercial, tourist, service, or agricultural facilities. Secondly, badia lands that fall within the zoning plans of administrative units. Thirdly, badia lands are subject to the Euphrates and Khabur dam projects and all irrigation projects implemented by the state.

Law No. 62 distinguishes between non-irrigated badia lands and irrigated badia lands, with specific utilisation methods outlined. The law prohibits the cultivation or farming of non-irrigated lands and limits their use to irrigation projects and animal husbandry only. As for irrigated badia lands, they benefit from government irrigation projects, which are invested in according to the plan set by the Ministry of Agriculture.

It is not yet clear whether badia lands, as part of state-owned properties, will be managed and protected by the General Commission for the Management and Protection of State Properties established under Law No. 43 of 2023, to manage and protect state-owned properties and maintain and invest in them to generate steady and permanent resources for the state treasury.

Government Plans to Convert Ghab Plain into a Private Agricultural Zone

07-05-2024/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

In recent weeks, several articles published in state-run news outlets discussed the possibility of converting Sahl Al-Ghab “Al-Ghab Plain” in western Hama into a “private agricultural zone.” It’s not clear what is meant by a private agricultural zone, and the regulations governing the agricultural sector have not addressed this concept before. Some articles have suggested that the private agricultural zone is similar to industrial zones and border crossings, where it would operate under independent management and work on developing the infrastructure of agricultural land to support farming and agricultural industries for their products.

It is worth noting that there is already an administrative and service-oriented authority, named General Commission for the Administration and Development of Al-Ghab (GCADA), based in the city of Al-Suqaylabiyeh in the rural parts of Hama. It enjoys legal personality, financial and administrative independence, and is linked to the Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform. This GCADA was established under Law No. 20 of 2005 to replace both the General Establishment for Forest Investment Management and Regulation, and the Directorate of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform previously working in Al-Ghab. However, the GCADA faces financial difficulties that limit its effectiveness, and today its role is largely advisory in agriculture, providing vaccines for animals, taking measures to prevent fires during the harvest season, and rehabilitating some irrigation channels sometimes with funding and assistance from international organisations.

Sahl Al-Ghab is located in northwestern Syria, between the coastal mountain range to the west and Mount Shahshabo and Mount Al-Zawiya to the east. The plain used to contain many water swamps on the banks of the Orontes River before they were dried up in the 1950s and converted into irrigated agricultural lands. The plain is a fertile, expansive plain, stretching between the governorates of Hama, Idlib and Lattakia, with a length of 80 kilometres and a width of 10-13 kilometres. Irrigation networks branch off from the Orontes River, making it rich in water resources.

A former employee at the Statistical Department of the GCADA told The Syria Report that the plain had suffered significant neglect before 2011, resulting in a decline in irrigated areas and pushing many farmers to focus on rain-fed crops. Meanwhile, Mustafa Al-Mohammad, the Director of Engineering and Technical Affairs at the GCADA, told the official Al-Baath newspaper on January 30, 2024, that large quantities of irrigation water are wasted in the plain annually, draining through irrigation channels into the Orontes River and then into Turkish-administered territories. He added, “We haven’t invested in a single drop of water since the 1950s, and there has been no comprehensive irrigation project for the Sahl Al-Ghab.”

Agricultural Land and Settlements in Sahl Al-Ghab

In Sahl Al-Ghab, land was distributed to farmers according to Law No. 66 of 1969, which amended Agricultural Reform Law No. 161. Law No. 66 of 1969 authorised the Ministry of Agriculture to distribute state-owned lands to farmers in certain areas, specifying that the irrigated area allocated to each family should not exceed four hectares and should not be less than two and a half hectares.

Farmers who benefited from lands in Sahl Al-Ghab locally are referred to as “licensed” or “investigated” farmers because local committees “investigated” their situations, considering factors such as family size, income level, and whether they owned or invested in other agricultural lands when distributing the land. The state had remained the owner of the land while the farmer had only the right to use it. The most recent amendment to the provisions of agricultural reform was through Law No. 61 of 2004, which considered the beneficiary’s ownership as full ownership, retroactively effective to the date of land grant, and registered in their name in the Land Registry. Under Law No. 61 of 2004, the majority of farmers in the plain now have official ownership documents from the Land Registry and are no longer mere beneficiaries.

In the plain, residential settlements are scattered, with a population of around 325,000 in 2010 according to figures circulated by the official press. Most of these villages formed from clusters of farmers who migrated to the plain after its drying and were allocated agricultural lands there under agrarian reform laws. Most of these migrants came from villages on the edges of the plain. Consequently, the plain appears to be divided longitudinally from north to south, with its eastern lands inhabited by farmers from Idlib, while its western lands are inhabited by farmers from Hama and Lattakia.

A significant portion of farmers and residents in the eastern part of the plain were forcibly displaced during the course of the war, becoming IDPs in opposition-held areas. Their lands are periodically put up for public auction by the governorates of Hama and Idlib for investment purposes. Currently, opposition forces control the northern parts of the Sahl Al-Ghab, making it constantly vulnerable to bombardment by regime forces. This impedes farming during periods of frequent military escalation. Additionally, mines are scattered in some areas of the plain, making water disposal there a dangerous task.

All these complexities make the inclusion of the concept of the “private agricultural zone” as a new legally undefined concept for investing in agricultural lands in Sahl Al-Ghab potentially detrimental to the rights of farmers and residents who were forcibly displaced to opposition-held areas.

Explained: The Right to Dispose of Amiri Lands

26-03-2024/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

The right of ownership entitles the holder to use, benefit from, and dispose of their property, according to Article 768 of the Syrian Civil Code. This means that full ownership grants the owner authority over the property, its benefits, and its disposal. Therefore, the right to dispose is a real right concerning the property, derived from the ownership right, enabling the holder to dispose of it.

The right to dispose of real estate is only used in reference to Amiri lands, which are owned by the state, and can be subjected to disposal rights. The state, as the owner of Amiri lands, grants individuals the disposal right to benefit from them, allowing them to use, exploit, and lease them. Disposal can be physical, such as digging or planting trees, or legal, such as transferring the disposal right to others while keeping the land’s ownership or the property’s base with the state.

The Syrian Civil Code does not include a definition of the disposal right but addresses it while defining the ownership right. The provisions related to the ownership right in the Civil Code apply to the right to dispose of Amiri lands, according to Article 772 of Civil Code No. 84 of 1949, unless the law states otherwise. This includes the scope of ownership, means of protection, limitations, reasons for acquisition, registration, and transfer.

Thus, the right to dispose is a limited ownership right, confined to granting the holder the authority to use and exploit the real estate, not its ownership. The right to dispose is similar to the right of usufruct in that both are real rights derived from the ownership right, but they differ in that the right to dispose applies only to Amiri lands, while the right of usufruct applies to owned real estate. Moreover, the right to dispose is a perpetual right that transfers to the heirs after the death of their ancestor, the disposer, whereas the right of usufruct is a temporary right that ends either when the term expires or upon the death of the beneficiary in all cases.

The right to dispose also differs from the ownership right in several respects:

Firstly, the ownership right pertains to real estate properties in administratively zoned and defined areas, whereas the right to dispose applies only to Amiri lands, where the state retains the ownership and grants others the right to benefit from them. Additionally, the ownership right recorded in Land Registries is a permanent right that does not expire with time, in contrast to the right to dispose, which expires if the land is not used for five years, according to Article 775 of the Syrian Civil Code.The right to dispose of Amiri lands can be registered in the Land Registry after 10 years from the date of possession if the possessor has cultivated the land, according to the judicial precedent set by the Court of Cassation in decision No. 293 of 1955.

The State Litigation Authority, which represents state institutions in legal proceedings whether initiated by or against them across various courts and levels, can claim the recovery of Amiri lands and convert them into private state property. This has not occurred in practice, but it remains a theoretical possibility, especially in the context of forced investments carried out by the state on properties belonging to forcibly displaced persons and those who have moved to opposition areas.

Secondly, in the event of death, the ownership right is subject to inheritance laws according to the Personal Status Law of 1953, which is based on Islamic Sharia, whereas the right to dispose of Amiri lands is governed by the Law of Transfer of Immovable Property of 1928. The 1928 law grants equal shares to both male and female siblings when dividing the inheritance among them. If a piece of Amiri land later falls within zoning boundaries and becomes privately owned property, this does not affect the heirs’ rights, and female shares cannot be reduced under the pretext that the legal status of the property has changed to privately owned and is subject to Islamic inheritance rules. The acquisition of rights by the heirs occurred before the legal status of the property changed, based on Article 825 of the Civil Code, which considers a person who inherits a property as its owner before registration. If Amiri land becomes privately owned before the disposer’s death, then the property is inherited according to the Islamic inheritance provisions in the Personal Status Law.

Thirdly, a property owner can endow it, meaning transfer it as a waqf (endowment) to the Ministry of Waqfs and its directorates, whereas those with the right to dispose of Amiri lands cannot establish an endowment right on them. Any waqf created on Amiri land is considered invalid according to Article 774 of the Civil Code.

Explained: Mixed Public-Private Sector Companies in the Agricultural Sector

13-02-2024/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

In late 2023, President Bashar al-Assad issued Law No. 40, which allows for establishing joint stock companies between the state and private investors operating in both the crop and animal agricultural sectors. The new law does not clarify the fate of the rights of workers and farmers on the lands where they work, including usufruct rights when the land ownership transfers to the new joint stock companies.

In Syria, mixed companies refer to companies in which the state partners with the private sector. Often, for a company to be considered mixed, the state must own a minimum of 25 percent of the newly-established company. This is also the case of the mixed joint-stock agricultural companies as specified in Article 2 of Law No. 40.

In practice, Law No. 40 replaces Legislative Decree No. 10 of 1986, which enabled the establishment of joint public-private sector companies in the agricultural sector for the first time since the Baath Party reached power in 1963.

The justifications for issuing the law include keeping pace with agricultural plans and production goals and encouraging companies working in the agricultural sector by giving them more flexibility to carry out their activities.

Law No. 40 requires companies that are established or adjust their status per its provisions to comply with the Companies Law issued by Legislative Decree No. 29 of 2011, which states that a joint stock company is a commercial company, regardless of its subject matter.

There are two types of such companies; the first is a public joint stock company consisting of no less than 10 shareholders, and the second is a private joint stock company consisting of no less than three shareholders. In both types, shareholders subscribe to tradable shares of equal value and can be sold or transferred to new partners. Applicants receive a certificate that includes their name and the number of shares they hold in the company.

Law No. 40 of 2023 considers the purpose of creating new companies to be agricultural work, allowing them to own and invest in agricultural land, provided that the company’s capital is not less than SYP 50 billion (approximately USD 3.5 million on the black market). The law also sets a maximum ownership limit for any one shareholder (along with their spouse or spouses and minor children) at five percent of the company’s capital shares, subject to the agricultural ownership limits stipulated in the agricultural reform laws and the agricultural property law. Neither Law No. 40 of 2023 nor the Companies Law No. 29 of 2011 specifies a limit on the amount of agricultural land a company can own.

Law No. 40 of 2023 grants these companies multiple facilities, exempting them from import bans and restrictions and allowing them to import all the needs of their projects and facilities, including machinery, equipment, vehicles, and fittings. The law also exempts these companies from all taxes, financial fees, local administration fees, customs duties, and other charges, regardless of their type and nature, for seven years after their first profitable balance sheet. These tax advantages were already present in Legislative Decree No. 10 of 1986.

Law No. 40 of 2023 also stipulates that if a company owns or invests in agricultural land, the acquired rights of the farmers and agricultural workers who were investing in it must be respected, per the laws in force before the issuance and enforcement of Law 40.

However, Law No. 40 did not specify which laws are referred to, leaving the method of respecting or compensating the rights holders unclear. For example, if there is a usufruct right on agricultural land, a joint stock company established under Law No. 40 can own that land. A usufruct right grants the beneficiary the right to use and exploit something, such as property or land owned by someone else. Law No. 40 did not clarify how to protect the usufruct right on that land, the fate of that right, or how its holders could be compensated due to the transfer of land ownership. The law did not set a deadline for compensating the holders of usufruct rights, the amount of their compensation, or even allocate them a number of shares in the newly established company.

Regime Forces Shell Farmland in Idlib

19-12-2023/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

Syrian regime forces continue to target farmers working in their fields near the front lines with opposition forces in the Idlib governorate. Over the past two months, regime attacks with shells, guided missiles and armoured drones have killed several farmers and have temporarily displaced farmers from the area, preventing them from harvesting their winter crops.

On November 30, a group of regime soldiers stationed in the town of Joreen in western Hama targeted an agricultural vehicle parked on the Qarqour-Frikeh road in the Ghab Plain in the west part of the Idlib governorate. The vehicle owners sowed their land with winter crops such as wheat, barley and legumes. The shelling destroyed the vehicle and left the farmers afraid to work on the land and its surroundings for fear of repeated shelling.

The towns of Qarqour and Frikeh are among the areas controlled by the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), affiliated with the Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) extremist Islamic group. It has become customary for regime forces stationed in the Joreen camp of the Sixth Division, at this time of year, to shell opposition-held agricultural areas near the front lines in Al-Ghab to remind farmers of the need to pay a kind of mandatory tax to allow them to continue working.

The shelling this season seems different, according to a local correspondent for The Syria Report, who said that the recent bombardment is part of a more organised campaign adopted by the regime forces targeting civilians in opposition areas.

Ahmed Yazigi, a member of the Syrian Civil Defence (White Helmets) executive board, told The Syria Report that from the beginning of 2023 until November 27, they had counted 18 missile attacks on agricultural areas under opposition control in northwestern Syria. These lands are the sole source of livelihood for their owners, hindering their right to benefit from them.

On November 28, a regime attack injured a father and two sons, with one of the sons having his arm amputated. At the moment of the attack, they were in their vehicle parked on their land between the towns of Kateyan and Zardana in eastern Idlib. After the frightened farmers, taking their wounded with them, took refuge in a nearby poultry farm, they were again subjected to shelling with a Cornet missile with a range of up to 8 kilometres, launched by regime forces stationed in a military base on a hill in the town of Kafr Aleppo in western Aleppo, where Iranian forces are also present.

This followed the shelling on November 16 of a bulldozer working on raising an earthen barrier to protect travellers on the Afs-Taftanaz road in eastern Idlib, which the regime forces have been shelling.

Mohammed Al-Qadi, a civilian from the village of Fouqfeen in southern Idlib, explained to The Syria Report the state of panic experienced by the town’s residents following a shelling that killed ten farmers from a single family, including children, while they were harvesting olives on November 25. Despite the olive picking season nearing its end, farmers have been unable to work in their fields since then, fearing they might be targeted again.

Notably, regime forces used advanced Russian Krasnopol (KM-1M Krasnopol-M2) artillery shells, which can be laser-guided or directed via drones, on the private farm in Fouqfeen.

Opposition sources confirmed to The Syria Report that the shelling coincided with the flight of Russian-made Orlan-10 drones. The shells were launched from a military site in the town of Shourlin in the Jebel Shashabo area south of Idlib, controlled by the 25th Special Mission Forces led by Brigadier General Suhail Al-Hassan, also known as “The Tiger,” who is backed by Russia. The sources confirmed that the site is about 10 kilometres from Fouqfeen and often witnesses the presence of Russian forces.

Mr Al-Qadi said that the farm was hit within the Idlib de-escalation zone and less than a kilometre away from the Turkish military point stationed on a hill in the town of Fouqfeen. The presence of this Turkish military point had previously helped reassure displaced residents of the town and residents of some neighbouring towns to return. Most of these residents are families working collectively in agriculture on their lands. The recent shelling caused a mass displacement from the exposed area vulnerable to shelling by regime forces.