The following text is a paper written by Jihad Yazigi, our editor-in-chief, as a contribution to a conference organized in March in Florence on the transformations taking place in the Middle East region.
You will find at the bottom of the page a link to the full e-book released on that occasion.
SYRIA’S IMPLOSION: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS
Introduction
Since the end of 2013, Syria’s front lines have broadly stabilized and the country is now divided into four main parts: one under the control of the regime, another of the Islamic State (IS), a third of the Kurds, and the fourth of various opposition groups.
There is now a wide array of competing local autonomous administrations, school curriculums and currencies. Syria’s economic map has also been modified with a transfer of private and public investments from the country’s main economic backbone along the Damascus-Aleppo line towards the coastal area.
This paper will try to explain Syria’s ongoing implosion and analyse the impact these changes are having on the country and on the terms under which the conflict will be resolved.
Background
Prior to the uprising, from a socio-economic perspective Syria could be divided into two parts. The western part of the country, which comprises the Damascus-Aleppo axis, including all the main cities in addition to the coast, was the more developed. The east and south of the country, consisting of the provinces of Daraa, Quneitra and Suweida (south), and of Deir-ez-Zor, Hassakeh and Raqqa (east), were much less developed in terms of their socio-economic indicators.
Exceptions obviously existed. The province of Idlib, west of Aleppo, was among the country’s poorest. Mostly rural, this province was actually detached from Aleppo in 1958 in order to weaken Syria’s northern metropolis. Similarly, the countryside around Aleppo had poor levels of economic and social development. The urban/rural divide in Aleppo is, indeed, one of the most stubborn lines of fracture in the country.
Meanwhile, the eastern provinces are rich in natural resources. Oil is extracted from fields around Raqqa and Deir-ez-Zor as well as in the extreme northeast on the border with Iraq. In addition, wheat, barley and cotton, the country’s three strategic crops are grown there. The country’s water resources are also mainly located there. The resource-rich part of the country was therefore only reaping limited benefits from its underground resources, a pattern seen in many other developing countries.
Syria was also governed by a relatively strong central state. The state institutions were active and spread across the country; the government continued to supply services (schooling, education, etc.), to invest in infrastructure, and also to intervene in the pricing of goods sold to consumers (bread, heating oil, etc.) and to producers (farming inputs, electricity, concessionary loans). In underdeveloped areas, the government remained an important employer, partly as a consequence of weak private investment.
The decade of Bashar al-Assad, in particular after 2005, saw, however, a reduction in the role of the state. Public investment was on the decline and subsidies for most goods and services were reduced. Government economic policies were also geared towards the services sector and to the benefit of urban centres at the expense of the suburbs, the countryside and generally the more remote parts of the country.
In a departure from past policies of the Baath Governments, the responsibility for the development of these areas was transferred to the private sector. Hence, companies investing in remote areas of the country were given tax breaks and other incentives as well as more flexible regulations. In the absence of a strong political will, however, investment and development in these areas lagged. It is not that the government did not realize the existing divide and the need to address it, but it did so too late. At the beginning of March 2011, only weeks after the outbreak of the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings and just days before that of the Syrian revolt, Bashar Al-Assad rushed to the north-eastern province of Hassakeh to announce the launch of the Tigris River diversion project, after more than three decades of delays – the project had an investment cost of USD 3 billion and was expected to irrigate large tracts of land, develop agricultural production and create jobs for thousands of people.
The Conflict Destroys the Status Quo and Divides the Country Into Four Broad Areas
Fast forward to 2016. The war has had a devastating impact on the economy and life of Syrians. The numbers are telling. According to a recent report published by the Syrian Centre for Policy Research (SCPR), by the end of 2015 the war had cost some USD 255 billion, GDP is less than half its 2010 value, unemployment is above 50 percent and poverty is over 85 percent.
Four distinct areas
An important and lasting impact of the war, however, is the fragmentation of the country into at least four distinct areas:
• One controlled by the regime, which corresponds to a very large extent to the western and wealthier part of Syria mentioned above: the coastal area and the main Damascus-Aleppo axis except for some rural and suburban regions and around half the city of Aleppo, which are mostly under the control of the opposition, and to a lesser extent, the Nusra Front.
• Another is controlled by the Islamic State in the east of the country, along the Euphrates River, broadly corresponding to the Arab tribal areas historically tied to Iraq, around the oil fields of Deir-ez-Zor and Raqqa.
• A third area in the northeast and in a pocket west of Aleppo is controlled by the Democratic Union Party, the Syrian branch of the PKK. These areas are where Kurds form a majority of the population or at least the most numerous minority. They are not, however, the only areas with a high concentration of Kurds; the cities of Aleppo and Damascus together host hundreds of thousands of them.
• Finally, a fourth area is under the control of various opposition groups, in addition to the Nusra Front. The opposition parts of Syria are themselves fragmented and have no geographic continuity, unlike the previous three areas.
The three latter areas correspond to the underdeveloped southern and eastern parts of Syria.
Regime areas
Although much less destroyed than the rest of the country, and in spite of the appearance of stability, changes affecting the regime-controlled parts of the country are having a profound impact on the broader Syrian economy and society because of the economic, political and cultural weight of these areas.
In this part of the country, where almost two thirds of the Syrians still living in the country reside, a new balance is being established. The Damascus-Aleppo axis, which traditionally constitutes Syria’s spinal column, has been significantly weakened by the physical destruction of its cities – half of Aleppo and Homs, the suburbs of Damascus – by the flight of its investors and its middle class, and by the weakening of the role, and institutions, of the state.
Private and public investment – or rather what has remained of it given that the current investment levels are only a fraction of what they were pre-uprising – is shifting to the coastal area. In 2015, for instance, 32 percent of the large private investments licensed by the Syrian Investment Agency were located in the Tartous and Lattakia provinces, while only 27 percent were located in Damascus and Aleppo. By comparison, in 2010 Damascus and Aleppo attracted a combined 40.5 percent of the projects licensed by the SIA compared with only 4.5 percent for Lattakia and Tartous. Similarly, last year in Tartous the number of small business projects doubled: the number of new individual companies created in that province increased from 867 in 2014 to 1,752. The number of shareholding companies increased from 119 in 2014 to 251 in 2015.
Private capital is attracted by the safety of the coastal area, in particular the Tartous governorate, which has witnessed almost no fighting or protests since the beginning of the uprising. In addition, the flow of people displaced from other regions of the country has brought investors that want to use their capital as well as to benefit from a relative increase in demand in that region. The shift to the coast is therefore partly a consequence of a change in the demographics – Alawites are no longer believed to constitute a majority of the residents in this part of the country.
To a large extent, public sector investment, meanwhile, has moved to the coast as part of the government policy of satisfying its core constituency. In autumn 2015, at a number of events widely covered by the state media, the Prime Minister, Wael al-Halqi, announced the launch of a combined SYP 30 billion worth of public investments in the provinces of Lattakia and Tartous. At the same time, it was announced that the government would allocate a meagre SYP 500 million to the city of Aleppo.
The coastal area also continues to maintain strong links with Damascus and the central Government through the state apparatus. A majority of working-age Alawites are believed to be employed by the state both in its military and civilian wings. The state has always been an important supplier of jobs and revenue for this community and this role has increased with the war and the contraction of the overall economy. This strong dependence of the Alawite community on the state is one important factor that stands against any prospect of autonomy for the coastal area and which raises the stakes for the control of Damascus.
The composition of the business community in these areas is also changing. To a large extent, traditional investors have left the country and have relocated in other parts of the region or the world, and have been replaced by new figures that have built their wealth from war-related activities. Elections at the Chambers of Commerce in Aleppo and Damascus at the end of 2014, for instance, saw a significant change in the membership of these chambers. In Aleppo, 10 of the 12 elected board members are new investors, many of whom were unheard of prior to the uprising. In Damascus, 7 of the 12 are in the same situation.
Outside the regime areas
The regions that are beyond the control of regime forces, some of them for more than three years now, have had to adapt to the situation and create new institutions and forms of governance. The traditional economic production patterns and centres have been destroyed, investors and the business class have left, and the trade and transport networks have been disrupted. This destruction follows decades of relative underdevelopment.
For the population in these areas, the new institutions that have been established to fill the vacuum left by the destruction of the pre-war economy and the absence of the state, often – although not always – come with more legitimacy than the government because:
• many are elected, in particular in opposition areas, albeit election processes often leave much to be desired;
• they are run by people from the region, many of whom have worked and fought to protect their community from the regime;
• they form part of a wider political project that is accepted by the population (Kurds and opposition).
In practice, these institutions are now competing with those of the government, and Syria is in a situation where at least three different institutions call themselves, or pretend to act, as a government, at least four school curricula are being taught to schoolchildren, and three currencies are being used as a medium of exchange.
The Kurds are licensing investment projects and publications, and in the last two years have passed dozens of laws governing life in their areas; IS is raising taxes, licensing investments and operating a police force; the opposition areas have plenty of elected councils that run day-to-day life. The interim government of the opposition has several ministries and has established bodies to distribute wheat and bread, run hospitals and channel aid inside the country.
The value of the expenditures by these newly-created authorities has been steadily increasing. According to the estimates of SCPR, the combined value of ‘public’ expenditure in the opposition, Kurdish and IS areas – i.e. by the institutions that sprang up in these areas – is now equivalent to 13.2 percent of Syria’s 2015 GDP, compared with 31.6 percent for public spending in regime areas. In other words, ‘public’ consumption in areas outside government control is now equivalent to more than a third of total public spending, a number that reflects the entrenchment and growing importance of the various new institutions that have been established across the country to replace the state.
Conclusions and Recommendations: Three Issues to Address Regarding the Country’s Implosion
The stability of Syria’s internal borders in the past three years, the entrenchment of the newly-established institutions, and the empowerment of new actors will raise serious challenges when the conflict ends. One of these is decentralisation. Beyond the Kurdish issue, the resolution of which is likely to involve a strong level of autonomy, decentralization provides one of the rare options that will allow all the new forces that have emerged from the conflict to be brought in. Calls for more local power are being heard across Syria, and one of the main problems preventing the unification of the opposition is actually the strong sense of autonomy developed in local communities across the country. The conflict has also seen the expression of long-hidden suspicions and distrust between cities, between cities and their surrounding countryside, and between different regions. Among urban elites, in particular in Damascus, decentralisation is often associated with partition and a loss of sovereignty and will therefore be opposed by many on both sides of the regime/opposition divide.
Another issue, which is partly related to decentralisation, is the fair allocation of resources. We have seen that the most resource-rich parts of the country are also the least developed. It is unlikely that these areas will again accept control by Damascus of their resources. Expenses in the Kurdish areas, for instance, are to a large extent funded with the oil extracted in these regions. In Deir-ez-Zor, prior to the emergence of IS, local tribes and communities had fought for the control of oil fields, which many perceived as being ‘stolen’ by Damascus. Allocating more resources to the regions will face opposition from any future Government, which will be short of revenue, in particular given that any reconstruction drive as significant as that needed by Syria will require a strong and well-funded central state.
The Syrian conflict has also raised the issue of the role of community in a state formally made of equal citizens. Sectarian and ethnic tensions have been exposed by the conflict, including the minorities’ fear of islamism, the Kurds’ fear of Arabism, the Christian Assyrians’ fear of the Kurds and the Sunnis’ profound sense of injustice and repression by the minorities. Beyond fears, the need to express cultural identities that have long been repressed has also been exposed. The question of how to build a state that keeps an equal distance from all of its citizens but at the same time guarantees their political and cultural rights, as individuals and communities, remains unanswered
The European Union would be well advised to encourage Syrian opposition groups, in a first stage, and other parties, such as the Kurds, in a second stage to engage in discussions on decentralization. Resistance to the idea is to an important extent a consequence of a poor understanding of the concept and of the issues at stake.
Engaging the younger generation would be particularly useful given their attitude that is broadly more receptive to the idea.
The EU should in particular draw from the experience of several of its member countries such as Germany and Spain, where decentralization is put in practice.
The EU should also strengthen local institutions through funding and training and by encouraging them to develop cooperation and move from very localised institutions, i.e. at the town level, to more regional ones. Democracy must also be encouraged through the election rather than the appointment of local level representatives.
Link to the e-book published on the occasion of the conference
Recent Syria Report Quotations in International Press
/in Uncategorized /by adminIn the past couple of weeks The Syria Report has been quoted by a number of international media.
The Washington Post: Assad loyalists are turning on Syria’s government as living standards deteriorate
The New York Times: As U.S. Tightens Iran Sanctions, Militant Groups and Political Allies Feel the Pain
The (London) Times: Tehran eyes vital Syrian port of Latakia as gateway to Med
Le Monde (French): Après huit ans de guerre, l’impossible reconstruction de la Syrie
France Culture (French): Syrie : l’après-guerre politique
Telepolis (German): Syrien: Der “zweite Krieg”
Directa (Catalan): “Síria no s’està reconstruint ni és probable que això es faci durant els pròxims anys”
المشكلة العقارية وتداعياتها على حقوق الملكية في سوريا: القانون رقم 10 لعام 2018
/in أوراق ودراسات, حقوق السكن والأراضي والممتلكات /by Rand Shamaaأثار صدور القانون رقم 10 لعام 2018 مخاوف السوريين حول حقوقهم في السكن والأراضي والممتلكات، حيث صدر هذا القانون في الوقت الذي تعرضت فيه أغلب المدن التي تشكل حواضر للسوريين لدمار واسع النظاق ولتهجير ما يقارب نصف سكان سوريا، بين لاجئ ونازح، وخروج الكثير من الأماكن عن سيطرة النظام واختلاق أطر الحكم المحلي، وتعرض الكثير من السجلات العقارية للحريق والتلف، وفقدان الكثير من السوريين لوثائق ملكيتهم، كما صدر هذا القانون متجاهلاً الأرث الممتد لعقود من انتهاك حقوق السكن والملكية في سوريا في ظل غياب الحماية الدستورية لهذا الحق، وتوالي القوانين المجحفة به، والخلل الإداري والقانوني في عملية تسجيل الملكية وحمايتها.
الأمر الذي يجعل من هذا القانون خطراً حقيقياً على حقوق الملكية، لذلك كان لابد من بيان الخلفيات التي أدت إلى ظهور هذا القانون، وبيان التحديات التي تمثلت بالسكن العشوائي والملكية الشائعة وعدم تخصيص أراضي معدة للبناء وإستعراض التشريعات العقارية وأثرها على الملكية الخاصة، وحق الملكية في الدساتير السورية والتخبط التشريعي في سوريا ولاسيما تلك المتعلقة بالملكية العقارية.
لذلك كان هذا البحث لتقديم فهم أوسع للمشكلة العقارية وبشكل خاص القانون رقم 10 ومعرفة أسبابه ومخاطر تطبيقه وعلاقته بالمشكلة العقارية في سوريا ومن ثم شرح أحكامه ومواطن الخلل فيه وسبل التغلب على تداعياته.
وتوضيح أثر التشريعات العقارية ولاسيما تلك التي صدرت بعد إندلاع النزاع على عودة اللاجئين والنازحين، والتحديات التي ستواجهها سوريا في مرحلة مابعد الإتفاق السياسي، وأثر ذلك على خلق البيئة الآمنة والمحايدة، ومدى توافق تلك التشريعات مع العهود والمواثيق الدولية، والحلول المتاحة أمام سوريا الجديدة لمعالجة آثار تلك التشريعات الهاضمة لحقوق السوريين وضمان وصولهم لحقوقهم في التملك.
العنوان: المشكلة العقارية وتداعياتها على حقوق الملكية في سوريا: القانون رقم 10 لعام 2018
الناشر: اليوم التالي
التاريخ: كانون الثاني 2019
التحميل: من هنا
أوراق بحثية حول القانون رقم 10
/in أوراق ودراسات, حقوق السكن والأراضي والممتلكات /by Rand Shamaaتعاين هذه السلسلة ممن الأوراق آثار المرسوم رقم 10 الذي أصدره بشار الأسد لعام 2018 الذي يقضي بجواز إحداث منطقة تنظيمية أو أكثر ضمن المخطط التنظيمي العام للوحدات الإدارية، بناء على اقتراح من وزير الإدارة المحلية والبيئة بالإضافة إلى تعديل بعض مواد المرسوم التشريعي رقم 66 لعام 2012.
وقد أثار القانون مخاوف بين النازحين قسراً داخل سوريا وخارجها حول إمكانية مصادرة الممتلكات في المناطق التي شردوا منها أثناء النزاع. كما يمكن أن يكون هذا التشريع عائقاً أمام عودة النازحين داخلياً وتحدياً إضافياً للجهود الرامية إلى التوصل إلى حل سياسي للصراع السوري. ويشير مراقبو هذا التشريع إلى أنها تأتي بالتوازي مع العمليات العسكرية التي يشنها النظام ضد المدن والأحياء السكنية ، لتحقيق أهداف وغايات واضحة.
العنوان: أوراق بحثية حول القانون رقم 10
الناشر: اليوم التالي
التاريخ: تشرين الأول 2018
التحميل: من هنا
WHAT COMES NEXT? REBUILDING THE MIDDLE EAST
/in Uncategorized /by adminThis short text is the contribution of our editor-in-chief, Jihad Yazigi, to the Arab Horizons report recently published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
To read the full Political Economy chapter of the report please go here: Arab Political Economy: Pathways for Equitable Growth
What Comes Next? Rebuilding the Middle East
Before planning for what comes next, we need to understand the consequences of economic policies implemented in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region before 2011.
These policies—including a reduced role for the state, lower fiscal deficits, and foreign trade liberalization—were largely liberal in nature and helped generate relatively high growth rates. However, they also had negative consequences. Fewer, not more, jobs—in Syria, the labor participation rate fell from 52.5 percent in 2002 to 42.7 percent in 2010; increased income inequality; and a continued brain drain. Since 2011, the destruction of several Arab countries has cost hundreds of billions of dollars, which has only added to the region’s woes.
Better governance and an improved business environment, as is often recommended by international institutions, may generate higher growth. But if growth does not create jobs or reduce inequality, how will that solve our problem? The MENA region must rethink its economic development model by challenging orthodox views and well-entrenched economic and business interests.
Three broad policies must be pursued:
For economic development in the Arab region to succeed, the young men and women of this region must be put back to work under terms that raise their incomes and preserve their dignity.
Video Interview: Post-War Reconstruction in Syria
/in Uncategorized /by adminA short video featuring an interview by Chatham House with our editor-in-chief, Jihad Yazigi.
Post-War Reconstruction in Syria
Video: Triggers of Return of Syrian Refugees
/in Uncategorized /by adminOn April 16, 2018, the Carnegie Middle East Center launched a report on the requirements for a return of Syrian refugees to their country titled Unheard Voices: What Syrian Refugees Need to Return Home.
The editor-in-chief of The Syria Report contributed to the panel discussion on that occasion.
Report Launch: Triggers of Return of Syrian Refugees
Quoted in Various Media Including CNN
/in Uncategorized /by adminThe Syria Report and its editor in chief have been quoted in several international media:
CNN: Assad may win Syria’s war, but he will preside over a broken country
Poland’s Obserwator Finansowy (in Polish): Nikt się nie garnie do odbudowy Syrii
Bulgaria’s Dnevnik (in Bulgarian): Призракът на “следвоенна Сирия” броди след 7 г. изтребление
Videos: Demystifying the Syrian Conflict
/in Uncategorized /by adminChatham House held in early March a one-day conference on the occasion of the seven-year anniversary of the Syrian revolution.
The event, called Demystifying the Syrian Conflict, had four sessions covering various issues, including the economy, politics and civil society. Here are links to the video recordings of the four sessions.
The first session on regime areas dynamics had three panelists including the editor-in-chief of The Syria Report.
Session one: Regime Area Dynamics
Session two: Rebel-held areas
Session three: Post-ISIS Areas
Session four: Civil Society and Communities
The Syria Report Mentioned by the Press
/in Uncategorized /by adminIn the past week, The Syria Report has been quoted by various media:
New York Times: Russia’s Greatest Problem in Syria: Its Ally, President Assad
The National: The mass return of refugees is not part of the Syrian regime’s survival plan
The Syria Report in the Press
/in Uncategorized /by adminThe Syria Report is quoted here by Arab News, following a recent event in Chatham House on Syria, seven years after the onset of the uprising.
No peace, no rebuilding for ‘broken’ Syria, say analysts
The Syria Report Quoted in the International Media
/in Uncategorized /by adminThe Syria Report and its editor in chief have been quoted in several international media:
The Century Foundation: The Factory: A Glimpse into Syria’s War Economy
AFP: Syria’s Deir Ezzor: a patchwork of competing interests
AP: Syria starts rebuilding even as more destruction wreaked
El Diario (Mexico – same AP story in Spanish): Siria empieza a reconstruir en medio de la violencia
Le Monde (Blog – French): Les Enjeux Cachés de la Reconstruction : Le Cas Alarmant de Homs
L’Orient Le Jour (Lebanon – French): Un « Solidere syrien » en préparation dans la banlieue de Damas ?
RBC (Russia): Новый виток войны: как победа над ИГ изменила сирийский конфликт
Paper on land and property issues in Syria (Arabic version)
/in Uncategorized /by adminThe following text is the Arabic translation of a recent paper by our editor in chief on land and property issues in Syria.
The paper, titled “Destruct to Reconstruct – How the Syrian Regime Capitalises on Property Destruction and Land Legislation,” was translated and published by Al-Jumhuriya, an independent online publication that specializes on Syria.
You can read the paper here: Al-Taamir Baad Al-Tadmir: Kayf Yastaghel Al-Nizam Damar Al-Mumtalakat wa Tashriaat Al-Aradi
For the original english version, which was published by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, please go here.
The Syria Report Quoted in Various Media
/in Uncategorized /by adminThe Syria Report and its editor-in-chief have been recently quoted in several publications:
The Washington Post: The Syrian war is far from over, but the endgame is already playing out
Aljazeera: SDF says it took Conoco gas field from ISIL
The Syria Report Quoted in Several Publications
/in Uncategorized /by adminThe Syria Report and its editor in chief have been recently quoted in several publications:
AFP: Assad may win war but will preside over a ruined Syria
Open Democracy: Militias and crony capitalism to hamper Syria reconstruction
Middle East Online: Quietly, the Assad Regime is Reshaping Syria
La Tribune de Genève: Assad et ses alliés ont repris le contrôle de la moitié de la Syrie
Paper by our editor-in-chief, Jihad Yazigi, on land and property issues in Syria
/in Uncategorized /by adminThe following text is a paper written by Jihad Yazigi, our editor-in-chief, on land and property issues in Syria. The paper is published by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.
Destruct to Reconstruct – How the Syrian Regime Capitalises on Property Destruction and Land Legislation
For decades, land and property issues have been a source of conflict in Syria. Over the course of the conflict, however, they have taken a broader dimension and a much more violent turn. Indeed, during the past six years the Syrian regime’s policies and efforts with regard to land and property have included the large-scale physical destruction of property, the erasure and falsification of records, and population displacement. Meanwhile, various laws and regulations have been enacted – such as the public private partnership law – which are presented as modern pieces of legislative reform, but in practice formalise the transfer of assets owned by the state to regime cronies. This paper argues that these policies have been carried out with the aim of reaching two broad objectives: first, to serve as weapons of war and extend the regime’s political control; second, to advance the economic interests of the regime’s elite and capitalise on the expected reconstruction drive.
Read the paper (pdf)
The Syria Report in the International media
/in Uncategorized /by adminThe Syria Report and its editor in chief have been quoted in several international media:
AP: Analysis: Toxic attack could wreck Assad’s political gains
The New York Times: The Grim Logic Behind Syria’s Chemical Weapons Attack
Frankfurter Allgmeine Zeitung (German): Welche Vergeltung droht Amerika?
Radio Popolare (Italian): Perché la guerra in Siria potrebbe finire
Le Monde (French): Reconstruction en Syrie : les entreprises acquises au régime favorisées
تأملات في التحديات المستقبلية الخاصة بتعويضات السكن والأرض والملكية للاجئين السوريين
/in أوراق ودراسات, حقوق السكن والأراضي والممتلكات /by Rand Shamaaفي هذه الورقة الصادرة في العام 2017، والمعنونة بـ”تأملات في التحديات المستقبلية الخاصة بتعويضات السكن والأرض والملكية للاجئين السوريين”، نجد نتائج مقابلات أجراها المجلس النرويجي للاجئين مع 580 أسرة سورية في لبنان والأردن والعراق حول مطالبهم المتعلقة بالسكن والأرض والملكية في حال عودتهم إلى سوريا. وتظهر النتائج مدى تعقيد المسألة. إذ ثمّة كم كبير من مزاعم الملكية غير المرفقة بوثائق قانونية تثبت صحتها. ويعود ذلك لعدة أسباب تشمل فقدان الوثائق أثناء التهجير القسري والممارسات الثقافية التاريخية المتعلقة بنقل الملكية ضمن العائلات. وعليه يجب أن تأخذ عمليات رد الحقوق والتعويض المستقبلية بعين الاعتبار تعقيد قضية السكن والأرض والملكية قبل النزاع، وضمان ايجاد سبل للانصاف حول الانتهاكات الواقعة خلال النزاع. يهدف المركز النرويجي من هذه الورقة إلى توضيح بعض التحديات المرتبطة بالسكن والأرض والملكية، عند العودة المستدامة إلى سوريا، وتقديم توجيهات حول الخطوات الأولى المحتملة للحد من آثار هذه التحديات والتصدي لها قبل خلق المزيد من الصراعات والحؤول دون العودة الدائمة.
العنوان: تأملات في التحديات المستقبلية الخاصة بتعويضات السكن والأرض والملكية للاجئين السوريين
الناشر: Norwegian Refugee Council
تاريخ النشر: كانون الثاني 2017
التحميل: من هنا
The Syria Report Quoted in the Media
/in Uncategorized /by adminThe Syria Report was recently quoted in several articles on Syria.
AFP: Millions without heat as ISIL explodes Syrian gas plant
Buzzfeed: Russian Ambassador’s Killing Shows How Syria’s Conflict Is Only Going To Get Worse
No going back: Why decentralisation is the future for Syria
/in Uncategorized /by adminThe following text is a paper written by Jihad Yazigi, our editor-in-chief, for the European Council on Foreign Relations, on the need to push for a decentralisation agenda in Syria.
SUMMARY
Five years of war have fuelled deep divisions in Syria, in particular along ethno-sectarian lines, but also along sharp geographic lines. Economic links and interdependency persists between various parts of the country despite the country fragmenting into competing centres of power over which Damascus will struggle to ever reassert control. This fragmentation extends to government-held areas where local power brokers are also asserting independence. Political and economic decentralisation, including a special status for Kurdish areas, is fast becoming a necessary condition for solving the conflict.
For this to become a reality, there needs to be formal devolution of power away from the centre, fairer allocation of resources – particularly oil revenues -, and efforts to reduce disparities in economic development. European actors should recognise the reality on the ground and shift their focus away from achieving a centralised power-sharing agreement towards negotiations based on devolution. A decentralised model will be difficult to implement, but ironically may offer one of the few means of holding the country together.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
For the full text go to No going back: Why decentralisation is the future for Syria
For the PDF version of the full text go to here
SYRIA’S IMPLOSION: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS
/in Uncategorized /by adminThe following text is a paper written by Jihad Yazigi, our editor-in-chief, as a contribution to a conference organized in March in Florence on the transformations taking place in the Middle East region.
You will find at the bottom of the page a link to the full e-book released on that occasion.
SYRIA’S IMPLOSION: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS
Introduction
Since the end of 2013, Syria’s front lines have broadly stabilized and the country is now divided into four main parts: one under the control of the regime, another of the Islamic State (IS), a third of the Kurds, and the fourth of various opposition groups.
There is now a wide array of competing local autonomous administrations, school curriculums and currencies. Syria’s economic map has also been modified with a transfer of private and public investments from the country’s main economic backbone along the Damascus-Aleppo line towards the coastal area.
This paper will try to explain Syria’s ongoing implosion and analyse the impact these changes are having on the country and on the terms under which the conflict will be resolved.
Background
Prior to the uprising, from a socio-economic perspective Syria could be divided into two parts. The western part of the country, which comprises the Damascus-Aleppo axis, including all the main cities in addition to the coast, was the more developed. The east and south of the country, consisting of the provinces of Daraa, Quneitra and Suweida (south), and of Deir-ez-Zor, Hassakeh and Raqqa (east), were much less developed in terms of their socio-economic indicators.
Exceptions obviously existed. The province of Idlib, west of Aleppo, was among the country’s poorest. Mostly rural, this province was actually detached from Aleppo in 1958 in order to weaken Syria’s northern metropolis. Similarly, the countryside around Aleppo had poor levels of economic and social development. The urban/rural divide in Aleppo is, indeed, one of the most stubborn lines of fracture in the country.
Meanwhile, the eastern provinces are rich in natural resources. Oil is extracted from fields around Raqqa and Deir-ez-Zor as well as in the extreme northeast on the border with Iraq. In addition, wheat, barley and cotton, the country’s three strategic crops are grown there. The country’s water resources are also mainly located there. The resource-rich part of the country was therefore only reaping limited benefits from its underground resources, a pattern seen in many other developing countries.
Syria was also governed by a relatively strong central state. The state institutions were active and spread across the country; the government continued to supply services (schooling, education, etc.), to invest in infrastructure, and also to intervene in the pricing of goods sold to consumers (bread, heating oil, etc.) and to producers (farming inputs, electricity, concessionary loans). In underdeveloped areas, the government remained an important employer, partly as a consequence of weak private investment.
The decade of Bashar al-Assad, in particular after 2005, saw, however, a reduction in the role of the state. Public investment was on the decline and subsidies for most goods and services were reduced. Government economic policies were also geared towards the services sector and to the benefit of urban centres at the expense of the suburbs, the countryside and generally the more remote parts of the country.
In a departure from past policies of the Baath Governments, the responsibility for the development of these areas was transferred to the private sector. Hence, companies investing in remote areas of the country were given tax breaks and other incentives as well as more flexible regulations. In the absence of a strong political will, however, investment and development in these areas lagged. It is not that the government did not realize the existing divide and the need to address it, but it did so too late. At the beginning of March 2011, only weeks after the outbreak of the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings and just days before that of the Syrian revolt, Bashar Al-Assad rushed to the north-eastern province of Hassakeh to announce the launch of the Tigris River diversion project, after more than three decades of delays – the project had an investment cost of USD 3 billion and was expected to irrigate large tracts of land, develop agricultural production and create jobs for thousands of people.
The Conflict Destroys the Status Quo and Divides the Country Into Four Broad Areas
Fast forward to 2016. The war has had a devastating impact on the economy and life of Syrians. The numbers are telling. According to a recent report published by the Syrian Centre for Policy Research (SCPR), by the end of 2015 the war had cost some USD 255 billion, GDP is less than half its 2010 value, unemployment is above 50 percent and poverty is over 85 percent.
Four distinct areas
An important and lasting impact of the war, however, is the fragmentation of the country into at least four distinct areas:
• One controlled by the regime, which corresponds to a very large extent to the western and wealthier part of Syria mentioned above: the coastal area and the main Damascus-Aleppo axis except for some rural and suburban regions and around half the city of Aleppo, which are mostly under the control of the opposition, and to a lesser extent, the Nusra Front.
• Another is controlled by the Islamic State in the east of the country, along the Euphrates River, broadly corresponding to the Arab tribal areas historically tied to Iraq, around the oil fields of Deir-ez-Zor and Raqqa.
• A third area in the northeast and in a pocket west of Aleppo is controlled by the Democratic Union Party, the Syrian branch of the PKK. These areas are where Kurds form a majority of the population or at least the most numerous minority. They are not, however, the only areas with a high concentration of Kurds; the cities of Aleppo and Damascus together host hundreds of thousands of them.
• Finally, a fourth area is under the control of various opposition groups, in addition to the Nusra Front. The opposition parts of Syria are themselves fragmented and have no geographic continuity, unlike the previous three areas.
The three latter areas correspond to the underdeveloped southern and eastern parts of Syria.
Regime areas
Although much less destroyed than the rest of the country, and in spite of the appearance of stability, changes affecting the regime-controlled parts of the country are having a profound impact on the broader Syrian economy and society because of the economic, political and cultural weight of these areas.
In this part of the country, where almost two thirds of the Syrians still living in the country reside, a new balance is being established. The Damascus-Aleppo axis, which traditionally constitutes Syria’s spinal column, has been significantly weakened by the physical destruction of its cities – half of Aleppo and Homs, the suburbs of Damascus – by the flight of its investors and its middle class, and by the weakening of the role, and institutions, of the state.
Private and public investment – or rather what has remained of it given that the current investment levels are only a fraction of what they were pre-uprising – is shifting to the coastal area. In 2015, for instance, 32 percent of the large private investments licensed by the Syrian Investment Agency were located in the Tartous and Lattakia provinces, while only 27 percent were located in Damascus and Aleppo. By comparison, in 2010 Damascus and Aleppo attracted a combined 40.5 percent of the projects licensed by the SIA compared with only 4.5 percent for Lattakia and Tartous. Similarly, last year in Tartous the number of small business projects doubled: the number of new individual companies created in that province increased from 867 in 2014 to 1,752. The number of shareholding companies increased from 119 in 2014 to 251 in 2015.
Private capital is attracted by the safety of the coastal area, in particular the Tartous governorate, which has witnessed almost no fighting or protests since the beginning of the uprising. In addition, the flow of people displaced from other regions of the country has brought investors that want to use their capital as well as to benefit from a relative increase in demand in that region. The shift to the coast is therefore partly a consequence of a change in the demographics – Alawites are no longer believed to constitute a majority of the residents in this part of the country.
To a large extent, public sector investment, meanwhile, has moved to the coast as part of the government policy of satisfying its core constituency. In autumn 2015, at a number of events widely covered by the state media, the Prime Minister, Wael al-Halqi, announced the launch of a combined SYP 30 billion worth of public investments in the provinces of Lattakia and Tartous. At the same time, it was announced that the government would allocate a meagre SYP 500 million to the city of Aleppo.
The coastal area also continues to maintain strong links with Damascus and the central Government through the state apparatus. A majority of working-age Alawites are believed to be employed by the state both in its military and civilian wings. The state has always been an important supplier of jobs and revenue for this community and this role has increased with the war and the contraction of the overall economy. This strong dependence of the Alawite community on the state is one important factor that stands against any prospect of autonomy for the coastal area and which raises the stakes for the control of Damascus.
The composition of the business community in these areas is also changing. To a large extent, traditional investors have left the country and have relocated in other parts of the region or the world, and have been replaced by new figures that have built their wealth from war-related activities. Elections at the Chambers of Commerce in Aleppo and Damascus at the end of 2014, for instance, saw a significant change in the membership of these chambers. In Aleppo, 10 of the 12 elected board members are new investors, many of whom were unheard of prior to the uprising. In Damascus, 7 of the 12 are in the same situation.
Outside the regime areas
The regions that are beyond the control of regime forces, some of them for more than three years now, have had to adapt to the situation and create new institutions and forms of governance. The traditional economic production patterns and centres have been destroyed, investors and the business class have left, and the trade and transport networks have been disrupted. This destruction follows decades of relative underdevelopment.
For the population in these areas, the new institutions that have been established to fill the vacuum left by the destruction of the pre-war economy and the absence of the state, often – although not always – come with more legitimacy than the government because:
• many are elected, in particular in opposition areas, albeit election processes often leave much to be desired;
• they are run by people from the region, many of whom have worked and fought to protect their community from the regime;
• they form part of a wider political project that is accepted by the population (Kurds and opposition).
In practice, these institutions are now competing with those of the government, and Syria is in a situation where at least three different institutions call themselves, or pretend to act, as a government, at least four school curricula are being taught to schoolchildren, and three currencies are being used as a medium of exchange.
The Kurds are licensing investment projects and publications, and in the last two years have passed dozens of laws governing life in their areas; IS is raising taxes, licensing investments and operating a police force; the opposition areas have plenty of elected councils that run day-to-day life. The interim government of the opposition has several ministries and has established bodies to distribute wheat and bread, run hospitals and channel aid inside the country.
The value of the expenditures by these newly-created authorities has been steadily increasing. According to the estimates of SCPR, the combined value of ‘public’ expenditure in the opposition, Kurdish and IS areas – i.e. by the institutions that sprang up in these areas – is now equivalent to 13.2 percent of Syria’s 2015 GDP, compared with 31.6 percent for public spending in regime areas. In other words, ‘public’ consumption in areas outside government control is now equivalent to more than a third of total public spending, a number that reflects the entrenchment and growing importance of the various new institutions that have been established across the country to replace the state.
Conclusions and Recommendations: Three Issues to Address Regarding the Country’s Implosion
The stability of Syria’s internal borders in the past three years, the entrenchment of the newly-established institutions, and the empowerment of new actors will raise serious challenges when the conflict ends. One of these is decentralisation. Beyond the Kurdish issue, the resolution of which is likely to involve a strong level of autonomy, decentralization provides one of the rare options that will allow all the new forces that have emerged from the conflict to be brought in. Calls for more local power are being heard across Syria, and one of the main problems preventing the unification of the opposition is actually the strong sense of autonomy developed in local communities across the country. The conflict has also seen the expression of long-hidden suspicions and distrust between cities, between cities and their surrounding countryside, and between different regions. Among urban elites, in particular in Damascus, decentralisation is often associated with partition and a loss of sovereignty and will therefore be opposed by many on both sides of the regime/opposition divide.
Another issue, which is partly related to decentralisation, is the fair allocation of resources. We have seen that the most resource-rich parts of the country are also the least developed. It is unlikely that these areas will again accept control by Damascus of their resources. Expenses in the Kurdish areas, for instance, are to a large extent funded with the oil extracted in these regions. In Deir-ez-Zor, prior to the emergence of IS, local tribes and communities had fought for the control of oil fields, which many perceived as being ‘stolen’ by Damascus. Allocating more resources to the regions will face opposition from any future Government, which will be short of revenue, in particular given that any reconstruction drive as significant as that needed by Syria will require a strong and well-funded central state.
The Syrian conflict has also raised the issue of the role of community in a state formally made of equal citizens. Sectarian and ethnic tensions have been exposed by the conflict, including the minorities’ fear of islamism, the Kurds’ fear of Arabism, the Christian Assyrians’ fear of the Kurds and the Sunnis’ profound sense of injustice and repression by the minorities. Beyond fears, the need to express cultural identities that have long been repressed has also been exposed. The question of how to build a state that keeps an equal distance from all of its citizens but at the same time guarantees their political and cultural rights, as individuals and communities, remains unanswered
The European Union would be well advised to encourage Syrian opposition groups, in a first stage, and other parties, such as the Kurds, in a second stage to engage in discussions on decentralization. Resistance to the idea is to an important extent a consequence of a poor understanding of the concept and of the issues at stake.
Engaging the younger generation would be particularly useful given their attitude that is broadly more receptive to the idea.
The EU should in particular draw from the experience of several of its member countries such as Germany and Spain, where decentralization is put in practice.
The EU should also strengthen local institutions through funding and training and by encouraging them to develop cooperation and move from very localised institutions, i.e. at the town level, to more regional ones. Democracy must also be encouraged through the election rather than the appointment of local level representatives.
Link to the e-book published on the occasion of the conference