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Aleppo City Council Harms Shop Owners in Souk Qastal for Qaterji Company’s Benefit

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The majority of the shops in Souk Qastal Al-Hajjarin in the old city of Aleppo, around 150 shops in total, remain closed for business despite the fact that regime forces have controlled the entirety of the old city and eastern neighbourhoods since forcibly displacing the opposition in late 2016.  

 

 

Historically, Souk Qastal Al-Hajjarin was known for its laurel and olive oil soap factories. In 1875, the neighbourhood contained 138 homes, bordered to the south by the Hatem and Jeb AsadAllah streets, to the north by Bhesita street, and to the east by the Ali and the old tanning workshop streets, an owner of one local historic shop told The Syria Report. 

Important landmarks in the souk include the Salhiya or Qadiriya corner, one of the oldest street corners in Aleppo, as well as the Sharbaji Mosque, the Nahuieen Mosque, the Shadhiliya School, the Wati Mosque, and the Orphans’ Office. Also in the souk is a water station built by the deputy of Aleppo, Yalbugha, in 1753, the New Bathhouse, and the Oil Khan, open since 1742. The souk has a water well that opened in 1900 and was known as Qastal Al-Hajjarin, the name that the souk itself eventually took.

A road passes through Souk Qastal Al-Hajjarin leading to the Bab Al-Faraj square, and another road to Bab Al-Janan. Three years before World War I, Sheikh Mahmoud Ibn Sheikh Mohammed Khair Al-Din Al-Halwi, a professor of the Salhiya Sufi Order, built 13 commercial shops on awqaf, or endowment, lands and leased them for the benefit of the Sufi Order. 

During the First World War (1914-1918)war, the local authorities of the Ottoman Sultanate demolished a number of houses and shops in the neighbourhood and widened the roads. With the end of that war and the collapse of the Ottoman Sultanate, the neighbourhood expanded, and the shops proliferated, making Souk Qastal Al-Hajjarin one of the most prestigious historic souks in old Aleppo.

In the second quarter of the 20th century, the Aleppo municipality opened a street in the old souk destroying many archaeological landmarks. On both sides of the new street, modern buildings appeared, occupied by bank branches, jewellers, gold shops, precious fabrics shops and carpet traders.

The shops in Souk Qastal Al-Hajjarin belong to their owners, most of whom inherited them from their fathers and grandfathers within families native to the area. In 1974, the Aleppo City Council took over all the shops in the neighbourhood – around 150 shops in total – for the purpose of zoning and expanding the Bab Al-Faraj area. According to the plans set for the project, the majority of those shops were slated for demolition. While waiting for the expansion and demolition, the Aleppo City Council rented those shops to their owners, and they became occupants via rental contracts. 

Then in 1986, UNESCO listed the old city of Aleppo on the World Heritage list. Consequently, implementation of the approved zoning plans was halted, but the shops remained owned by the City Council. The situation remained as it was until 2011. The zoning plan was not implemented and the shops were not demolished – nor, however, were they returned to their owners or compensated for.

The souk witnessed a general strike in mid-2012 as part of the Syrian revolution, making it clear that many occupants were against the regime. From 2012 to 2016, the souk became a site for regime forces to position themselves near the frontline with the opposition, which at the time was entrenched in the old city of Aleppo. The souk was subjected to vandalism and destruction, primarily when the regime forces opened the talaqiyat in its walls and ceilings, which are openings used for shooting and mortar shells, as well as for monitoring, sniping and reconnaissance. These talaqiyat were also struck by opposition forces in their response to regime weapons fire. This is besides the demolition operations that occurred in the historic souk to make way for armoured vehicles and heavy military machinery.

Despite the regime forces regaining complete control of east Aleppo in 2016, they did not help shop owners restore and rehabilitate their properties in the souk. On the contrary, they tried to obstruct such work. In 2018, the Aleppo City Council issued Decision No. 78 to again seize the shops, preventing their occupants from repairing and reopening them before paying the full rent due for the years 2012-2016. The council also decided to triple the rental prices for the shops.

One shop owner told The Syria Report that the City Council seized his shop in 2018, along with dozens of neighbouring ones. They were forced to pay SYP 2 million in rent due for the years 2012-2016, during which the shop was closed due to regime forces’ positions in the market and its transformation into a military zone.

Some former shop occupants refused to pay the new rents, amid rumours that the City Council will return and force them to vacate the shops even if they make the request back payments. Meanwhile, some shop occupants have filed lawsuits against the City Council.

In an even more unusual step, in August 2022, the City Council issued Decision No. 4532, cancelling the previous Decision No. 78, and reinstating the old lease contracts with the market shop occupants, provided that the legal claims are withdrawn. Then the council returned in 2023, and raised the value of the shop rents many times over. Now the monthly rent per shop is around SYP 250,000, though rents vary based on shop size.

According to some shop owners, the City Council’s policy is an intentional move to evict the remaining souk occupants in favour of the Qaterji Development and Real Estate Investment Company. Some accuse the Qaterji company of influencing the governorate and city councils, pressuring them to force shop owners to leave. The ultimate goal is unclear.

 Interviewees told The Syria Report they suspect that the company’s final aim is not just to lease the shops after their owners have vacated, but is linked to a broader project related to emptying the shops first and then embarking on a complete souk renovation project. Some occupants pointed to the possibility of Qaterji partnering with international or local organisations for the souk’s renovation, and then reinvesting in it. Some shop owners said that they are even deprived of benefiting from Decree No. 13 of 2022, which grants extensive tax facilities and exemptions within the old cities in the provinces of Aleppo, Homs and Deir-ez-Zor.

Hussam Qaterji, an Aleppo MP for the People’s Assembly since 2016, is one of the most prominent businessmen loyal to the regime to have thrived during the war years. Qaterji primarily worked in buying oil and wheat for the Damascus government from northeastern Syria during its control by the Islamic State organisation, and later by the Syrian Democratic Forces. He heads the Qaterji International Group, which includes various companies, one being the Qaterji Development and Real Estate Investment Company established in August 2017, and headquartered in the Aleppo governorate building.

Several shop owners said that some employees of the Aleppo City Council and the governorate council are now working for the Qaterji Company. They receive high wages from the Qaterji Company on the condition of continuing in their official jobs in the municipal councils. Shop occupants accuse these employees of facilitating the Qaterji Development and Real Estate Investment Company’s business interest at the expense of the shop owners, as well as the governorate and city councils.

Explained: Compensation for Expropriation

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Property expropriation is legitimate in Syria but it remains an administrative act that affects individual property rights. According to the law, any administrative authority, when expropriating for public benefit, must pay fair compensation to the owners of expropriated properties. This acts as a safeguard for property rights against uncompensated or free expropriation.

The 2012 Syrian Constitution mentions fair compensation for expropriation – this means that the compensation amount should not be less than the current value of the expropriated property, and it should be paid in full and immediately. However, the expropriation law enacted by Decree No. 20 of 1983 gives the expropriating administration a five-year period to pay this compensation. If the administration is late in payment, they are obliged to pay a legal interest of six percent for each year of delay.

Expropriation Law No. 20 stipulates assessing the value of expropriated properties based on their value immediately before the expropriation decree date. It did not consider any subsequent price increases due to the expropriation project, commercial speculations, or the passage of time.

The advisory opinion of the State Council No. 106 of 1983 followed the same approach, considering that the assessment of expropriated property values is based on their status at the time of expropriation, without taking into account any subsequent changes in their descriptions, whether due to the owners, public entities, or as a result of the execution of the expropriation project.

After specialized committees assess the property’s value and compensation according to the expropriation law, their decision is final and cannot be reviewed. Even if the expropriating administration delays payment for more than five years, the owner of the expropriated property does not have the right to request a reevaluation of the property.

This legally mandated payment period is unduly long, allowing the expropriating administration to delay its payments. Such delays can be detrimental to the owner of the expropriated property, especially if they need to purchase another property. The current value of a property, assessed at the beginning of the payment period in Syrian pounds, is lower than its value five years later at the end of that period, considering the fluctuation in the exchange rate of the Syrian pound and its purchasing power.

The 1983 expropriation law did not distinguish between licensed and unlicensed buildings when discussing the estimation of compensation value for the expropriated property. The law considered that the property value assessment includes the land, buildings, and construction. Meanwhile, real estate departments at the governorate level compile a list of property owners set for expropriation, registered rights holders, their respective shares, and their sizes. The expropriating entity then notifies the owners and the beneficiaries of the estimated value of these properties. Compensation from the expropriating administration is limited to those whose names appear in the list of rights holders and will not cover owners of unlicensed buildings constructed on public properties.

 

The administration can expropriate the property before paying the compensation. This goes against the principle of fair compensation, which necessitates that the administration should pay before taking possession of the property.

The expropriation law specifies two methods for payment of compensation: direct payment and deposit. In direct payment cases, the expropriating entity pays the compensation directly to the property owner or deposits the amount as a trust with the property registry until the property owner and a representative from the expropriating entity are present. The owner’s acknowledgment of receiving the compensation is then documented, and the property’s ownership is transferred and registered under the name of the expropriating entity. For this payment method, the property’s record must be free from any notes or restrictions.

The second method is the deposit: the expropriating entity deposits the compensation in the name of the owner at one of the public banks, after which the property’s ownership is transferred to the expropriating entity.

Explained: Expropriating Free of Charge One-Quarter from a Piece of Real Estate

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Syria’s Expropriation Law, enacted by Decree No. 20 of 1983, grants certain public entities the authority to deduct the equivalent of one-quarter of the area of a property that is partially expropriated, free of charge and without compensation. The Expropriation Law justifies this measure by arguing that the value of the remaining portion of the property will increase due to the improvements made to the deducted one-quarter. This assumption stems from the idea that the value of the rest of the property will increase due to the implementation of public benefit projects that may be implemented by public and private entities on the expropriated land. 

As a consequence, public entities now have legal authority to expropriate, without compensation, one-quarter of the area of any property – so long as the expropriation affects only a portion of the property while the remaining part stays with the owner and remains usable.

Article 31 of the Expropriation law from 1983 outlines the provisions for this free one-quarter deduction and specifies its conditions – these relate to the administrative body entitled to expropriate, the projects that permit the deduction of the free one-quarter, and the specifics of the expropriated property itself.

The first paragraph of Article 31 states: “Administrative entities and units, the Syrian railways institutions, the Syrian Civil Aviation Authority and the General Directorate of Syrian Ports, may, free of charge and once only, deduct the equivalent of one-quarter of the area of the property being partially expropriated. This deduction is permitted for road and street construction or expansion, for establishing and expanding reservoirs, airports, ports, squares, public parks and markets, and for implementing railway, irrigation, drinking water, oil, gas and electricity projects, provided the remaining part of the property remains usable.”

Only the entities mentioned above have the right to expropriate the free one-quarter. Other entities may not – though the judicial ruling in Decision No. 474, Base 2101 of 1986, stipulates that, in such a case, expropriation by the public entity must be based on a legal document, namely the expropriation decree. If the administration seizes the property unlawfully in a manner that contradicts the law that protects property rights, it is deemed an infringement on individual rights. Thus, the entity does not have the right to deduct the free one-quarter.

Article 31 also explicitly mentions the projects for which administrative entities can deduct a free one-quarter of a property for implementation. A free deduction cannot be made for any project not explicitly mentioned in the text of Article 31. This restriction prevents excessive expropriation without compensation, which constitutes an infringement on property rights. For example, the jurisprudence of the Supreme Administrative Court, in Decision No. 227, Base 135 dated 10/05/1965, affirms that the free one-quarter deduction is not permissible if the expropriation is for investment projects.

Furthermore, for a public entity to deduct the “free” one-quarter legally, it must only expropriate a portion of the property, not its entirety. When expropriating the entire property, the administrative entity must pay the full compensation. In practice, if such an entity expropriates a part of the property and deducts the free one-quarter, and later decides to expropriate the entire property, they must then compensate for the one-quarter they previously did not pay for, in essence paying full compensation for the property.

As mentioned earlier, the remaining, non-expropriated part of the property, should be usable by the property owner. If it is not, then the property owner can request the administration to fully expropriate it within three years from the date of initial expropriation, according to Article 11 of Decree No. 20 of 1983.

Jurisprudence in Decision No. 417, Base 1056 dated April 20, 1992, confirmed this principle, stating that the deduction of the free one-quarter is contingent on a part of the expropriated property remaining usable. If this condition is not met and the entire property is expropriated, full compensation must be paid.

In any case, expropriation without compensation under the guise of a free one-quarter deduction contradicts the 2012 Syrian constitution, which emphasises the protection of private property – namely, expropriation is only permissible for public benefit and in return for fair compensation. The Expropriation Law’s given justification for the right to deduct one-quarter of a property without compensation is that it will benefit the remaining part of the property through improvements. However, this assumption is not based on realistic grounds. On the contrary, such expropriation can potentially harm the remaining part of the property.

Pre-Fab Homes in Jabrin: For Earthquake Victims, or Militias Members?

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Local militias in Aleppo, loyal to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, have reportedly seized 150 out of 450 pre-fab homes meant to benefit civilians impacted by the February 6 earthquake, according to a local source. 

Only 300 of these pre-fab homes would have reached its destination in the Jabrin area, which had been designated for the temporary housing, according to the source. Out of the 150 pre-fab homes seized, the Baqir Brigade militia, loyal to the Revolutionary Guard, has seized 30 dwellings, setting them up near their stronghold in the Belloreh neighbourhood in eastern Aleppo. And local militias in Aleppo loyal to the Revolutionary Guard, have seized 120 of the dwellings and moved them to military bases and locations they control in Azzan, Assan and Al-Hader in southern Aleppo governorate, as well as Nubl and Zahraa in northern Aleppo. 

On April 15, the state-run SANA agency quoted a member of the Aleppo governorate’s Executive Office, saying that the body has allocated 13 hectares in Jabrin for a Popular Mobilisation Forces relief initiative. The Iraqi Popular Relief Force is the civilian arm of the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Forces, comprised of armed, majority Shiite Iraqi factions. 

The relief initiative coordinator previously told SANA that the project aims to set up 500 housing units. Each dwelling is 36 square metres and consists of two bedrooms, a salon and its annexes, and is equipped with a solar panel. Iron is the primary material used in manufacturing these units, along with sound and thermal insulation materials. They are to be furnished and can accommodate six to eight people. These dwellings, constructed by the Popular Relief Forces, appear to be little more than tin sheds, according to published photos.

The Syria Report’s local correspondent noted that there is confusion surrounding the distribution process of these pre-fabricated homes in Jabrin to the earthquake victims in Aleppo. To date, the Aleppo City Council has not issued any lists of eligible recipients for these homes, nor any clarification on how to apply for them or what criteria applicants must meet. Meanwhile, residents in Aleppo say there are rumours that these homes will be distributed to members of local militias loyal to the Revolutionary Guard. 

In March, the Aleppo governorate operations room adopted a plan to construct pre-fabricated temporary housing units to shelter those affected by the earthquake. The units were planned to be set up over 50 hectares in Jabrin, an area near Aleppo International Airport, surrounded by an industrial zone and the Aleppo train station. The area was incorporated into the administrative borders of Aleppo city in 1996 and had been the site of a refugee shelter and camps established in 2017.

Most of the land in the town of Jabrin is publicly owned, and was acquired by the state in various stages since the 1980s. Originally, Jabrin’s lands were private agricultural properties owned by local villagers. 

In 1981, however, the Aleppo City Council acquired 323 hectares of this land to establish an industrial zone. The council also planned to set up a vocational zone in Jabrin specifically for car maintenance workshops. Many industrial and vocational plots have been developed over the past decades through collaboration between the Aleppo governorate and Aleppo City Council, along with the General Federation of Artisans Associations (GFAA), although a formal industrial zone and vocational area have not fully materialised.

Despite these extensive land expropriations in Jabrin, the area has not seen any significant benefits. The town still lacks basic services like electricity, water and sewage facilities, and most of its construction is unlicensed. However, the acquisitions have not stopped. 

In 2004, the Minister of Irrigation issued Decision No. 1739 to implement a water canal from the main channel in Maskana to the Queiq River, and Decision No. 840 in 2005 to build feeder channels to the plains of southern Aleppo. These decisions led to the expropriation of many properties and parts of properties in the town and its remaining lands.

Decree No. 840 was issued to acquire most of Property No. 466 in Jabrin for the irrigation project in the southeastern plains of Aleppo. The project uprooted 15,000 olive and pistachio and grape vines, in addition to arable grain-cultivated lands.

 In 2006, Decree No. 460 was issued, stipulating cash payments as compensation for the properties and parts of properties that were expropriated for the project. However, according to The Syria Report’s local correspondent, the majority of those affected in the Jabrin area have not received any compensation for their expropriated lands.

During the conflict, the site of the Jabrin Industrial Zone remained under the control of regime forces as it was close to Aleppo’s civilian and military airports. The industrial area has become a hub for local militias loyal to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, including the Al-Quds Brigade, which has its main base in the nearby Al-Nayrab camp. A local source in the Jabrin area told The Syria Report that between 2012-2016, displaced people from eastern Aleppo neighbourhoods lived in designated areas of the industrial zone in Jabrin. Meanwhile, pro-regime militias allocated some of these areas as depots for their vehicles, weapons and ammunition.

After regime forces regained control of east Aleppo in late 2016, the City Council promised to rehabilitate the Jabrin Industrial Zone, and complete and hand over the real estate plots within the zone. It also aimed to encourage the relocation of trades and crafts from inside Aleppo city to Jabrin. However, the council’s promises remained unfulfilled, and the Jabrin Industrial Zone remained as it had been previously.

In 2017, a shelter centre for displaced people was opened in the Jabrin Industrial Zone. That same year, the Aleppo City Council stated that work had begun on completing the first phase of the vocational area for car maintenance in Jabrin, after the site had been divided into multiple project phases. However, no actual progress has been made on the project.

A year later, in 2018, the Aleppo City Council allocated the centre to receive displaced residents from the Shiite villages of Kafraya and Al-Foua in the Idlib countryside. In recent months, the Aleppo Defenders’ Brigade militia, affiliated with the Syrian branch of Hezbollah, relocated more than 400 families from Kafraya and Al-Foua from the Jabrin shelter to apartments in areas under their control in the neighbourhoods of Bab Al-Nayrab, Al-Marjeh, Al-Firdous, Al-Balloura, Karm Homad and Al-Maadi. These apartments were originally owned by people who had been forcibly displaced to opposition-controlled areas in northwestern Syria.

In 2019, Aleppo City Council formed a follow-up committee to rehabilitate the Jabrin Industrial Zone in preparation for transferring the craftspeople. Many of the applicants and allottees on plots in the Jabrin Industrial Zone, whether built or still in the planning stage, were internally displaced by the war. According to the GFAA, those people’s subscriptions will be cancelled on the grounds of defaulting on their instalment payments.

Explained: Easement Rights for Public Benefit

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On July 9, 2023, the Prime Minister’s Office issued Decision No. 1141, which sets easement rights for a series of properties located within the route and perimeter of the high-voltage electricity line 66, running between the towns of Al-Kiswah in Rural Damascus and Al-Sanamayn in Daraa. Decision No. 1141 also included the establishment of easement rights for public benefit, such as the right of way across another person’s land and the placement of poles and towers, including the extension of electrical and aerial cables.

Articles 960 to 993 of the Syrian Civil Code No. 84 of 1949 regulate the provisions of easement rights.

Under Article 960, an easement is defined as an obligation imposed on a specific property for the benefit of another specific property owned by another person. In other words, an easement is an in rem right that is applied to a property for the benefit of another property, rather than a personal right for the property owner. This concept was also confirmed by the judicial interpretation of the Court of Cassation No. 622 base 663, dated August 28, 1960. Essentially, easement limits the authority of the property owner in using some of their rights on their property or granting neighbouring property owners usage rights on the designated property.

Next, Article 961 of the Civil Code lists the types of easements. A natural easement occurs due to natural events, such as the flow of water from higher ground to lower ground and does not require official documentation in the Land Registry. A legal easement, whether for public or private benefit, also does not require a Land Registry entry. The third type is a consensual easement, arranged by individuals on their properties through mutual agreement — this type requires documentation in the Land Registry.

Article 967 of the Civil Code refers to specific laws and regulations that determine the legal easement rights for public benefit, such as enabling access to beaches and riverbanks, or facilitating the construction, maintenance or usage of public pathways or facilities, especially military installations on land or at sea.

Syria’s Expropriation Law, issued by Decree No. 20 of 1983, granted public entities the right to establish easement rights on properties that may be expropriated for the implementation of public benefit projects. Under Article 37 of this decree, establishing easement rights for public benefit must be done through a decree based on the proposal of the relevant minister, while easements must be compensatory. This is due to the clear impact these easements can have, causing harm to certain property ownership rights. For example, in the case of establishing easement rights for the passage of high-tension electrical wires over private properties, this leads to damage to all such properties through which the wires pass, causing a decrease in their value. Therefore, justice requires compensation for property owners adversely affected by this.

However, the more recent Decision No. 1141 from July did not include any reference to potential compensation for property owners who have had easement rights imposed on their properties. This means the decision violates Article 37 of Expropriation Decree No. 20 of 1983. In this case, the owners of these properties could resort to the administrative judiciary to demand compensation for the easement rights imposed for public benefit on their properties.

Finally, expropriation or easement for public benefit carried out without a decree, as is the case with Decision No. 1141, constitutes an infringement on property rights. Jurisprudence, as per Decision No. 606 base 640 of 1996, considers that expropriating someone else’s property without issuing an expropriation decree is an unlawful act. The general jurisdiction of the ordinary courts would handle compensation claims in such instances.

Explained: Real Estate Rights that Are Subject to Expropriation

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Expropriation addresses real estate property rights, including primary and secondary in rem rights on property. Real estate in rem rights are the direct authority that the law assigns to an individual over a specific property without the mediation of another. These rights are categorised into primary in rem rights, which include rights of usage, enjoyment, and easement, and secondary in rem rights that cover collateral mortgages, possessory mortgages, and rights of privilege.

These rights may be taken over upon the expropriation of a given property. For instance, if the public authority takes over the property, it controls ownership of that property and any associated in rem rights belonging to others, such as registered easement rights. The public authority must then compensate the former holders of these rights. Furthermore, the public authority can expropriate a right in rem on a property without taking over ownership, such as establishing an easement on a property by laying an electrical tension line while leaving the property under the owner’s possession.

Under Article 2 of the Expropriation Law, issued by Legislative Decree No. 20 of 1983, expropriation can be applied to both built and unbuilt properties, subdivided or jointly owned. It is also permissible to expropriate lands even if they are allocated for construction, so long as they are included in the expropriation plan to implement public benefit projects.

Agricultural lands have been given special attention in expropriation cases. Under Council of Ministers Circular No. 86/B-15/4778 of 1983, the expropriating authority cannot seize agricultural land and prevent the farmer from exploiting it before an official expropriation decision and settlement of the farmer’s rights.

Authorities may expropriate an entire property or just a part of it. However, if the remaining part of the property becomes unusable, the expropriating authority should then expropriate that part within three years upon the owner’s request and following a decision from the local council stating that the remaining part is unusable. In this instance, the council’s decision must be per Article 11 of Expropriation Law No. 20.

On the other hand, if a public authority expropriates a property larger than needed for a public benefit project, this does not negate the public benefit of the excess portion, nor does it affect the validity of the expropriation decree. The authority has the right to manage the remaining amount according to the expropriation decree provisions based on the determination set by the Court of Cassation under Principle 459 issued by Decision No. 269 of 1984.

It is also permissible for public authorities to expropriate portions of multiple different properties to construct on them after merging and unifying them or subdividing them, as stipulated in Article 5 of Law No. 20.

Article 2 of the Expropriation Law allowed for the expropriation of awqaf (endowments) properties, while Law No. 26 of 2000, which amended the Urban Expansion Law, did not permit such properties. Article 2 of Law No. 26 specifies that endowment properties belonging to various religious sects should not be subject to expropriation under its provisions. Therefore, the expropriating authority always relies on the provisions of Expropriation Law No. 20 when expropriating a property owned by the Ministry of Endowments.

Finally, for properties owned by public entities, Expropriation Law No. 20 does not contain a provision allowing their expropriation. However, the General Assembly of the Advisory Department for Fatwa and Legislation in the State Council stated in its Decision No. 2199 of 2010 that an expropriation order issued by the Prime Minister for a property to benefit of one of the governorates is considered null.

In the rationale of the General Assembly’s 2010 decision, it was expressed that all state interests aim equally to achieve public benefit projects. As such, giving one of these entities the right to expropriate properties owned by another public entity is inappropriate. On the other hand, in a more recent ruling by the General Assembly of the State Council, issued as No. 200 of 2013, it was determined that for the expropriation of a property belonging to a public entity, the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform must be approached to allocate the property. An expropriation decision cannot be issued before this step. Otherwise, it would be considered null.

Explained: The Role of Public Benefit in Unrestricted Expropriation

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Public benefit is considered the fundamental purpose of expropriation, justifying the sacrifice of individual ownership for the public good. In theory, no official entity can request expropriation unless it aims to implement projects of public benefit. It is also not permissible for such entities to change the intended project to go against the decision of public use for which the expropriation was issued.

The scope of public benefit can be widened to include all administrative activities involving the provision of public services, regulation of public facilities, construction of infrastructure and establishment of institutions to align with the state’s overall plans and policies.

One requirement of public benefit is that it serves the interest of unspecified people or groups. If it is directed toward a specific group or to individuals, then the public nature of the benefit disappears. The Supreme Administrative Court confirmed this in its Jurisprudence No. 409 of 1980, which considered that an expropriation decree, if it benefits specific individuals by the nature of their work, even if they are not limited, is not immune from legal challenges over violation of the constitution and law, and the judiciary may exercise its oversight.

The close link between an expropriation decree and the concept of public benefit makes expropriation, which lacks the characteristics of public benefit, an infringement on private property. The Administrative Judiciary Court confirmed this principle in Jurisprudence No. 786 of 1996 when it stated that “expropriating part of a property by forcibly including it in an expropriation, despite the lack of need for it in implementing the expropriation project, is considered a major flaw that reduces the expropriation deed to a state of non-existence.”

Although the Expropriation Law No. 20 of 1983 and various judicial rulings have outlined the general guidelines of public benefit, they have left it to the expropriating entity to assess whether there is a public benefit to a given project without clarifying the nature of that benefit or the reasons on which it should base this assessment. Jurisprudence No. 979 of 1978 affirms this, stating that “the assessment of the existence of public benefit in expropriation is left to the discretion of the administration without question from the judiciary.”

Of course, these powers granted to administrative bodies, namely, to assess the existence of public benefit without legal or judicial controls, can lead to administrative arbitrariness and infringement on individual property rights.

Sometimes, the expropriating party may delay the implementation of the expropriation project for so long that the public benefit for which the expropriation decree was issued no longer exists. Although the Expropriation Law does not address this situation, judicial reasoning in issues 9-10 of the Lawyers’ Journal in 1999 confirmed that “Expropriation, which is the forcible deprivation of property, was originally legislated to implement public benefit projects. Considering that the expropriating administration did not implement the expropriation project within 30 years, the idea of public benefit from its expropriation disappears, and with it, the legitimacy of its expropriation.”

The Expropriation Law greatly expanded the concept of “administration.” It includes ministries, public administrations, public institutions and local administrative units, the Baath Party, and “popular organisations,” which refers to various types of unions (workers, youth, women, etc.) set up by the Baath Party. All these bodies can request expropriation to implement public benefit projects, after which an expropriation decree is issued based on the proposal of the relevant minister. This decree is final and may not be appealed, meaning it is beyond judicial oversight.

However, the amendment to the Expropriation Law issued by Decree No. 11 of 1986 required an expropriation decision to come via decree of the Prime Minister, which can be modified or annulled by a decree from the Syrian president. Therefore, the oversight of expropriation decisions lies with the president. Nevertheless, this does not equate to judicial oversight, which all administrative actions should be subject to, given the independence that the judiciary must enjoy, making it the competent authority in determining legitimacy per the requirements of law and justice.

Barring expropriation from judicial oversight could lead to instances of it taking place without actual justifications. This necessitates the establishment of legal controls on expropriation, through amending Decree No. 20 of 1983, and making expropriation subject to administrative judicial review. The administrative judiciary is responsible for settling disputes between public bodies and interests on one side and private entities and interests on the other. Administrative disputes usually concern the annulment of administrative decisions, halting their implementation, or ruling on compensation for any resulting damage to prevent any infringements on property rights.

Fire Ravages Damascus’ Historic Sarouja Neighbourhood

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On the morning of July 16, a fire ravaged a section of the historic Sarouja district in Damascus. The fire occurred during a heatwave that affected most of Syria and caused several other blazes, including a wildfire on Mount Mazzeh the day before. The Sarouja fire, however, resulted in widespread destruction to several historic Damascene homes that were used as residences or small industrial workshops for leather, shoes and manufacturing materials, which contributed to the rapid spread of the flames.

Among the damaged properties was a home dating back to the 19th century that once housed the last Hajj Amir (commander of the annual Hajj pilgrimage) of the Ottoman Sultanate era, AbdulRahman Pasha Al-Youssef, who was killed in 1920. The fire also affected the house of Khalid Al-Azm, a Damascene politician and the last head of a democratically elected government before the Baath Party’s military coup in 1963. Azm’s house, which dates back to the 18th century, was partly used as a museum.

The Sarouja neighbourhood dates back to the Mamlouk era and is named after Mamlouk prince SaremEddin Sarouja, who died in 1342. The neighbourhood was built northwest of the capital’s Old City, outside its historic walls. It became a destination for Mamlouk princes, who built palaces, schools, mosques, and baths in the area. In the Ottoman era, the district housed senior employees of the Sultanate in Damascus, causing it to expand in the style of Ottoman architecture, earning it the nickname “Little Istanbul.” After the French Mandate 1946 ended, the neighbourhood became popular among the Damascene elite.

With the Baath Party’s political takeover in 1963, Sarouja began to be marginalised for ideological reasons, as it was a bourgeois area feared for its democratic leanings. The Baath Party did not hesitate to dispossess the elite residents of the district of their property, pushing many residents to leave the area and altering the socio-urban fabric. Concurrent with the wave of nationalisation and agrarian reform at the time, the Master Plan for Damascus, known as the plan by French architect Michel Écochard, was issued in 1968. This plan leaned more towards the modern planning and organisation of the contemporary city of the time rather than preserving the district’s old historical fabric.

In the 1970s and 1980s, under the Écochard plan and its amendments, the Damascus governorate appropriated large parts of Sarouja to construct public utilities such as streets and traffic junctions and prepare sites for building government and commercial institutions. In the late 1970s, the governorate cut through Al-Thawra Street, dividing the neighbourhood between east and west, and confiscated the necessary land and multi-storey buildings on either side of the thoroughfare. This expropriation took place without compensation or with significant delays in paying the affected parties. Some historic houses in the district were demolished, and modern facilities and towers were built in their place, including the General Directorate of Cadastral Affairs building and the Souk Al-Khaja. The governorate also granted land in Al-Bahsa area to the west to merchants to construct commercial buildings and hotels.

The Écochard plan also envisioned the construction of a major traffic and commercial axis within Saruja called King Faisal Street, but it has not yet been implemented. This axis aims to create a traffic throughway from the centre of Damascus to its east, running along the northern wall of the Old City. However, implementing the road means confiscating a large part of Sarouja and removing the southern part of the neighbourhood to connect Al-Thawra Street with Bab Touma Square. This road plan was discussed several times before 2011, and the idea has been modified multiple times to become both a traffic and tourist throughway zoned as a tourism area. Despite this, the project was obstructed due to pressure from local residents, intellectuals, and archaeologists.

Amid the popular rejection of the road construction plan, the Damascus governorate has resorted since the 1980s to prevent the issuance of restoration permits throughout the district, considering any restoration work without a licence to be a form of unlicensed construction that must be removed immediately. As a result, the district began to suffer from severe neglect, containing historic ruins in desperate need of restoration. According to The Syria Report sources, the Damascus governorate often uses this method when faced with criticism of an expropriation decision. 

This has led to the collapse of more than one building in the neighbourhood, as happened in February 2019 when a house fell due to rain. In 2007, one person was killed when the dilapidated roof of his house, for which the governorate refused to grant a restoration licence, collapsed on him.

Since 2011, the district has experienced even worse neglect, especially as some residents were not far removed from the protests opposing the regime. As a result, the governorate intensified its crackdown on unlicensed construction and provided the bare minimum of services. Sarouja saw a complete absence of safety and civil defence measures and lacked a proper fire brigade as the old district’s narrow streets could not properly fit full-size fire trucks. 

Like all parts of Damascus, Sarouja has been experiencing recurring fires in the recent heat waves, often aided by the proliferation of informal electricity networks. Additionally, the harsh electricity rationing programs, which reach up to five hours of power cuts vs one hour of connection, impose additional electrical loads on power transformers due to the excessive power demand in the brief supply period.

Alongside the hot weather and poor maintenance, some transformers explode, causing fires to break out and spread. Despite the neighbourhood residents’ demands for improved services and the refurbishment of the electricity networks, they have always been met with negligence by the government and officials. This may not be a direct, intentional act against Sarouja, as much as simply corruption and laxity in the Damascus governorate, lack of funding, poor planning and a decline in efficiency.

And aside from the property expropriations, some of the burned buildings are classified as historical, meaning that the owners of these properties are prohibited from disposing of or restoring them. This has turned these buildings into a dispute between the state and the original aggrieved owners, with many cases pending in the courts since decades ago. The prohibition has also led to problems among the heirs of these properties and disputes between old tenants refusing to vacate them.

A source from the Damascus governorate told The Syria Report that the property situation in the Sarouja neighbourhood, like many areas of historic Damascus, is a large cluster of unsolvable legal issues accumulated over decades. While the source suggested that the fire was most likely unintentional, its results may benefit more than one party. The Damascus governorate is keen on resolving the built-up issues and proceeding with the execution of expropriations and establishing commercial and tourist projects. Some property owners also benefit from the burning of the buildings as it removes their historical status, allowing them to construct new buildings in their place.

No Homes for Returnees to Ayn Al-Fijeh

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Regime forces allowed some displaced residents to return to the Rural Damascus town of Ayn Al-Fijeh in late 2022. Since then, dozens of residents have inspected their homes, but only a few have chosen to settle there permanently due to the extensive damage to their properties and essential infrastructure, especially the drinking water network, difficulties in restoration and lack of efforts to remove rubble.

Ayn Al-Fijeh belongs administratively to the Zabadani district. It is also the centre of a subdistrict that includes nine towns and villages known as the villages of Wadi Barada. The town is about 15 kilometres west of the centre of Damascus, and it’s spring is the primary source of drinking water for the capital city and part of its countryside. The population of Ayn Al-Fijeh was approximately 6,000 before 2011, according to local estimates. The local armed opposition took control of Ayn Al-Fijeh in February 2012, so it was subjected to a punishing siege, continuous bombardment and repeated invasions by the regime forces.

Opposition forces threatened to cut off water to Damascus to improve the conditions for civilians in the town. In December 2016, regime forces backed by the Lebanese Hezbollah militia launched a military operation against the opposition in the town, resulting in significant damage to the Fijeh spring due to artillery and air bombardment. The regime managed to enter Ayn Al-Fijeh on January 28, 2017. It took control of the spring after reaching an agreement that resulted in the forced displacement of 2,100 residents to northern Syria.

In 2018, Law No. 1 was issued, establishing two buffer zones around the Fijeh Spring. A direct zone includes the land immediately surrounding the water source, and an indirect zone surrounds the direct one. The law stipulates the expropriation of properties and parts of properties located within the direct zone. It also established two other buffer zones, direct and indirect, along the water delivery tunnels from the Fijeh spring to Damascus. The law stipulated amending the zoning plan for Ayn Al-Fijeh so that residential areas located within the direct zones would be removed.

Only property owners in the indirect zone around the spring and waterway could repair damaged homes. The law also stipulates that residential facilities built before the enactment of this law in the indirect zone can remain, albeit under a set of conditions. Many houses and residences of the old town of Ayn Al-Fijeh fall within the areas of the direct zone.

While implementing the law, regime forces demolished and bulldozed entire residential neighbourhoods in Ayn Al-Fijeh, whose share of the direct zone was 45 hectares. This area was subject to expropriation and removal of all property contents. Republican Guard forces salvaged what could be recycled and reused from the houses before demolishing them, including ceramics, doors, windows and electrical wiring. After detonating the homes, they also extracted iron rebar. Sources from The Syria Report stated that the Republican Guard sold the iron to a company with large presses to reshape the extracted metals into large cubes. 

Afterwards, the salvaged metal cubes were weighed in a collection area at the entrance to Ayn Al-Fijeh, before loading them into trucks and transporting them to smelting furnaces. The Rural Damascus governorate then brought dozens of heavy construction vehicles to Ayn Al-Fijeh to bulldoze the two buffer zones. Local sources suggest that more than half of the buildings in the town have been destroyed. Only an area of open fields on the side adjacent to the town of Bseima remains habitable and survived the bulldozing operations.

The Rural Damascus governorate later contracted with the General Company for Engineering Studies, affiliated with the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, in August 2020 to prepare detailed zoning plans for a new Wadi Barada suburb east of Ayn Al-Fijeh. The governorate stated this suburb would serve as paid alternative housing for the owners of properties expropriated under Law No. 1 of 2018.

Then in late 2020, for the first time, regime forces allowed some of the town’s displaced residents to briefly visit their properties, though they weren’t allowed to stay permanently. After that, residents were allowed to submit return requests to the temporary building of Ayn Al-Fijeh’s local council in the town of Jdeidat Al-Wadi, as Ayn Al-Fijeh’s original council building had been destroyed. After obtaining security approval for a return request, residents can submit a home repair request only if their repairable home is located in the indirect zone. 

A local correspondent for The Syria Report indicated that anyone wishing to repair their home must submit a request to the local council to obtain a repair permit, accompanied by documents proving their ownership of the property. Afterwards, they must obtain a report from the Construction Safety Committee in the Rural Damascus governorate specifying the percentage of damage in the building they wish to return to.

According to The Syria Report’s sources, repair permits were granted for some homes where the damage exceeded 60 percent. However, receiving a repair permit is also contingent on obtaining security approval. In Ayn Al-Fijeh, this approval is given by the Political Security Branch and the Republican Guard, the two forces controlling the town.

On May 5, 2023, the head of the local council in the town told the semi-official newspaper Al-Watan that only a few dozen people currently reside in the town, due to the lack of drinking water available. He added that the process of repairing the drinking water network has halted, while the process of repairing the sewage networks has not yet begun. This is due to the town being subject to Law No. 1 of 2018, which mandates the creation of the buffer zones around the Fijeh spring, and requires that the construction sewage networks in the town be done in a specific technical manner that prevents contamination. Meanwhile, the electricity network is in no better condition, and out of three transformers, only one has been installed, though has yet to be connected to the network.

According to The Syria Report’s correspondent, there are still more than 4,000 cubic metres of rubble in the town, which neither the Rural Damascus governorate’s Technical Services Directorate nor the public construction companies have begun to remove. Local council work crews, in cooperation with small private crews working under temporary contracts, have opened most of the main roads and moved the rubble to smaller side streets. Sometimes residents resort to manually moving the rubble from in front of their homes on the side roads, and placing it on the main roads instead. In any case, the rubble that still remains lacks metal or other recyclable materials, which could explain the lack of interest of the Republican Guard and the Fourth Division in removing it.

On January 10, 2023, the head of the Al-Fijeh local council, Mohammed Shibli, told the state-run news agency SANA that 500 families had submitted requests to repair their homes. The requests were approved after the governorate’s Construction Safety Committee concluded that the homes were sound and could be repaired. He added that the families had begun removing the rubble from the homes, and he vowed to work on rehabilitating local infrastructure in parallel with the rubble removal operations.

But local sources expressed doubts to The Syria Report about the municipality having granted 500 repair permits, adding that the number of houses in the town that could be repaired is much lower than that. A source from the town explained that the main dilemma is the difficulty in obtaining new permits for completely destroyed buildings, outside the buffer zone and waterway areas of the spring, and within the zoned area of the town. This is partly because most of the town’s homes were multi-storey buildings consisting of a number of apartments, and were commonly owned rather than subdivided. Each construction permit application must be accompanied by a subdivision plan, which lists each owner and their location, and this in turn requires an agreement between the owners and a subdivision of the property in question. If there are multiple owners for one property and a subdivision plan is available in accordance with their shares, each of the owners must obtain security approval to get a building permit. But because some of those owners have been forcibly displaced or are wanted by security forces, they are unable to obtain security approval, which prevents the issuance of a building permit. In other cases, the financial costs of building permits have prevented some owners from agreeing to share the burden.

Explained: Aleppo City Zoning Plans

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The earliest known landmarks in Aleppo date back to the Greek era, when the city was called Beroea. At the time, the city had a grid-like structure built around a citadel, the remains of which are today’s Jalloum neighbourhood and a network of commercial markets within the ancient citadel walls. During the Byzantine era, the city expanded, and districts like Bousita and Farafra arose. In the mid-13th century, suburbs such as the Misabbin and Dubbagha districts appeared outside the castle walls. In the early 16th century, new areas such as Mashariqa, Kallasa, Bab Al-Maqam, Bab Al-Nairab, Banqusa, and the Maraashi district began to appear as gathering spots for Turks coming from Maraash, with Christian suburbs arising in Salib Al-Kubra, Salib Al-Sughra and Al-Jdeida. During this period, new neighbourhoods appeared named after the major industries established there, such as the Al-Najarin (carpenters), Al-Bayada (copper or brass work polishers) and Al-Qazazin (glassworkers).

The first attempt to formally zone Aleppo dates back to the late Ottoman period. In 1867, the first municipality in the city was established and had an area of about 550 hectares. In 1882, the Ottoman authorities commissioned a German engineer named Jung to draw up the city’s first zoning plan. Jung adopted the principle of wide streets and a grid plan for the city, completing it in 1899. The Department of Technical Affairs in Aleppo adopted the project in 1915.

However, the zoning plans for present-day Aleppo date back to 1954, by the French architect André Gutton. He oversaw a new zoning plan with a Western urban character, with wide streets and multi-storey buildings, linking the city centre with its urban expansion zones. Under this plan, roads were paved, including the one that connected the Umayyad Mosque and the citadel, causing partial or complete demolition of some archaeological buildings, including Hammam Al-Wasani, Khan Al-Wazir, Khan Al-Saboun, Al-Matbakh Al-Ajami, and the Sharfia School.

In 1974, Japanese expert Banshuya made a new zoning plan for Aleppo, raising many objections. Based on this plan, the Aleppo municipality began to establish a new centre for the city on the part of the historic city centre. The municipality commissioned the engineering unit from the Faculty of Architecture at the University of Aleppo, with support from the Military Housing Establishment, to develop a study for the Bab Al-Faraj project, which included the construction of high-rise buildings and wide streets. The municipality expropriated more than half of the area allocated for the new city centre. It began implementing these city blocks on AbdulMunim Riyad Street. During the preparation stage, work crews found parts of the ancient wall of Bab Al-Faraj, which extends from Bab Al-Faraj Square to Bab Al-Nasr.

The Old City was subsequently added to the UNESCO World Heritage List, and the Ministry of Culture registered the neighbourhoods within the citadel walls as archaeological areas where demolition and construction are prohibited. Only restoration would be allowed in those areas under Decision No. 47 of 1979, coinciding with UNESCO issuing two successive reports in 1979 and 1980 calling for preserving Aleppo’s Old City. Just a few years later, in 1983, the World Symposium for the Protection of Old Aleppo, held by the Aleppo branch of the Engineers’ Syndicate, called for the preservation of the traditional urban fabric of the Old City while adopting new ideas to provide public services there.

The Ministry of Culture issued Decision No. 15 in 1986, listing some neighbourhoods outside the Old City walls as archaeological areas where construction and demolition are prohibited. A committee for the protection of the Old City was also formed. The escalating local objections to the Bab Al-Faraj project caused its suspension, the cancellation of Banshuya’s zoning plan and the establishment of a special Old City-dedicated office in the Aleppo municipality.

Then in 2001, the General Company for Engineering Studies (GCES) began studying the new zoning plan with an area of 41,000 hectares. The new project added 20,000 hectares to cover the needs for expansion until 2015; that included 4,000 hectares for the industrial zone in Sheikh Najjar, 8,000 hectares for residential urban development, 5,000 hectares as green tourism areas, and 3,000 hectares as protected zones around the city.

The GCES completed the zoning plan for Aleppo in 2004. Still, it overlooked key planning points such as transportation, services and investment activities. Consequently, the Aleppo municipality contracted again with the GCES to update the plan and issue several detailed zoning studies.

The general zoning plan for Aleppo was reissued multiple times in recent years, aiming to receive and study objections as part of the regular mechanism for issuing such plans. Most recently, in 2018, the plan underwent final approval by the executive office of Aleppo governorate. This plan was formally issued by the Decision of the Minister of Public Works and Housing No. 2650/S in April 2022, containing 30 areas for population expansion. The plan included two real estate development zones; Al-Haidariya, with an area of 80 hectares to accommodate 7,300 housing units, and Tel Al-Zarazir, with 60 hectares to accommodate about 6,000 apartments. The plan also put in place some industrial zones, such as in Khan Al-Asal. At the same time, the detailed zoning plan for the Karm Al-Jazmati informal settlement in east Aleppo was issued and added to the approved general zoning plan for the city.

AANES Road Expansions Threatens Resident HLP Rights

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In July 2022, the municipality of Qamishli, which is part of the majority Kurdish-controlled Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria (AANES), began work to beautify and expand the western entrance of the city, known as Amuda Road. However, property owners on both sides of the road raised grievances that the project violates their property rights.

The road expansion will follow an old detailed zoning plan issued in 1994. It will be 600 metres long and nine metres wide. Four of the nine metres will be designated for sidewalks and five for a green strip. The expansion will cut into properties 34 and 36 in the Halalia No. 408 real estate zone. Some 31 individuals, most of whom bought their shares before the 1994 zoning plan was issued, own these two properties. Since then, some of the owners have built homes or shops on their shares, which are now threatened with partial or full demolition.

One of those property owners told The Syria Report that their 100-square-metre house is located directly on the road, which will eat into 90 square metres. 

The AANES established its municipalities in 2014 and seized most of the municipal buildings in the parts of northeastern Syria it controls. However, they preserved the old archives and documents, as well as engineering plans, surveys, topographical charts, and zoning plans, which they relied on to grant construction permits and conduct urban planning tasks. Meanwhile, the municipalities still operating under the Damascus government’s Ministry of Local Administration moved to new, smaller locations in Qamishli, Hassakeh, Amuda and Deirek. There, they have a small staff, and their work is limited to authenticating old documents they issued and providing some administrative data.

In 2022, AANES’ Qamishli municipality twice issued eviction notices for property owners along the road expansion area. However, the notices had no legal basis and did not include a signal for expropriating the properties under eviction. They also failed to include any compensation for the property owners. The owners rejected the eviction notices and prevented municipal workers from carrying out preparatory work on the road project. 

Nevertheless, in July 2022, municipal workers began demolishing an earthen wall surrounding a house in the eviction area. But the residents gathered and confronted the workers, halting the demolition. Afterwards, affected residents submitted a collective complaint to the municipality against the project and presented their ownership deeds. In addition, they demanded financial or in-kind compensation for the damages they would incur due to the road project. 

One of the residents, whose property was at risk of demolition, told The Syria Report that municipal employees in Qamishli, some of whom are part of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), responded to the protesters with rhetorical language and party slogans. The employees said that people from the majority-Kurdish Afrin region of Aleppo governorate had seen their properties seized, looted and extorted by the Turkish-backed National Army. They criticised the Qamishli residents for demanding compensation for the road expansion project. 

Still, the municipality temporarily halted work on the project and tried to persuade residents to get on board. In September 2022, the municipality formed a committee to study and prepare a proposal for compensating the affected residents based on current property prices in that real estate area. The committee included employees from the municipality’s Violations Department and Topographical Department, as well as from the Real Estate Offices Union, a part of the Federation of Professions, an AANES-run organisation aiming to regulate certain labour in the market. The Federation of Professions is responsible for estimating property prices and resolving some real estate disputes. 

That December, the committee concluded they must provide cash compensation to residents affected by the road project. It estimated the price per square metre of land in the area to be between USD 500 and 800. However, the Municipalities Authority for Al-Jazira region, one of the AANES institutions tasked with supervising the area’s municipalities, rejected the committee’s idea. According to a correspondent for The Syria Report, this rejection was given verbally and without any justification. The Municipalities Authority invited the affected property owners to a meeting and tried convincing them that the area adjacent to the proposed road expansion would become commercial property and its value would increase. Still, the residents rejected the offer and demanded cash payment. The authority continued with administrative procedures to approve the road expansion project and sent this by mail to the Office of Municipal Affairs at the Council of Northeastern Syria. But the concerned residents returned and proposed a new idea for in-kind compensation via subdivisions of state-owned land to be coordinated between Qamishli’s government-run and AANES-run municipalities. 

More recently, on February 10, the Qamishli municipality’s executive office issued Administrative Decision No. 13, which states that the “green strip” along the road expansion zone will be converted into a setback to remain under the current residents’ ownership and that the zoning classification of the land will change from residential to commercial. The executive office considered this sufficient compensation for the property owners, who would benefit economically from what it said would be a better use of that land area. They could construct four-storey buildings per the commercial zone’s building codes. The new commercial classification will also increase the square-metre property prices. The Qamishli municipality’s technical office also affirmed that Decision No. 13 was submitted to the Municipalities Authority for Northeastern Syria, which will review it and either approve or reject it.

The Syria Report’s correspondent said that if Decision No. 13 is approved, those who objected to it will only have the option of filing a lawsuit to the judiciary to demand compensation. 

Article 41 of the AANES Social Contract Charter, issued in 2016, serves as a constitution. It states that private property is safeguarded and must be fairly compensated in cases of expropriation. Meanwhile, Article 88 says to resort to Syrian law and apply it in “legislative gaps” cases. In this case, with the absence of a specific expropriation law within the AANES, Syria’s Expropriation Law No. 20 of 1983 could be applicable, as it stipulates fair compensation for public benefit expropriation projects. 

Al-Marsouma Family from Deir-ez-Zor Buying Real Estate in Moadhamiyat Al-Sham

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The past three years have seen rapid real estate purchasing in the Rural Damascus governorate city of Moadamiyat Al-Sham driven by contractors and builders who have good relations with the Fourth Division officials, which control the area. Among these contractors are representatives of a family in Deir-ez-Zor. While the process does not directly threaten housing, land, and property rights, because it is conducted legally, it carries risks as it is systematic and concentrated, taking advantage of the difficult economic conditions of the area’s residents to buy their properties.

Administratively, Moadamiyat Al-Sham falls under the jurisdiction of the Daraya district, west of the capital, and borders the Damascus neighbourhood of Mazzeh. It used to be known for olive cultivation and seasonal crops, but lost its agricultural character in the 1950s when the state acquired most of its lands for the Ministry of Defence and the Damascus governorate. Expropriations increased in the mid-1970s to establish a security-military belt west of Damascus. The total expropriated land in Moadamiyat Al-Sham amounts to about 80 percent of its area (around 3,377 hectares out of a total area of 4,210 hectares), affecting approximately 35,000 individuals.

Moadamiyat Al-Sham was home to around 70,000 people before 2011. The city’s eastern neighbourhood was predominantly populated by Alawite families of officers working at the Mazzeh military airport and for Air Force Intelligence. The opposition took control of large parts of the city at the end of 2012, forming a single military zone with the adjacent Darayya until the end of 2015. Reconciliation took place there in September 2016, under Russian sponsorship, after the displacement of 500 activists and fighters who rejected the reconciliation and their families. However, the city is still effectively besieged with checkpoints and is controlled by the Fourth Division and Air Force Intelligence through a network of loyal local militias.

The opposition news site Sowt Al-Asima reported in November 2022 that representatives of Sheikh Farhan Al-Marsouma have been purchasing dozens of properties and agricultural lands since 2018 in cooperation with the Fourth Division and local militia leaders. In addition, they have brought in 250 families from the Al-Marsouma clan to reside there.

According to The Syria Report’s sources, Al-Marsouma is a small family, not a clan, originally from Al-Harri in the Al-Bokamel area of Deir-ez-Zor governorate’s eastern countryside. The family is Sunni, but, like many families and tribes in the region, they associate themselves with Ahl Al-Bait, representing the prophet Mohammad’s lineage. Due to the location of the town of Al-Harri in the desert between Syria and Iraq, the family has historically been known for smuggling goods across the borders, especially cigarettes.

The head of the family is Sheikh Farhan Al-Marsoumi, who is active in real estate contracts in different areas of Syria and invests money for family notables and others who have worked in contracting in the Gulf. Sheikh Farhan is known for his work in the illicit oil trade and smuggling between the areas of the majority-Kurdish Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria (AANES) and regime-controlled areas of Deir-ez-Zor. In addition, he has good relations with the Iranian militias that control the Syrian-Iraqi border area. In 2020, he had an unsuccessful run for a seat in the parliament.

According to a correspondent for The Syria Report, there is no evidence to prove that Al-Marsoumi, his family or his work directly serve the interests of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. However, there are rumours of him buying properties in Moadamiyat Al-Sham as part of an Iranian plan for social engineering and changing the demographic fabric of the Damascus region. According to these rumours, Al-Marsouma seeks to establish a home base for his family in Moadamiyat Al-Sham because it is close to the capital. However, The Syria Report was unable to confirm these rumours.

The correspondent added that people from Deir-ez-Zor have resided in Moadamiyat Al-Sham and the neighbouring Daraya since before 2011, and many of them own the properties where they live. According to real estate contractors in the city, this phenomenon is currently not limited to Al-Marsouma representatives, any contractor with financial liquidity can purchase any property. However, what distinguishes the Al-Marsouma family is their financial capability and the good prices they offer to buy properties in an area suffering financial hardship and an effective siege.

Al-Marsouma family reportedly do not focus on properties owned by regime opponents or forcibly displaced individuals from the city. Instead, they buy properties available for sale regardless of the owners. In addition, al-Marsouma representatives prefer buying properties that do not have any transfer of ownership restraints, such as seizures and mortgages, meaning properties whose owners do not have security issues with the Syrian security services.

This buying and selling process is carried out legally. However, most sellers are forced to sell due to difficult economic conditions. Contractors have set a standardised price for properties and land in Moadamiyat Al-Sham: one qasba of land (23.75 square metres) ranges from SYP 2 to 5 million, depending on the location. The price per square metre for new, uncompleted construction ranges from SYP 400,000 to 1.5 million, while the price per square metre for old “Arab-style” houses is no more than SYP 150,000. These prices are considered unfair and are 10 percent lower than those in surrounding areas like Jdeidet Artouz, Sahnaya, and Jdeidet Artouz al-Balad.

As for the properties of regime opponents that have undergone precautionary asset seizure by the Ministry of Finance under Anti-Terrorism Law No. 19 of 2012, Al-Marsouma representatives have purchased these properties through mutual agreement with the owners, most outside Syria. They sign sales contracts with old dates and at low prices. The seizure mark on the property remains in the Land Record in such cases. Al-Marsouma family representatives sometimes target these properties due to their low prices. This has caused intense competition between Al-Marsouma representatives and other contractors, leading in at least one case of kidnapping and threats involving the security services. In most of these cases, a negotiated settlement was reached in favour of the Al-Marsouma family, in exchange for financial sums to the other party to be withdrawn from the purchasing process.

Notable here is the exploitation by Al-Marsouma of a contentious issue in Moadamiyat Al-Sham: Due to the historical expropriation of properties in the area, most of the remaining properties in the city still have common ownership among their inheritors. Consequently, the process of terminating the common ownership and transferring the resulting shares to each inheritor in has not yet been carried out for these properties. After the issuance of precautionary seizure orders on regime opponents’ properties in 2011, their shares were seized from properties jointly owned with others. Legally, the seizure should be limited to the share of the property that is subject to the seizure. However, in practice, precautionary seizure prevents the remaining inheritors from conducting any transaction or transfer of ownership without obtaining prior security approval.

According to the regulations, obtaining a construction permit on commonly owned land within the zoning areas is not permissible. However, it appears that Al-Marsouma representatives, through their security connections, have obtained such permits on land with common ownership if the seized share of one of the partners is relatively small. In such cases, the family representatives submit a “common ownership license” application for construction to the Moadamiyat Al-Sham municipality, whereby construction is authorised on the un-seized shares per the building codes. Meanwhile, the seized share is left as a setback or a jardin. If the seized share is significant, construction is carried out in violation of the building codes. 

Explained: Expropriation for Unifying Real Estate Properties

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On March 26, 2023, the Council of Ministers issued a decision to expropriate a property in Aleppo, considering it to be public property, and merged it with an adjacent one.

Decision No. 517 expropriated Section B of Real Estate 13480 from Aleppo’s Real Estate Zone No. 4. The property was merged with Real Estate 9637 after its owners failed to agree to implement approved zoning measures for the city of Aleppo. 

The Council of Ministers issued a similar decree, No. 1972, on November 3, 2022, which expropriated Property 1858 and part of Property 1074 from the Northern Qatana Real Estate Zone No. 65 in the Rural Damascus governorate. The purpose of this decree was to merge those two properties with Property 1072 and expropriate part of Property 1854 and merge it with Property 1071. These measures would help implement the approved zoning plan for the Qatana area after the owners of those properties failed to reach an agreement to do so. 

Syria’s Council of Ministers may issue expropriation decrees like the ones above to implement projects that are considered to have a public benefit, according to the expropriation law included in Legislative Decree No. 20 of 1983. There is a wide range of projects that fit this category, including paving new roads or expanding existing roads and constructing squares, souks, houses of worship, military barracks, airports, hospitals, medical centres, agricultural facilities, oil projects, and buildings for the Baath Party or other various organisations, as well as implementing zoning plans, tourism projects, and industrial zones. In addition, expropriation can also extend to real estate or parts of real estate that are unsuitable for construction so that they can be merged and made suitable for construction.  

According to Decree No. 20, during the implementation of an approved zoning plan, if there are any adjacent properties (or parts of properties) that are unsuited for construction (due to small surface area or odd geometric shape), the owners of these properties must agree to merge them so that they can become suitable for construction according to their governorate’s building codes. 

But if these owners fail to reach an agreement, then the local administrative unit may merge the properties and expropriate them in exchange for an expropriation compensation. Administrative authorities must document the process of combining these confiscated properties in the presence of the rights holders. This documentation can serve as evidence of the expropriation. 

These properties must meet certain conditions to be merged. For example, they must be adjacent, be in the same real estate zone, and have the same legal classification. This merging process is a technical transaction similar to the real estate subdivision. First, a sworn engineer inspects the properties on the ground to ascertain their combined shape, draws technical plans, and organises surface area and boundaries records. They then transfer these records to the Land Registry department and later to the relevant administrative authority to approve the technical plans. 

The administrative authority must then sell the newly merged real estate via exclusive auction to the owners of the combined properties. If there is a successful sale through this method, the buyer must pay the relevant administrative unit 15 percent of the sales value to cover administrative expenses. But if this exclusive auction does not reach the expropriation compensation value, the property goes up for public auction under Decree No. 28 of 1969, which regulates contracts made by public authorities. This auction is public and open to anyone, not just the owners of the merged properties. Once a sale is complete, the administrative unit uses the proceeds from the auction to pay the expropriation compensation to the owners of those expropriated properties.

The Expropriation Law allows administrative units to take one-quarter of the confiscated property free of charge in cases of partial expropriation so long as the remaining three-quarters of the property is suitable for use. In such cases, the administrative unit does not pay expropriation compensation for that deducted one-quarter of the property. However, if those remaining three-quarters are unsuitable for use, the entire property is expropriated. 

Damascus to Evict Residents in Upscale District, Establish Instead Public Park

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In early March, the Ministry of Tourism issued a warning to residents of the Kiwan plot of land, which belongs administratively to the Mazzeh area district of Damascus, ordering them to leave within six months so that a public park can be established in their place. 

Kiwan

The Kiwan land extends from the Al-Jamarek Square (Customs Square) to the foot of Mount Qasioun and has an area of around 20 hectares. The Sheraton Damascus hotel was built on part of that land in the 1970s. Originally, this plot of land surrounded the historic Kiwan neighbourhood established in the early 1900s. It was home to traditional Arab-style houses, a historic mill, a mosque and the home of Syrian theatre pioneer Abu Khalil Al-Qabbani.  

There appears to be a dispute between the Damascus governorate and the Ministry of Tourism over the land. The first expropriation there dates back to 1973 via Decree No. 1976, and a second via Decree No. 563 of 1974 covering additional land. Both of these expropriation decrees were issued to benefit the Ministry of Tourism to establish a tourism project, while the Directorate of Planning and Urbanisation in the Damascus governorate kept Kiwan’s description as agricultural land and prohibited construction there in order to preserve the green area in the capital. As a result, the ministry didn’t implement any project, while the governorate stopped issuing construction permits there and prevented renovation of existing buildings, which led to informal settlements. 

Then in the early 2000s, the Directorate of Planning and Urbanisation changed the description of the Kiwan land from agricultural to investment, offering it for real estate investment. In 2005, the Ministry of Tourism offered up 15 hectares of land in Kiwan to establish a tourist-commercial investment project that included hotels, art and heritage exhibition halls and restaurants. Then in 2007, the ministry signed a “Build-Operate-Transfer” (BOT) investment contract for the project with the Kuwaiti Al-Kharafi Group, to establish a tourist complex on a six-hectare patch of land in Kiwan. The estimated cost of the project was USD 217 million, to be implemented within three years. The Kuwaiti company would operate and invest in the project for 45 years before returning it to the Ministry of Tourism. In 2010, Al-Kharafi Group established Kiwan Tourism Investment Company to implement the project, but the start of the Syrian revolution in 2011 caused it to halt.

Public park

The Ministry of Tourism has also proposed an environmental park project in Kiwan since 2004, to be a site for tourism, heritage, cultural events, art exhibitions, an eco-heritage hotel, water features and cafeteria. In 2007, the Damascus Governorate  issued decision No. 891 allocating an area of six hectares in Kiwan for the project. 

Between 2011 and 2016, the ministry contracted with the private International University to use parts of the area that had been allocated for the park. However, a legal dispute arose between the two sides over contract violations and ended in the ministry’s favour, with the university being expelled from the site. 

Later, in November 2019, the Higher Tourism Council headed by the Prime Minister issued Decision No. 438 to establish the environmental park on 15 hectares of land in Kiwan, jointly with the Damascus governorate. The contract included allocating 1.5 hectares for tourism investment and to set up recreational activities, a terraced cafeteria and a heritage hotel. 

The agreement also included redistributing the ownership of Kiwan land between the governorate and the Ministry of Tourism, with the governorate owning 13.5 hectares, and the remaining area to be owned by the ministry. According to the agreement, the governorate is responsible for providing infrastructure for the park, while the ministry provides alternative housing for residents.

The Ministry of Tourism also signed a memorandum of understanding with the Federal Science Foundation in Crimea, to enhance tourism cooperation between the two in the field of eco-tourism and benefit from the foundation’s experience in establishing parks and eco-tourism sites. This would include the Kiwan environmental park project, the state-run SANA news agency reported in November 2022. Russia occupied the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine in 2014 and established a republic there under its control.

Alternative housing

In early March, the Ministry of Tourism issued warnings to 20 residents in Kiwan who were living within the area designated for the environmental park. Then on March 8, 2023, the Minister of Tourism said in a radio interview that the residents must evacuate their homes and move to alternative housing in the Qudsaya suburb  in the countryside of Damascus. The Minister explained that the Ministry of Tourism had previously contracted with the General Housing Establishment and purchased residential buildings in the Qudsaya suburb, allocating 175 housing units for Kiwan evacuees and those eligible for alternative housing. So far 90 units have been delivered, and the rest will be handed over gradually. He added that no one is given eviction notices before alternative housing is secured for them.

That said, alternative housing is not provided free of charge, and those eligible for it must pay the cost in monthly instalments over 25 years, a former official in the Ministry of Tourism said in November 2019. 

While it is clear, based on official statements, that 175 families in Kiwan are eligible for alternative housing, it is not clear how many properties are subject to demolition, the total number of residents in the area who are not eligible for alternative housing, or their housing conditions. In all official statements, the law on which the Ministry of Tourism relied to secure alternative housing for these 175 people was never mentioned.

Aleppo to Provide Temporary Shelters for Residents of Building at Risk of Collapse

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Two temporary housing buildings have been completed in Aleppo’s Masaken Hanano district and will house residents of homes at risk of collapse, the governor of Aleppo told the state-owned Tishreen newspaper in early January. 

The units are part of a project–slated for completion by the end of 2023–that the Aleppo City Council launched in 2020 to construct 10 residences containing 224 apartments in Masaken Hanano, in Aleppo’s eastern neighbourhoods, a source on the council told The Syria Report. The council owns the units.

However, the units were not fully allocated for residents whose homes are at risk, unlike what the governor said. According to the city council source, the council will not distribute them as alternative housing but rather as temporary shelters for emergency or urgent cases. For example, people facing sudden eviction from their homes due to imminent collapse will be allowed to stay in the Masaken Hanano housing units for a renewable six-month period, during which time they must search for other housing. 

Unconfirmed rumours suggest that the 10 housing units project was built on the site of buildings that were destroyed by regime airstrikes during the period of opposition control over east Aleppo in 2012-2016. Thos destroyed buildings are said to have been owned by residents who were forcibly displaced from the area.

The city council plans to use the units to house some residents of the informal Al-Haydariyeh neighbourhood, which is now the site of a real estate development zone, the council source said. These residents will only be allowed to live in the units temporarily, until the housing units allocated to them are completed–which in turn will not be free of charge, as residents have to buy it.

Under Real Estate Development and Investment Law No. 15 of 2008, a real estate development zone may handle informal settlements, no matter the size of the latter. An administrative body subjecting an area to Law No. 15 may expropriate privately owned real estate located within that area in accordance with the Expropriation Law. In cases like this, the administrative body must allocate a portion of the residential plots it builds to sell to the owners of the real estate expropriated from that zone.

According to the website of the General Commission for Real Estate Development and Investment, the Aleppo City Council established the real estate development zone in Al-Haydariyeh in 2010. The 118-hectare zone was meant to “upgrade” the area, which contained unlicensed constructed buildings. The area is fully expropriated by the state, and all the real estate within it are included in the general zoning plan for Aleppo city, which was approved in 2004. 

Beyond the housing project in Masaken Hanano, the city council has a number of other units in the neighbourhood, as well as in Al-Sukkari and Al-Mashhad neighbourhoods that can be used as temporary shelters. Such buildings are owned by people who were forcibly displaced to opposition-held areas. They were partially damaged, though the city council rehabilitated a number of them in 2021-2022 and they now house families who were evacuated from at-risk homes in Al-Saliheen, Al-Fardous, Al-Maadi, Al-Maysar, Qadhi Askar and other neighbourhoods. 

In December 2022, the city council began demolishing some severely damaged and uninhabitable buildings in various parts of east Aleppo. The head of the city council said on November 9, 2022 that evacuations had begun for some 1,500 buildings at risk of collapse so that they could be demolished. He added that an action plan was needed to evacuate and find alternative housing for those residents, as a sizable portion of those buildings are still inhabited. 

For those forced to vacate their damaged, at-risk homes, temporary housing is not easy to come by. The city council requires that applicants meet a complex set of conditions before being granted such housing. One person who was evacuated from their home in Al-Saliheen neighbourhood told The Syria Report that the city council refused to grant them the temporary housing usually given to people in his situation because “he owns a car.” The justification wasn’t clear but it could be that the council considers a car-owner as being relatively well-off and hence not needing support. Other people said that wasta, or personal connections, were needed to obtain such housing, or payment of bribes to city council officials. 

AANES and Compensation for Those Impacted by Expropriation

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When the various institutions belonging to the Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria (AANES) expropriate privately owned lands for the public benefit, they compensate the original owners, albeit only if the latter demand such payments. The lack of laws about expropriation and bodies to regulate the process contribute to this phenomenon. The same issue applies to damages wrought on real estate and land due to the conflict and the security activities of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). 

First, land or real estate owners must submit a complaint to one of the agricultural real estate sub-committees in Northeast Syria, a region known as the Jazira. These sub-committees operate beneath the General Agricultural Real Estate Committee, affiliated with the AANES’ agriculture ministry, the Agriculture Authority. The judges who serve on these committees are appointed by the Justice Authority, the AANES’ justice ministry, and settle disputes related to agricultural lands and other real estate located outside the zoning plans of the area’s cities. They study the complaints and issue decisions to provide or withhold compensation. Complainants may also file lawsuits before the People’s Courts affiliated with the AANES. These courts, in turn, issue decisions on compensation that municipalities must follow. 

Expropriations for military use

In 2016, during the expansion of the Tal Baydar military base in the city of Tal Tamar, in the rural Hassakeh governorate, the Tal Tamar municipality expropriated some privately owned lands. The base consists of an airport, training facilities and warehouses. Both US forces and the SDF are stationed there. The owners of the expropriated lands submitted complaints and compensation requests to the Tal Tamar agricultural committee, which issued a decision to compensate them. Because AANES has no expropriation law, the payment was made similarly to an unlimited lease, with an annual value equivalent to the fertile agricultural seasons. At the same time, the landowners do not possess any actual lease contracts or expropriation decisions for their lands. 

A similar case occurred during work in 2014-2015 to expand the Salman Bek Agricultural Airport, which is located in the city of Amouda in rural Hassakeh and is currently occupied by the SDF for military purposes. The Amouda municipality expropriated civilian-owned properties surrounding the airport and compensated them, in line with decisions from the General Agricultural Real Estate Committee, with annual “lease” payments. 

Military and security damage to real estate

Privately owned real estate properties have been damaged due to war and security activities by the SDF in many border areas of the Hassakeh governorate. 

Some farmers submitted compensation requests for damages during the 2019-2020 agricultural season due to the SDF digging trenches and tunnels beneath their fields. But the General Agricultural Real Estate Committee rejected the farmers’ requests, claiming that the SDF would fill the trenches and tunnels, thereby making the damages temporary. The farmers later filled in the tunnels at their own expense after the SDF abandoned any efforts to do so. 

Digging such tunnels has harmed the foundations of homes in the villages along the Syrian border with Turkey and in the neighbourhoods of Al-Hilaliyeh and Al-Gharbiyeh in the northern part of Qamishli. Cracks appeared on the walls, raising fears amongst residents. Local administrative units, known as “communes,” rejected requests for compensation. 

Past expropriations

Municipalities within the AANES have rejected compensation requests for expropriations that occurred before 2014 on the pretext that they are not liable for such seizures, which Damascus carried out. However, the Syrian government’s municipal authorities are still active in some AANES areas, though they have minimal duties and budgets. For the most part, they certify certain documents that have previously been issued.

Some real estate owners whose properties in Amouda were expropriated in 2002 filed a lawsuit in 2019 before the AANES court after the municipality had refused to provide them compensation. In turn, the court rejected their request because the expropriation occurred when the regime was in control. Thus, the court found that the Syrian regime should have provided compensation at the time.

Explained: Seizure and Expropriation in Syria’s Public Assets Collection Law

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Syria’s Public Assets Collection Law allows the General Commission for Taxes and Fees, part of the Ministry of Finance, to transfer private real estate to state ownership if the original owners fail to pay the necessary taxes and fees. The law was promulgated by Legislative Decree No. 341 of 1956 and its amendments.

Decree No. 341 sets the general terms for the categories of taxes that authorise the state’s seizure of taxpayers’ properties. It includes various types of taxes and direct and indirect fees, as well as additions and fines to those fees. In other words, the payments listed in the decree include all taxes and fees payable to state administrations and institutions under the applicable laws and regulations. Generally, the Public Assets Collection Law applies to income taxes, real estate sales tax, and others. 

Decree No. 341 also outlines the methods for paying taxes and fees and the procedures against those who fail to pay. The process begins with a warning, then property seizure, and, finally, the sale of the seized property. The taxpayer must cover all the costs associated with the sale procedure. 

Under Decree No. 341 and its amendments, the judicial authorities do not have the right to halt the implementation of these procedures. Meanwhile, the right to carry out these procedures is granted only to Syria’s financial authorities, which violates the principle of judicial independence. The seizure begins with a warning sent by the relevant Financial Department to taxpayers who have failed to pay their taxes and fees. Then, there is another warning. After ten days, the Financial Department director issues a decision to seize the taxpayer’s assets. 

There are two cases in which Decree No. 341 grants financial authorities the right to make asset seizures without issuing a warning to the owners. First, if the failed taxpayer no longer lives in Syria permanently, and second, if there are legitimate reasons to expect that the failed taxpayer may be hiding their assets. These two provisions give financial departments far-reaching powers to seize assets belonging to Syrians abroad on the pretext that they are no longer permanently based in the country. 

The government may also enforce a property seizure against a failed taxpayer’s movable and immovable assets and their proceeds, whether those assets are in the taxpayer’s possession or a third party. Such individuals may be tenants of the property. In these cases, seizure leads to the tenants losing their rights to benefit from the property without a valid reason. 

Afterwards, the Minister of Finance issues a regulatory decision that includes the sale of the seized property. When a sale cannot be processed, the General Commission for Taxes and Fees may amend the property’s records within the Land Registry to be listed under the state’s name. 

During the issuance of the Minister of Finance’s decision to register the property under the state’s name, the owner may pay a sum equal to the financial dues and any expenses. Payment of this sum then cancels the registration of the property under the state’s name, and the original owner may then retain their property. 

But in cases where the owner fails to make the payment and after ownership of the property is formally transferred to the state, the state must wait at least three years until it can sell it. During these three years, the original owner or the inheritor of the property may request that it be recovered to them, provided that they pay all financial dues, expenses, fees, and fines incurred during the time the property was registered in the state’s name. 

Government Issues Decision to Expropriate Properties in Rural Damascus

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On August 28, the Damascus governorate’s General Establishment for Drinking Water and Sewage sent a letter to the mukhtar of a town in Rural Damascus stating that the government will expropriate property falling within two real estate zones per Article 9 of Expropriation Law No. 20 of 1983. 

In its letter (Letter No. 10099), the water establishment referenced a previous letter issued by the Ministry of Financial Resources (Letter No. 5436 of August 16, 2022) and Expropriation Decision No. 1298 of August 10, 2022, which stipulated the expropriation of properties and parts of properties from the Ayn Al-Fijeh and Deir Muqarren real estate zones. 

The expropriation decision, issued by the Council of Ministers, included hundreds of properties that would be expropriated in order to implement a project around the Ayn Al-Fijeh Spring. The decision affirmed that there were Expropriation Plans for the project, and that the plans were being arranged by the Prime Ministry, the Ministry of Financial Resources, and the Damascus governorate’s General Water Establishment. 

On September 12, the governor of Damascus met with the mayor and city council members of Ayn Al-Fijeh to discuss the matter. Afterwards, the mayor published pictures of the expropriation decision and the water establishment’s letter on his personal Facebook page. 

Notably, none of these communications mentions Law No. 1 of 2018, which established two protected zones around the Ayn Al-Fijeh Spring: the direct and indirect zones. The direct zone surrounds the spring and is meant to provide maintenance and safety preservation to prevent pollution, while the indirect zone includes land surrounding the spring and the direct zone. 

Article 3 of Law No. 1 permits the expropriation of properties or parts of properties located within the direct zone, according to expropriation plans attached to the Law, and orders property compensation that accounts for the real values of properties. 

Article 4 stipulates the creation of the two protected zones mentioned above and two pipelines for transporting water from the Ayn Al-Fijeh Spring to Damascus. The direct zone around the two pipelines is set at 10 metres side, while the width for the indirect zone is set at 20 metres. 

The Law did not explicitly stipulate the expropriation of lands for both protected zones around the two water pipelines. It also prohibits certain work from being performed within the direct zones around the spring and the pipelines. This work included digging wells, transporting rocks, dirt or sand outside the zone, building facilities, using fertilisers and pesticides, paving or extending roads, and performing agricultural or manufacturing work.  

The Law also stipulates an amendment of Ayn Al-Fijeh’s and Deir Muqarren’s zoning plans to remove any residential areas within the direct zone. However, it permits people in villages within the spring’s indirect zone to renovate existing houses rather than build new ones. Any residential facilities built within the indirect zone before the issuance of the Law may remain in place if they meet certain conditions. Many of Ayn Al-Fijeh’s older historic homes are located within the direct zones surrounding the spring and the pipelines. 

The expropriation decision, published in the Official Gazette Issue No. 31 on August 24, 2022, includes several hundred completed properties and portions of 18 other properties. Most of the properties are in Ayn Al-Fijeh, with a smaller number in Deir Muqarren. All of the 18 partially expropriated lands are in Ayn Al-Fijeh. The expropriation plans for the protected direct zone around the spring have not yet been published, but the expropriation of land suggests that the plans include most of Ayn Al-Fijah and some parts of Deir Muqarren. 

Regime forces have not yet allowed forcibly displaced people to return to their homes in Ayn Al-Fijeh. Residents fled the town during the regime’s military offensive on opposition factions in the broader Wadi Barada area in 2017. In 2020, the regime did authorise some residents to come check on their homes for the first time since the conflict. These residents were chosen based on lists approved by the national security services. 

In a radio interview this past March, the Ayn Al-Fijeh mayor said displaced residents who seek to return to the town face two problems. The first is that the alternative housing project programme has yet to begin for owners whose homes were expropriated in Ayn Al-Fijeh and Wadi Barada. Second, public services have not yet been restored to the town. The mayor added that the municipality removed all “encroachments” from the spring’s direct zone but did not clarify what he meant by “encroachments.” However, aerial photographs suggest that much of the town has been razed. 

In August 2020, the Rural Damascus governorate contracted General Company for Engineering Studies (GCES), affiliated with the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, to prepare detailed and executive zoning plans for a Wadi Barada residential suburb east of Ayn Al-Fijeh. The suburb would serve as alternative housing for owners of properties that were confiscated under Law No. 1 of 2018 and those whose homes were destroyed by wartime fighting in the area. 

Explained: Expropriation Plans

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An expropriation plan is a document issued by an official authority that has made an expropriation decision. It contains the properties and portions of properties that will be expropriated per Article 7 of Expropriation Law No. 20 of 1983. 

The document also includes a map of the real estate that has been acquired and any surrounding properties based on the boundary lines of the properties recorded in the Land Registry if the properties have undergone the delimitation and census process within an area’s zoning plan.

Expropriation Law No. 20 permits the cadastral affairs directorates to undertake delimitation and census procedures for expropriated real estate if the properties are located outside a zoning plan. The expropriating entity must inform the relevant cadastral affairs directorate of its decision to delimit and census the land and send along a copy of that decision with the plans. Under the law, if cadastral affairs directorates are aware of an expropriation decision, they are prohibited from approving the separation or merging of property or granting construction approval. 

In addition, the law requires the expropriating entity to publish its expropriation decision in the Official Gazette and a local newspaper, including the real estate numbers and where the real estate owners may find a copy of the plans for their expropriated properties.  

The plans must show all facilities, trees, and other material rights within the map of the confiscated lands. Under Administrative Judiciary Decision No. 84/2 of 1997, contradictions between the expropriation plans and the reality on the ground are considered a serious legal problem that results in the cancellation of the expropriation decision. At the same time, the administrative judiciary has decreed that it has no jurisdiction over expropriation decisions except in cases where such decisions have serious problems. 

In addition, an expropriation plan must come with a document known as an expropriation chart, which includes the real estate numbers, facilities, total surface area, expropriated surface area, and the estimated value of the properties. Expropriating entities must include these documents in their plans if a final expropriation decision is to be issued.

Issued in 1983, the Expropriation Law allowed public entities, such as ministries and local administrations, to expropriate real estate for “public benefit,” such as paving, straightening or widening roads; building public squares, playgrounds, and parks; and constructing waterways, military barracks, oil and gas facilities, and tourism sites. 

Establishing a Reserve Around the Fijeh Springs

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This text, enacted at the beginning of 2018, establishes a protected area around the Fijeh Springs, which involves the expropriation of real estate within the immediate surrounding of the water canals that transport water from the springs to Damascus.

Law No. 1 of 2018
Establishment of a Reserve Around Fijeh Springs

The President of the Republic
In accordance with the provisions of the Constitution
Promulgates the following:

Article 1
The following words and phrases have the following meanings:

The Minister:The Minister of Water Resources

The Establishment: The Public Establishment for Drinking Water and Sanitation in the Governorate of Damascus.

General Director: The General Director of the Public Establishment for Drinking Water and Sanitation in the Governorate of Damascus.

Direct Reserve:The land that surrounds the water source, allowing access to it for the purposes of the water source’s maintenance, its preservation, and preventing it from being polluted.

Indirect Reserve: The lands surrounding the water source’s Direct Reserve, within which it is forbidden to engage in particular activities, so as to prevent the water source’s pollution and depletion.

Article 2

  1. Two reserves are to be established around the Fijeh Springs:
  2. The Direct Reserve
  3. The Indirect Reserve
  4. The dimensions of the two reserves noted above are to be specified via the topographical plan (1/1,000,000 scale) and plan (1/5,000 scale) attached to this law. A copy of each plan is to be held by the Ministry of Water Resources, the Ministry of Local Administration and the Environment, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, the Governorate of Damascus, the Governorate of Rural Damascus, and the Establishment.
  5. Fixed signs are to demarcate the boundaries of the Direct and Indirect Reserves on the ground.

Article 3
The appropriation of real estate, and portions of real estate, falling within the Direct Reserve is subject to the plans attached to the law, and to compensation equivalent to the actual value of the property.

Article 4

  1. Two reserves are to be established along the two aqueducts that carry water from Fijeh Springs to Damascus:
  2. The Direct Reserve
  3. The Indirect Reserve
  4. The Direct Reserve for the two aqueducts is to be 10 meters wide on each side of the tunnel, calculated from the centre of the tunnel, per the attached plan that is to be prepared by the Public Company for Technical Studies and Investments.
  5. The Indirect Reserve for the two aqueduct tunnels is to be 20 meters on each side of the tunnel, calculated from the centre of the tunnel and including the Direct Reserve.

Article 5

  1. It is absolutely forbidden to engage in any of the following activities in the Direct Reserve of Fijeh Springs, or the two aqueducts from Fijeh Springs to Damascus:
  2. Digging wells of any depth.
  3. Filling holes of any size.
  4. Creating quarries, dirt beds, or sand pits, or creating any hole for any reason.
  5. Carrying stones, dirt, or sand outside of the reserve for any reason.
  6. Building any industrial, commercial, agricultural, residential, or tourist facilities, including fuel stations, fuel tanks, or garages; using fertilizers or herbicides; or building housing of any type whether the facilities or buildings are made of cement, stone, wood, metal, or any other material.
  7. Establishing or extending roads of any grade.
  8. Erecting any installations or tanks for any purpose.
  9. Undertaking any agricultural, industrial, commercial, touristic, or construction work.
  10. The work of the Establishment in pursuit of the goals specified in its discharge instrument are excepted from the provisions of paragraph 1.

Article 6

  1. The licensing of any official body for any of the works described in paragraph 1 of Article 5 is considered absolutely void, does not establish any right, and is not entitled to any compensation.
  2. The organisational plans of the municipalities of Al-Fijeh and Dayr Muqaran are to be amended to eliminate the residential zones located within the Direct Reserve.

Article 7

  1. All of the works forbidden in the Direct Reserve noted in Article 5 above are also forbidden in the Indirect Reserve for Fijeh Springs and the two aqueducts from the Fijeh Springs to Damascus. The current situation is to be documented upon the promulgation of this law through aerial photographs taken by an official body of the Syrian Arab Republic and verified by the Public Directorate for Real Estate Interests. The photos are to be held by the Ministry of Water Resources, the Ministry of Local Administration and the Environment, the Governorate of Damascus, the Governorate of Rural Damascus, and the Establishment.
  2. The villages located in the Indirect Reserve of Fijeh Springs and the two aqueducts from Fijeh springs to Damascus are allowed to engage in the following works within their current boundaries:
  3. Practice rain-fed agriculture alone, without the use of herbicides or fertilizers that accumulate.
  4. Raise livestock through pasturage alone.
  5. Restore only standing residences.
  6. Implement the organisational plan for the municipalities of Dayr Muqaran and Al-Fijeh following its amendment per the requirements of the reserve mentioned in Article 5 of this law, such that it makes allowance for alternative facilities in an area of the organisational plan located outside of the boundaries of the Direct and Indirect Reserves.
  7. Residential facilities that were permitted before the promulgation of this law in the Indirect Reserve can remain in place so long as they are furnished with a mixed “pipe within pipe” sanitation network and fuel tanks with mixed walls, at the expense of those with a relationship to the property. In the case that the owners of these facilities do not respond within six months from the date on which they are informed of the requested procedures, the Establishment is to direct the Governorate of Rural Damascus to tear down such facilities at their owners’ expense.

Article 8
The Establishment is the public agency that holds authority over the Fijeh Springs reserve and the two aqueducts that extend from the springs. It has the authority to administer and represent them.

Article 9

  1. Anyone who violates the provisions of Article 5 of this law is to be punished with between one and three years in prison and a fine of 500,000 Syrian pounds.
  2. Anyone who violates the provisions of Article 7 of this law is to be punished with between one and three years in prison and a fine of 500,000 Syrian pounds.

Article 10

  1. The Minister is to promulgate a decision in which he will name the employees charged with the investigation and prevention of the violations enumerated in Articles 5 and 7 of this law. They will have law enforcement status. Before they begin their work, it is incumbent upon them to legally swear before the judge of the Civilian Court of First Instance in the Governorate of Damascus.
  2. It is incumbent upon the employees with law enforcement status, upon the organisation of the guard, to prevent infringements, and to seize the means and instruments by which infringements are committed, per the relevant systems.
  3. Without obviating the strongest stipulated punishments in the other laws, law enforcement employees who facilitate, cover up, or neglect to prevent violations are to be punished by those punishments stipulated in Article 9 of this law. The same applies to employees of all state public bodies who issue orders or instructions without a legal basis that lead to damage of the Fijeh Springs water system.

Article 11
It is incumbent upon the directors and presidents of the police departments, the directors of the districts, and the captains of Interior Ministry police stations to provide support to law enforcement in preventing violations.

Article 12
The Establishment is to remove construction violations at the violating party’s expense per the provisions of Articles 9 and 10 of this law.

Article 13
The Minister is to promulgate executive instructions for the implementation of this law.

Article 14
Action per Law 10/1989 is to be cancelled.

Article 15
This law is to be published in the Official Gazette.

Damascus, 01/05/1439 Hijri., 18/01/2018 Gregorian

President of the Republic
Bashar Al-Assad

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