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Property Fraud and Poor Services in the Yarmouk Palestinian Refugee Camp

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Recent reports of increased property fraud in the Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp in Damascus have prompted many displaced property owners to temporarily return, inspect their properties, and implement some protective measures such as installing doors and windows for houses and securing locks for shops. These individuals are required to obtain temporary security clearance to visit the camp.

Activists from the camp, including lawyer NourEddin Salman, have issued repeated warnings on social media in recent months about widespread property fraud occurring in the camp. These fraudulent activities have resulted in a surge of illicit property sales, with an increasing number of homes being sold illegally. A gang is reportedly selling many shares in undivided common properties in the area between Loubieh Street and the Yarmouk Girls’ School and has allegedly amassed around SYP 2 billion through this fraudulent and deceitful scheme, according to activists. Mr Salman advised anyone looking to purchase property in the camp to first inquire with neighbours about the seller and the property, verify ownership documents, ensure the validity of the sales contract, and obtain a current description of the property’s condition and boundaries from a court-appointed expert engineer.

Wafaa, a displaced resident of the camp now living in Damascus, learned from one of her former neighbours that a few individuals recently inspected her uninhabited house on Al-Urubah Street in the camp with the intent to buy it, according to a correspondent for The Syria Report. When Wafaa’s neighbour inquired, the individuals claimed they were there to view the house, which they said was for sale by its owner. After a discussion, the neighbour identified the person who falsely claimed ownership of Wafaa’s house and was trying to sell it. Based on this information, Wafaa filed a complaint with the Yarmouk Camp police station, which managed to detain the alleged seller who claimed ownership of her house. However, according to Wafaa, this individual was able to bribe the police officers, who then wrote in their report that the incident was a mistake rather than fraud, stating that the seller had mistakenly identified the house due to changes in the area’s landmarks caused by destruction.

Nizar, a Syrian Palestinian refugee from Yarmouk Camp currently residing in Sweden, told The Syria Report that he learned through friends still living in the camp that unknown individuals are renovating a house that belonged to Nizar’s grandfather. The house, located on Thalatheen Street, is partially damaged due to the fighting. Nizar confirmed that he has a court ruling proving his late grandfather’s ownership of the property. He added that his grandfather died in 2010, and then his father was killed in a bombing on the camp at the beginning of 2015, and consequently, the 105-square-metre house became the property of 21 heirs, including Nizar.

He noted that complications prevented them from completing the inheritance process, including the war, the siege of the camp, and the disruption of official institutions. Additionally, none of the heirs remains in Syria except for his uncle, who is disabled and unable to manage his affairs. Two of the heirs are missing, and their whereabouts are unknown.

The inheritance inventory document is the primary document used to determine the names of the deceased’s heirs, their relationship to the deceased, and their respective shares of the inheritance. This document can only be issued after the death of the testator, the registration of their death in the civil registry, and the issuance of a death certificate and a family record for the heirs. After this, the relevant court can be approached to obtain the inheritance certificate. The court then appoints an expert to identify the heirs and their shares of the estate.

Nizar pointed out that those renovating his grandfather’s property have a court-certified purchase contract for the house. He is unsure how someone without ownership was able to sell it to them. He plans to appoint a lawyer to challenge the validity of the sale contract in court.

According to The Syria Report’s correspondent, one of the common practices in the camp currently involves seizing adjacent properties or parts of them during the renovation of a specific property. This is done by encroaching on portions of neighbouring properties, exploiting the destruction and the loss of landmarks. According to activists in the camp, it appears that an influential person has usurped land next to the vegetable market on Palestine Street, which belongs to the General Authority of Palestinian Arab Refugees. The land previously contained buildings and homes that were destroyed, leaving only rubble, allowing the influential person to seize the land and build on it.

The correspondent reported that a real estate office employee in the camp mentioned that some fraud attempts were thwarted after news about them spread on social media. He added that with the increasing number of returnees to the camp, it is rare to find a neighbourhood without at least one inhabited house, which now serves as an early warning network for property owners in the same area, who often share relationships or kinship.

According to estimates by the Action Group for Palestinians of Syria in early June, approximately 50,000 people have returned to the Yarmouk Camp. Despite the concerted efforts by the returnees to improve the camp’s service conditions, they face many difficulties and challenges. For instance, the camp remains isolated from neighbouring areas, with only one entry and exit point via the Batikha roundabout in the Zahira neighbourhood.

Most areas of the camp still suffer from significant problems, such as some streets around the Yarmouk Camp cemetery and the entrance to the Zain neighbourhood (administratively part of Yalda) being flooded with sewage water from damaged and decayed pipes. Potholes abound on Safad Street, making it difficult for vehicles to pass, which hinders the return of displaced residents to the area. The lack of drinking water in many neighbourhoods and the absence of electricity limit stability in some regions. Residents of School Street have requested an electricity supply, but to no avail. Even Haifa Avenue, opposite the building of the Public Establishment for Transmission and Distribution of Electricity (PETDE), remains without electrical coverage. Residents resort to installing electric cables at their own expense in areas without electricity, but these either get stolen or removed by the PETDE, citing network infringement.

Rubble presents a major issue across most of the camp, still densely scattered in the Wasim Project, the Moroccan neighbourhoods, Safad Street, Kafr Qasim Street, and others. This problem is exacerbated by returnees clearing debris from their homes and neighbourhoods, often dumping it around the houses or transporting it to the PETDE’s land area on Thalatheen Street.

Meanwhile, the camp municipality has begun allowing owners of completely destroyed houses to remove the debris and manage it. Typically, these owners make agreements with building contractors to remove the rubble for free in exchange for the contractors taking the iron and metals from the debris to sell to metal traders.

Many Idlib Residents Unable to Preserve their Property Rights in Damascus

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AbdulHamid, aged 55, owns a three-story property in the Hajira area of Babila, south of Damascus. The building is licensed in a zoned area, and AbdulHamid holds an official ownership deed. However, he had to leave Hajira at the end of 2012 and return to his hometown in Jabal Al-Zawiya in Idlib due to fear of armed clashes as regime forces advanced towards Hajira.

In 2013, regime forces took control of Hajira, and since then, AbdulHamid has been unable to return and check on his property. Recently, he heard from an old neighbour that an officer from a pro-regime militia had seized his property in 2014. AbdulHamid fears he will not be able to obtain security approval if he wants to authorise someone with a power of attorney to sell his house on his behalf. He is also concerned that the officer who seized his property might take illegal steps to register the property in his name.

Many Idlib residents, like AbdulHamid, have lost access to their properties in Damascus and its countryside due to the disruption of free and direct movement between opposition and regime-controlled areas in northwestern Syria. This lack of access to their properties has encouraged regime loyalists to seize some of them.

Like many Syrians, some Idlib residents who studied and worked in Damascus and its countryside and stayed there, living and buying homes and properties. This includes public sector and government institution employees, as well as military and security personnel, traders, businessmen, and freelancers. In some informal settlements in Damascus, there are entire neighbourhoods populated by Idlib residents, most notably Al-Hafez Street in the informal Tishreen neighbourhood, primarily inhabited by Idlib migrants who were police officers and personnels.

After 2011, some of these residents returned to Idlib, fearing arbitrary arrests and the detention of people from rebellious governorates at checkpoints. A significant number of police officers from Idlib defected and helped form opposition factions in Damascus and its countryside, fighting against regime forces. Over time, as Idlib became the main stronghold of the Syrian opposition, the people of Idlib began to suffer from discrimination in regime areas. Gradually, many Idlib residents preferred to return and leave their properties and homes in Damascus and its countryside.

Ahmad, aged 46, owns a flat on the first floor of a licensed building in the zoned area of the town of Aqraba in the Damascus countryside. He was forced to flee and leave his flat at the end of 2012 to escape the nearby battles. Ahmad told The Syria Report that he left everything in his home as it was, hoping for a swift return. However, 11 years have passed since then, and his hope for a quick return has faded as he settled in his hometown of Binnish, eastern Idlib. Ahmad says he has no idea about the current condition of his flat, whether it is occupied or destroyed. He adds that he no longer has any means of obtaining information about his property.

Movement between regime and opposition-controlled areas remained possible until 2018 through the Morek crossing in the northern Hama countryside, but it was limited to a small segment of Idlib residents who were not wanted by security forces. The military campaign by regime forces against the opposition in northwestern Syria between 2018-2020 not only established the current borders between the opposition and regime areas but also reduced the direct transport between the two regions.

Idlib residents who remained in opposition-controlled areas in Damascus and its countryside were forced to leave during the forced displacement campaigns that accompanied the regime’s gradual recapture of those areas until 2018. Sharif, aged 38, from the city of Taftanaz in the Idlib countryside, had a flat in a licensed building in the zoned area of central Douma in the Damascus countryside. He stayed there until 2018 when regime forces seized it and forcibly displaced those who refused reconciliation to Idlib. Sharif says his flat was partially burned by a shell during the last battles. He could not take his belongings, but he still keeps the official deed of his property ownership, although he has lost hope of returning.

Idlib residents who fled from Damascus and its countryside have found themselves almost trapped in Idlib, unable to return to inspect their properties. Just a few days ago, the Abu Al-Zindeen crossing in Aleppo countryside was opened but only for commercial movement between the two areas. In practice, to this day, there is no direct route connecting the two areas that would allow the movement of people. Therefore, those wishing to return to regime areas have to travel from opposition areas to areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Manbij, and from there to regime areas in Aleppo. These travel difficulties, costs, and the risks of arbitrary and random detentions for bribe payments have always limited the return movement.

IDPs Return to Regime-Controlled Areas in Idlib and Hama

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In several public statements Syrian officials have encouraged the return of Internally Displaced People (IDPs) from opposition areas in northwestern Syria to regime-controlled areas in the countryside of Idlib and Hama. However, no Syrian official has mentioned that returnees must undergo security screening by reconciliation committees as a condition for their return. The journey back is costly, and some returnees face arrest and financial extortion.

For example, Abu Burhan has been waiting for three months to obtain  a security approval for his request to return to his hometown in the eastern Idlib’s countryside. Displaced since 2020, Abu Burhan and his family reside in a refugee camp in Atma in northern Idlib. His cousin, who lives in regime-controlled areas, convinced him to apply for return through the reconciliation committee. Abu Burhan said that if he receives a security approval, he will return to work on his pistachio farm, which would provide his family with the minimum living costs, as their financial situation has become dire in the Atma camp.

Abu Burhan fears disclosing any information that might identify him, worrying about security persecution if he returns or if his return request is denied. He plans to return alone initially, leaving his family in the camp. Depending on the situation in his village, he will either return to the camp or have his family join him.

Abu Burhan’s cousin informed him that the pistachio trees on his land have yielded a very good crop this year, prompting him to take the risk of returning to harvest this season. He added that his cousin had managed to bribe a member of the committees responsible for designating absentee lands for public auctions for investment by relatives over the past few years. This allowed Abu Burhan’s cousin to harvest the pistachio crop from his land during these years. However, it wasn’t for free. Abu Burhan said his cousin always negotiated a large share of the crop’s price, exploiting his absence. “I have more rights to the harvest than my cousin. Here in the camp, I don’t have the money to buy bread to feed my family,” he said.

A significant number of those returning to regime-controlled areas are motivated by the desire to return to their farmlands, reinvest in them, and benefit from their produce. A better option than staying in the camps and enduring the harsh conditions there. According to a report by the Syria Response Coordinators team on May 31, 91.16 percent of families in northern Syria are living below the poverty line, with 40.9 percent reaching severe food insecurity. These indicators explain why forcibly displaced people in the north are seriously considering returning to regime-controlled areas despite the potential risks.

Those wishing to return to regime-controlled areas must submit a return request to the reconciliation committee, either through relatives or acquaintances or by contacting the committee directly via WhatsApp, according to a correspondent for The Syria Report. There are three regional reconciliation committees: one in Khan Sheikhoun, another in Maarat Al-Numan, and another in Abu Dhuhour. To submit the request, one must send a photo of their ID card, photos of the family record book, and indicate which family members are returning and justify why the others are not. Often, the justification is that they are outside Syria. Afterward, a committee from various security agencies reviews the request. Approval or rejection of requests usually comes within one to three months. Those whose requests are approved are given a written approval that facilitates their passage through regime checkpoints until they reach their destination.

The correspondent noted that older men are often the ones who decide to return, as young men, if they return to regime-controlled areas, must immediately join the military service, which prevents many of them from returning. Additionally, the opposition Syrian National Army  (SNA) prohibits the return of young men aged 18-30.

There is no direct route between opposition and regime-controlled areas. The return journey starts from opposition areas in Idlib and rural Aleppo to the Aoun Al-Dadat crossing between Jarablus, controlled by the Turkish-backed SNA, and Manbij, under SDF control. From the Aoun al-Dadat crossing, returnees move to the Al-Tayha crossing between SDF areas in Manbij and regime-controlled areas in Aleppo.

The cost of the return journey from Idlib to Hama via this route exceeds USD 250, not including the bribes imposed by various checkpoints controlled by different factions along the way.

Returnees must register their personal details with the military police of the SNA in the presence of two guarantors who hold ID cards issued by one of the local councils affiliated with the Syrian Interim Government (SIG). These guarantors must attest that the returnee will not join the regime’s military forces and is returning for agricultural purposes.

Returnees can bring whatever luggage and furniture they wish, but they must send a description of their belongings to the reconciliation committee for registration and make them known to regime checkpoints upon their return so that these belongings don’t get confiscated. They must also specify whether they are returning in their own vehicles or rented ones. These vehicles must be registered with the transport directorates in regime-controlled areas.

Approximately 10 days after returning, the returnee will be notified by a representative of the relevant security branch in the area to report to a specific security branch for an investigation. In many cases, returnees have reported harassment and threats at these security branches, aimed at extorting money from them. One returnee to Khan Sheikhoun earlier this year said he was forced to pay about USD 20,000 to branch officers to secure his release. He confirmed that no charges were brought against him, he was not presented to a court, and he was only released after his relatives managed to raise the full amount. This is essentially kidnapping for ransom, according to the correspondent, who noted that this practice is commonly used against returnees whom the security officers know are financially capable.

Travel Documents Denied for Regime Defectors

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The National Security Office, Syria’s highest security authority, has issued new instructions denying certain categories of Syrians the right to obtain passports through embassies and consulates abroad or through immigration and passport offices within Syria, according to a report published on May 15 by opposition website Sawt Al-Asima

The categories primarily affected include defectors from the army and security agencies, as well as public sector and ministry employees who left their positions without formally resigning. Many government bodies do not accept resignations from their employees, forcing them to leave and be considered as having abandoned their job.

The report states that the implementation of these instructions began in early June, following the dissemination of lists containing the names of defectors and those who abandoned their jobs. It is not clear from the report whether settling one’s security status has  become a prerequisite for granting passports to these individuals. A security settlement involves an investigative process where the subject must confess to any anti-regime activities they have engaged in. This process does not guarantee that those who undergo it will not be arrested or forcibly disappeared.

Syrian Penal Code No. 148 of 1949 stipulates that a government or public sector employee who leaves their job without legal approval, or who fails to return to work within 15 days after their leave ends, is committing the crime of job abandonment. This offence is punishable by imprisonment for three to five years and a fine. Since 2011, the Syrian authorities have added political dimensions to job abandonment, considering anyone who leaves their job to be a security fugitive. Abandoning a military position is subject to the Military Penal Code No. 61 of 1950 and prosecuted for desertion.

To obtain a passport, whether within Syria or at embassies, several documents must be presented. These include the old passport or travel document, a residency card, personal identification, a copy of the family ledger, personal photographs, and for males aged 17-42, a military service document (such as a deferral certificate, discharge certificate, or proof of exemption fee payment). The application must be submitted by the individual themselves or by a relative up to the third degree, such as an uncle or aunt, with proof of relationship.

The negative impact of these instructions goes beyond denying these individuals the freedom to travel and reside abroad legally. It also prevents them from completing transactions in Syria through powers of attorney granted to their relatives or lawyers inside Syria. In matters of housing, land, and property rights, many Syrians living abroad must authorise a relative inside Syria to manage their properties. Since embassies require a passport to notarise powers of attorney, this decision effectively prevents them from notarising these documents at Syrian embassies abroad. Therefore, the inability of these groups to obtain passports abroad means they cannot secure other necessary documents to protect their property rights.

Syrian Civil Code No. 84 of 1949 does not set conditions for issuing powers of attorney, whether inside or outside Syria, beyond specifying the “subject of the commitment,” which is the action or task the representative is required to perform. Personal identification cards of the principal and representative are necessary for completing the powers of attorney but are not a condition according to the civil code. Similarly, Notary Law No. 15 of 2014 does not impose conditions on notarising powers of attorney; it only defines the notary’s duties, which include notarising contracts, declarations, and documents, recording them, and providing certified copies upon request.

Since 2011, numerous decisions and security directives have been issued to impose restrictions on issuing powers of attorney, both domestically and internationally. One such restriction is the requirement for security approval for general powers of attorney. Generally, to issue an international specific power of attorney regarding a property, the following documents are required: the principal’s personal identification card, a property registration statement proving ownership, an inheritance certificate if the property is jointly owned by heirs, a clearance certificate from the finance department, and a valid Syrian passport for the principal.

For issuing any power of attorney or any document by a notary public (a power of attorney issued in Syria), Law No. 15 of 2014 does not require a passport, only a personal identification card. If the ID card is unavailable, the individual may present a valid passport as an alternative form of identification.

Therefore, the requirement for a passport when issuing an international power of attorney contradicts the provisions of the law. Moreover, denying certain groups of people the right to obtain a passport lacks any legal basis.

Explained: Damascus Eases Security Restrictions on Real Estate Transactions

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A letter from the Office of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, No. 3039/1, issued on March 6, maintains the requirement for security approvals on certain real estate transactions “for the time being,” but has eased some of its other requirements and effects.

Pre-approval from the security services is a condition for the notarisation of real estate sales and general power of attorney transactions performed before a notary public. This security approval is issued by the Political Security Division of the Ministry of Interior and is considered an unlawful restriction on the property’s ownership right.

The Political Security Division can grant or deny the security approval for the person concerned with the real estate transaction. Security approval can be denied for various reasons, such as if the person concerned is wanted for investigation or arrest by one of the branches of the security agencies. Technically, this security request is an illegal procedure, because it is not based on a search warrant issued by the judicial police for a clear charge. Instead, the request for investigation or arrest may just be a malicious report filed against the person by a security informant, or due to a name similarity, or even due to other restraints on Disposal of the person’s property. In the event of an absentia conviction for a felony on the person concerned, or by the Antiterrorism Court, the Ministry of Finance imposes a precautionary seizure on their movable and immovable properties.

Letter No. 3039/1, marked “confidential and urgent,” is directed to the Ministries of Interior, Public Works and Housing, Finance, Justice, Local Administration and Environment, and is based on another letter, number 054/3, issued on February 29 by the National Security Office, a body affiliated with the Presidential Palace.

The format of Letter No. 3039/1 is similar to internal official confidential correspondences, some of which were leaked to the media. These included the implementation of gradual restrictions on real estate transactions since the early months of the Syrian uprising in 2011. This began with circular No. 85 dated June 15, 2011 from the the General Directorate of Cadastral Affairs, which agreed with the content of a letter from the Office of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, i.e., the Prime Ministry, No. 1355 dated June 8, 2011, regarding the requirement for prior security approval on specific real estate transactions. The exact nature of these transactions was not clarified. However, the requirement for prior security approval on real estate sales and permanent lease contracts (known as furoogh contracts in Arabic), in all zoned and unzoned areas, was added through circular No. 463 from the the General Directorate of Cadastral Affairs issued on August 12, 2015, which agreed with the content of a letter from the Office of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers No. 4554 issued on August 4, 2015. Circular No. 463 stated that the purpose of requiring prior security approval was “to ensure the legal and security rights of citizens, and those wishing to sell their properties or transfer them to others.”

In September 2021, the Ministry of Justice issued Circular No. 30, which linked the issuance of a judicial mandate to manage the assets of absent or missing people to the condition of obtaining the necessary prior security approval. In August 2022, the Ministry of Justice issued Circular No. 22, making obtaining security approval a condition for completing procedures for death declaration cases in Sharia courts.

What is new in Letter No. 3039/1 is the emphasis on the Political Security Division to justify the reasons for not granting security approval, with the aim of “allowing citizens to review the relevant authorities and properly address their situations.” The letter also called on the Political Security Division to ensure that the procedure of refusal applies only to the concerned individual, without affecting their family; parents, spouse, and siblings. Prior to this, the Political Security Division would refuse to grant security approval to all relatives of the concerned individual.

Letter No. 3039/1 also stated that the decision to grant or deny security approval should be made within a timeframe not exceeding 48 hours.

In cases where security approval is denied for an individual who owns a share in a commonly owned property, this should not affect the shares of the other partners, who should still be able to sell their shares and proceed with the termination of the common property, with the restriction remaining only on the share of the individual concerned. Previously, the denial of security approval for one individual would halt all real estate transactions for all partners.

Furthermore, the denial of security approval for the individual concerned no longer affects the shares of others in profit-sharing and joint venture agreements. These contracts serve as investment agreements between the owners of a property and its investors, with rights and responsibilities for all parties defined by the profit-sharing or partnership agreement.

The same principle now applies in the case of voluntary partition, an agreement among all partners in a property to exit the state of common ownership and divide the property among themselves by mutual consent. If one of them objects, judicial partition can be pursued through a lawsuit to end the common ownership. The inability of one of the partners to obtain security approval no longer prevents the possibility of voluntary partition of the property and exiting the state of common ownership among partners. Previously, the denial of security approval for one of the partners would stop the entire voluntary partition process.

Also, the refusal to grant security approval to the individual concerned is no longer an obstacle to the transfer of rights through inheritance to the rest of the heirs. This includes the inheritance of properties and real estate rights, such as the right to dispose of Amiri lands. It has become possible to proceed with the transfer of inheritance from the deceased to the heirs, even if one of them has not received security approval. Previously, the failure of one of the heirs to obtain security approval prevented the process of inheritance inventory.

In cases where a property is commonly owned by individuals, among whom some are unable to obtain security approval, within areas subjected to zoning, development, or urban planning laws, or real estate investment regulations, this is no longer considered an obstacle as per the new letter. It is now possible to include the property in the project, while maintaining a provisional seizure mark on the share of the individual concerned.

Security Approval Requirements Hinder Real Estate Operations for Kurds in Hassakeh

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To conduct any real estate transaction in the border area of Hassakeh Governorate under de facto control of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), an administrative process called “legal licensing” must be carried out that requires prior security approval. This process and its relevant security approval can only be obtained through the security services of the Syrian regime.

Though the AANES has controlled the Hassakeh governorate since 2014 and established directorates, institutions and courts, it has not established its own Directorate of Cadastral Affairs due to the lack of available Land registries. Therefore, the documentation of real estate occurrences in Hassakeh remains limited to real estate documentation offices under the Directorate of Cadastral Affairs in the Ministry of Local Administration of the Damascus government and the relevant courts under the Ministry of Justice.

The headquarters of these courts and real estate documentation offices are located in the “security squares” controlled by the regime’s forces in the cities of Hassakeh, Qamishli and Al-Malikiah. These courts and offices require those wishing to confirm their real estate occurrences on lands outside of zoning plans and in the border areas with Turkey and Iraq to obtain prior security approval issued by a decision of the Minister of Interior based on a proposal from the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, and approval from the Ministry of Defence. This is per the Law No. 41 of 2004 Determination of Border Areas, amended by Decree No. 43 of 2011. Law No. 41 of 2004 and its amendments aim to impose a security belt within the Syrian territories along the borders, limiting legal transactions in real estate ownership in border areas.

Practically, anyone wishing to conduct any real estate transaction in the border area must undertake the legal licensing’s administrative process. This involves submitting a request to the Directorate of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, accompanied by individual registration extracts for the parties involved in the real estate transaction, a copy of the legal contracts between them, a real estate registration statement, and a land area statement. The property details, parties involved in the real estate transaction, and the request for legal licensing are then sent to the Ministries of Interior and Defence, which contact the security services to conduct a security study on the contract parties. Based on this study, security approval or rejection is given.

Until 2011, parties involved in a real estate sale, for example, were required to present the legal licence during the progression of a lawsuit to confirm the property sale contract in the Civil Court of First Instance. If the legal licence was not presented, the lawsuit would later be dismissed in court. Buyers often resort to a court ruling to prove the purchase of a property. This is done for various reasons, including when the real estate is not subdivided, there is difficulty in obtaining prior security approval, or there are problems obtaining a construction permit, even if the land is ready for construction.

Often, lawyers would suffice with filing a lawsuit to confirm a real estate sale contract and registering it in court. If the legal licence was approved, they would continue with the lawsuit; if it was rejected, they would be satisfied with a copy of the session minutes, which the buyer would use as proof of their property ownership.

However, Law No. 43 of 2011, which amends Law No. 41 of 2004, abolished this possibility and mandated a legal licence before filing the lawsuit. The security apparatuses require that parties involved in real estate transactions in the border areas reside in Syria when requested for an investigation, or their departure from Syria must have been legal through official crossings and airports. This condition often deprives many refugees in neighbouring countries who left Syrian territories through irregular means of obtaining a legal licence. The security study to approve or reject the legal licence typically takes four months. In case of rejection, one must wait a year before reapplying for the legal licence to the Directorate of Agriculture.

In practice, obtaining security approval for the legal licence is difficult if one of the transaction parties is Kurdish. The Syria Report has not found any circular or decision from any official Syrian body prohibiting Kurds from receiving security approvals for legal licensing. This remains the case even after Decree No. 49 of 2011 issuance, which granted Syrian nationality to those registered as “foreigners” in Hassakeh. Security personnel meticulously investigate details about the parties involved in the real estate transaction, including their tribal and ethnic lineage, relatives, whereabouts and professions. They interview neighbours, work colleagues, mukhtars and others. Lists of names whose legal licensing applications have been rejected are displayed in the real estate documentation offices.

Kurdish farmers in border areas often resort to concluding informal sale contracts when purchasing land and informal sharecropping or agricultural investment contracts when leasing it. In both cases, these contracts are not documented with any official authority, which affects land prices.

Kamiran, who is Kurdish, told The Syria Report that in 2020, he bought agricultural land in the border area with Turkey and paid an SYP 150,000 (around USD 170 then) bribe to the security personnel who investigated him at his home. Despite this, his application for legal licensing was rejected, and he was forced to sell the land he had purchased under an informal contract.

Similarly, Hasni, who is also Kurdish, told The Syria Report that he obtained the legal licence to register agricultural land he bought outside the zoning plan in his name in the land registry after paying USD 2,000 to a security services intermediary.

On the other hand, Mohammad, an Arab, said his father bought a two-hectare plot of land 20 years ago in the countryside of Qamishli. However, he did not obtain the legal licence because the seller had been convicted in a separate case involving the Agricultural Cooperative Bank. Consequently, Mohammad’s father could not secure a court ruling affirming the validity of his purchase, and all he possesses is a document registering the lawsuit. A few years ago, the original seller of the land returned and claimed it, arguing that it was still in his name in the Land Registry. Therefore, Mohammad resorted to a court affiliated with the judicial apparatus of the AANES and filed a property extortion lawsuit. However, the court also rejected his case due to the absence of a court ruling or ownership deed in Mohammad’s family’s possession.

Administrative and Legal Obstacles Prevent Confirmation of Property Ownership in AANES Areas

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Admist rising real estate prices, increasing pressure of housing needs for displaced people in the Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria (AANES) areas, and the continuous migration of locals abroad, residents seek to document their property ownership by all available means. However, they face obstacles, mainly due to the judicial overlap and the dual authority in charge of real estate documentation between the Damascus government and AANES authorities.

Many people in AANES areas are trying to legally confirm their ownership by filing lawsuits to ensure sales contracts in the civil courts, for the first instance, under the Ministry of Justice in the Damascus government. In this case, the buyer only receives a judicial decision to confirm ownership if the property is located within a zoning plan. The Damascus real estate authorities refuse to carry out lawsuits to confirm sales contracts for properties outside of zoning plans and require a letter from the concerned municipality indicating the zoning nature of the property and the Building Code followed. The issue is that the zoning nature of most real estate areas outside major city centres is still undivided commonly owned land. As in all informal settlements, landowners sell parts of it or properties built on it as undivided shares.

For example, Ahmad has a property in Hassakeh city and confirmed the sales contract by a judicial decision from the civil court of first instance. However, when Ahmad sold his property, the same court refused to confirm the previous sales contract it had issued and asked the new buyer to obtain a letter from the municipality showing the zoning nature of the property. When he consulted the municipality, they conducted a topographic survey of the property and compared it with their zoning plans. They found that the house was built on land designated for a public park.

Expropriation for public benefit is exclusively done by a decision notified to the stakeholders, with appropriate compensation. However, in Ahmad’s case, the land was noted in the zoning plan to be a public park, but in reality, it had not yet been expropriated for that purpose. As long as the expropriation decision is not issued, the property is not public property. Therefore, ownership can be confirmed until the expropriation decision and compensation are properly issued. However, this did not happen with Ahmad, as his lawsuit was dismissed, and he could not confirm the sales contract and transfer the property to the new buyer.

Similarly, Khaled, who purchased a house and filed a lawsuit to confirm the sales contract, was surprised to find that the land on which the house was built was designated in the zoning plans to construct a school. Khaled could not confirm his ownership in this case, so he cancelled the sales contract and recovered what he had paid to the seller.

In reality, as long as there is no restraint on the disposal of the property, the owner has complete freedom to manage it. Even if the property is marked for public benefit in the zoning plans, the court should decide to confirm the sales contracts and not deprive the buyer of confirming their ownership, even if the implementation of those plans is delayed. Over the past years, the war has disrupted the urban expansion of cities and towns and, therefore, the process of updating the zoning plans and aligning them with realities on the ground.

Khalil said that when he filed a lawsuit to confirm the purchase contract of his house, which he has owned for decades on the outskirts of Qamishli city, the civil court of first instance demanded a legal permit. A legal permit is an administrative process conducted by the Directorates of Agriculture and Real Estate Affairs if the property is located in border areas outside of zoning plans. In this case, prior security approval endorsed by the Ministries of Defense and Interior is required.

As Khalil discovered, the Qamishli municipality had been planning to zone that area for years and included it in the city’s zoning plan. However, administrative procedures delayed this process, and then the war led to the neglect of the issue, which remains unresolved.

On the other hand, the AANES does not recognise the allocation documents issued by municipalities affiliated with Damascus after 2011. Allocation documents are akin to property ownership documents issued by municipalities to confirm the ownership of properties, most of which are lands sold to individuals. The AANES bases this on the regulations and systems law it issued in 2014 to regulate urban development. AANES authorities require those wishing to obtain an allocation document to purchase properties from its municipalities exclusively.

This applies to properties sold by municipalities affiliated with Damascus after 2011. The AANES does not recognise the allocation documents issued by the regime’s municipalities after 2011 and asks their purchasers to obtain new allocation documents from its municipalities. The buyer is forced to repurchase the property from the AANES’ municipalities. A buyer may choose not to do this, but if they want to build on the land, they must, again, obtain a construction permit from the AANES’ municipalities. Here, it becomes necessary to obtain an AANES allocation document.

Another Qamilshi resident, Layla, said that she obtained an allocation document from the Damascus-affiliated Qamishli municipality in 2013. However, in 2023, the AANES’s municipality asked her to repurchase the same land from them to issue a construction permit for it.

Bribes, Security Services, Major Obstacle to Return in Al-Tadhamon

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On Monday, the Damascus governorate announced the collapse of parts of a building in an informal settlement in the Tadhamon district south of Damascus, leading to one fatality and 14 injuries. The building, consisting of several floors, three inhabited, had cracks due to the damages done by war. However, its owner had undertaken repairs, according to City FM radio. 

The building had been damaged due to combat activities. Its owner managed to return and obtain a licence to renovate it. However, without conducting an engineering study for its structural integrity, sources told the local correspondent for The Syria Report.

The semi-official Al-Watan warned on Tuesday of the remaining part of the building collapsing. An official source in the Damascus governorate reported the detention of 10 individuals pending investigation in connection with the building collapse and the search for another 8, Al-Watan also said.

This marks the first time an inhabited, rehabilitated building collapsed without proper engineering reinforcement in Al-Tadhamon. However, such occurrences have become commonplace in other war-affected areas, especially in East Aleppo. What is noteworthy in the Tadhamon case is the hesitant return of displaced individuals, attributed to the strictness in granting security approval for those wishing to return to the neighbourhood. The de facto authorities controlling Al-Tadhamon, which include the Military Security Intelligence Service and the National Defence Forces (NDF) militia, also make returning residents pay bribes to get this security approval.

Al-Tadhamon is located southeast of Damascus and is considered the southern gateway to the capital, six kilometres from the city centre. The neighbourhood dates back to the late 1960s when thousands of people from the Golan and Quneitra regions were displaced following the fall of the Golan Heights to Israel in the June 1967 war. These displaced people established informal settlements on the agricultural lands of the Tadhamon area belonging to Damascus city. The neighbourhood also attracted a significant influx of people from rural areas of Syria. 

Before 2011, about 200,000 people lived in Al-Tadhamon, historically suffering from poor services and living conditions. Many residents rose against the regime in 2011. The opposition controlled the southern part of the neighbourhood from 2012, which afterwards was under continuous siege and bombardment by regime forces, causing widespread destruction. 

In 2015, that part of the neighbourhood fell under the control of the extremist Islamic State group, leading to the displacement of most of its remaining inhabitants, before falling back into regime hands in early 2018, accompanied by the forced displacement of the remaining residents.

In July 2018, the Damascus governorate formed a committee to implement Law No. 3 of 2018, which related to removing rubble from damaged buildings, to identify buildings fit for habitation in Al-Tadhamon. However, the law does not seem to have been implemented in the neighbourhood.

In September 2020, the Damascus Governorate announced that displaced people from the area could gradually return after obtaining security clearance. Those wishing to return to Al-Tadhamon must submit a return application at the Midan municipality in Damascus, including personal documents, proof of property ownership in Al-Tadhamon, a financial clearance, and payment of accumulated dues for electricity, water and telephones.

Subsequently, the application must be forwarded to Military Security, which conducts a security review of the returnees’ files and either approves or rejects the request. Knowing the security criteria for issuing these approvals or denials is difficult. However, in principle, approval is not granted to anyone who participated in activities opposing the regime in the area, whether peaceful or armed, even if they had reconciled and settled their security status. Denials of return are not limited to opponents but also include their relatives. In other cases, the approval and rejection process seems random and not based on any transparent database or rule.

One of the former residents of Al-Tadhamon, now living in Turkey and owning a house in one of the neighbourhoods of Al-Tadhamon near the neighbouring town of Yalda, managed to authenticate a final sale contract of the house to one of his relatives at the Syrian embassy in Ankara, to enable his relative to renovate the house and then rent or sell it. However, his relative could not obtain the necessary security clearance, and the responsible officer requested that the house’s original owner apply for the security clearance.

The Midan municipality agrees to the return request if the security clearance is issued. It requires the displaced person wishing to return to take full responsibility for their property’s safety and remove the rubble at their own expense.

According to a local correspondent for The Syria Report, no more than 1,500 people have returned to Al-Tadhamon to date. One of the returnees told the correspondent that Military Security has been refusing to grant new security clearances for the past year without payment of a bribe, even when applicants submit all the required documents. The security officers demand a payment of SYP 1 million for approval.

However, the approval issued by the Military Security for return is not enough. After that, the NDF, which controls Al-Tadhamon, must also agree to the return, although it has no official authorisation granting it these powers. The militia’s approval is exclusively granted in exchange for a monetary payment, which varies depending on the property’s location and degree of personal acquaintance with the returnees. In several cases, NDF personnel bought houses from the returnees at low prices after harassing them, controlling the quantity of building materials allowed into the neighbourhood for restoration and rehabilitation, and demanding bribes at each checkpoint.

In one incident, the Syria Report’s correspondent reported that the NDF offered to buy a house in the neighbourhood for SYP 18 million (about USD 1,300). When the owner refused to sell, he was imprisoned on charges of disrupting public security. He was not released until he agreed to sell the house. In another case, the NDF prevented a homeowner from re-entering the neighbourhood despite obtaining security clearance for return.

According to local sources, many of the current inhabitants of Al-Tadhamon are not its original residents and are living in houses that are not theirs. The sources believe that the NDF has allowed these people to extort the properties due to personal acquaintanceships, relationships, or in exchange for bribes. One of the inhabitants has built a wall around a block containing six traditional “Arab-style” houses near buildings known as the military housing buildings (unrelated to any military institution). However, he is not from the area and does not own any property there.

A resident also told The Syria Report that anyone wanting to return to the streets of Daaboul, Maliki, Slaikha, and the Tuesday Market, which are areas adjacent to Al-Tadhamon and belong to the neighbouring town of Yalda, must apply to the official in charge of the NDF in Al-Tadhamon.

Some Displaced Residents Allowed to Return to New Neighbourhoods in Al-Hajar Al-Aswad

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Since early 2023, the Rural Damascus governorate has permitted displaced residents from the Al-Wahda and Al-Istiqlal neighbourhoods of Al-Hajar Al-Aswad to apply to return home. Previous returns in 2022 were limited to residents who had been displaced from the Tishreen and Al-Thawra neighbourhoods. 

Al-Hajar Al-Aswad is a city and the administrative centre of a subdistrict within the Rural Damascus governorate and borders the Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp. About a half million people lived in Al-Hajar Al-Aswad before 2011, and at the time it was home to the largest population of displaced families who had fled the Golan Heights in the June 1967 war with Israel. Because of this dense concentration of residents from the Golan’s Quneitra governorate, the two governorates of Rural Damascus and Quneitra have overlapping authority in Al-Haja Al-Aswad. In any case, much of the city consists of informal settlements that are unzoned and unserved, and which became a destination for low-income Syrians moving to the greater Damascus area from other governorates. 

The city faced severe wartime destruction during the period of opposition control in 2012-2015, as well as during Islamic State control in 2015-2018. Regime forces regained control of Al-Hajar Al-Aswad in 2018 after a massive aerial and artillery bombardment campaign that destroyed entire neighbourhoods and forcibly displaced remaining residents. 

Until late 2022, only residents from the Tishreen and Al-Thawra neighbourhoods were allowed to return to the city, because those areas were the least affected by wartime damages. However, rubble remains scattered along the main road connecting those two neighbourhoods, as well as in many other areas, despite individual efforts by returnees to remove it at their own expense. In late 2022, a delegation of Al-Hajar Al-Aswad residents met with the Rural Damascus governor, Safwan Abu Saada, to complain about the low quality of public services in Tishreen and Al-Thawra. They demanded that the governorate take necessary steps to halt the looting and theft of their newly restored homes, as well as speed up rehabilitation of water, electricity and sewage networks and paving roads. Abu Saada responded that the governorate and relevant authorities were working hard to secure those necessities, and stressed that it was important for the local community to cooperate and participate in reconstruction. 

Meanwhile, Al-Wahda and Al-Istiqlal neighbourhoods, which before 2011 had a majority of Turkmen and Circassian residents from the Golan Heights, suffered worse damage from the war, which delayed returns. In late 2022, some residents who had been displaced from Al-Istiqlal took part in a volunteer campaign to clean the neighbourhood, including removing rubble from homes and some streets. They collected the debris in public squares, in coordination with the municipality. Still, at the time they were not allowed to return home, and so they left once again after they had completed the campaign. During a tour of Al-Hajar Al-Aswad in January 2023 Quneitra governor Mutaz Abu Al-Nasr Jamran said that he had ordered work crews from his governorate to clean Al-Wahda and Al-Istiqlal neighbourhoods. However, these crews did not start cleaning the main streets and some side streets of the two neighbourhoods until March 13 — and even then only spent four days on the job. 

Residents from Al-Jazira and Al-Alaf neighbourhoods are still prohibited from returning, as those areas were mostly destroyed due to a network of tunnels the Islamic State dug beneath them during its period of control. The two neighbourhoods also suffered intense bombing during the final military campaign in 2018 by regime and Russian forces. Khaled Khamis, head of Al-Hajar Al-Aswad City Council, posted to Facebook on March 11 that important steps had already been taken to rehabilitate the city’s infrastructure and services. He added that returns would later be allowed to Al-Jazira neighbourhood, but only after the governorate removed buildings there at risk of collapse. 

Notably, the Quneitra governorate is the one that always begins removing the rubble from neighbourhoods where the Rural Damascus has allowed residents to return. After such work begins, the Quneitra governorate then withdraws its work crews and machinery without explanation and Rural Damascus governorate work crews take over the job. This is what happened in Al-Thawra and Tishreen neighbourhoods in early 2022 — at the time, the Quneitra governorate and Golan notables obtained approval for residents to return. It started removing rubble and then left for the Rural Damascus governorate to take over.

Residents have criticised this unusual behaviour by the Quneitra governorate, which has yet to rehabilitate any of its centres or schools in Al-Hajar Al-Aswad. A source familiar with the governorate council’s operations told The Syria Report that this is due to funding issues. While the Rural Damascus governorate often receives aid from local and international NGOs for early recovery project contracts it undertook in the city, the Quneitra governorate has been unable to receive any of this assistance. Instead, it relies solely on its own budget and whatever it can collect in accordance with the Financial Law of Administrative Units. 

Syrian authorities are seeking out international organisations to obtain funding for early recovery projects. These include rehabilitation of schools, water, electricity and sewage networks and rubble removal. It appears that Syrian authorities have set such rehabilitation as a precondition for return of displaced residents to their hometowns. 

In addition to the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC), currently a team from the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Antioch and All the East is helping rehabilitate Al-Hajar Al-Aswad with help from Norwegian Church Aid, which in March restored the city’s medical centre before handing it over to the Rural Damascus Directorate of Health. The French NGO Première Urgence Internationale also rehabilitated the city’s third mixed-gender school alongside the Rural Damascus governorate and the Ministry of Education. 

The Al-Hajar Al-Aswad City Council head said in March 2023 that there had been 3,100 applications to return to the city, of which 2,700 were approved. He added that around 350 homes had been restored, 140 of them with assistance from SARC. Finally, he vowed to restore the city’s drinking water network soon. Still, a local correspondent for The Syria Report said that returns to the city were still low, and that only about 1,000 people (200 families) had returned to settle there. Though many displaced residents return to their homes sporadically to check on their homes, most choose not to resettle in the area, as it still lacks basic services such as water and electricity. 

According to the correspondent, returnees may now undergo security checks at the municipal office in the district branch of the Military Security detachment on Al-Thalatheen Street in neighbouring Yarmouk before they enter Al-Hajar Al-Aswad. Al-Thalatheen Street is the main entryway into the city. The procedures for obtaining security approval have not changed, and those wishing to return must submit an application to Al-Hajar Al-Aswad municipality, which then sends their files to the district branch. There, the applications undergo study before either approval or rejection. Those who have lost their property ownership documents have still not been able to obtain security approval, despite having followed the municipality’s instructions: getting a record from the police station, obtaining an electricity or water payment receipt, and providing a paper from their neighbourhood mukhtar in which two witnesses from the area testify that the applicant is a local property owner. 

One displaced man told The Syria Report that he visits Al-Hajar Al-Aswad every month to check on his house. Each time, he finds that conditions have worsened due to looting, especially in the Al-Alaf and Al-Jazira neighourhoods. Looters take anything that can be sold or recycled, including the city’s newly installed lighting poles. On top of that, the checkpoint at the entrance to the city imposes fees on residents hoping to bring in furniture for their homes.

Al-Marsouma Family from Deir-ez-Zor Buying Real Estate in Moadhamiyat Al-Sham

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The past three years have seen rapid real estate purchasing in the Rural Damascus governorate city of Moadamiyat Al-Sham driven by contractors and builders who have good relations with the Fourth Division officials, which control the area. Among these contractors are representatives of a family in Deir-ez-Zor. While the process does not directly threaten housing, land, and property rights, because it is conducted legally, it carries risks as it is systematic and concentrated, taking advantage of the difficult economic conditions of the area’s residents to buy their properties.

Administratively, Moadamiyat Al-Sham falls under the jurisdiction of the Daraya district, west of the capital, and borders the Damascus neighbourhood of Mazzeh. It used to be known for olive cultivation and seasonal crops, but lost its agricultural character in the 1950s when the state acquired most of its lands for the Ministry of Defence and the Damascus governorate. Expropriations increased in the mid-1970s to establish a security-military belt west of Damascus. The total expropriated land in Moadamiyat Al-Sham amounts to about 80 percent of its area (around 3,377 hectares out of a total area of 4,210 hectares), affecting approximately 35,000 individuals.

Moadamiyat Al-Sham was home to around 70,000 people before 2011. The city’s eastern neighbourhood was predominantly populated by Alawite families of officers working at the Mazzeh military airport and for Air Force Intelligence. The opposition took control of large parts of the city at the end of 2012, forming a single military zone with the adjacent Darayya until the end of 2015. Reconciliation took place there in September 2016, under Russian sponsorship, after the displacement of 500 activists and fighters who rejected the reconciliation and their families. However, the city is still effectively besieged with checkpoints and is controlled by the Fourth Division and Air Force Intelligence through a network of loyal local militias.

The opposition news site Sowt Al-Asima reported in November 2022 that representatives of Sheikh Farhan Al-Marsouma have been purchasing dozens of properties and agricultural lands since 2018 in cooperation with the Fourth Division and local militia leaders. In addition, they have brought in 250 families from the Al-Marsouma clan to reside there.

According to The Syria Report’s sources, Al-Marsouma is a small family, not a clan, originally from Al-Harri in the Al-Bokamel area of Deir-ez-Zor governorate’s eastern countryside. The family is Sunni, but, like many families and tribes in the region, they associate themselves with Ahl Al-Bait, representing the prophet Mohammad’s lineage. Due to the location of the town of Al-Harri in the desert between Syria and Iraq, the family has historically been known for smuggling goods across the borders, especially cigarettes.

The head of the family is Sheikh Farhan Al-Marsoumi, who is active in real estate contracts in different areas of Syria and invests money for family notables and others who have worked in contracting in the Gulf. Sheikh Farhan is known for his work in the illicit oil trade and smuggling between the areas of the majority-Kurdish Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria (AANES) and regime-controlled areas of Deir-ez-Zor. In addition, he has good relations with the Iranian militias that control the Syrian-Iraqi border area. In 2020, he had an unsuccessful run for a seat in the parliament.

According to a correspondent for The Syria Report, there is no evidence to prove that Al-Marsoumi, his family or his work directly serve the interests of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. However, there are rumours of him buying properties in Moadamiyat Al-Sham as part of an Iranian plan for social engineering and changing the demographic fabric of the Damascus region. According to these rumours, Al-Marsouma seeks to establish a home base for his family in Moadamiyat Al-Sham because it is close to the capital. However, The Syria Report was unable to confirm these rumours.

The correspondent added that people from Deir-ez-Zor have resided in Moadamiyat Al-Sham and the neighbouring Daraya since before 2011, and many of them own the properties where they live. According to real estate contractors in the city, this phenomenon is currently not limited to Al-Marsouma representatives, any contractor with financial liquidity can purchase any property. However, what distinguishes the Al-Marsouma family is their financial capability and the good prices they offer to buy properties in an area suffering financial hardship and an effective siege.

Al-Marsouma family reportedly do not focus on properties owned by regime opponents or forcibly displaced individuals from the city. Instead, they buy properties available for sale regardless of the owners. In addition, al-Marsouma representatives prefer buying properties that do not have any transfer of ownership restraints, such as seizures and mortgages, meaning properties whose owners do not have security issues with the Syrian security services.

This buying and selling process is carried out legally. However, most sellers are forced to sell due to difficult economic conditions. Contractors have set a standardised price for properties and land in Moadamiyat Al-Sham: one qasba of land (23.75 square metres) ranges from SYP 2 to 5 million, depending on the location. The price per square metre for new, uncompleted construction ranges from SYP 400,000 to 1.5 million, while the price per square metre for old “Arab-style” houses is no more than SYP 150,000. These prices are considered unfair and are 10 percent lower than those in surrounding areas like Jdeidet Artouz, Sahnaya, and Jdeidet Artouz al-Balad.

As for the properties of regime opponents that have undergone precautionary asset seizure by the Ministry of Finance under Anti-Terrorism Law No. 19 of 2012, Al-Marsouma representatives have purchased these properties through mutual agreement with the owners, most outside Syria. They sign sales contracts with old dates and at low prices. The seizure mark on the property remains in the Land Record in such cases. Al-Marsouma family representatives sometimes target these properties due to their low prices. This has caused intense competition between Al-Marsouma representatives and other contractors, leading in at least one case of kidnapping and threats involving the security services. In most of these cases, a negotiated settlement was reached in favour of the Al-Marsouma family, in exchange for financial sums to the other party to be withdrawn from the purchasing process.

Notable here is the exploitation by Al-Marsouma of a contentious issue in Moadamiyat Al-Sham: Due to the historical expropriation of properties in the area, most of the remaining properties in the city still have common ownership among their inheritors. Consequently, the process of terminating the common ownership and transferring the resulting shares to each inheritor in has not yet been carried out for these properties. After the issuance of precautionary seizure orders on regime opponents’ properties in 2011, their shares were seized from properties jointly owned with others. Legally, the seizure should be limited to the share of the property that is subject to the seizure. However, in practice, precautionary seizure prevents the remaining inheritors from conducting any transaction or transfer of ownership without obtaining prior security approval.

According to the regulations, obtaining a construction permit on commonly owned land within the zoning areas is not permissible. However, it appears that Al-Marsouma representatives, through their security connections, have obtained such permits on land with common ownership if the seized share of one of the partners is relatively small. In such cases, the family representatives submit a “common ownership license” application for construction to the Moadamiyat Al-Sham municipality, whereby construction is authorised on the un-seized shares per the building codes. Meanwhile, the seized share is left as a setback or a jardin. If the seized share is significant, construction is carried out in violation of the building codes. 

Have Displaced Residents Returned to Maaret Al-Numan?

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On October 15, pro-regime media reported that 800 displaced families had returned to Maaret Al-Numan, located in the rural Idlib governorate. A ceremony was reportedly held for their return, attended by state and Baath Party officials. But when the ceremony ended, most returning families left the destroyed city, according to a correspondent for The Syria Report in the area, as extensive damage to homes and infrastructure has rendered Maaret Al-Numan uninhabitable. 

Maaret Al-Numan is located in the southern part of Idlib and is the governorate’s second-largest city after its eponymous capital. Opposition forces held the city from 2012-2020. During this time, some residents moved to live in regime-held areas in the nearby coastal governorates and Hama. Then in 2020, the regime waged a military campaign on the southern part of Idlib governorate, regaining control over several major cities such as Saraqeb and Maaret Al-Numan. The campaign caused all remaining residents of Maaret Al-Numan to flee north to displacement camps in opposition-held territory. 

Since then, the pro-Russia 25th Special Mission Forces Division has controlled the emptied-out city, running it as a military zone because of its proximity to lines of contact with rebel forces in the southern Idlib governorate. The division has barred displaced Maaret Al-Numan residents from returning home to the city, even those living in regime-controlled areas of Syria. As in other areas of rural southern Idlib, work crews contracted by the regime forces have looted homes in Maaret Al-Numan, extracting whatever materials they could recycle, such as iron roofing. 

According to The Syria Report’s correspondent, the Idlib governorate had transported displaced Maaret Al-Numan residents who gathered in Al-Assi Square in the city of Hama to their home city to participate in the return ceremony on October 15. Most of the families included Baath Party members and army personnel. 

The Idlib governor and Idlib’s Baath Party branch leader participated in the ceremony, which was meant to open what they called a “reception centre for citizens returning to the city of Maaret Al-Numan.” They said the centre was opened to ease the return of the city’s displaced residents. A Syria Report correspondent reported that one of the centre’s tasks is to grant returnees security approvals after settling their security and military conscription statuses. 

The governor said those wishing to return and live in the city could visit the reception centre and apply for return. He added that the centre will collect data on those people before approving them return. This data, he said, is necessary to secure essential services for returnees. 

During the ceremony on October 15, the governorate utilised heavy machinery to remove rubble and clear public roads under the supervision of the 25th Special Mission Forces Division. However, according to The Syria Report’s correspondent, the day’s rubble removal was merely propaganda to shoot a promotional video and halted immediately afterwards. 

A large-scale return of residents to Maaret Al-Numan does not yet appear possible amid the sheer destruction to the city, including to its water, sewage and electrical networks, as well as the remaining rubble and other debris.

On October 19, a government delegation visited the city. The group included the Minister of Local Administration and Environment and the Minister of Public Works and Housing. Official media reported that the delegation viewed the city’s situation and oversaw the restoration of essential services, rubble removal and repair of damaged roads. The delegation reportedly also identified and estimated the scope of the damages and determined the city’s most urgent needs to facilitate the return of displaced residents to their homes. 

According to official statements, electricity will likely not return to the city before the end of 2022. Schools must also undergo repairs before reopening. The water network needs testing to find any defects, as facilities were damaged and shut down for long periods due to the fighting. 

During the delegation’s visit to Maaret Al-Numan, the governor of Idlib stated that he had sent a memorandum to the council of ministers that included a study on requirements for restoring services such as electricity, water and healthcare to the city. The governor added that the services will be restored once the necessary funding is allocated. 

Officials from Baath Party and Idlib governorate held a meeting on October 9 in Hama alongside Maaret Al-Numan private economic actors, to encourage the latter to participate in efforts to restore the city’s infrastructure and public facilities. Afterwards, the “Committee to Facilitate the Return of Maaret Al-Numan Residents,” formed by the Idlib branch of the Baath Party, worked to collect donations of supplies and money to encourage displaced residents of the city to return home. For example, one businessperson donated a heater for each family that wishes to return to Maaret Al-Numan, while another gave SYP 1 million per family. Another person promised to remove rubble from local homes should the owners return.

Security Approval for Dozens of People to Return to Rural Damascus

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On September 20, the State Security Department’s General Intelligence sent the mukhtar of Al-Dekhaniyeh, a town in the Rural Damascus governorate, a list of names of 70 displaced residents. Although the issuance of the list suggests that the intelligence agency had no objection to their return, it does not necessarily mean that returns will occur anytime soon.

According to a correspondent for The Syria Report, the town’s mukhtar requested that those whose names appeared on the list visit his office to submit applications for return. He informed the returnees to bring their ID cards and documents proving property ownership in the town and electricity, water and phone bills. Real estate contracts not formally listed within the Land Registry or with the courts would not be accepted. 

On September 29, a group representing the displaced residents of Al-Dekhaniyeh met with the governor of Rural Damascus and the town’s mukhtar, demanding that the governor expedite their return process. They also offered to help remove rubble and other rehabilitation work in the town. The governor promised to start the return process by the end of October, affirming that rehabilitation work on the town’s infrastructure would also begin soon. 

The correspondent reported the governor of Rural Damascus saying that since 2018, around 400 families have submitted return requests to the governorate and that those requests were assigned numbers. He added that anyone with a return request whose name did not appear on the list should submit a request to the State Security Department in Kafr Sousseh, Damascus, to obtain security approval. An estimated 5,000 people lived in the town before 2011. 

The correspondent added that some 600 families have yet to submit any requests to the governorate for returning to Al-Dekhaniyeh. According to the governor, these families must submit their requests to the governorate, obtain numbers, and then visit the State Security Department in Kafr Sousseh. 

Al-Dekhaniyeh belongs to the Al-Kisweh district in Rural Damascus, adjacent to the city of Jaramana. It is close to the city centre of Damascus, located just 1.50 kilometres from the capital’s historic Bab Sharqi area. Al-Dekhaniyeh’s zoning plans are old and categorise much of the land within its boundaries as agricultural, where construction is prohibited. Nevertheless, like many other parts of Rural Damascus surrounding the capital city, Al-Dekhaniyeh has witnessed a boom in informally built housing since the 1970s due to the rising demand for cheap accommodation. 

The town is also an important industrial centre, home to many warehouses belonging to Damascus merchants. There are also car repair workshops, iron workshops, and textile factories. Located in Al-Dekhaniyeh are factories for the General Company for Manufacturing Nylon Threads and Stockings, the General Company for Paints, Chemical Industries Omayad Paints, and more. 

Opposition forces launched an attack on the town in 2014. The rebels managed to take control of most of the town at the time. However, regime forces recaptured it after a month of fierce battles that saw so-called “elephant missiles” wreak widespread damage to infrastructure and private property. Afterwards, Al-Dekhaniyeh became a closed military zone, with regime forces bulldozing many homes in the northern neighbourhood and using the rubble to build berms separating the town from nearby Ain Terma during the time opposition forces controlled it. Work teams contracted by the regime looted homes belonging to displaced residents, withdrawing iron from the roofs and water and plumbing pipes. 

Al-Dekhaniyeh has been empty of its residents since 2014, with regime forces still not permitting them to return. Most of the displaced now live in nearby neighbourhoods of Damascus, such as Al-Dweilaeh, Kashkoul and Al-Kabbas, and the Rural Damascus city of Jaramana. Many fear that the security services view them as sympathetic to the opposition and that they helped opposition forces enter the town’s northern neighbourhoods in 2014, preventing them from being approved to return home. According to The Syria Report’s correspondent, most residents permitted to return via the State Security list are from the town’s southern neighbourhoods. Until now, entry to the town is prohibited. An Air Force Intelligence checkpoint in Al-Kabbas and a State Security checkpoint in Al-Dweilaeh prevent anyone from entering. 

Meanwhile, the Damascus governorate has transformed the northeastern part of Al-Dekhaniyeh into a waste dump for the capital’s eastern neighbourhoods. According to the correspondent, the piles of garbage are now several storeys high and have overtaken some real estate in the area. 

In February 2018, the president of the Jaramana City Council told local media that Al-Dekhaniyeh would be annexed into the city’s zoning expansion plan. He added that the process would include removing rubble and dilapidated buildings, providing services, and distributing certain rights to their holders. 

Finally, in early 2021, the head of Rural Damascus’ Directorate for Decision and Regional Planning Support told local media that a detailed zoning plan was underway for Al-Dekhaniyeh. 

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