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Explained: The Tax on Informal Roofing and Housing

25-04-2023/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

The Syrian state has continuously refused to recognise the existence of housing in informal settlements. Instead, it insists on considering them uninhabited land, which may include private agricultural land on which construction is prohibited or public property. At the same time, state institutions have provided essential public services to informal housing areas, such as water, electricity, telephone services, built schools, and paved roads.

Meanwhile, residents in informal settlements pay some fees, such as sanitation, electricity, and water bills, in addition to being charged a rooftop tax, which is a tax on every existing roof. All real estate properties, regardless of the type, including residential buildings, shops, and facilities, are subject to the tax. However, the law does not provide a specific definition for the rooftop tax; it is generally defined as any fee or tax the state imposes on all properties. Taxpayers pay the governorate financial departments, with the most prominent example being the real estate and building plots income taxes.

The Real Estate and Building Plots Income Tax Law, issued by Decree No. 53 in 2006, imposed an annual tax on all rooftops, regardless of their type, such as residential buildings, shops and facilities, in both zoned and informal areas alike. According to the real estate register records, the government mainly applies the tax on the property owner. However, Decree No. 53 allowed financial departments in governorates to charge the property occupant for this tax, even if Land Registry documents do not establish their ownership. It is sufficient for the owner to submit documents accepted by the financial departments to charge the tax, such as water and electricity bill payments or a standard property sales contract. Charging the people who build unlicensed construction over extorted public property is also permissible. Decree No. 53 explicitly stated that this tax does not constitute a formal document for transferring or proving ownership.

Essentially, the principle of the rooftop tax is to impose it on those whose ownership is established in the Land Registry, as this is the legal indication that they are benefiting from the property in question. However, financial departments can impose the tax on the property beneficiary, as is the case with a property buyer under a court ruling. The tax can be imposed on them if they possess and benefit from the property. This actual owner can submit any document that the financial department can rely on to justify collecting the tax from them. Financial departments are only concerned with collecting the tax, especially since the law considers paying the tax and any documents issued by the financial department regarding its payment as not constituting proof of ownership.

A judicial ruling of the Court of Cassation, issued in Decision No. 50, Basis 385 by the General Authority of the Court of Cassation in 2018, in the context of investigating the tax liability on the right of a furough shop, stipulated that the tax liability cannot be relied upon to determine the shop owner for furough, especially amid any legal dispute over ownership. Furough refers to lease contracts for shops with an indefinite duration, signed before the enactment of Rent Law No. 10 of 2006, and subject to the system of compulsory extension, regardless of the landlord’s wishes and intentions.

Paying the rooftop tax in informal housing areas does not grant the properties legal recognition. Since informal settlements and all the housing they contain are not recorded in the Land Registry, property owners in these areas are partners in common ownership, with their shares being non-subdivided. Planning Law No. 46 of 2004 allowed shareholders in informal settlements to license existing unlicensed buildings. This was in exchange for a financial guarantee to cover the expenses of servicing such areas, as estimated by the administrative authorities. This could have been a possible entry point for legal recognition of rooftops within informal housing areas. Law No. 46 did not specify any particular tax that must be paid for building licensing, and thus any tax imposed on the property can be considered a rooftop tax.

However, Law No. 46 went unimplemented until it was repealed by the Planning and Urban Development Law No. 23 of 2015. Law No. 23 allowed owners of land outside a zoned area to apply for converting the land into plots slated for construction, provided that they pay the necessary expenses for connecting public utilities such as roads, sidewalks, water and electricity. The law thus eliminated the possibility of licensing existing unlicensed buildings in zoned areas.

Explained: Zoning Plan in Douma

22-11-2022/in Analysis & Features, HLP /by Rand Shamaa

Douma is a city in East Ghouta and serves as the administrative centre of the Rural Damascus governorate and the Douma district, which contains seven districts. The 2010 census estimated that 300,000 people live in the 3,000-hectare city.

The Douma Department of Real Estate has 68 real estate zones covering the entire Douma district. The city is composed of nine real estate zones: Sahat wa Arab, Annatar, Qasareen Shams, Al-Dweir, Al-Rumman, Al-Qusayr, Al-Mazraaeh, Betwaneh, and Al-Ab. Sahat wa Arab and Qasareen Shams form the main historic centre of Douma, which hosts the Great Mosque, Al-Ghanem Square, Al-Hal Souk, and Khorshid Street.

Informal housing

The importance of Douma increased in the 1980s, making the city a popular destination for newcomers from other parts of the country. The new arrivals increased the demand for housing in the area. Thus, the city began to expand informally at the expense of local farmland, especially in the north and south. By 2010, these informally built areas comprised 70 percent of the total area of Douma.

One group of informal housing projects, dubbed Al-Hajjarieh, sprouted at the city’s northern end, extending over the Antar, Al-Rumman, and Qasareen Shams real estate zones. Another one, Haret Al-Deirieh, was also established in the Betwaneh real estate zone. A third informal housing project took shape on an area legally classified as agricultural land in the Annatar and Al-Rumman, extending to the Damascus-Homs highway. Some informal housing projects were also constructed in Al-Qusayr real estate zone, eventually reaching the Al-Hajjarieh informal housing project from the west.

On top of that, Al-Mazraaeh and Al-Ab zones south of Douma, which were previously classified as agricultural land, became informal housing areas. The informal housing project in Al-Mazraaeh expanded until it reached the nearby town of Al-Shayfounieh, while the informal housing in Al-Ab reached the city of Misraba.

Similar housing projects made their way to the Al-Dweir real estate zone, which contains the Adra Prison and the Ibn Sinna Hospital for Psychiatric Illnesses.

It is worth noting that Douma’s informal housing projects sprouted, for the most part, on private agricultural lands that were not previously zoned rather than on public property. The owners of these unlicensed homes also pay a roof tax to the Rural Damascus governorate’s Department of Finance. In other words, these properties are noted in the governorate’s financial records as houses although they are unlicensed. That said, these homes are not listed in the Land Registry and are still considered legally considered to be commonly owned shares of properties.

Zoning

Douma has an old zoning plan issued in 1966. In 2003, however, the municipality expanded its zoning plan to include new areas such as the Haret Al-Joureh neighbourhood and new housing cooperative homes in the Annatar real estate zone. This expansion also included previously unzoned areas of Annatar, Al-Ab, and Al-Mazraaeh. The zoning plan’s total surface area after the 2003 expansion reached 560 hectares and was approved in 2005.

Compulsory land readjustment

The 2003 expansion also zoned a 250-hectare area of Douma according to the principle of compulsory land readjustment. The readjustment occurs when a site is being zoned by distributing property shares to rights holders, often not in the original locations of those properties, and after deducting a certain percentage of those properties without compensation. The decision to undertake this zoning process was made per Law No. 9 of 1974, which concerns the division, zoning, and construction of cities. The law prohibits transactions that subdivide or consolidate real estate and grant construction permits before completing the compulsory land readjustment process.

In Douma’s case, the compulsory land readjustment included parts of the Annatar, Al-Rumman, Betwaneh, Al-Mazraaeh, and Al-Ab real estate zones. For example, the newly zoned portion of Betwaneh, which was previously classified as agricultural land, was renamed the “Tantheem Khalaf Al-Baladieh” and has become known as among the nicest and most expensive parts of Douma due to its modern urban planning and green spaces.

On the other hand, compulsory land readjustment was not implemented in other parts of Douma, where dense informal housing remain in place. In 2005, Douma’s city council decided to make the compulsory land readjustment areas subject to rezoning under Law No. 46 of 2004, an amendment of Law No. 9 of 1974. This amendment allowed compulsory land readjustment areas to be considered areas of collective unlicensed construction. The measure made it easier to grant construction permits, carry out real estate subdivisions, and consolidate transactions under certain conditions within such areas. The Rural Damascus governorate approved the city council’s decision in 2010, but it has yet to be implemented.

Post-2011

During the 2011 uprising, protests reached Douma, and the government tried to control the situation by requesting that a committee of residents be formed so that they could communicate their demands. This committee then submitted its demands, which, most notably, included expanding Douma’s zoning plan.

In June 2011, the Rural Damascus governor said that the residents’ demands were being implemented and affirmed the need to enact the new zoning plan as quickly as possible. He gave Douma’s Directorate of Cadastral Affairs a one-month deadline to complete lists of common property owners and form a committee to follow up on implementation and overcome any roadblocks.

Then, in June 2011, the government issued five decrees for the Douma district, Decrees No. 195-199, which allowed the city council to implement compulsory land redistribution under Law No. 9 of 1974 for the following real estate zones: Al-Ab, Annatar, Al-Sindyaneh, Betwaneh, Al-Gharbieh, and Al-Rumman. The five decrees deemed the implementation of such work in these areas to be in the public interest.

Furthermore, implementing the decrees was supposed to speed up the compulsory land redistribution process and solve the problem of informal housing and common ownership. However, deteriorating security and political conditions prevented the decrees from being carried out. Meanwhile, during the regime’s siege of East Ghouta between 2013 and 2018, regime forces bombed Douma heavily with artillery fire and rockets, leading to widespread damage in residential neighbourhoods, whether zoned or informal.

The information in this article draws on a wide-ranging interview The Syria Report conducted with Adnan Taha, a former official at the Office of Documentation in Douma.

The Rise and Fall of the Informal Settlement

15-11-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

In the 1990s, the owner of a large plot of arid land outside Damascus died, bequeathing his land to his four sons. The sons shared common ownership of the property, with each holding 674 of the land’s total 2,400 shares. In legal terms, the land was excluded from the town’s zoning plan and classified as agricultural, meaning construction on the plot was unauthorised.

According to Article 780 of the Syrian Civil Code, common ownership is when two or more individuals share ownership of one property such that each share is not subdivided, making them co-owners.

In this case, the four sons determined the locations of their shares without official documentation. Because the land was classified as agricultural, each son built an unlicensed house and sold what remained for unlicensed construction. Because the land was owned as a commons, the sales were made for the original property’s shares through contracts documented by the notary.

The new buyers then built unlicensed houses on their plots of land without construction permits and without registering their properties in the Land Registry. This is how informal settlements began to arise in the area in the late 1990s. However, despite all the changes that have occurred to the property since its original owner’s death, the legal classification of the land has remained as it was beforehand: arid agricultural land. In the late 1990s, at least 25 multi-storey buildings with dozens of apartments were built on the land. Each owner of these apartments technically owns a share of the original, commonly owned property.

This informal settlement did not have basic services, such as public water, electricity, and sewage networks, among other things. And yet, high costs and increased demand for housing in formally zoned areas pushed people to build and live in informal housing instead. After several years, the local municipality eventually provided some services to this particular district.

Here is where the story of Omar and his five brothers, who moved to Damascus for college and work, begins. The six brothers saved enough money to purchase a house in the informal settlement in 2002. The home was one storey and was constructed on a 120-square-metre plot of land. But because the property was not formally listed in the Land Registry, the brothers’ ownership of the home took the form of 21 common shares of the original, larger plot of land in the informal settlement. That meant their sole proof of ownership was a contract sale of shares under an irrevocable power of attorney regulated by a notary. Because their shares were small, the brothers agreed to register their shares pro forma under Omar’s name because their allocations were small.

After some time passed, the brothers reinforced the house and constructed additional storeys due to the increasing urgency of their housing needs. By 2011, they had a three-storey house with five apartments. The legal status of their property, however, did not change. It was still simply 21 commonly owned shares of the original land.

At one point, the brothers began considering the possibility of terminating the common ownership of their property to preserve each of their rights. Here they came across a complex legal situation, which made things difficult for them for two main reasons. First, the municipality must correct the classification of the original land from agricultural to residential before terminating the common property, which is beyond the brothers’ abilities. Second, there was the practical issue of a large number of common owners of the original land.

Faced with these roadblocks, the brothers drew up a quota purchase contract in which they specified each brother’s share and its classification. For example, Omar owned the right-hand apartment on the home’s second storey. They registered it with the Damascus governorate’s Directorate of Finance and paid the required fee to legitimise the contract.

By 2012, once the revolution transformed into an armed conflict, Omar and his brothers, like many other informal settlement residents, fled to Damascus and left their homes behind. Regime forces seized control of the area and allowed residents to return only once to check on their properties, preventing them from returning to live there. Omar and his brothers inspected their apartments and found that the building had not been significantly damaged.

A security service branch arrested Omar in 2015, and the family’s multiple attempts to secure his release failed. This complicated the situation because the notary initially registered the 21 commonly owned shares under Omar’s name.

In 2017, the family learned that Omar had been killed under torture just a month after his arrest. They did not receive his body, and instead received a piece of paper requesting them to visit the Tishreen Military Hospital to pick up his death certificate.

In 2018, regime forces permitted residents of the district to visit their properties for a second time after regime forces retook East Ghouta from the opposition. The brothers discovered their neighbourhood was completely looted, despite the regime controlling it throughout the war. The house was robbed of its furniture, doors, windows, and baths, and anything that did remain had been destroyed.

The family’s building and other buildings in the area were no longer habitable. Even if their building was intact, the family members were scattered worldwide, some as refugees abroad and others internally displaced. Those who remained in Syria tried to return to the building but lacked the finances to restore it.

In addition, when Omar died under torture, he left behind a wife and two daughters. Because he has no male heirs, his wife, daughters, mother and brothers became his heirs, per Islamic inheritance rules. This means that the number of shareholders in the commonly owned property has now increased.

Omar’s small neighbourhood is an example of dozens of other informal areas across Syria that have seen similar fates. Approximately 40 percent of people in Syria live in informal districts, where common ownership is still the norm. Many of these areas saw significant destruction due to the war. Meanwhile, their residents were forcibly displaced and, thus, at risk of losing their housing, land, and property rights.

Spate of Building Evacuations in Aleppo

27-09-2022/in HLP, News /by Rand Shamaa

Eviction and evacuation of damaged homes have continued in the Karm Houmed neighbourhood of east Aleppo city amid fears of building collapses. Some of the recent demolitions appear to have been done at random or based on maliciously written reports, rather than on safety standards or legal requirements.

Karm Houmed is among a handful of very low-income informally built neighbourhoods in southeastern Aleppo. Most of the homes there adhere to what is known locally as “Arab housing,” which includes small one- or two-storey unlicensed homes built either on agricultural land that is not slated for construction or on public property. The area also features some multi-storey apartment buildings.

According to a correspondent for The Syria Report in the area, Karm Houmed residents fear their homes could collapse after a building in the nearby Al-Fardous neighbourhood recently crumbled and killed at least 13 people. Some residents have reported cracks in their buildings to the authorities. Many homes in the area have since been evacuated, with local authorities arranging the demolition process afterwards.

Some families have also voluntarily evacuated their homes without notifying authorities after noticing cracks in the walls of their homes. Some of these newly displaced families have moved in with relatives or are staying in rental homes in neighbouring districts.

Many houses in the area were damaged from wartime fighting and heavy regime bombardment when opposition forces controlled eastern Aleppo between 2012 and 2016. “Barrel bombs,” dropped by regime forces over the neighbourhood, have been especially responsible for the damage. The indirect effects of these attacks have begun to surface, i.e. cracks in many walls and damage to weak foundations due to water leaks from poorly maintained and damaged sewage pipes.

The correspondent reported that in mid-September, residents submitted a complaint to the Qadhi Askar Department of Services, part of the Aleppo City Council, saying that there were cracks in a two-storey building that houses three families and a total of about 20 individuals. One day later, the city council evacuated the building at night, albeit without providing alternative shelter for the residents. The evacuated families went to stay with relatives in nearby areas.

Afterwards, on September 17, machinery provided by the Aleppo branch of the Ministry of Defence’s Military Housing Establishment demolished the building with help from the Faylaq Al-Mudafaeen Halab (Aleppo Defenders Corps), a pro-Iran militia. According to The Syria Report’s correspondent, the Qadhi Askar Department of Services does not have the machinery or equipment required to demolish buildings and remove rubble, so it requested assistance from the Military Housing Establishment and from the Faylaq Al-Mudafaeen Halab’s services unit. The unit is areas under the control of the militia and performs public service tasks as an ostensibly civilian arm of the group. Karm Houmed is among the areas under the control of the militia and the Baqir Brigade, a militia loyal to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard.

The Aleppo City Council also recently informed residents of other nearby buildings that they must evacuate. But because no alternative shelter or housing was provided, most of those evacuated residents simply returned home after a few days, despite the cracks in their buildings.

Another worrying phenomenon has emerged since the collapse of the apartment building in Al-Fardous, according to The Syria Report’s correspondent. Namely, security informants or regular people write reports on cracked buildings, which they submit to the Qadhi Askar Department of Services and the Aleppo City Council’s Public Safety Committee. While some of the reports are factual and include information on the dangers to the building as reported by residents and neighbours, other reports are written in bad faith with the aim of deliberately removing the residents of some buildings due to previous conflicts. Neither the Qadhi Askar Department of Services nor the Public Safety Committee verifies the level of risk described in these reports.

For example, the Qadhi Askar Department of Services recently received a report about cracks in a six-storey building in the Al-Saliheen neighbourhood. The building was immediately evacuated and sealed by the Al-Saliheen police force. Notably, the building has no residents but does have a sewing workshop occupying the ground and first storeys. Though the building was indeed damaged and unsafe, the writers of the report apparently had a dispute with the owners of the sewing workshop and wanted to remove them from the premises, according to The Syria Report’s correspondent.