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Former Governor Arrested for Unlicensed Construction in Lattakia

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Former Lattakia Governor Major General Ibrahim Khader Al-Salem was arrested under a warrant issued on October 18, by the Ministry of Justice’s Lattakia Court and placed in the governorate’s Al-Basseh prison. Out of 14 officials wanted for investigation in the same cases, 10 were arrested and four went into hiding. 

Among the charges directed against the former governor, according to the arrest and summons warrant, are crimes of bribery, forgery of official documents, the misuse of public funds, embezzlement, and seizing state properties. A video clip circulated on social media showing Mr Salem surrounded by police officers, apparently at the moment of his arrest and being led out of his house. However, it appears that his arrest preceded the warrant by more than 45 days, according to local media.

On October 3, the semi-official Al-Watan newspaper reported the arrest of current and former officials, neighbourhood mukhtars, building contractors, and influential people, describing them as part of an organised corruption network involved in serious unlicensed construction, public funds embezzlement, changing the zoning status of real estate areas, extorting public properties, and money laundering. The newspaper stated that a precautionary seizure was placed on the properties of these accused individuals, including their spouses and children. Other local media also reported the recovery of some state properties seized by the accused.

Among the detainees are the director of Cadastral Affairs in Lattakia and his assistant, two former mayors of Lattakia city, and the former director of the technical services department. Also among the accused is a member of the People’s Assembly, amid reports of demands to lift his immunity for arrest.

The current head of the Lattakia Governorate Council announced on September 10 the transfer of five files to the monitoring and inspection authorities, including files regarding transgressions in the Lattakia City Council, the General Housing Establishment, and other projects, where corruption and waste exceed billions of Syrian pounds, according to Al-Watan. 

Meanwhile, the Prime Minister issued Resolution No. 1751 on November 13 to form a committee to count and study all properties whose zoning status was modified in Lattakia, believed to involve more than 180 properties, as well as study the modifications to the building code. The committee includes the Deputy Minister of Local Administration and Environment, the Deputy Minister of Public Works and Housing, the head of the Lattakia City Council, a judge from the State Council, the director of the financial directorate of the governorate, and the director of the real estate services directorate.

As some local news outlets reported, Mr Salem is supported by Bouthaina Shaaban, the political advisor to Syria’s President Bashar Al-Assad, with whom he has a familial connection. He previously held the position of head of the Criminal Security Branch in Lattakia and is one of the longest-serving governors among those appointed since 2011. He served as the governor of Lattakia for seven years, from 2014 to 2021.

In Syria, the governor sits at the head of the highest executive authority in their governorate and is directly appointed by the President of the Republic. According to Local Administration Law No. 107 of 2011, the governor is the representative of the central authority, an agent for all ministries, and is appointed and dismissed by decree. The law also states that the governor is, by default, a member of the Higher Council for Local Administration, and the governor chairs the Executive Office in the province, which in turn is part of the Governorate Council. The governor has the right to name members of the permanent or temporary committees that they establish, and they have the powers of judicial police in the case of flagrant crimes. They are responsible for contracting, and ordering expenditure for the governorate budget, and all official directorates in the governorate are subject to their written orders.

Reports in local media have pointed to corruption cases exceeding SYP 52 billion, most notably real estate issues, such as overlooking major cases of unlicensed construction, including an unauthorised increase in the number of storeys, in exchange for the governor and his partners receiving a share in each building. Some local networks have reported that the number of properties registered in the name of the governor, his wife, and his children exceeds 100 properties. However, The Syria Report has not been able to verify the accuracy of this information.

However, according to media reports, the most prominent case of unlicensed construction committed by the governor relates to the Zeitouna residential project in Al-Mashaher area of Lattakia city, which was established on land without detailed zoning plans to date. The general zoning plan for the area had envisaged the construction of schools, public parks, and housing. 

It is unclear who owns the land and whether it is private or expropriated. In any case, the project contractor, in partnership with the former governor, built a luxurious residential project in Zeitouna without leaving space for gardens and schools. Theoretically, this means that despite its luxury, the project is considered informal, built on public property, or land commonly owned but not subdivided in the Land Records. Consequently, the residential apartments in the project will not be noted in the Land Records. They will not be eligible for subdivision and registration in the names of their buyers. However, in practice, the buyers were granted official ownership deeds for these apartments, meaning the official documents were falsified. 

The opposition website Al-Hal Net reported in 2021 that developers of residential apartments in Zeitouna had begun requiring applicants to pay half the property’s value in advance. According to the website, the apartment was valued at more than SYP 100 million at that time.

In August 2021, Al-Wahda published an interview with the director of the Zeitouna project, who said the buildings included shops, commercial markets, storeys designated for offices, and, above them, 10 residential storeys. The engineer indicated that the project began in 2017 and was completed in multiple phases. The extent of completion of the project and whether it is partially or fully inhabited is unclear amidst news of fraud and corruption in connecting the electricity, sewage, and water networks.

Moreover, news leaked about the same contractor and the former governor extorting a large property from a private company in the Al-Slaybiyeh real estate area and incorporating it into the Zeitouna project. Additionally, the former governor granted approval to change the zoning status of some areas from commercial to residential, allowing for the construction of additional storeys while maintaining their commercial nature. Some pro-regime influencers on social media revealed an agreement between members of the arrested network to inflate the prices of certain properties artificially.

This news of the former governor’s corruption does not come as a surprise. It is a quasi-official way of dealing with influential regime officials whose interests conflict with those more powerful than them. For example, a similar case happened with the former businessman Rami Makhlouf. With the lack of transparency in the official media and the inability to access the real reasons that led to the opening of corruption files against the former governor of Lattakia, unconfirmed rumours circulate that the problem stems from the former governor and his partner, the contractor in the Zeitouna project, refusing to pay USD 10 million to one of the influential senior officials in the state. However, The Syria Report was unable to substantiate this rumour.

Bribes, Security Services, Major Obstacle to Return in Al-Tadhamon

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On Monday, the Damascus governorate announced the collapse of parts of a building in an informal settlement in the Tadhamon district south of Damascus, leading to one fatality and 14 injuries. The building, consisting of several floors, three inhabited, had cracks due to the damages done by war. However, its owner had undertaken repairs, according to City FM radio. 

The building had been damaged due to combat activities. Its owner managed to return and obtain a licence to renovate it. However, without conducting an engineering study for its structural integrity, sources told the local correspondent for The Syria Report.

The semi-official Al-Watan warned on Tuesday of the remaining part of the building collapsing. An official source in the Damascus governorate reported the detention of 10 individuals pending investigation in connection with the building collapse and the search for another 8, Al-Watan also said.

This marks the first time an inhabited, rehabilitated building collapsed without proper engineering reinforcement in Al-Tadhamon. However, such occurrences have become commonplace in other war-affected areas, especially in East Aleppo. What is noteworthy in the Tadhamon case is the hesitant return of displaced individuals, attributed to the strictness in granting security approval for those wishing to return to the neighbourhood. The de facto authorities controlling Al-Tadhamon, which include the Military Security Intelligence Service and the National Defence Forces (NDF) militia, also make returning residents pay bribes to get this security approval.

Al-Tadhamon is located southeast of Damascus and is considered the southern gateway to the capital, six kilometres from the city centre. The neighbourhood dates back to the late 1960s when thousands of people from the Golan and Quneitra regions were displaced following the fall of the Golan Heights to Israel in the June 1967 war. These displaced people established informal settlements on the agricultural lands of the Tadhamon area belonging to Damascus city. The neighbourhood also attracted a significant influx of people from rural areas of Syria. 

Before 2011, about 200,000 people lived in Al-Tadhamon, historically suffering from poor services and living conditions. Many residents rose against the regime in 2011. The opposition controlled the southern part of the neighbourhood from 2012, which afterwards was under continuous siege and bombardment by regime forces, causing widespread destruction. 

In 2015, that part of the neighbourhood fell under the control of the extremist Islamic State group, leading to the displacement of most of its remaining inhabitants, before falling back into regime hands in early 2018, accompanied by the forced displacement of the remaining residents.

In July 2018, the Damascus governorate formed a committee to implement Law No. 3 of 2018, which related to removing rubble from damaged buildings, to identify buildings fit for habitation in Al-Tadhamon. However, the law does not seem to have been implemented in the neighbourhood.

In September 2020, the Damascus Governorate announced that displaced people from the area could gradually return after obtaining security clearance. Those wishing to return to Al-Tadhamon must submit a return application at the Midan municipality in Damascus, including personal documents, proof of property ownership in Al-Tadhamon, a financial clearance, and payment of accumulated dues for electricity, water and telephones.

Subsequently, the application must be forwarded to Military Security, which conducts a security review of the returnees’ files and either approves or rejects the request. Knowing the security criteria for issuing these approvals or denials is difficult. However, in principle, approval is not granted to anyone who participated in activities opposing the regime in the area, whether peaceful or armed, even if they had reconciled and settled their security status. Denials of return are not limited to opponents but also include their relatives. In other cases, the approval and rejection process seems random and not based on any transparent database or rule.

One of the former residents of Al-Tadhamon, now living in Turkey and owning a house in one of the neighbourhoods of Al-Tadhamon near the neighbouring town of Yalda, managed to authenticate a final sale contract of the house to one of his relatives at the Syrian embassy in Ankara, to enable his relative to renovate the house and then rent or sell it. However, his relative could not obtain the necessary security clearance, and the responsible officer requested that the house’s original owner apply for the security clearance.

The Midan municipality agrees to the return request if the security clearance is issued. It requires the displaced person wishing to return to take full responsibility for their property’s safety and remove the rubble at their own expense.

According to a local correspondent for The Syria Report, no more than 1,500 people have returned to Al-Tadhamon to date. One of the returnees told the correspondent that Military Security has been refusing to grant new security clearances for the past year without payment of a bribe, even when applicants submit all the required documents. The security officers demand a payment of SYP 1 million for approval.

However, the approval issued by the Military Security for return is not enough. After that, the NDF, which controls Al-Tadhamon, must also agree to the return, although it has no official authorisation granting it these powers. The militia’s approval is exclusively granted in exchange for a monetary payment, which varies depending on the property’s location and degree of personal acquaintance with the returnees. In several cases, NDF personnel bought houses from the returnees at low prices after harassing them, controlling the quantity of building materials allowed into the neighbourhood for restoration and rehabilitation, and demanding bribes at each checkpoint.

In one incident, the Syria Report’s correspondent reported that the NDF offered to buy a house in the neighbourhood for SYP 18 million (about USD 1,300). When the owner refused to sell, he was imprisoned on charges of disrupting public security. He was not released until he agreed to sell the house. In another case, the NDF prevented a homeowner from re-entering the neighbourhood despite obtaining security clearance for return.

According to local sources, many of the current inhabitants of Al-Tadhamon are not its original residents and are living in houses that are not theirs. The sources believe that the NDF has allowed these people to extort the properties due to personal acquaintanceships, relationships, or in exchange for bribes. One of the inhabitants has built a wall around a block containing six traditional “Arab-style” houses near buildings known as the military housing buildings (unrelated to any military institution). However, he is not from the area and does not own any property there.

A resident also told The Syria Report that anyone wanting to return to the streets of Daaboul, Maliki, Slaikha, and the Tuesday Market, which are areas adjacent to Al-Tadhamon and belong to the neighbouring town of Yalda, must apply to the official in charge of the NDF in Al-Tadhamon.

Explained: Can a State Entity Expropriate a Property Before the Issuance of an Expropriation Decree?

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Syria’s Expropriation Law No. 20 of 1983 stipulates that a property can only be expropriated by a decree issued on the recommendation of the relevant government minister. This decree must declare the public benefit of seizing that property – that is, public entities can only expropriate properties after such a decree is issued. However, Law No. 20 permits public entities to expropriate properties in two specific circumstances without or before the issuance of such a decree.

In the first case, a public entity can implement what is known as “marking the property,” i.e. marking the property’s Land Record for expropriation based on the detailed zoning plan for the area and, initially at least, following an expropriation decree. Marking the property on the zoning plan prevents the owner from disposing of it. Expropriation Law 20 No. 1983 does not specify a time limit for issuing an expropriation decree after marking the property. 

According to The Syria Report’s HLP legal consultant, this represents a constitutional violation as it infringes on property rights without obliging the expropriating public entity to issue the expropriation decree within a specific period.

The Supreme Administrative Court’s Decision No. 15 regarding Appeal No. 25 of 1980 clarified that merely marking the property on a plan, indicating its designation as a government building, is insufficient to prevent the owner from disposing of it. A formal expropriation decree is necessary, as anything less would strip the owner of their rights using an illegal method and an unauthorized authority, making the expropriation mark unlawful and subject to cancellation, according to the HLP legal consultant.

However, the Supreme Administrative Court’s Decision No. 84 regarding Appeal No. 1204 of 2004 reversed Decision No. 15 of 1980. The court justified its decision by stating that zoning plans cannot be challenged before the Council of State. These plans are deemed general zoning decisions. Those affected by the plan can object within the timeframe specified in the Urban Planning Law No. 5 of 1982.

Article 5 of Law No. 5 of 1982 explains that objections to proposed zoning plans must be made within 30 days before a technical committee that the governor forms. However, this committee is merely administrative and has no judicial authority. This deprives the rights holder of seeking redress before the competent administrative court, which violates the principles of justice. The decision to mark property for expropriation based on a zoning plan is an administrative decision restricting the owner’s right to dispose of their property. Such decisions should be challengeable before the competent court, according to the HLP legal consultant.

In the second case, Law 20 No. 1983 allows a public entity to seize a property before the expropriation decree is issued, provided the property is undeveloped, such as agricultural land. Developed properties cannot be seized before the decree is issued and the property’s value is estimated.

Therefore, if the entity seizes a property before issuing an expropriation decree, they are obliged to compensate the property owner according to the principles of tort liability as stipulated in the Syrian Civil Code and subject to regular judicial jurisdiction. This approach was adopted by the Court of Cassation in Decision No. 857 with Base No. 984 of 2022, stating that if the entity’s expropriation of a property is proven illegal, it constitutes material extortion requiring compensation, with jurisdiction vested in the regular judiciary.

Pro-Regime Militias Extorts Property Owner in Rural Damascus

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Hammoud purchased a 10-hectare plot of land overlooking a main road in a Rural Damascus governorate town in 1993. The land was within the town’s zoning plan, and Hammoud obtained a construction permit for an industrial facility and a residential apartment adjacent to it. The total built-up area on his land was more than 400 square metres. Hammoud, who had lived abroad, invested the fruits of his many years of hard work in this project, aiming for it to serve as his retirement guarantee and an future asset for his children.

However, Hammoud continued to travel overseas for work, which slowed down the industrial facility and apartment building construction. The buildings were not completed until 2005. He did not wish to take out loans to import machinery for the facility; instead, he preferred to take his time with the industrial project, continue to work abroad for an extended period, and use the facility building as a warehouse for storing goods. By 2011, he had finished building the apartment, and it was ready for him to move in.

However, the strategic location of the land (overlooking the town and a main road), along with the size of the industrial facility and its technically sound construction using reinforced concrete, made the entire project attractive to the various military forces that traded control of the area. By the end of 2012, as the pace of peaceful demonstrations in the region increased and acts against the regime escalated, a regime-affiliated armed group seized Hammoud’s land. They turned the facility into their base, bringing in equipment and ammunition. Once, when Hammoud approached his property hoping to meet the officer in charge, he was driven away and threatened with death should he return.

Regime forces remained on Hammoud’s property for over a year before relocating elsewhere and handing it over to the pro-regime militia, the National Defence Forces (NDF). During its occupation, the NDF looted the facility and adjoining apartments, stealing all its contents, including the suspended ceilings and roof tiles. The leader of this local armed group was killed in 2015 during armed clashes with the opposition in the area. Afterwards, the group disbanded and left the site, during which Hammoud was abroad. Upon hearing the news, Hammoud returned to check on his land and properties.

However, when he arrived, Hammoud was surprised to find yet another pro-regime militia had taken over the site. The militia’s leader had initially joined an armed opposition faction at the start of the uprising but later reconciled with the regime forces and formed a local militia, coordinating with Military Intelligence. Aside from fighting against opposition factions, this militia was also involved in wartime economy tactics, such as kidnapping for ransom, drug and arms trafficking, and car theft.

The militia reportedly considered Hammoud’s property an ideal base of operations, using it to hold kidnap victims, dismantle stolen cars for parts, and store and distribute drugs. They altered the facility and the apartment’s structure, building additional sections and demolishing walls in certain areas. The militia leader made the site his headquarters, setting up an office decorated with stolen goods from other regions, where he received his visitors.

As their illicit business ventures thrived, the militia took over several villas and homes in the same town, using them as residences for their members and families. Most of these homes and villas belonged to regime opponents or expatriates who had not returned to the town since 2011 due to the war and lack of security. Legally speaking, these takeovers are known as property extortion, i.e., taking over someone else’s property without their consent, or asserting control over someone else’s property without any legal ownership or valid reason.

Since 2015, Hammoud has tried every means available to reclaim his property. Initially, he sought the help of intermediaries to negotiate with the militia leader. He also turned to the legal system and hired a “top-notch” lawyer, one who had connections with officials in the military and security forces, allowing them to mediate with those parties. Such lawyers demand high fees, often off the books, frequently claiming the funds are used to bribe officers, officials and judges. Hammoud says his lawyer led him on for two years, taking significant fees without any results, not even filing a lawsuit. Other intermediaries proved no better, rustling in Hammoud and spending exorbitant amounts of money to no avail.

A high-ranking regime military officer facilitated the first direct meeting between the Hammoud and the militia leader and took place in the militia leader’s luxurious office, which Hammoud says he no longer recognised as his property. An additional storey had been built, escalators installed, and armed guards were stationed everywhere, treating the militia leader with reverence, even kissing his hand as he passed or entered his office. Hammoud describes the scene as reminiscent of a mafia film.

The mediator turned out to be a close friend of the militia leader, revealing an evident prior agreement between them that he said would be a middle-ground solution: Hammoud would pay $150,000 for the militia to vacate the site, compensating for the alterations the militia leader had made to the property. Stunned by the amount, Hammoud immediately rejected the offer and made to leave. But the mediator stopped him, Hammoud says, suggesting another solution: that Hammoud writes off half the property in the militia leader’s name, making them partners in ownership. Hammoud also firmly rejected this offer.

Other mediators also stepped in at different stages, albeit reaching similar terms. With every door seemingly closed before him, Hammoud eventually turned to the judiciary and hired another lawyer to file a case for eviction from his extorted property. The militia leader did not attend any court sessions but had a group of lawyers represent and defend him. The defence was based on the militia leader’s claim that he had purchased the property from its owner. Yet, he failed to present the sales contract, alleging it was lost.

The militia leader’s legal team made offers throughout the trial to Hammoud to relinquish his property or pay compensation to the militia leader in exchange for eviction. Due to the lack of evidence, the trial court ruled in Hammoud’s favour, allowing him to reclaim his property; the appellate court did the same. However, each time the judicial police accompanied the property owner to implement the court’s eviction decision, a high-ranking official contacted the police chief, persuading him to abandon the site without enforcing the ruling.

Finally, after a full year of delayed implementation of the ruling, Hammoud was forced to seek the assistance of a high-ranking regime military officer. This officer intervened by dispatching a military force that accompanied the judicial police, and they evicted the occupants. And though Hammoud regained his property, there is still a legal restraint on disposal transactions related to it. He says he does not know the reason for this restriction. Still, he suspects it is an attempt by the militia leader’s lawyers to keep matters unresolved and force him to pay compensation.

Property Extortion in Damascus’ Ash Al-Warwar Informal Settlement

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Over the course of the war, many residents of the informal Ash Al-Warwar settlement in Damascus have been expelled from their homes due to their sectarian or ethnic affiliations or their political orientations. Militias loyal to the regime or newly displaced people to the area have seized the properties of these absentees.

Ash Al-Warwar emerged in the early 1970s as a series of scattered buildings in a rugged mountainous area overlooking Barzeh Al-Balad, a Damascus district. These buildings were constructed on public properties that the residents seized and divided into small plots of land on which they built tightly connected homes devoid of construction safety conditions. The land is owned by the municipalities of Barzeh in Damascus and Maaraba in Rural Damascus, which means it falls administratively under those municipal authorities. However, the governorate of Damascus is directly responsible for providing services in the settlement, while it is under the authority of Al-Qaboun police force.

Most residents of Ash Al-Warwar are Alawites from the Masyaf area in the Hama governorate, and some neighbourhoods are named after Masyaf villages, such as Deir Mama, Al-Naqir and Baarin. The settlement also includes small neighbourhoods of Sunni migrants from Deir-ez-Zor and Al-Qalamoun in Rural Damascus, as well as Kurdish migrants from northeastern Syria. A significant proportion of residents are from low-income families and are minor public sector and ministry employees, especially in the army and security agencies.

Public services in Ash Al-Warwar were already poor before 2011 on various levels. For instance, the area was not served by a transport line to and from the capital city and taxis often refused to enter it due to its rough and narrow roads. The water and sanitation network was dilapidated, and residents often extended sections of it at their own expense, without supervision and maintenance by the government water and sanitation institutions. Residents depended on securing their consumer and food needs from the nearby Barzeh neighbourhood due to the lack of public markets in Ash Al-Warwar.

In 2011, with increasing sectarian polarisation with Barzeh, armed popular committees loyal to the regime formed in Ash Al-Warwar and integrated with the National Defence Forces, a regime militia, by the end of 2012. The National Defence Forces in Ash Al-Warwar and opposition forces in Barzeh engaged in violent battles that, by 2013, destroyed the frontline area between them. Both sides also exchanged sectarian cleansing operations to expel the remaining Sunnis from Ash Al-Warwar and Alawites from Barzeh. The National Defence Forces seized these homes in Ash Al-Warwar, distributing them to the families of its fighters from the neighbourhood and to displaced Alawite people coming from Al-Baath Street in the nearby Tishreen informal settlement next to Al-Qaboun.

Aliaa is originally from the Syrian coast and now lives with her husband in a formerly predominantly Kurdish neighbourhood of Ash Al-Warwar. The Kurdish residents, who were mostly Sunni, refrained from open conflict against regime forces on a sectarian basis in most parts of Syria, including Ash Al-Warwar. However, most of the Kurds were expelled from Ash Al-Warwar, and the National Defence Forces took over their houses to accommodate the families of its fighters. Aliaa says that some of these Kurdish families migrated to Europe, while others ended up in Hassakeh. She adds that the National Defence Forces justified the seizure of their properties by saying that a Kurdish state had been established in northeastern Syria and that they should move there.

According to Aliaa, two years ago few of those Kurdish residents returned to Ash Al-Warwar and demanded their homes back. Some of them sought help from the Fourth Division detachment present in Ash al-Warwar in order to evict the current occupants of their homes. In some cases, the Fourth Division intervened and evacuated the occupants, after the returnees showed water and electricity bills, and witnesses from their old Alawite acquaintances and neighbours testified that they were the original homeowners. In other instances, the current occupants of those properties refused to leave.

Ramia is a young Kurdish woman who used to live in Ash al-Warwar with her mother and siblings, in a two-storey building built by her late father. As the violence in the neighbourhood escalated during the war, all her male siblings migrated to Europe, and Ramia moved to live in the neighbouring Kurdish-majority RuknEddin neighbourhood in Damascus. National Defence Forces took over their building and distributed its apartments to the families of its fighters. Ramia kept all the documents proving her family’s ownership of the building, which are receipts for paying water, electricity and telephone bills. About a year ago, Ramia filed a complaint with the Public Prosecution, accusing the occupants of the building of theft. One of the lawyers told her that she would not be able to reclaim the building by filing a property seizure lawsuit, but only if she filed a criminal complaint. Ramia accompanied a police patrol, to which she paid a hefty bribe, that helped her recover the building.

It is difficult for residents to file property extortion lawsuits, as they do not have sufficient property documents. Therefore, it is easier to file a complaint to the Public Prosecution in Damascus, where the complainant reports that their home has been robbed, then extorted. The prosecution then transfers the complaint to Al-Qaboun Police Department, which in turn sends a police patrol to the house to evacuate its occupants. The patrol requests on-site witnesses to confirm the complainant’s ownership of the house. In other instances, the complainant seeks help from the Fourth Division’s local detachment to carry out the same task, even though it is not within its jurisdiction.

Saeed is from Idlib and lived in a neighbourhood mostly inhabited by people from Deir-ez-Zor in Ash Al-Warwar. He was forcibly evicted from his home after a group of young men broke into it, assaulted him and accused him of belonging to an opposition faction. Most of the Sunni residents evicted from Ash Al-Warwar were from Idlib. Usually they were driven out by arresting family members, accusing them of belonging to opposition factions and threatening intimidation. Saeed did not leave the country but ended up renting a house in a nearby neighbourhood. An Alawite family now lives in his home in Ash Al-Warwar. Saeed fears approaching any type of authority to reclaim his house, and he has no intention of returning to the neighbourhood after what he has endured there. Saeed’s ultimate hope is for the family living in his house to pay him rent.

Rida, a young Alawite man, lived with his family in a rented house in the nearby Barzeh Al-Balad neighbourhood. Rida has a brother working in the intelligence services, and the whole family supports the regime. The family was threatened by opposition factions to leave Barzeh, through pamphlets placed in front of their house urging them to leave the neighbourhood, and by writing threats on their door.

Rida’s family left Barzeh in late 2011 and lived in a building in Ash Al-Warwar, the owner of which is from Barzeh and had also been displaced from the neighbourhood. The building consists of three storeys near the main road leading to Tishreen Military Hospital. Rida’s family took over the entire building, refusing to share it with the National Defense Forces. In 2016, a confrontation broke out between the two parties, involving bombs and light weapons. The family still lives in the building, supported by the local mukhtar, known for his strong relations with high-ranking officials in the security and military services.

Explained: Judicial Overlap and HLP Rights in AANES-Held Areas

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Since its founding in 2014 under the name “Democratic Federation of Rojava – Northern Syria”, the Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria (AANES) has clashed with Damascus-run authorities, which continued to function in the so-called “security squares” held by the regime in various cities of northeastern Syria. The AANES judiciary also has seen competition and dispute with the Damascus government, affecting matters related to housing, land and property rights. 

As AANES took control of prisons in the area in 2014, it established a judicial structure headed by the Social Justice Council to act as ministry of justice, and affiliated diwan departments to act as courts. These diwans have two levels: first are the Social Justice Diwans, which oversee various cases except for terrorism-related suits. Second are the Discrimination Authority Diwans, which act as appeals courts. This system has seen significant difficulties and challenges, including continued operation of Damascus-run courts, which operate in the regime-run security squares. 

These regime-run courts have continued their duties at all levels of litigation: reconciliation, first instance, appeals and cassation. However, the authority of the judicial police charged with executing the court’s decisions are limited only to the security square areas. If the judicial officer is asked to send a subpoena or other notification to someone outside of the security square, then the phrase “outside of authority” is written on the request.

Meanwhile, the AANES recognises rulings made by the Damascus-run courts, including those affirming sales contracts, leases, termination of common ownership, settlement and more. In real estate cases, there is an additional problem, however: an absence of official Land Registry records under the AANES amid continued reliance on records made by local departments of the central Directorate of Cadastral Affairs in Damascus. Those local departments have also continued their duties inside the security squares.

To resolve part of this problem, the AANES Social Justice Council issued Decree No. 6 in 2021, which prevented Justice Diwans from accepting real estate in-kind lawsuits related to the original property rights for rural properties located outside of zoning plans. The decree required a return to pre-2013 status for rural properties and state-owned properties, i.e., before the announcement of the formation of the Democratic Federation of Rojava – Northern Syria. It also obligated Justice Diwans not to consider lawsuits related to the origin of the real estate rights, which had previously been considered and ruled on by a final judicial decision, regardless of the issuing entity. The Council said this decree was meant to preserve the rights of citizens, avert any potential future disputes, maintain public interest and safeguard property rights. One of the reasons for issuing the decree was the AANES’ desire to stop judicial overlap in the areas it controls.

Decree No. 6 could mean some risks to HLP rights, such as freezing the hearing of some real estate dispute cases, resulting in time lost. For example, a man named Ahmad in Qamishli told The Syria Report that an AANES court refused to consider his lawsuit to reclaim a property before the government’s Civil Court of First Instance in the city decided on a lawsuit over the origin of the property right between him and his opponent. Only once Ahmad obtains a ruling from the Damascus-run court confirming his ownership can he proceed to implementation through the regime-affiliated judicial officer in Qamishli. However, if this implementation is not done properly because the property is “outside of control”, it is then Ahmad’s right to file a lawsuit for property extortion before the AANES’ courts, which resort to Asayish forces for implementation.

Fakhri is another resident who has been impacted by judicial overlap. He was young when his father died in 2001, before the implementation of a judicial ruling to recover a property from occupants who refused to hand it over. In 2019, Fakhri requested implementation of the 2001 decision through the implementation department of the Damascus-affiliated judicial officer in Qamishli. The judicial officer refused because the neighbourhood where the property is located is “outside of security control.”

Fakhri filed a lawsuit in 2022 before an AANES court for handover of the extorted property. The court refused to consider the lawsuit and returned it based on Decree No. 6, after the property occupant highlighted a judicial decision issued in 2013 by the Damascus-run Civil Conciliation Court in Qamishli, confirming his ownership of the same property. Thus, the dispute over the origin of the real estate right, which had previously been considered and ruled on by a final judicial decision from a court affiliated with Damascus, was upheld.

AANES courts do consider property extortion cases, according to Decree No. 6. Extortion is taking someone else’s property without their consent, or doing so without a legal document of ownership or a legitimate reason. The law does not require coercion as a condition for extortion; seizure without a legal justification suffices. The penalty for extortion, according to the AANES Penal Code, is up to two years in prison, and it is one of the most common complaints received by the public prosecutor in AANES areas. 

Upon his return from Germany in 2022, Nabil found that his partner in an industrial shop in Qamishli had sold his share without consulting him. The shop was not divided between the old partners. According to the new sales contract, the buyer’s share of the shop was not determined. Nabil filed an objection to the sale, claiming that he should have been prioritised to buy his partner’s share, as the shop was communally owned. The People’s Court in Qamishli dismissed Nabil’s lawsuit, referring to Decree No. 6, due to the existence of an allotment document issued by the Qamishli Municipal Council indicating the share of each partner, which Nabil rejected. He resorted to filing an objection lawsuit before the regime’s courts in Qamishli for the same case.

NGOs Using Absentees’ Homes in Khan Sheikhoun

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After the earthquake on February 6, 2023, NGOs and international organisations increased their development and relief project activities in regime-controlled areas of Idlib governorate. Some of these organisations now use the homes of displaced persons as their offices.

On May 3, the Syrian Development Horizons Association opened an office in Khan Sheikhoun, with the attendance of the Idlib governor and the local Baath Party branch secretary. Many NGOs working in regime-controlled parts of Idlib have offices in Khan Sheikhoun since the governorate made it the alternative administrative centre for the governorate in late 2021, the city of Idlib being outside its control.

According to a local correspondent for The Syria Report, the headquarters of the Horizons Association is a house that belonged to a member of the Haloum family, who were forcibly displaced to opposition-controlled areas of northern Syria. The home is in the Al-Bira neighbourhood of eastern Khan Sheikhoun. It was damaged by artillery shelling from regime forces, but the association has worked to restore it.

The association claims it rented the house from its owner, though The Syria Report has not been able to independently confirm this claim. Some members of the Haloum family still live in Khan Sheikhoun, and some are members of the regime forces. Those members consider themselves the custodians of all the Haloum family’s homes and properties in Khan Sheikhoun, including those who were forcibly displaced from the city. Therefore, they treat the Haloum properties in Khan Sheikhoun as their own.

In any case, even if the home is rented, the fact that this is occurring on a property whose owners cannot use because they were displaced, can be considered a violation of the housing and property rights of the home owners.

The Horizons Association was declared by the Ministry of Social Affairs Decision No. 477 on February 23, 2023. It describes itself as a provider of social services, including educational support, execution of development projects and support for families returning to their hometowns in Idlib. Despite its recent establishment, the association has carried out projects related to psychological and educational support for children in Idlib, funded by UNICEF, according to what the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Association said in a televised interview, which the Association published on its Facebook page on May 14.

On the other hand, in early May 2023,  the governor of Idlib announced the opening of a clinic by the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC), in the city of Khan Shaykhun. It contains women’s, children’s clinics and offers free medicine. Reportedly, the Italian NGO INTERSOS Humanitarian Aid Organisation supported the opening of this clinic. There is another clinic in Khan Sheikhoun, but it belongs to the Directorate of Health in Idlib. It was opened in July 2021, but its patients reportedly suffer from poor medical services and difficulty obtaining medicines.

A source on the ground told The Syria Report that the new clinic by SARC was established on a property owned by a member of the Muhanna family, who were forcibly displaced to opposition areas in northern Syria. The Syria Report could not find another source to corroborate that information and it is not clear whether the SARC or Idlib Governorate have officially rented the property from its owner. In any case, the state prevents the return of  IDPs from opposition areas, unless they submit to a security check by the intelligence services and accept what the regime calls “settlement agreements” and then join the military service for those of conscription age. The state also forbids its citizens to deal with residents of opposition areas. Therefore, even if a rent was paid, the decision to use that property would be a violation of HLP rights.

The Muhanna property, located in the eastern district of Khan Sheikhoun, was a home and not intended as a health centre. The eastern district in Khan Sheikhoun contains bases and offices for numerous security and military departments for regime forces and their Russian and Iranian allies. These forces have seized many houses in the district, via a process called property extortion.

INTERSOS started working in regime-controlled areas of Syria in 2019. It has an office on Aref Al-Shahabi Street in the capital, Damascus, and some of its projects are funded by UNHCR. On May 30, the head of INTERSOS in Syria, Pietro Caborus, and his accompanying delegation, visited the governor of Idlib. During the visit, they discussed the services currently provided by the Red Crescent in the governorate and explored expanding services to cover all sectors, according to a Facebook post by the governorate. Earlier, on March 15, a delegation from INTERSOS, led by its Regional Director for the Middle East Martin Rosselot, as well as the head of SARC’s Idlib branch, visited the winter clothes distribution point for families affected by the earthquake in Maarat al-Numan. They also visited the medical clinic in the town of Al-Tamanah. The clinic has begun providing services to families returning to the area.

How One Man Lost His Land and House in Basilia City

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In early 2011, Ibrahim bought a small piece of land in the Bayader Nader informal settlement near Kafr Sousseh in Damascus. He built a small unlicensed house on the land, but was forced to flee the city because of his political activities against the regime. While he was gone, someone else seized his house and sold it. Then, the entire area became subject to rezoning as part of the second zoned real estate area in Damascus, established via Decree No. 66 of 2012. This area would come to be known as Basilia City. Ibrahim lost his house, and it is now difficult for him to claim his rights as laid out in Decree No. 66.

Ibrahim is originally from Deir-ez-Zor, and the 95-square-metre piece of land he bought in Bayader Nader was worth SYP 45,000 (about USD 1,000 in 2011). As with all informal settlements built on private agricultural land, construction is technically illegal — that meant Ibrahim had actually just purchased a share of the original agricultural property. This made Ibrahim merely one among dozens of shared owners of the property, most of whom were also from Deir-ez-Zor. Common ownership means there are two or more owners of one property — their individual shares are not subdivided, which makes them shared owners of a single piece of real estate. Agricultural lands like the one Ibrahim built his home on cannot be subdivided, nor the common property can be terminated. The only proof of ownership in such cases is through a notarised sales contract that specifies which share the buyer now owns. It may also include a statement specifying the location of the land, and a description of the property if there has been construction. In all cases, buildings constructed on lands that were sold in this manner, as well as sales of such buildings, are not formally recorded in the Land Registry. 

The original owner of Ibrahim’s land comes from a family that works in contracting, construction and real estate, and some of the family members have good relations with influential figures in the regime as well as Hezbollah officials. According to Ibrahim, the family utilised these relationships to solve some complex real estate issues. When the Syrian revolution began in 2011, Ibrahim decided to build on his piece of land without a construction permit. Ibrahim took advantage of the municipality’s relative laxity in halting unlicensed construction during that time and benefitted from services provided to him by the owner of the land, who is also a contractor. Within just a few months, the contractor built a one-storey house with three rooms and a salon, as well as a kitchen and bathroom. The construction costs totaled SYP 700,000, which Ibrahim paid to the contractor. He also obtained electricity and water meters for the house. 

Ibrahim’s story is not unique. During that same period, Ibrahim’s contractor built dozens of identical, unlicensed houses on small plots of land in Bayader Nader for dozens of people, most of whom were from Deir-ez-Zor like Ibrahim.

Ibrahim did not end up living in that house, as his opposition to the regime meant he had to leave Syria after he became wanted by the security services. In order to maintain the house while he was away, he leased it to someone he knew. Others from Deir-ez-Zor who had also built unlicensed houses in the area took similar measures. 

In 2012, the Decree No. 66, was issued, which stipulated establishing two zoned real estate areas within the general plans for Damascus city. One of those zones, Basilia City, had an area of 954 hectares that included the Bayader Nader informal settlement. However, implementation of that zoned real estate area did not begin immediately due to ongoing battles on the ground. 

Ibrahim’s contractor belonged at this time to the pro-regime National Defence militia and became a leader of its local group in Bayader Nader. Clashes approached the area in 2013-2014 as the opposition took control of the neighbouring Yarmouk camp and Al-Qadam areas. After making sure he was gone, the contractor evicted the tenant from Ibrahim’s house then leased it instead to one of his own acquaintances, taking advantage of the general chaos in the area. He did the same with other absentees for whom he had built previously unlicensed houses in Bayader Nader, by extorting its occupants and then leasing them to other people. 

Ibrahim, who could not return to Syria, nevertheless discovered by chance in 2015, that someone from Idlib governorate had bought his house. When one of Ibrahim’s relatives visited the house, the occupant showed that they had a sales contract from the contractor, who was also the original owner of the agricultural land. 

Because Ibrahim’s ownership is technically just a share on a commonly owned, non-subdivided property, it could be located anywhere on the original plot of land. This means that the extorter — in this case the contractor — can sell the same property over and over, so long as the sales contracts are not recorded in the Land Registry, and so long as owners like Ibrahim are unable to return and prove their ownership via the judiciary. 

With the return of relative stability to the area, and after regime forces retook control in 2018, the Damascus governorate began work on the Basilia City project. This included preparation of large parcels of land, including parts of Bayader Nader, whose residents were evicted. 

Under Decree No. 66 and the subsequent Law No. 10 of 2018 that amended it, real estate properties in Basilia City are distributed to rights holders after zoning via shares, according to the results of the work of the inventory and Description Committee. Those who owned agricultural land within the area and didn’t construct anything on it can receive financial compensation, to be set by the governorate, and this was the case of Ibrahim.

Ibrahim, was unable to find out what happened to his house, and whether it had been evacuated and removed, or it was still standing and being rented to strangers. His name was on a list for those entitled to receive only financial compensation — this is because he was a joint owner of a share of agricultural land before the zoning process. And because Ibrahim is wanted by the security services, he is afraid to return to Syria in order to claim his rights and prove via the judiciary that he owned an unlicensed house, a process that could allow him to obtain organisational shares in Basilia City. 

Under Decree No. 66 the occupants of their own properties in the area before the zoning process can obtain these shares as well as the right to apply for alternative housing, albeit at their own expense. However, those who only owned their real estate without living on it are only entitled to organisational shares. Those who were occupants but did not own the real estate can apply for alternative housing.

Palestinian Aid Group Builds Settlement for Displaced Syrians in Afrin

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The Ajnadin Palestine displacement camp for Syrians officially opened on January 04, 2023, in the Afrin region in the northern part of the Aleppo governorate. Referred to as a “village,” the project aims to secure semi-permanent alternative housing for displaced Syrians in opposition-held areas. A local group called the Idlib Nation Team, active in Afrin, built the village with support and funding from Ajnadin, a Palestinian NGO based in the Israeli-occupied East Jerusalem neighbourhood of Bayt Hanina. 

According to media reports, Ajnadin transferred the funds for the village from its account in the Israeli Habolim Bank. The fact that a Palestinian NGO in Israeli-occupied territory is funding a displacement housing project in Syria sheds light on the sheer depth of the crisis faced by displaced Syrians. 

A source from Ajnadin told The Syria Report that the newly built village contains 50 dwellings for 50 families who had previously been living in displacement camps in rural Afrin. Each home has two bedrooms, a salon, a kitchen, and a bathroom, totalling around 45 square metres. There are two one-cubic-metre water tanks per unit, interior doors and windows, two main iron doors, and a 35-square-metre garden. A sewage network services the entire village. It also has a mosque and an Islamic studies centre for teaching Sharia and Quran. 

The village is built on about 2.50 hectares of flat un-planted agricultural land near Shatika, a town in the Jandares district west of Afrin. However, the existing 50 dwellings only occupy one hectare of land, with the remainder set aside for a future stage of expansion in the project to build more housing units.  

In the second phase of the village, the Idlib Nation Team will build 50 more homes and a school. Construction was supposed to begin in the first few months of 2023 but was postponed until the end of the year due to the February 06 earthquake, a source from the Idlib Nation Team told The Syria Report. 

The Idlib Nation Team increased its support for the village and its residents after the earthquake. It set up a camp of dozens of tents to accommodate people affected by the disaster. The organisation was also in charge of implementing this project and confirmed it opened a village school last March for the children.

A source from the Idlib Nation Team told The Syria Report that the local council in Jandares granted the organisation land to build the village. The source added that Turkish officials in the area approved the project. However, the contract between the organisation and the local council does not indicate that the team owns the land or the residential units. Rather, the organisation’s role, according to the contract, is limited to the construction and supervision of housing operations. The local council is responsible for managing the village. 

The homes cannot be sold or transferred to the families who live there. These families only have the right to use the housing units and cannot lease them. Therefore, according to the source, the village effectively belongs to the Jandares Local Council.  

In 2018, Turkey-backed opposition factions took control of the entire Afrin region during Operation Olive Branch, forcing the displacement of much of the original population, most of whom were Kurds. There were also many violations of housing, land and property rights. In addition, more than 100,000 forcibly displaced people from the countryside of Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo also moved to Afrin, with many of them living in the homes of displaced Kurds.

A local source told The Syria Report that the land on which the village was built is not public or endowment property but privately owned by individuals from the Kurdish Manan family, which was forcibly displaced from the area in 2018. The opposition factions controlling the area accuse members of the Manan family of belonging to the majority Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG). Several family members were reportedly killed during the fighting in 2018.

The Manan family’s land is not an isolated case: it is among other lands that some opposition factions have extorted since 2018 on the pretext that their owners belong to the YPG. Sometimes, some factions grant these lands to local organisations to build residential villages to house the families of displaced opposition fighters from other parts of Syria.

Syrians Deported from Lebanon Face HLP Violations Upon Their Return

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In recent weeks, Lebanese authorities have arrested hundreds of displaced Syrians without official residency papers and deported dozens back to Syria. Human rights groups have warned that the deportations put victims at risk of persecution, including illegal and arbitrary detention, torture, sexual violence, and forced disappearance by Syrian security forces. Some of the deportees also face challenges related to housing, land, and property rights. 

Official Lebanese figures estimate between 1.50 and 2.08 million Syrians residing in Lebanon, a large portion of whom are formally registered with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. However, they have been unable to obtain official residency papers in Lebanon due to complex administrative procedures. Lebanese authorities have justified the recent spate of raids, arrests and deportations by citing an old decree issued by the Higher Defence Council in 2019 that ordered the deportation of Syrians who entered Lebanon via informal border crossings. 

Ibrahim is a Syrian man from Qusayr, a rural city in the southern part of the Homs governorate near the border with Lebanon. He owns an Arab-style house there with a front garden, all of which is officially listed under his name in the Land Registry. Ibrahim also holds a “green tabu” title deed for the property. 

Syrian opposition forces briefly controlled Qusayr in 2012-13 before regime forces and the Lebanese Shia militia Hezbollah captured it in 2013, displacing the residents. Ibrahim fled to Lebanon through an informal border crossing and now lives in Zahleh, a city in the Bekaa Valley. At first, he obtained official residency papers in Lebanon but recently failed to renew them due to new restrictions by Lebanese authorities. 

A Lebanese Military Intelligence patrol stopped Ibrahim on his way to work last week at a temporary checkpoint set up along a public road. They then deported him and other detained Syrians to the border area between Lebanon and Syria at the Masnaa crossing, where the Lebanese authorities handed deportees to a Syrian Military Intelligence detachment. From there, Ibrahim underwent a security check and received a Ministry of Interior document informing him he had 15 days to begin his mandatory conscription in the Syrian army. 

Afterwards, he entered Syrian territory and headed to his hometown just outside Qusayr. But when he arrived, Ibrahim was shocked to find a family of strangers living in his house who refused to leave. He told The Syria Report that the family was from the city of Homs and consisted of a father who was a member of Military Intelligence and two adult sons, one who is a volunteer in Military Intelligence and the other a member of Lebanese Hezbollah. Ibrahim filed a complaint at the police station, where an officer advised him to seek the help of the judiciary to reclaim his extorted home. Property extortion is when someone seizes another person’s property without the latter’s consent, a legal property deed, or legitimate reason. 

Several families have previously voluntarily returned to Qusayr before Ibrahim but were unable to reclaim their extorted homes from military members and officers and Hezbollah fighters, even after filing official complaints and lawsuits. Ibrahim was advised to join the army and then file the lawsuit, which would strengthen his position given that the case would involve the seizure of a home belonging to a military member. 

Qusayr is treated somewhat differently from other areas in Syria as it is today considered a sphere of influence for Hezbollah, which runs military bases and training camps there. Only Syrian regime forces and allied militia members are allowed to settle in the area. 

Ahmad, another young man from Qusayr, faces a similar situation. Syrian members of Hezbollah now occupy his house. Like Ibrahim, Ahmad has a “green tabu” deed for his Arab-style house near the Lebanese border, which was damaged during wartime clashes. Hezbollah converted the house into what appears to be a military site for its members. However, unlike Ibrahim, Ahmad cannot reclaim his house even if he joined the army and getting the property back would be a long and arduous process with no guarantee of success. As such, Ahmad decided to return to Lebanon through an informal crossing. 

Meanwhile, Adnan was displaced from his hometown in the countryside just west of Damascus alongside his family in 2013 during battles between regime and opposition forces and resettled in Lebanon. Adnan’s brother was an opposition fighter who was killed during the clashes with the regime’s Fourth Division popular committees, which took control of their hometown in 2016. As retribution for his brother’s fighting, these popular committees seized Adnan’s house and used it as a headquarters for their members. Since 2017, they have also been cultivating and harvesting crops on Adnan’s land without his consent. 

In recent days, the Lebanese army arrested Adnan and more than 50 other Syrians during a raid on homes in the Burj Hammoud neighbourhood just outside Beirut. The detainees faced verbal and physical abuse before authorities took them to the border and left them at the Masnaa Crossing. Syrian Military Intelligence arrested Adnan, but they released him because he was not wanted by any security agencies or for military conscription. Adnan says he cannot demand his house back unless he coordinates with the committees that seized it. Making such a demand through the judiciary could expose him to potential retaliation or being framed and arrested for a made-up charge. 

Lebanese authorities also recently arrested and deported four Syrian refugees during a raid on a camp in Al-Qaraoun in the western Bekaa Valley. The four detainees were displaced from the Aleppo governorate town of Khanasir in 2012 after militias affiliated with Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps took control of the area. The government has banned original residents from returning to the area as those militias now consider it a closed military zone. With no other options, the four detainees returned to Lebanon from Syria that same day after reaching out to a Lebanese people smuggler and paying USD 150 for the journey. 

Khalil fled to Lebanon from a rural area near Salamieh in the Hama governorate in 2012. He owns an Arab-style house and 15 hectares of farmland. However, the area was devastated during clashes between opposition and regime forces. Several days ago, Lebanese authorities arrested Khalil at a temporary checkpoint on the Zahleh highway. Notably, authorities left Khalil and the others detained with him at the Masnaa crossing, where smugglers with ties to the Fourth Division found them and offered to take them back across the border into Lebanon for USD 100 each. They took the offer and went back to Lebanon. 

By this point, Khalil’s house in rural Hama had been completely destroyed, and his land was seized and cultivated by people with ties to the regime. During displacement, Khalil also lost the title deeds for the house and his land. In addition, the area lacks electricity and other infrastructure, and unexploded landmines there mean returning would be too dangerous for Khalil and his family. 

NDF Extorts Real Estate in Homs’ Al-Zahraa Neighbourhood

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When the Syrian revolution began in 2011, most residents of Al-Zahraa neighbourhood in Homs sided with the regime, many even joining the National Defence Forces (NDF), a pro-government militia. The NDF subsequently made Al-Zahraa a base for attacks on surrounding pro-opposition neighbourhoods, such as Al-Bayadeh and Karam Al-Zeitoun, and harassed residents of Al-Zahraa, seizing many displaced people’s homes. 

Situated in the eastern part of Homs, Al-Zahraa is an informal settlement built in the 1970s on agricultural land not meant for construction. A sizable minority of Sunni Bedouin clans historically from the area live in the neighbourhood, alongside an Alawite majority originally hailing from rural parts of the Homs governorate. Most Alawite residents of Al-Zahraa are low-income employees and workers in state institutions, as well as the security and military services. 

The neighbourhood saw a blossoming leftist movement in the 1980s. It served as a hiding spot for members of the League of Communist Action (LCA) who were wanted by the security authorities. The LCA is a communist anti-regime movement active in the 1980s, whose members were primarily members of religious minorities, university students and members of the armed forces. Many members were subject to reprisals by the security services, torture and years of imprisonment. 

Like most informal settlements in Syria, Al-Zahraa suffered from poor government services such as electricity, water, sewage, municipal services and healthcare. That began to change in 2011 as construction work picked up, spurred by NDF members who had become wealthy by looting the surrounding neighbourhoods. The government started to pay more attention to Al-Zahraa in response to the loyalty presented by its residents. Roads were paved, and transportation became better organised. 

In December 2012, four Alawite female nurses were murdered, and their bodies were thrown in Al-Zahraa’s main public square. The NDF massacred 40 Sunni residents in retaliation. Remaining Sunni residents, as well as pro-opposition Alawite residents, subsequently fled the neighbourhood. The NDF was then able to extort the empty homes. Property extortion is the seizure of someone else’s property without their consent or legal basis for ownership or legitimate reason. 

Souad, who comes from a Sunni family, lived at home with her mother when the revolution broke out. Their house was unlicensed and constructed by her father several decades previously. Though Souad’s father was already deceased at the time, he had been a volunteer in the Syrian army, and old friends and colleagues surrounded their home from his army days. Fearing sectarian violence, Souad and her mother fled the house during the war. The NDF soon seized it. In 2015, she turned to the police for help recovering the home but later preferred to sell it at a lower price and live elsewhere. 

Such harassment did not only target Sunni residents of the neighbourhood but also Alawites who opposed the regime. Saeed, an Alawite man in his 40s, left his home in Al-Zahraa due to a dispute with NDF members after the 2012 massacre. Because of Saeed’s stance against revenge killings, people threw stones at his house. Fearing things could worsen, he left his home and rented a house in a nearby neighbourhood. Shortly afterwards, the NDF allowed the family of one of its fallen fighters to reside in Saeed’s house. 

Saeed managed to visit his house several times after the fighting ended in 2014 and asked the family living there to leave, to no avail, he told The Syria Report. It was only after he filed a complaint to the police, complete with documents proving his ownership of the house, that he could get it back. Because there are no proper title deeds for houses in informal settlements, ownership documents usually include notarised purchase contracts for agricultural land or shares and any available electricity, water and phone bills. 

The property violations have even affected members of the NDF. Ali, who came from a Bedouin clan in Al-Zahraa, was affiliated with the NDF but was killed in a personal dispute with other Bedouin residents in 2013. His family received threats after the incident, telling them to leave the neighbourhood. They did so, moving to another part of Homs, and another NDF-affiliated family settled in their empty house. 

In at least one case, an NDF officer on duty was also targeted. In 2014, security forces carried out a series of arrests on NDF members in Al-Zahraa, on numerous charges, including drug trafficking, theft, gang membership and kidnapping for ransom. The family of one of those arrested turned to an Alawite officer from Al-Zahraa to mediate for their son’s release. Because the officer refused to mediate, he was subject to intimidation tactics, including a bomb thrown at his home. In the end, he decided to flee the neighbourhood. 

AANES Occupies Absentee Properties for Free and via Forced Tenancy

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Recent years have seen the majority-Kurdish Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria (AANES) authorities seize many absentee-owned properties. When those absentees return home and demand their properties back, authorities have offered to lease them, without any compensation for the previous occupancy period. 

Seizure of absentees’ real estate is a form of property extortion without the owners’ consent or knowledge, and without any legal ownership title or legitimate reason to do so. 

Various entities within the AANES have taken possession of empty or absentee-owned real estate, including buildings, shops and homes. Most of the absentees are expatriates originally from the area whose properties have been seized by the AANES without their approval–sometimes without any notification. Many of these absentees were forced to return either permanently or temporarily, or appoint someone on their behalf, in order to sue the various AANES entities that had seized their properties. In most cases, they were able to reach a contractual agreement where the property-seizing entity would pay a monthly or annual rent. These contracts preserve the rights of the lessors and include terms on the time period for the lease, the eviction period and conditions to not modify the property. 

A correspondent for The Syria Report spoke with K. R., who appointed a lawyer via a power of attorney through the Syrian Embassy in Sweden to recover a property she owns in Qamishli that the AANES’ Union of Engineers took to use as their headquarters in 2018. When K. R. requested that the union vacate the property, they instead offered for her to rent it and even drew up a lease contract. The lawyer rejected this offer, explaining that his client feared losing her property after four years of occupancy without compensation. The union ended up vacating the property in late 2022 without paying any compensation to K. R. for the years it had occupied the space. 

However, the process isn’t always so simple. The Committee for Protecting Religions, which is affiliated with the AANES, occupied the home of Mr Al-Khatouni in the Al-Wasta neighbourhood of Qamishli without informing him. Mr Khatouni, who lives abroad, appointed his brother to recover the house. The committee agreed to vacate the property but requested a payment equal to the value of the improvements it had made to the home. Khatouni agreed to pay, but the committee returned and bargained over taking the water tanks and other equipment that they had installed, despite the fact that the payment included those items. When Mr Khatouni refused, the committee decided not to vacate the home and stayed on without paying rent. 

AANES courts do not hear civil real estate disputes for zoned areas until after the Department of Real Estate Complaints (part of the Categories Union) has heard and mediated such cases for reconciliation between the two sides. The Categories Union is an AANES organisation aimed at regulating market professions. Should efforts at mediation fail, then the Department of Real Estate Complaints sends a report to a court called the Justice Diwan to settle the dispute.

Meanwhile, the AANES’ Committee for Protecting Absentee Syriac and Assyrian Properties began a new policy in early 2022 to collect rental payments from AANES institutions that have occupied Christian-owned properties in the cities of Qamishli, Deirik and Al-Qahtaniyeh in the  Hassakeh governorate. In most cases, the committee negotiates with these AANES bodies without the authorisation or knowledge of the actual property owners. According to The Syria Report’s local correspondent, the committee takes a 35 percent cut of the occupants’ rental payments for itself, giving the remainder to the property owner. It is unclear what happens in cases where the property owner is deceased or has no heirs. 

The AANES formed the Committee for Protecting Absentee Syriac and Assyrian Properties in 2014 as a civil body to intervene before AANES courts in disputes involving absentee Christians. The committee considers complaints about extortion or occupation of absentees’ properties, as well as requests by tenants of these properties related to rental payments, vacancies and eviction. 

For example, the AANES’ Logistics Commission has occupied a building owned by A. Gh., an absentee, without payments since 2015. In October 2022, the Committee for Protecting Absentee Properties informed the Logistics Commission that it needed to either vacate the property or enter into a formal contract with payments calculated according to the property’s current market value. The two sides managed to reach an agreement and made a contract. However, A. Gh. had not appointed the committee to negotiate on his behalf or to lease out his property. In cases like this, any dispute or complaint from the original property owner about the contract must be directed to the committee, which drew up the lease agreement on their behalf. 

SNA Seize Properties of Residents Loyal to AANES in Tal Abyad

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Since pro-opposition Syrian National Army factions seized Tal Abyad and its surrounding countryside along the Syrian-Turkish border in 2019, many Kurdish residents were forced to flee the area. They ended up in areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the Raqqa and Hassakeh governorates. 

In their wake, SNA factions seized the properties of now-absent Kurdish residents working for the Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria (AANES) and the SDF. They have also taken properties belonging to displaced Arabs and Turkmen loyal to AANES. 

Tal Abyad is located in the Raqqa governorate and sits along the Syrian-Turkish border. The city was established in the early 1900s and became a destination for Armenians fleeing the genocide in Turkey. Before 2011, Tal Abyad was home to around 120,000 people, including Arabs from various tribes and Kurds, Turkmen, and Armenians. Tal Abyad residents work mainly in agriculture and trade. 

The city has also been known for its role in smuggling networks between Syria and Turkey. The Syrian government included the city in the provisions of Decree No. 41 of 2004, which regulates real estate ownership along the border. Under this decree and its amendments, people must obtain security approval before any legal disposal of their property in such areas. The Minister of Interior issues the approval based on a proposal from the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform and the Ministry of Defence. 

After intense battles with the Islamic State, the SDF captured Tal Abyad and the surrounding countryside in 2014 and maintained control of the border strip until October 2019, when the Turkish-backed SNA took the area during Operation Euphrates Shield. The operation aimed to remove SDF from a 30-kilometre belt of territory along the Syrian side of the border. 

Sheikh Hammad Al-Hammoud, a notable from one of the Arab tribes in Tal Abyad, told The Syria Report that he was displaced from the area during Operation Euphrates Shield. After he left in 2019, the SNA seized 100 hectares of his agricultural land in the village of Al-Ali Bajlih outside Tal Abyad under the pretext that he was loyal to AANES. 

Sheikh Al-Hammoud worked in agriculture and trade before 2011, but his favourable reputation and success in mediating disputes between residents landed him an appointment as a member of the AANES reconciliation office during its control of Tal Abyad from 2014 to 2019. The office is an official entity that aims to solve disputes amicably before reaching the court. 

According to Al-Hammoud, a group from the Ahrar Al-Sharqiyeh faction, which is part of the SNA, seized his land before the 2020 wheat harvest season without any prior warning or official charges against him, and without filing any actual case in court. 

Seizing someone else’s property without consent and a legal ownership deed or legitimate reason is considered extortion. No act of force needs to have occurred for a seizure to be classified as extortion.

Such seizures did not stop at the properties of employees of the AANES and its military and security institutions. They also extended to their families and relatives. 

AbdelMonaem is from the village of Sheriaan, south of Tal Abyad, and works as a traffic police officer for the AANES’ Asayish security forces. He was also displaced to Raqqa after Operation Euphrates Shield. According to AbdelMonaem, a group from the SNA-aligned Jabhat Al-Shamiyeh faction seized his 60-hectare agricultural land near the Al-Jallab River. However, the land is still registered in the name of AbdelMonaem’s father, who died in 2017. The heirs have not yet conducted the inheritance proceedings, so there are, in effect, multiple co-owners of the land, including seven sons and six daughters. 

Jabhat Al-Shamiyeh expelled AbdelMonaem’s brothers from the land just before the wheat and barley harvest in 2020, he says, under the pretext that he works with the Asayish. His family members paid the price. 

Meanwhile, Issa AbdulAziz is a Turkmen sheikh from the Al-Toubal clan who hails from the village of Hammam Al-Turkmen outside Tal Abyad. He was a political detainee in Syrian regime prisons from 1984 to 1996, charged with loyalty to the Iraqi Baath Party. Currently, AbdulAziz is a member of the Syrian Future Party, which supports AANES. 

AbdulAziz told The Syria Report that a group from Ahrar Al-Sharqiyeh seized 40 hectares of his family’s land before the 2020 wheat harvest season under the pretext that he works with the SDF. His 83-year-old mother went to Ahrar Al-Sharqiyeh’s headquarters in the area with documents proving that she and her husband, not AbdulAziz, owned the land. The faction referred her to court but without any luck. One Ahrar Al-Sharqiyeh leader reportedly told her: “When your son returns, the land will return to you.” Members of the faction are still cultivating the farmland. 

Meanwhile, AbdulRahman Al-Mohammad, who is from the village of Al-Jurn Al-Aswad outside Tal Abyad, bought three hectares of land from his neighbour in 2014. Due to the trust between the neighbours and because the local Cadastral Affairs directorates were not operating in the area during that period, Al-Mohammad did not formally register the purchase. The land’s previous owner was then displaced from the area during Operation Euphrates Shield. 

A group from Ahrar Al-Sharqiyeh seized the land by force in 2020 on the pretext that the owner was pro-regime. AbdulRahman could not convince the faction that he, not his former neighbour, was the land’s current owner. He was also unable to document his ownership of the property in the Land Registry. Repeated harassment by Ahrar Al-Sharqiyeh pushed AbdulRahman to flee to Raqqa. 

Iran-Affiliated Brigade Refuses to Return Homes in East Aleppo to Original Owners

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Many returnees to the eastern neighbourhoods of Aleppo city could not recover their homes, which were occupied during their absence by families who had been displaced from the Idlib governorate towns of Kafraya and Al-Fuaa. The Al-Baqir Brigade, a militia loyal to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, controls some neighbourhoods in east Aleppo and has refused to return the occupied properties to their original owners. 

Some displaced homeowners who have returned to the east Aleppo neighbourhoods of Al-Marjeh, Al-Maadi, Al-Saliheen, Bab Al-Neirab, and Al-Fardous have filed lawsuits before the civil courts in the city to evict the current occupants. They have also unsuccessfully attempted to mediate with the head of the Al-Baqir Brigade, Khaled Al-Marai, a sheikh from the Al-Bakareh tribe. 

Residents from Kafraya and Al-Fuaa, two Shia-majority towns, mostly remained politically loyal to the Syrian regime. They were forcibly displaced from their homes in several stages, the last of which was in July 2018. Their expulsion was part of the so-called Four Towns Agreement, the IRGC, Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, and the Islamist Ahrar Al-Sham group negotiated in April 2017 in Doha, Qatar. The agreement stipulated the simultaneous expulsion of residents from several besieged towns, including Madaya and Al-Zabadani in the Rural Damascus governorate and Kafraya and Al-Fuaa in Idlib. 

More than 40,000 Kafraya and Al-Fuaa residents were displaced from their homes and sent to live in displacement shelters in regime-held areas. From there, the Al-Baqir Brigade transferred around 2,000 families to the areas it controls in east Aleppo, allowing them to occupy the vacant homes of displaced residents from those neighbourhoods. 

The homes in east Aleppo are owned by displaced people who fled the fighting between 2012 to 2016 or by pro-opposition residents who were forcibly displaced, most of whom are Sunni Muslims. The latter group were expelled during the regime’s final attack on east Aleppo in late 2016 and sent to opposition-controlled areas of rural northern Aleppo governorate. Most of the people now returning home to east Aleppo are from the first group, as forcibly displaced residents must obtain security approval to return. 

Meanwhile, the Al-Baqir Brigade has done restoration work on some homes and apartments damaged by previous fighting and regime bombing in the area during opposition control in 2012-16. Namely, the brigade made the houses it worked on habitable, with repaired water and electrical networks. The homes were also provided with furniture by the Aleppo Defenders Corps, another pro-IRGC militia, to house the displaced people from Kafraya and Al-Fuaa properly.

One displaced resident who tried returning home to the Al-Marjeh neighbourhood told The Syria Report that members of the Al-Baqir Brigade prevented him from visiting his house, which a family from Al-Fuaa now occupies. He added that a group of homeowners communicated with the Al-Baqir Brigade leadership in the Al-Balloureh neighbourhood to mediate their return and evict the current occupants, but the commanders rejected their pleas.

The returnee said he is now living in a rented home in the same neighbourhood as his house. Another displaced person from east Aleppo told The Syria Report that he had filed a complaint to the court, which subsequently issued a ruling evicting the occupants from his home. However, he said the ruling has yet to be executed and that a group affiliated with the Al-Baqir Brigade threatened him with physical harm or detainment if he continued pursuing the eviction. 

Officials from Al-Baqir Brigade suggested that if alternative housing units are made available for the Kafraya and Al-Fuaa families, the homes in east Aleppo will return to the original owners. However, according to The Syria Report’s correspondent, the officials implied that the returning homeowners would, in this case, have to pay the costs of restoring their houses. 

Meanwhile, a source in Aleppo’s Directorate of Endowments told The Syria Report that the Iranian government is equipping residential buildings on endowment properties in the Jibb Al-Jalabi neighbourhood of east Aleppo. The source added that the Kafraya and Al-Fuaa families would move to those homes under long-term rental contracts. Iran built numerous residential facilities in Jibb Al-Jalabi in 2020 and 2021. The country also set up a consulate nearby, in the same area. 

Opposition Vows to Return Seized Properties in Northern Aleppo

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Under the pretext of security and military needs, an armed opposition group seized civilian-owned farms and homes in the city of Al-Bab in northern Aleppo in 2017. Five years later, the original owners have been unable to recover their properties. 

The group that seized the properties is led by a man named Fadi Al-Saleh, also known as Fadi Al-Deiri, and has been allied with various Syrian National Army (SNA) factions. Most group members were forcibly displaced from Homs and its countryside to northern Syria, where Al-Bab is located. 

Currently, the group is known as the Bayazeid Brigade. It is affiliated with the Sultan Malakshah Division, a part of the Turkish-backed SNA’s Second Corps that controls the Euphrates Shield area of the northern Aleppo governorate. Previously, the group had been affiliated with the Sultan Murad Division before splitting in 2020. 

In 2017, the Bayazeid fighters extorted 25 farms and houses in Al-Bab. They claimed the properties belonged to regime loyalists and absentees who no longer lived in the area. Afterwards, the group made the properties into its headquarters and refused to return them to their owners, claiming they were strategically located and overlooked regime territory.  

Most recently, on September 29, 2022, the Hayat Thaeroon, a component of the SNA in Al-Bab, reached an agreement with the owners of the 25 extorted properties. Under this agreement, the homes and farms must be handed over to their owners within a six-month deadline. Thaeroon would be given priority if the owners decided to sell their properties in the future. However, the agreement, made in the presence of Al-Bab Revolutionary Council representatives and local notables, did not include signed approval by representatives of the Bayazeid Brigade or the affiliated Sultan Malakshah Division. 

Thaeroon is a group of several SNA factions and is meant to serve as a unified military body for northern Syria. It works on various opposition-related issues in the area, such as settling disputes and restoring certain rights.  

Under last month’s agreement, which The Syria Report reviewed, Thaeroon promised to return the extorted homes and farms to their owners by the end of the six months. 

The owners of the 25 extorted properties organised a protest in Al-Bab on September 23, demanding that their homes and farms be returned. In a statement released after the demonstration, some owners said they had received death threats from Fadi Al-Deiri. 

According to The Syria Report’s correspondent in the area, the property owners have received multiple offers from Al-Deiri via intermediaries to sell their homes and farms. They rejected the proposals, insisting instead on recovering the properties instead. 

Previously, in 2019, the property owners turned to the SNA General Command’s Security Establishment in Al-Bab, when Fadi Al-Deiri’s group was a part of the Sultan Murad Division. Some owners obtained a letter from the Security Establishment directing Sultan Murad to vacate the properties. However, the properties remained occupied and the Security Establishment ceased to exist in 2020. 

Other attempts to seek mediation from SNA leaders failed, despite SNA commanders, such as Second Corps leader Muhammad Al-Baz, pledging in 2020 to return the extorted properties to their owners. 

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