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Explained: Damascus Eases Security Restrictions on Real Estate Transactions

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A letter from the Office of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, No. 3039/1, issued on March 6, maintains the requirement for security approvals on certain real estate transactions “for the time being,” but has eased some of its other requirements and effects.

Pre-approval from the security services is a condition for the notarisation of real estate sales and general power of attorney transactions performed before a notary public. This security approval is issued by the Political Security Division of the Ministry of Interior and is considered an unlawful restriction on the property’s ownership right.

The Political Security Division can grant or deny the security approval for the person concerned with the real estate transaction. Security approval can be denied for various reasons, such as if the person concerned is wanted for investigation or arrest by one of the branches of the security agencies. Technically, this security request is an illegal procedure, because it is not based on a search warrant issued by the judicial police for a clear charge. Instead, the request for investigation or arrest may just be a malicious report filed against the person by a security informant, or due to a name similarity, or even due to other restraints on Disposal of the person’s property. In the event of an absentia conviction for a felony on the person concerned, or by the Antiterrorism Court, the Ministry of Finance imposes a precautionary seizure on their movable and immovable properties.

Letter No. 3039/1, marked “confidential and urgent,” is directed to the Ministries of Interior, Public Works and Housing, Finance, Justice, Local Administration and Environment, and is based on another letter, number 054/3, issued on February 29 by the National Security Office, a body affiliated with the Presidential Palace.

The format of Letter No. 3039/1 is similar to internal official confidential correspondences, some of which were leaked to the media. These included the implementation of gradual restrictions on real estate transactions since the early months of the Syrian uprising in 2011. This began with circular No. 85 dated June 15, 2011 from the the General Directorate of Cadastral Affairs, which agreed with the content of a letter from the Office of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, i.e., the Prime Ministry, No. 1355 dated June 8, 2011, regarding the requirement for prior security approval on specific real estate transactions. The exact nature of these transactions was not clarified. However, the requirement for prior security approval on real estate sales and permanent lease contracts (known as furoogh contracts in Arabic), in all zoned and unzoned areas, was added through circular No. 463 from the the General Directorate of Cadastral Affairs issued on August 12, 2015, which agreed with the content of a letter from the Office of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers No. 4554 issued on August 4, 2015. Circular No. 463 stated that the purpose of requiring prior security approval was “to ensure the legal and security rights of citizens, and those wishing to sell their properties or transfer them to others.”

In September 2021, the Ministry of Justice issued Circular No. 30, which linked the issuance of a judicial mandate to manage the assets of absent or missing people to the condition of obtaining the necessary prior security approval. In August 2022, the Ministry of Justice issued Circular No. 22, making obtaining security approval a condition for completing procedures for death declaration cases in Sharia courts.

What is new in Letter No. 3039/1 is the emphasis on the Political Security Division to justify the reasons for not granting security approval, with the aim of “allowing citizens to review the relevant authorities and properly address their situations.” The letter also called on the Political Security Division to ensure that the procedure of refusal applies only to the concerned individual, without affecting their family; parents, spouse, and siblings. Prior to this, the Political Security Division would refuse to grant security approval to all relatives of the concerned individual.

Letter No. 3039/1 also stated that the decision to grant or deny security approval should be made within a timeframe not exceeding 48 hours.

In cases where security approval is denied for an individual who owns a share in a commonly owned property, this should not affect the shares of the other partners, who should still be able to sell their shares and proceed with the termination of the common property, with the restriction remaining only on the share of the individual concerned. Previously, the denial of security approval for one individual would halt all real estate transactions for all partners.

Furthermore, the denial of security approval for the individual concerned no longer affects the shares of others in profit-sharing and joint venture agreements. These contracts serve as investment agreements between the owners of a property and its investors, with rights and responsibilities for all parties defined by the profit-sharing or partnership agreement.

The same principle now applies in the case of voluntary partition, an agreement among all partners in a property to exit the state of common ownership and divide the property among themselves by mutual consent. If one of them objects, judicial partition can be pursued through a lawsuit to end the common ownership. The inability of one of the partners to obtain security approval no longer prevents the possibility of voluntary partition of the property and exiting the state of common ownership among partners. Previously, the denial of security approval for one of the partners would stop the entire voluntary partition process.

Also, the refusal to grant security approval to the individual concerned is no longer an obstacle to the transfer of rights through inheritance to the rest of the heirs. This includes the inheritance of properties and real estate rights, such as the right to dispose of Amiri lands. It has become possible to proceed with the transfer of inheritance from the deceased to the heirs, even if one of them has not received security approval. Previously, the failure of one of the heirs to obtain security approval prevented the process of inheritance inventory.

In cases where a property is commonly owned by individuals, among whom some are unable to obtain security approval, within areas subjected to zoning, development, or urban planning laws, or real estate investment regulations, this is no longer considered an obstacle as per the new letter. It is now possible to include the property in the project, while maintaining a provisional seizure mark on the share of the individual concerned.

Coerced Farmland Sales South of Damascus Amid Rumours of Al-Salam International Highway Project

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Damascus traders are pressuring property owners west of the old Damascus-Suweida road to sell at lower prices than the prevailing prices in the area. The reason for the focus on these properties is unclear, though recent rumours hint at a possible reinstatement of the Al-Salam Highway project passing through the area or the start of a new industrial zone project.

These properties belong to the village of Khirbet Al-Shiyab, which is part of the Kisweh district in the Rural Damascus governorate. Khirbet Al-Shiyab is located on the administrative border between the governorates of Damascus and Suweida, adjacent to the village of Khalkhala and its military airport in the northern rural part of the Suweida governorate. The area is close to the city of Sayyida Zeinab in Rural Damascus. It contains military sites belonging to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and its allied Syrian militias. Although the village of Khirbet Al-Shiyab is small, part of its land has been expropriated since the 1960s for the benefit of the Ministry of Defence, with air defence brigades such as Brigade-157 and Brigade-155 having their headquarters nearby. Due to the presence of Roman and Ottoman archaeological sites, the village also has seen expropriations for the benefit of the Directorate of Antiquities and Museums in the Ministry of Culture.

It appears that Damascus real estate traders have been looking for agricultural land in the area for months and are purchasing land whose property records have no disposal restrictions. This has caused a stir in the real estate market in Khirbet Al-Shiyab, as well as in neighbouring villages and towns such as Matala, Najha, and Al-Adiliyah, raising their prices.

The reason for the rush to buy land in this area is unclear. However, some influential traders and businessmen initiate the purchase of land or properties in specific areas, often due to their prior knowledge of plans to implement investment or service projects that could increase property prices there. Thus, these traders can profit by purchasing properties at low prices and then selling them at higher prices after the planned projects are implemented.

For example, Mohammad owns 10 hectares of land in Khirbet al-Shiyab communally with two partners, holding a title deed since before 2011. The land is agricultural, with one of its edges stretching 50 metres along the old Damascus-Suweida road, and it is bordered to the west by the Al-Salam Highway project. Mohammad told The Syria Report that Damascus real estate traders, some with close connections to security and military bodies, are pressuring land and property owners in the area to sell below the prevailing market rates. Mohammad explained that one trader offered them SYP 20 million per dunum (about USD 1,350), while the current rate in the area is much higher (SYP 120 million). When the partners refused to sell, personnel from the Brigade-157 air defence set up a tent on their land. The officer in charge of the tent told Mohammad that a military point and air defence system would later be established on their land to “counter Israeli attacks.”

According to Mohammad, the tent and the threat of establishing a military site on their land were coordinated between the real estate trader and officers from Brigade 157, all to pressure the partners into selling the land at a low price. However, Mohammad managed to remove the soldiers’ tent through his acquaintance with an officer in the military intelligence division responsible for the area.

In any case, this is legally considered property extorsion, meaning taking over someone else’s property without their consent or obtaining possession of it without a legal title to ownership or a legitimate reason.

A similar situation happened with Said, who told The Syria Report that he was forced to sell part of his land to a Damascus trader at much lower than the market rate to get rid of a military force that had taken over his land under the pretext of installing an air defence system. Said adds that after the sale was completed, the military personnel withdrew and left no trace behind.

Notably, these lands in Khirbet al-Shiyab were previously proposed as part of the Al-Salam Highway project, a commercial international route connecting Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. The Al-Salam Highway is expected to cross the Syrian-Lebanese border at the Masnaa-Jdeidet Yabous point, then pass through the towns of Abu Qawooq, Mazraat Al-Nafoor, and Husseiniya in Quneitra, and the cities and towns of Zakia, Moadamiyet Al-Sham, Khan Al-Shih, Qatana and Khirbet Al-Shiyab in Rural Damascus, and Ghbaggib and Mankat Al-Hatab in Daraa, reaching the Nassib-Jaber border crossing with Jordan.

Rumours about the Al-Salam Highway project began in 2006, coinciding with a property-buying spree along its proposed route by real estate brokers on behalf of the Mashreq Investment Fund company, owned by businessman Rami Makhlouf. The company managed to purchase hundreds of hectares along the proposed route. Most of these lands are rocky and unfit for agriculture. Some of the lands were taken by the regime’s Seventh Division, preventing their owners from using them without officially expropriating them. This buying spree led to a rise in land prices along the proposed route, with the price per dunum (1,000 square metres) reaching SYP 2.5 million (approximately USD 50,000 at the time) from a pre-2006 price of SYP 20,000 (about USD 400).

The situation was not without complications. Most of the properties purchased by Mashreq Investment Fund were undivided shares of commonly owned lands, meaning Mashreq became an additional communal partner. Therefore, in March 2019, Mashreq lawyers filed lawsuits against the other share-owning partners in various locations to terminate the common ownership. For example, a meeting was held between the real estate judge and the common partners in the city of Zakia to agree on termination. During the meeting, brokers offered the remaining common owners in those lands to sell their shares to the company for USD 3,000 per dunum. However, most of the partners refused the offer and refused to agree to a subdivision plan that would transfer their shares away from the proposed highway’s route.

Despite renewed discussions about reviving the Al-Salam Highway project, no tangible changes have occurred except in Khirbet Al-Shiyab. Instead, there are plans for another project in the area, potentially driving Damascus traders to purchase land there. A source from the village speculated to The Syria Report that the motivation behind land purchases could be a proposed plan to establish an “eco-friendly” industrial zone. This initiative was previously announced by the Director of Decision Support and Regional Planning in the Rural Damascus Governorate, AbdulRazzaq Damiriya, in December 2018 and also by the Director of Industrial Zones in Damascus, Asaad Khalouf, in February 2019.

The proposed industrial zone project would cover 250 hectares of land next to Khirbet Al-Shiyab and is expected to include eco-friendly industries such as textiles, pharmaceuticals, wood crafts, traditional heritage crafts, and more. Mr Damiriya mentioned to the official news agency SANA that the governorate had signed a contract with Tishreen University to prepare the general and detailed zoning plans and planning studies for the new industrial zone, including land use plans, topographics, and subdivision plans. He noted that most properties proposed for the industrial zone are state-owned, while 30 to 40 hectares are privately owned.

Mr Damiriya stated that the rest of the land would not be expropriated but would be developed under a public-private partnership law. According to Law No. 5 of 2016 on public-private partnerships, such partnerships are contractual relationships of agreed duration between a public entity and a private sector partner. The private partner invests in designing, constructing, executing, maintaining, rehabilitating, developing, managing, or operating a public facility or project for the public entity, aiming to contribute directly to public service or any service in the public interest to the contracting public entity or on its behalf to the end beneficiary. Despite Damiriya’s announcement that work on the industrial zone would begin in 2019 and the subdivision of plots would be completed by 2020, no developments have occurred on the ground since then.

Calls to Subdivide Properties in Upscale District of Damascus

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According to pro-government media reports, during a regular meeting of the Damascus Governorate Council in mid-January 2024, members called for the subdivision and correction of descriptions for the Adawi and Eastern Tijara areas and the issuance of ownership deeds for their properties.

Nouri Salman, the director of the Provisional Land Register at the Damascus Directorate of Cadastral Affairs, explained to the semi-official Al-Watan newspaper that the subdivision and correction of descriptions for these properties are within the jurisdiction of the Damascus Directorate of Cadastral Affairs and the Damascus governorate. He added that to subdivide and correct the descriptions of these properties, a request must be submitted to the Damascus governorate to open a technical mandate for the horizontal subdivision of the area, followed by its vertical subdivision, the so-called “Building subdivision”, after which the deeds can be transferred from the Provisional Land Register to the Land Register in the Directorate of Cadastral Affairs.

The technical mandate is a process of technical inspection of a property to determine its boundaries on the ground, carried out by a committee from the Directorate of Cadastral Affairs, with a representative from the administrative unit to which the property belongs. Opening a technical mandate means submitting a request to the Directorate of Cadastral Affairs in the concerned governorate to schedule a date for the technical inspection of the property.

The correction of descriptions is an administrative transaction conducted by the Directorate of Cadastral Affairs upon request from the property owner. The process aims to match the property descriptions recorded in its Land Record with its actual condition. For example, a property may be recorded as agricultural land while it is actually a multi-storey building.

Meanwhile, the subdivision of a property is a technical transaction conducted by the Directorate of Cadastral Affairs based on a request from the property owners. The aim is to divide the property into separate and independent properties. The property subdivision process is conducted as if the property were commonly owned.

Horizontal division involves:

  • Splitting the land into plots prepared for construction.
  • Assigning each a number.
  • Entering them into the Provisional Land Register.

Subsequently, the owner of one of these plots can obtain a construction permit for a building with multiple floors and residences. After the building’s completion and the sale of these homes, the plot can be vertically subdivided, creating a new land record for each apartment within the building as an independent property. These real estate occurrences are then transferred from the Provisional Land Register to the Permanent Land Register.

The Eastern Tijara and Adawi areas in Damascus are an urban extension, partly informal, located east of Damascus city. Al-Tijara and Al-Adawi are considered upscale neighbourhoods in Damascus, known for their modern construction, spacious apartments, high prices, green spaces, parks, and public amenities. The extension of the area began in the 1950s on agricultural lands known as Al-Adawi orchards.

In Eastern Tijara and Adawi, there are three types of properties: first, licensed buildings on zoned land with ownership deeds, subdivided and registered in the Land Registry, each residence having an independent land record, allowing relatively easy sale and purchase unless there are restraints on disposal against it. Most of these buildings were constructed in the 1950s and 1960s.

Second, particularly in the western part of the Eastern Tijara neighbourhood, are buildings licensed and constructed by housing cooperatives on zoned land. Most are subdivided horizontally, not vertically. These buildings were erected during the 1970s and 1980s. Reasons preventing the vertical subdivision of properties include the death of one of the owners and placing restraints on disposal mark on the entire original property until the heirs agree on dividing their shares or unresolved building violations. In such cases, the real estate occurrences are registered in the Provisional Land Legister using ownership documents issued by the Directorate of Housing Cooperation in the Ministry of Public Works and Housing to establish ownership and complete sale and purchase transactions. However, these are not transferred to the Land Registry because the property has not been subdivided vertically.

Thirdly, there are unlicensed buildings erected on zoned land more than 40 years ago in the far eastern part of the area. Still, they have not been horizontally subdivided and, therefore, not vertically subdivided either. These buildings were constructed in the 1980s, marked by construction chaos in Damascus, when landowners built on their plots before subdividing them horizontally into building-ready plots, yet adhered to the urban planning and building regulations, aiming for future licensing. In the area, there are multiple cases where a single piece of land has several buildings on it. However, it still remains as one property not subdivided into construction-ready plots. Therefore, all these buildings and the residences within them are still owned in common by their owners, with one land record. The process of horizontal subdivision has been hindered over time, especially with multiple building violations, generations of heirs, and restraints on disposal. Many of these homeowners have no proof of ownership other than court judgments affirming their purchase contracts.

According to The Syria Report’s local correspondent, there are hundreds of affected individuals in the second and third types of buildings, where these homeowners and residents cannot secure loans with their properties as collateral, obtain restoration permits, or sell them officially. The market value of these residences is much lower than their counterparts in the same area. Initiating a technical assignment process for description correction and subdivision is not as straightforward as local authorities claim. The Directorate of Cadastral Affairs requires all co-owners of a property to apply for description correction and subdivision, a hard task due to the presence of hundreds of heirs and their legal representatives, not to mention those who have emigrated or are absent.

Explained: Agricultural Regulation

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There is no precise definition for an agricultural regulation. However, it is a commonly used term for a notice issued to a farmer who owns their land. By obtaining this agricultural regulating document, the farmer gains access to government-subsidised agricultural inputs such as seeds, fertiliser, diesel fuel and a certificate of origin for the crop. The farmer can only obtain the agricultural regulation notice if they commit to planting specific crops like wheat, barley, cotton, and sugar beet following the annual agricultural plan approved by the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform. The farmer is also required to sell the crop exclusively to the state. An agricultural regulating notice is not considered a property ownership deed per se.

Various laws and decisions mention agricultural regulation. Among these are the Agricultural Production Regulating Law No. 59 of 2005 and its executive instructions, amendments via Decree No. 28 of 2014 and Decree No. 14 of 2017, and the Ministry of Agriculture’s Decision No. 8/T of 2006 and its amendment via Decision No. 125/T of 2016.

It is not easy to define agricultural regulation terms from these laws and decisions, as the term can sometimes refer to the Ministry of Agriculture’s annual plan, sometimes to the notice granted to the farmer, and sometimes to the administrative procedure or application for obtaining agricultural regulating notice. Adding to this ambiguity is using terms on official websites such as “agricultural regulating procedure” and “entering into agricultural regulation,” which implies adherence to the annual agricultural plan.

Simply put, the agricultural regulating notice is the document that a farmer who owns their land (and sometimes also raises livestock) obtains by adhering to the annual agricultural plan. This notice allows the farmer to extract another document called the “agricultural licence,” which in turn entitles them to access facilities and guidance, and subsidised quotas of seeds, fertiliser, diesel fuel for agricultural use and feed sold at reduced prices and in quantities that match the size of the land and the number of animals. 

The validity period of the agricultural licence is five years and is renewable. In recent years, to renew the agricultural licence, it has been sufficient for the farmer to provide a written commitment that there has been no change in their previous information. If the agricultural plan is not followed, such as planting a different crop, the farmer is deprived of both the agricultural regulation notice and agricultural licence, and financial penalties are imposed.

The agricultural regulating notice is a prerequisite for applying for agricultural loans from the Agricultural Cooperative Bank and receiving compensation provided by the Fund for Mitigating the Impact of Drought and Natural Disasters on Agricultural Production.

To obtain an agricultural regulating notice, a farmer submits an “agricultural regulation” request to the Agricultural Extension Unit in their area, which is affiliated with the Ministry of Agriculture. The farmer must have a deed of ownership for their land or a real estate record from the Land Registry or citizen service centres. If they do not have such documents, any of the following documents may be substituted: a judicial ruling or decision with final judgment, a statement of land use for beneficiaries of agrarian reform, a judicial declaration of ownership, a certificate of land transactions for lands that have not undergone delimitation and census, a lease or sharecropping contract, a general or special power of attorney organised by a notary public, a statement of ownership from the land distribution committee for reclaimed lands not yet registered in the names of their owners in the Land Registry, or a retention and waiver statement issued by the Directorate of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform for owners covered by the agrarian reform law in specified and released areas.

Obtaining any of these documents, including the property deed, is not easy for many farmers, often due to the lands not being subdivided. Their ownership remaining in common, the processes of delimitation and census not being completed, the marks of Restraint on Disposal that prevent transactions, pending inheritance disputes, in addition to issues with agrarian reform laws that grant farmers the right to use the land rather than own it.

To resolve these complications, at the end of 2023, the Ministry of Agriculture agreed to accept the physical inspection notice as an alternative to ownership documents when submitting an agricultural regulating procedure. A physical inspection notice is an on-site inspection conducted by a committee from the Agricultural Extension Unit for the concerned land based on a request from the stakeholder.

Due to all these administrative and bureaucratic complexities, farmers’ interest in agricultural regulation in regime areas has declined over the past few years, especially with the reduction in their diesel, fertiliser, and seed quotas and the falling prices of crops set and purchased by the state. Many farmers have seen agricultural regulation as a losing venture, turning instead to more economically viable crops such as vegetables, grains, pistachios and cumin and taking charge of marketing them independently.

Administrative and Legal Obstacles Prevent Confirmation of Property Ownership in AANES Areas

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Admist rising real estate prices, increasing pressure of housing needs for displaced people in the Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria (AANES) areas, and the continuous migration of locals abroad, residents seek to document their property ownership by all available means. However, they face obstacles, mainly due to the judicial overlap and the dual authority in charge of real estate documentation between the Damascus government and AANES authorities.

Many people in AANES areas are trying to legally confirm their ownership by filing lawsuits to ensure sales contracts in the civil courts, for the first instance, under the Ministry of Justice in the Damascus government. In this case, the buyer only receives a judicial decision to confirm ownership if the property is located within a zoning plan. The Damascus real estate authorities refuse to carry out lawsuits to confirm sales contracts for properties outside of zoning plans and require a letter from the concerned municipality indicating the zoning nature of the property and the Building Code followed. The issue is that the zoning nature of most real estate areas outside major city centres is still undivided commonly owned land. As in all informal settlements, landowners sell parts of it or properties built on it as undivided shares.

For example, Ahmad has a property in Hassakeh city and confirmed the sales contract by a judicial decision from the civil court of first instance. However, when Ahmad sold his property, the same court refused to confirm the previous sales contract it had issued and asked the new buyer to obtain a letter from the municipality showing the zoning nature of the property. When he consulted the municipality, they conducted a topographic survey of the property and compared it with their zoning plans. They found that the house was built on land designated for a public park.

Expropriation for public benefit is exclusively done by a decision notified to the stakeholders, with appropriate compensation. However, in Ahmad’s case, the land was noted in the zoning plan to be a public park, but in reality, it had not yet been expropriated for that purpose. As long as the expropriation decision is not issued, the property is not public property. Therefore, ownership can be confirmed until the expropriation decision and compensation are properly issued. However, this did not happen with Ahmad, as his lawsuit was dismissed, and he could not confirm the sales contract and transfer the property to the new buyer.

Similarly, Khaled, who purchased a house and filed a lawsuit to confirm the sales contract, was surprised to find that the land on which the house was built was designated in the zoning plans to construct a school. Khaled could not confirm his ownership in this case, so he cancelled the sales contract and recovered what he had paid to the seller.

In reality, as long as there is no restraint on the disposal of the property, the owner has complete freedom to manage it. Even if the property is marked for public benefit in the zoning plans, the court should decide to confirm the sales contracts and not deprive the buyer of confirming their ownership, even if the implementation of those plans is delayed. Over the past years, the war has disrupted the urban expansion of cities and towns and, therefore, the process of updating the zoning plans and aligning them with realities on the ground.

Khalil said that when he filed a lawsuit to confirm the purchase contract of his house, which he has owned for decades on the outskirts of Qamishli city, the civil court of first instance demanded a legal permit. A legal permit is an administrative process conducted by the Directorates of Agriculture and Real Estate Affairs if the property is located in border areas outside of zoning plans. In this case, prior security approval endorsed by the Ministries of Defense and Interior is required.

As Khalil discovered, the Qamishli municipality had been planning to zone that area for years and included it in the city’s zoning plan. However, administrative procedures delayed this process, and then the war led to the neglect of the issue, which remains unresolved.

On the other hand, the AANES does not recognise the allocation documents issued by municipalities affiliated with Damascus after 2011. Allocation documents are akin to property ownership documents issued by municipalities to confirm the ownership of properties, most of which are lands sold to individuals. The AANES bases this on the regulations and systems law it issued in 2014 to regulate urban development. AANES authorities require those wishing to obtain an allocation document to purchase properties from its municipalities exclusively.

This applies to properties sold by municipalities affiliated with Damascus after 2011. The AANES does not recognise the allocation documents issued by the regime’s municipalities after 2011 and asks their purchasers to obtain new allocation documents from its municipalities. The buyer is forced to repurchase the property from the AANES’ municipalities. A buyer may choose not to do this, but if they want to build on the land, they must, again, obtain a construction permit from the AANES’ municipalities. Here, it becomes necessary to obtain an AANES allocation document.

Another Qamilshi resident, Layla, said that she obtained an allocation document from the Damascus-affiliated Qamishli municipality in 2013. However, in 2023, the AANES’s municipality asked her to repurchase the same land from them to issue a construction permit for it.

Rising Number of Kurds Formalise Property Ownership in Northeast Syria

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Until just a few years before 2011, the sales of houses, commercial shops, and agricultural lands in northeastern Syria were done via contracts that were not officially registered in the courts or Land Registry.

There were various reasons for this. One was the reliance on personal trust between people due to tribal kinship relationships. Another was a limited understanding of legal matters. There was also a desire to avoid the financial costs of property transfer. Moreover, thousands of Kurds were stripped of their Syrian nationality under the exceptional 1962 census and were deprived of most of their housing, land and property rights, leaving them unable to carry out formal real estate transactions.

As a result, many properties and lands in northeastern Syria remained communally owned and undivided. Their ownership documents were unofficial sale contracts known as “barania contracts” – in Arabic, barania means “outside”, here referring to contracts being “outside” the legal system, i.e., informal. However, the accumulation of these issues over time led to many serious problems affecting housing, land and property rights.

Today, a number of factors — urban growth and zoning expansion, population growth with internally displaced families from other governorates, and multiple, overlapping authorities in control of northeastern Syria– leave the heirs in the governorate fearing they could lose their property rights. Decree No. 49 of 2011, which finally granted Syrian nationality to Kurds previously registered as “foreigners”, has contributed to a surge in demands from this group to formalise real estate transactions that occurred during the period in which they were deprived of Syrian nationality as ownership by foreigners is very restricted.

As a result, many people are now seeking to solidify their property ownership in the official land registries. To do this, an individual (or one of their heirs) wishing to confirm their property ownership, referred to as the “first party”, must present the unofficial “barania” sales contract to the original seller (or one of their heirs) — referred to as the “second party” — under whose name the property is still registered. The first party then asks the second party to acknowledge the validity of the barani contract in court.

In many cases, the second party unofficially demands a sum colloquially termed the “taradia” (or “appeasement”) in exchange for acknowledging the sale in court. Currently, this amount depends on the property’s size and location. One heir occupying a property in Qamishli told The Syria Report that he paid around USD 3,000 to the lawyers of the original property seller’s heirs (under whose name the property is still registered) to have them acknowledge the barania sales contract’s validity in court, even though the sale occurred 40 years ago.

If the first party’s lawyer initiates a case to validate the property sale for their client in the relevant court, and official notifications are made through newspapers, and the second party or their legal representative becomes aware of this, the second party often intervenes in the lawsuit. At this point, if the first party does not pay the taradia, then the second party usually obstructs the lawsuit’s progress. The second party may then resort to prolonging the lawsuit, either by denying the barania contract’s validity or challenging its authenticity, alleging forgery.

If the first party has lost the barania sales contract, the second party might demand a larger payment, asking for witnesses from the neighbourhood who can confirm that the first party indeed occupied the property before 2011. Thus, particularly if the property in question is commercial or residential, the first party might be compelled to yield to the second party’s demands.

For example, when Zuhair, one Hassakeh resident, conducted a topographical survey on a plot intended for construction that he purchased 30 years ago, he discovered that 30 square metres of it were public property. Nonetheless, Zuhair had to pay a taradia for the entire land area before the original seller agreed to confirm the contract’s validity in court. 

In contrast, AbdulRahman, another local resident, didn’t need to pay any taradia when he filed a case to validate the purchase contract of his house, which he has lived in for 40 years. This was because the seller had emigrated from Syria years ago and didn’t delegate anyone to handle his affairs. The seller did not attend the court hearing, despite being notified through official newspapers. After listening to two witnesses and conducting a local investigation, the judge decided on the matter, issuing a decision to validate the contract.

Explained: How Imbalanced Contracts Impact HLP Rights

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Al-Ghabn, which translates to “injustice” or “disadvantage”, is a lack of balance in the obligations imposed on contracting parties, and manifests as a clear discrepancy between what one party takes and what it gives to the other.

The Syrian Civil Code focuses on cases of al-ghabn in certain exchange contracts. These are contracts that impose a pre-determined material obligation on each party towards the other, such as a sale contract that obliges the seller to deliver the sold item and the buyer to pay the specified price.

However, the Civil Code does not provide for occurrences of al-ghabn in potential exchange contracts that impose obligations on both parties of the contract, but does not specify what each party takes or gives when the contract is made. One example is insurance contracts. Similarly, al-ghabn cannot occur in donation contracts, such as those for gives, which impose an obligation only on the giver. Therefore, there is no scope to discuss a balance of obligations and the occurrence of injustice in the aforementioned contracts.

The Civil Code discusses two types of al-ghabn:

Firstly, material or abstract imbalance: This is material damage inflicted on one of the two parties to the contract via a lack of reciprocity between the two sides. The law does not intervene to protect against abstract imbalance, however, except in cases concerning sound capacity or consent. 

The most notable cases of abstract imbalance in the Civil Code include those of real estate sales of properties belonging to minors below 18 years of age or who lack capacity, either by themselves or through their guardian, if they were to sell their real estate at a value of less than one-fifth its actual value. Here the law is based on the idea of caution in guaranteeing the rights of the party who lacks capacity. Still, this does not prevent such a person’s guardian from selling the property in question after obtaining legal permission to do so.

Material imbalance, on the other hand, can include an imbalance in the distribution of shared assets. Under Article 799 of the Civil Code, a partner to a commonly owned piece of real estate may file a lawsuit requesting termination of the common property if they prove that they faced al-ghabn, or an imbalance, of more than one-fifth the value of the property at the time of division. 

The Civil Code entitles the defendant in such a case to halt the litigation and stop the new division of the property if they compensate the complainant either in cash or in kind for the losses incurred. Such al-ghabn lawsuits, however, are limited to cases of consensual division only, and are not permitted in cases of judicial division in lawsuits to terminate common ownership, as a ruling for termination constitutes and admission of fair rights between the two sides. 

Secondly, Al-ghabn al-istighlali, or exploitative fraud: This is when one party to a contract exploits the recklessness or impulsive behaviour of the other, thereby inflicting injustice on them through the contract. This is a result of an imbalance in obligations between the two parties, as the wronged party would not have entered into the contract if not for the exploitation wrought by the other.  

The principles of exploitative fraud are governed by Article 130 of the Civil Code. This article stipulates that if the obligations of one of the contractual parties do not match up with what the other party received as a benefit to the contract, or if they do not match with the obligations of the other party, then a judge may invalidate that contract or reduce the obligations at the exploited party’s request. In such cases, the wronged party must prove that they would not have entered into the contract if not for the other party having exploited their recklessness or impulsive behaviour.

Clear recklessness is an imbalance in a person’s actions — for example, a young person squandering a large inheritance, or someone continuing in unproductive ventures. Meanwhile, impulsive behaviour is a psychological tendency for someone’s emotions to take precedence over their will — this can include cases such as a wealthy elderly man marrying a young woman and signing contracts relinquishing his possessions to her in a way that exploits his impulses. 

Contrary to al-ghabn along, where the Civil Code sets a specific one-fifth limit (as mentioned above), there is no limit by which the occurrence of exploitative injustice can be assessed — rather, it is sufficient that there is imbalance between the obligations of the two parties. It is up to the discretionary authority of the judge to determine the occurrence of al-ghabn, and they should rely on expertise according to the nature of each case. The court has asserted in its jurisprudence that al-ghabn must be exorbitant to be lifted from the wronged party.

The party to a contract who fell victim to exploitative fraud can file a lawsuit within a year from the date of the contract. The competent civil court will either cancel the contract or reduce his obligations. The other party can halt the lawsuit for annulment if he offers to the court to remove the injustice. It is up to the judge to decide here, according to Article 130 of the Civil Code.

The Syrian Civil Code, issued in 1949, should be amended and the instances listed of exploitative fraud should be expanded, adding to clear recklessness and impulsive behaviour, a new condition represented in the exploitation of need or circumstances, as is currently the case. 

Networks of influential individuals exploit the security circumstances of regime opponents, buying their properties at the lowest prices. The owners of these properties are forced to sell them for fear of them being seized and confiscated according to the terrorism law, inflicting gross injustice from the other party who exploited their needs and circumstances. Therefore, justice requires that these individuals are given the right to file a lawsuit to remove the flagrant injustice inflicted on them as a result of selling their properties, and to demand the annulment of the sale or completion of the payment within a specified period beginning after the threat of security pursuit has subsided.

Explained: Zoning Plan in Douma

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Douma is a city in East Ghouta and serves as the administrative centre of the Rural Damascus governorate and the Douma district, which contains seven districts. The 2010 census estimated that 300,000 people live in the 3,000-hectare city. 

The Douma Department of Real Estate has 68 real estate zones covering the entire Douma district. The city is composed of nine real estate zones: Sahat wa Arab, Annatar, Qasareen Shams, Al-Dweir, Al-Rumman, Al-Qusayr, Al-Mazraaeh, Betwaneh, and Al-Ab. Sahat wa Arab and Qasareen Shams form the main historic centre of Douma, which hosts the Great Mosque, Al-Ghanem Square, Al-Hal Souk, and Khorshid Street. 

Informal housing

The importance of Douma increased in the 1980s, making the city a popular destination for newcomers from other parts of the country. The new arrivals increased the demand for housing in the area. Thus, the city began to expand informally at the expense of local farmland, especially in the north and south. By 2010, these informally built areas comprised 70 percent of the total area of Douma. 

One group of informal housing projects, dubbed Al-Hajjarieh, sprouted at the city’s northern end, extending over the Antar, Al-Rumman, and Qasareen Shams real estate zones. Another one, Haret Al-Deirieh, was also established in the Betwaneh real estate zone. A third informal housing project took shape on an area legally classified as agricultural land in the Annatar and Al-Rumman, extending to the Damascus-Homs highway. Some informal housing projects were also constructed in Al-Qusayr real estate zone, eventually reaching the Al-Hajjarieh informal housing project from the west. 

On top of that, Al-Mazraaeh and Al-Ab zones south of Douma, which were previously classified as agricultural land, became informal housing areas. The informal housing project in Al-Mazraaeh expanded until it reached the nearby town of Al-Shayfounieh, while the informal housing in Al-Ab reached the city of Misraba.  

Similar housing projects made their way to the Al-Dweir real estate zone, which contains the Adra Prison and the Ibn Sinna Hospital for Psychiatric Illnesses. 

It is worth noting that Douma’s informal housing projects sprouted, for the most part, on private agricultural lands that were not previously zoned rather than on public property. The owners of these unlicensed homes also pay a roof tax to the Rural Damascus governorate’s Department of Finance. In other words, these properties are noted in the governorate’s financial records as houses although they are unlicensed. That said, these homes are not listed in the Land Registry and are still considered legally considered to be commonly owned shares of properties. 

Zoning

Douma has an old zoning plan issued in 1966. In 2003, however, the municipality expanded its zoning plan to include new areas such as the Haret Al-Joureh neighbourhood and new housing cooperative homes in the Annatar real estate zone. This expansion also included previously unzoned areas of Annatar, Al-Ab, and Al-Mazraaeh. The zoning plan’s total surface area after the 2003 expansion reached 560 hectares and was approved in 2005. 

Compulsory land readjustment

The 2003 expansion also zoned a 250-hectare area of Douma according to the principle of compulsory land readjustment. The readjustment occurs when a site is being zoned by distributing property shares to rights holders, often not in the original locations of those properties, and after deducting a certain percentage of those properties without compensation. The decision to undertake this zoning process was made per Law No. 9 of 1974, which concerns the division, zoning, and construction of cities. The law prohibits transactions that subdivide or consolidate real estate and grant construction permits before completing the compulsory land readjustment process. 

In Douma’s case, the compulsory land readjustment included parts of the Annatar, Al-Rumman, Betwaneh, Al-Mazraaeh, and Al-Ab real estate zones. For example, the newly zoned portion of Betwaneh, which was previously classified as agricultural land, was renamed the “Tantheem Khalaf Al-Baladieh” and has become known as among the nicest and most expensive parts of Douma due to its modern urban planning and green spaces. 

On the other hand, compulsory land readjustment was not implemented in other parts of Douma, where dense informal housing remain in place. In 2005, Douma’s city council decided to make the compulsory land readjustment areas subject to rezoning under Law No. 46 of 2004, an amendment of Law No. 9 of 1974. This amendment allowed compulsory land readjustment areas to be considered areas of collective unlicensed construction. The measure made it easier to grant construction permits, carry out real estate subdivisions, and consolidate transactions under certain conditions within such areas. The Rural Damascus governorate approved the city council’s decision in 2010, but it has yet to be implemented. 

Post-2011

During the 2011 uprising, protests reached Douma, and the government tried to control the situation by requesting that a committee of residents be formed so that they could communicate their demands. This committee then submitted its demands, which, most notably, included expanding Douma’s zoning plan. 

In June 2011, the Rural Damascus governor said that the residents’ demands were being implemented and affirmed the need to enact the new zoning plan as quickly as possible. He gave Douma’s Directorate of Cadastral Affairs a one-month deadline to complete lists of common property owners and form a committee to follow up on implementation and overcome any roadblocks. 

Then, in June 2011, the government issued five decrees for the Douma district, Decrees No. 195-199, which allowed the city council to implement compulsory land redistribution under Law No. 9 of 1974 for the following real estate zones: Al-Ab, Annatar, Al-Sindyaneh, Betwaneh, Al-Gharbieh, and Al-Rumman. The five decrees deemed the implementation of such work in these areas to be in the public interest. 

Furthermore, implementing the decrees was supposed to speed up the compulsory land redistribution process and solve the problem of informal housing and common ownership. However, deteriorating security and political conditions prevented the decrees from being carried out. Meanwhile, during the regime’s siege of East Ghouta between 2013 and 2018, regime forces bombed Douma heavily with artillery fire and rockets, leading to widespread damage in residential neighbourhoods, whether zoned or informal. 

The information in this article draws on a wide-ranging interview The Syria Report conducted with Adnan Taha, a former official at the Office of Documentation in Douma.

The Rise and Fall of the Informal Settlement

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In the 1990s, the owner of a large plot of arid land outside Damascus died, bequeathing his land to his four sons. The sons shared common ownership of the property, with each holding 674 of the land’s total 2,400 shares. In legal terms, the land was excluded from the town’s zoning plan and classified as agricultural, meaning construction on the plot was unauthorised.

According to Article 780 of the Syrian Civil Code, common ownership is when two or more individuals share ownership of one property such that each share is not subdivided, making them co-owners. 

In this case, the four sons determined the locations of their shares without official documentation. Because the land was classified as agricultural, each son built an unlicensed house and sold what remained for unlicensed construction. Because the land was owned as a commons, the sales were made for the original property’s shares through contracts documented by the notary. 

The new buyers then built unlicensed houses on their plots of land without construction permits and without registering their properties in the Land Registry. This is how informal settlements began to arise in the area in the late 1990s. However, despite all the changes that have occurred to the property since its original owner’s death, the legal classification of the land has remained as it was beforehand: arid agricultural land. In the late 1990s, at least 25 multi-storey buildings with dozens of apartments were built on the land. Each owner of these apartments technically owns a share of the original, commonly owned property. 

This informal settlement did not have basic services, such as public water, electricity, and sewage networks, among other things. And yet, high costs and increased demand for housing in formally zoned areas pushed people to build and live in informal housing instead. After several years, the local municipality eventually provided some services to this particular district. 

Here is where the story of Omar and his five brothers, who moved to Damascus for college and work, begins. The six brothers saved enough money to purchase a house in the informal settlement in 2002. The home was one storey and was constructed on a 120-square-metre plot of land. But because the property was not formally listed in the Land Registry, the brothers’ ownership of the home took the form of 21 common shares of the original, larger plot of land in the informal settlement. That meant their sole proof of ownership was a contract sale of shares under an irrevocable power of attorney regulated by a notary. Because their shares were small, the brothers agreed to register their shares pro forma under Omar’s name because their allocations were small. 

After some time passed, the brothers reinforced the house and constructed additional storeys due to the increasing urgency of their housing needs. By 2011, they had a three-storey house with five apartments. The legal status of their property, however, did not change. It was still simply 21 commonly owned shares of the original land. 

At one point, the brothers began considering the possibility of terminating the common ownership of their property to preserve each of their rights. Here they came across a complex legal situation, which made things difficult for them for two main reasons. First, the municipality must correct the classification of the original land from agricultural to residential before terminating the common property, which is beyond the brothers’ abilities. Second, there was the practical issue of a large number of common owners of the original land. 

Faced with these roadblocks, the brothers drew up a quota purchase contract in which they specified each brother’s share and its classification. For example, Omar owned the right-hand apartment on the home’s second storey. They registered it with the Damascus governorate’s Directorate of Finance and paid the required fee to legitimise the contract. 

By 2012, once the revolution transformed into an armed conflict, Omar and his brothers, like many other informal settlement residents, fled to Damascus and left their homes behind. Regime forces seized control of the area and allowed residents to return only once to check on their properties, preventing them from returning to live there. Omar and his brothers inspected their apartments and found that the building had not been significantly damaged. 

A security service branch arrested Omar in 2015, and the family’s multiple attempts to secure his release failed. This complicated the situation because the notary initially registered the 21 commonly owned shares under Omar’s name. 

In 2017, the family learned that Omar had been killed under torture just a month after his arrest. They did not receive his body, and instead received a piece of paper requesting them to visit the Tishreen Military Hospital to pick up his death certificate. 

In 2018, regime forces permitted residents of the district to visit their properties for a second time after regime forces retook East Ghouta from the opposition. The brothers discovered their neighbourhood was completely looted, despite the regime controlling it throughout the war. The house was robbed of its furniture, doors, windows, and baths, and anything that did remain had been destroyed. 

The family’s building and other buildings in the area were no longer habitable. Even if their building was intact, the family members were scattered worldwide, some as refugees abroad and others internally displaced. Those who remained in Syria tried to return to the building but lacked the finances to restore it. 

In addition, when Omar died under torture, he left behind a wife and two daughters. Because he has no male heirs, his wife, daughters, mother and brothers became his heirs, per Islamic inheritance rules. This means that the number of shareholders in the commonly owned property has now increased.

Omar’s small neighbourhood is an example of dozens of other informal areas across Syria that have seen similar fates. Approximately 40 percent of people in Syria live in informal districts, where common ownership is still the norm. Many of these areas saw significant destruction due to the war. Meanwhile, their residents were forcibly displaced and, thus, at risk of losing their housing, land, and property rights. 

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