The Ministry of Local Administration and Environment is working to amend the Financial Law of Administrative Units No. 37 of 2021 to review the matter of fees and taxes collected by administrative units, including those linked to real estate.

The Ministry of Local Administration and Environment formed a special committee at the beginning of the year to study the proposed amendments to the 2021 law, and  held its first meeting on February 22.

The committee is chaired by the Deputy Minister of Local Administration for Technical Affairs and includes representatives from the Ministry of Finance, the General Commission for Taxes and Fees, and the Central Authority for Financial Auditing, in addition to a lawyer, a representative from the ministry’s Finance Directorate, and a technical member. It also includes three members representing administrative units, selected in coordination with these units, given the impossibility of representing every administrative unit.

Ali Al-Hamad, a spokesperson of the Ministry of Local Administration, told The Syria Report that the committee had been granted a three-month deadline to complete amendment proposals, and that its first meeting was a foundational session to begin reviewing the articles of the current law. He added that it is still too early to discuss the nature of the amendments, as the committee is still only beginning its work, but that the aim is to reconsider certain taxes and reorganise them within a clearer legislative framework.

Law No. 37 of 2021 and its implementation instructions regulate the financial resources of administrative units within the framework of Local Administration Law No. 107 of 2011. Administrative units include the governorate, city, town, and municipality. They are granted the authority to collect fees and taxes in return for services they provide or licences they issue within their administrative boundaries. 

The law distinguishes between two types of resources. The first consists of direct fees collected by the administrative unit for specific services, such as road construction, paving, lighting, and issuing building permits. The second consists of indirect resources, represented by shares transferred to administrative units from taxes and fees collected by public authorities, including property income taxes and vacant land taxes. 

Under Law No. 37, administrative units receive a 10 per cent share of property income and vacant land taxes collected by the Finance Directorates in the Ministry of Finance, while additional fees collected nationwide are distributed among administrative units according to percentages set by the same law.

Law No. 37 of 2021 introduced a fundamental amendment to some real estate fees by linking them to prevailing market property values rather than fixed estimated values. Under the law, a percentage of a property’s prevailing value is collected when granting a building permit, or a permit for reconstructing or adding new extensions, with the implementation instructions determining the details and calculations of these fees. The prevailing value has also been used as a basis for determining the improvement fee resulting from public benefit works, which is imposed on owners of built and unbuilt properties, rooftops, and land that benefit from such works. Each administrative unit determines, within its boundaries, the areas affected by improvements and collects the fee from liable parties according to mechanisms set by the law and its implementation instructions, while granting concerned parties the right to object and appeal in accordance with established procedures.

According to Mr Hamad, the aim of the amendment is to reorganise certain taxes which he described as “arbitrary,” without going into further detail. He noted that the ministry seeks to develop its legislative structure and amend the necessary legal instruments related to its work, including those connected with urban planning. Mr Hamad added that the ministry will communicate with various administrative units in order to reach a legal formula suited to the current phase, and that a three-month deadline is sufficient to study the law’s articles and propose the necessary amendments.

The anticipated amendment process raises the issue of the mechanism of revenue flow between administrative units, governorates, and the public treasury. Under Law No. 37 of 2021, administrative units collect direct fees within their boundaries, while shares of fees and taxes collected by public authorities – including property income and vacant land taxes – are transferred to them. Some of these revenues pass through governorates as part of the process of preparing public budgets before being reallocated to administrative units, making actual benefit from revenues dependent on allocation and public spending mechanisms. This places the issue of the financial independence of administrative units at the centre of the discussion surrounding the amendment, particularly regarding the possibility of adjusting the share of revenues or the mechanism for retaining revenues within the administrative unit itself. No official details have yet been issued on whether the amendment will affect the share of revenues stipulated in the law or be limited to regulating fees and their calculation mechanisms.

The discussion surrounding amendments to the Financial Law of Administrative Units comes within the context of the experience of implementing Law No. 37 of 2021 over recent years, particularly after linking a number of fees to prevailing market property values. This link, when first implemented, led to a notable increase in building permit fees and improvement fees, which was reflected in construction costs and licensing activity. Two main issues intersect in this discussion. The first is technical, related to the method of calculating fees and linking them to prevailing values. The second is financial and administrative, connected to the independence of administrative units in managing their resources and the limits of their ability to retain revenues or rely on transfers through the public budget.

On January 28, the General Directorate of Cadastral Affairs issued its Circular No. 57, which provides for the removal of seizure notices, bans on disposal, and restrictions of disposal placed on properties belonging to opposition figures issued during the Assad regime by the “Intelligence Branch”. The circular stated that the branch is not legally authorised to impose these restrictions.

The circular came in response to Letter No. 1117 calling for the removal of those notices, which the Ministry of Defence sent on January 11 to the Ministry of Local Administration and Environment, which in turn referred it to the Directorate of Cadastral Affairs on January 19.

Circular No. 57 did not rely on Decree No. 16 of 2025, which stipulated the cancellation of precautionary seizure decisions between 2012 and 2024, in accordance with the provisions of the Law on the Powers of the Judicial Police No. 63 of 2012. This points to duality and a lack of organisation in the process of lifting notices and seizures that were imposed under unjust security decisions during the Assad regime. The Ministry of Defence’s Letter No. 1117 provided for the lifting of seizure notices that had already been addressed by Decree No. 16 without mentioning it. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Defence’s letter added the notices of ban on disposal and restriction of disposal, which were not mentioned in Decree No. 16 of 2025.

The Ministry of Defence’s letter named only the “Intelligence Branch”, which most likely refers to the Military Intelligence Branch (Military Security) as it is affiliated with the Ministry. By contrast, Decree No. 16 of 2025 covered all notices issued by the Ministry of Finance, based on instructions from the security services.

A “ban on disposal” notice is a precautionary restriction placed on the property record in the Land Registry to prevent the owner from carrying out any disposition of the property – such as sale, mortgage, or gift – before that notice is removed. Such a notice is imposed pursuant to a judicial ruling or pursuant to a law. Ban on disposal includes several types: a mortgage notice; real estate insurance in favour of state-owned banks pursuant to Decree No. 31 of 2005 relating to the Real Estate Bank; a ban on disposal pursuant to the Agrarian Reform Law No. 161 of 1958; and a ban on disposal related to the freezing of funds pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism Law No. 19 of 2012.

As for a “restriction of disposal” notice, it is a precautionary measure placed temporarily on a person’s properties to ensure the collection of debts or financial obligations owed by them to the state. This notice does not prevent the owner from benefiting from their property or leasing it, but it prevents them from disposing of it and transferring its ownership. This notice is recorded in a register within the Disposal Directorate. That means it is not entered on the property record itself. The source of this notice is often the Finance Directorate or the municipal council, in response to requests from the security services.

Decree No. 16 of 2025 was supposed to include the cancellation of seizure notices, bans on disposal, and restrictions of disposal, with the issuance of implementing instructions for each of those cases, instead of issuing a new letter from the Ministry of Defence to regulate these cases. This may cause confusion for those harmed by these notices, due to the multiplicity of legal references – decrees, letters, and circulars -issued to address the same situation. This leads to uncertainty in identifying the legal basis governing their case and the authority they should approach to have that notice struck off.

Even with Decree No. 16 of 2025 and the Ministry of Defence’s Letter No. 1117, there are still no implementing instructions and no clear procedures for lifting those notices. This increases the suffering of those affected, as it requires them to travel to Damascus and follow up with the central Directorate of Cadastral Affairs, other official departments, and branches of the security services to remove those notices. Addressing these complications requires issuing implementing instructions that specify clear procedures for the process of lifting notices, and restricting this to a single body as far as possible to simplify matters for those affected.

The issuance of Circular No. 135 by the Ministry of Finance on July 30, 2025 has affected the regulatory framework of Syria’s real estate market, as it redefined the basis for calculating real estate sales tax and linked the completion of property transfers to obtaining a “No Objection to Completing the Real Estate Transaction” document.

The Ministry of Finance issued Circular No. 135 in July 2025, which reduced the prevailing values adopted by the finance directorates to 30 per cent of the values previously set. That is, a property whose prevailing value had been estimated by the finance directorate at SYP 1 billion is now calculated for tax purposes on the basis of only SYP 300 million. Accordingly, the base on which the tax is calculated — that is, the value to which the percentage specified in the law is applied — has shrunk by 70 per cent compared with the previous administrative estimate.

The tax equals the legal percentage multiplied by the prevailing value adopted by the Ministry of Finance. So, if that legal percentage is one per cent and the adopted prevailing value is SYP 300 million, then the tax is SYP 3 million. Therefore, reducing the prevailing value to 30 per cent means reducing the tax base itself, not amending the legal tax rate.

Real Estate Sales Law No. 15 of 2021 had set the sales tax at one per cent on ready residential properties, to be calculated from the “prevailing value” adopted by the Ministry of Finance, not from the price stated in the sale contract between seller and buyer. When the law was approved, this shift was presented as a means of achieving tax justice and preventing sales from being registered at prices lower than the real price. The law stipulated the adoption of a three-tier valuation structure, including sub-committees in administrative units, main committees in the finance directorates, and a central committee chaired by the Minister of Finance, which was supposed to ensure an estimate close to the prevailing market price. However, practical application has shown that the estimate is made based on valuation maps adopted by the finance directorates, without any reliance on a systematic on-site inspection or detailed market data.

The latest reduction under Ministry of Finance Circular No. 135 did not affect the mechanism for determining the prevailing value itself, but was limited to the percentage used to calculate it. Thus, the core problem remains, namely that the tax is imposed on an administrative estimated value that may not match the actual prevailing price at which the sale takes place in the market.

Despite reducing the prevailing value to 30 percent of previous estimates, criticism is growing over the valuation mechanism itself. Some taxpayers whom The Syria Report interviewed at the Damascus Finance Directorate said that the problem lies not only in the calculation percentage, but in the basis on which the estimated value is built. Zahir, who owns a residential property in the New Zahera area, said that the market value of his property is close to SYP 1 billion, yet the finance directorate estimated it at SYP 1.2 billion —an increase of SYP 200 million over the actual price at which the sale was conducted. Although the buyer paid only SYP 1 billion, the tax that Zaher must pay is calculated according to the higher estimated value adopted by the finance authorities.

Rafd, who owns a property in the RuknEddin area, questioned the mechanism used in the valuation, pointing to the absence of expert committees carrying out field inspections, and said that the estimate is made by employees in offices, without ground visits. In his view, the property cannot be sold at the price determined by the finance directorate if it exceeds the price actually being used in the market.

Real estate expert Ammar Youssef said that there is clear disorder in the valuation process and that it does not reflect the true value of properties on the ground. He noted that the mechanism in place since the issuance of Law No. 15 has not changed, as the estimate is carried out by employees in the finance directorates according to administrative estimates, not by specialised real estate valuation experts. Mr Youssef called for the formation of committees of specialist real estate experts to revalue properties in line with market prices. Continuing to rely on the current mechanism, he said, causes injustice to property owners. He also questioned the reasons for the finance directorates’ persistence with the same method of estimation despite repeated criticism.

Accordingly, it appears that lowering the percentage used to calculate the prevailing value did not address the essence of the problem, as the gap remained between the actual prevailing market price and the estimated value adopted for tax purposes, which directly affects the cost of sale and the confidence of those dealing in the real estate market.

Alongside the debate over valuation, the “No Objection to Completing the Real Estate Transaction” document still constitutes an additional obstacle to completing sales and transferring ownership. Obtaining this document is considered a condition within the financial clearance procedure, which is required before registering the sale or transferring ownership. The financial clearance procedure is completed at the finance directorate in the governorate where the property is located, where the concerned party submits an application that includes a real estate registration statement and the sale contract. After reviewing the tax status and ensuring there are no dues or legal impediments such as seizure notices or a restraint on disposal in the real estate record, the directorate issues the financial clearance document and, in parallel, the “No Objection to Completing the Real Estate Transaction” document, to complete the transfer of ownership in the Land Registry.

However, some applicants reported that the procedures for obtaining the document may go beyond the financial aspect to include referrals to Internal Security and vetting procedures that may extend for long periods. Amer, one applicant, told The Syria Report that he submitted an application to obtain the “No Objection” document, and after reviewing the data he was asked to refer to Internal Security because his father was an officer under the Assad regime, even though his father was discharged in 1990. He explained that since 10 days ago, the “study” is still ongoing and he has not obtained the document.

Likewise, Khaled, another applicant at the Damascus Finance Directorate, said that he submitted an application to obtain the document three months ago and has not received it to date, because of what he described as a study by Internal Security that has not yet been completed. He considered that this document has become one of the forms of security approvals.

By contrast, a source in the Damascus Finance Directorate told The Syria Report that the “No Objection to Completing the Real Estate Transaction” document is issued on the same day by the Ministry of Finance. Anyone with a legal issue is referred to Internal Security to resolve that issue, the source said, adding that the finance directorates are not concerned with security procedures.

According to Ministry of Finance Circular No. 135 issued this past July, the “No Objection” document came in the context of resuming the issuance of financial clearance after it had stopped since December 2024, in coordination with the Ministries of Interior and Local Administration. Circular No 135 was a continuation of Circular No. 87 issued on June 21, 2025, which allowed the granting of the financial clearance document to those wishing to transfer their real estate ownership through assignment or direct relinquishment in the Land Registry, after its issuance had stopped since December 2024. This shows that the resumption of ownership transfer transactions took place gradually through successive circulars to reactivate the real estate market after a period of freeze.

Circular No. 135 made the document valid for only three months, and it is granted in parallel with financial clearance, after coordination with the General Commission for Taxes and Fees and the Directorate of Cadastral Affairs to ensure there are no seizure notices or a ban on disposal. The circular also referred to coordination with what is known as the “Security Approvals Platform” to verify that there are no security reasons preventing the owner from disposing of their property. This platform is not available to the public, and is used by employees of government bodies to verify that there are no security impediments when carrying out a real estate transaction. Accordingly, the “No Objection” document replaced the direct security approval that had previously been imposed, but in a new administrative form.

There is no explicit legal text requiring the obtaining of the “No Objection” document to complete a real estate transaction, as the registration condition set out in the Real Estate Sales Law relates to obtaining financial clearance. However, the administrative circular in practice linked financial clearance and the “No Objection” document, making the latter an effective requirement for completing the transfer of ownership.

Thus, a document that is supposed to be a financial procedure linked to financial clearance becomes a point of intersection between the financial administration and the security bodies, whether through institutional coordination or through individual referrals to Internal Security, which leads to delaying the completion of sale and ownership transfer transactions and adds a new procedural burden to the real estate market.

After the administration of Raqqa city was transferred to Syria’s transitional authorities in January, urban challenges that had accumulated over the past years became evident. Residents had been relying on themselves to repair their homes, while construction expanded onto agricultural land outside the zoning plan, and informal building was on the rise. Amid damaged infrastructure, the emergence of informal settlements, and the discovery of tunnels within inhabited neighbourhoods, the city’s new administration faces the task of regulating the existing urban fabric and setting out a clear reconstruction plan.

Immediately after the Syrian Democratic Forces’ withdrawal, the transitional administration appointed AbdulRahman Salameh as governor of Raqqa, along with deputies and executive directors to implement his decisions. However, members of the governorate council and the executive office have not yet been appointed. The transitional administration also appointed Shahoud AbdulAziz as head of the city council, though no decision has been issued appointing the council members.

Since the fall of Assad’s regime at the end of 2024, no elections have been held at the municipal or governorate level, and the transitional administration appoints all officials and employees across local administrations.

In January, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) withdrew from Raqqa city, which had been run by the Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria (AANES) for the past eight years. This came amid military confrontations and political agreements, most notably the January 10 agreement between the SDF and the transitional government’s forces, which led to the SDF’s withdrawal from the entire Raqqa governorate. The SDF had entered Raqqa at the end of 2017, with air support from the US-led International Coalition against the Islamic State (ISIS), following battles that lasted nearly two years. The city had fallen into the hands of ISIS in 2014, after battles with armed opposition factions, becoming the first major city the group controlled in Syria.

These successive military and administrative changes were reflected directly in the city’s urban fabric. In 2017, Raqqa was subjected to intensive coalition airstrikes that led to widespread destruction estimated at around 80 per cent of its housing. Since then, residents have been repairing their homes at their own expense, with limited support from humanitarian organisations.

Neighbourhoods close to the centre of Raqqa’s old city, such as Al-Maamoun, Al-Mansour, Al-Mahdi, Al-Badu, and Al-Dariyya, are among the most damaged neighbourhoods. Repair activity in these neighbourhoods is limited because of the extensive destruction.

Meanwhile, the neighbourhoods of Al-Ramila, Al-Rashidiya, Al-Mashlab, Al-Rumaniya, Hittin, Al-Qadisiyah, and Al-Yarmouk were less damaged and witnessed major repair activity during the period of AANES control. These self-funded repairs took place without a comprehensive reconstruction plan led by an official body, and in many cases without regulatory oversight, which led to widespread illegal construction practices.

Informal settlements have also appeared in recent years on the city’s eastern and western outskirts. These areas were originally farmland; at first, informal camps were set up there, before unlicensed homes were built. These new informal settlements lack services such as sewage, water, and electricity, and their homes severely lack structural safety standards.

Mohammad Al-Salameh, the head of the Engineers’ Syndicate in Raqqa, told The Syria Report that residents’ reliance on themselves to repair their homes left many of them vulnerable to exploitation by real-estate traders. A number of owners sold their flats at low prices because they could not bear the costs of repair or rebuilding. Some real-estate traders bought severely damaged homes in a practice locally known as “selling air,” meaning the trader purchases a heavily damaged home, repairs or rebuilds it, and then resells it at market prices. The neighbourhoods of Al-Ramila, Al-Mansour, and Al-Qitar saw a concentration of this type of unlicensed repair, which in turn lacks engineering standards for structural safety.

At the same time, there is still no accurate number of damaged homes within the neighbourhoods. The absence of an updated database on the city’s urban situation, despite years having passed since the end of the major battles there, limits the new municipal authorities’ ability to set planning policies.

Infrastructure in Raqqa city remains widely damaged, and according to the director of technical affairs in the city council, Walid Al-Ahmad, sewage networks and other service facilities are completely destroyed and need rehabilitation. Mr Ahmad estimated the cost of rehabilitating the city’s main roads at around USD 42 million.

Rubble remains a major issue in Raqqa, and work to remove it began in 2018 with assistance from the US Agency for International Development from the main streets in the neighbourhoods of Al-Mansour, Twenty-three, Al-Ramila, and Al-Rashidiya.

The problem of tunnels dug during the years of the Islamic State group’s control has emerged. According to Al-Ahmad, tunnels have been discovered at 30 sites inside the city, including sites within residential neighbourhoods. Fifty tunnel openings have been documented, some of them five to six metres deep. The presence of these tunnels within inhabited areas poses risks to existing buildings, especially in light of repair and construction carried out in recent years without organised engineering supervision.

Meanwhile, construction in agricultural areas surrounding Raqqa continues, despite those areas not being part of the city’s 2009 zoning plan. According to Mr Ahmad, the city’s area under that zoning plan is around 2,400 hectares, while its area alongside those unregulated extensions reaches around 3,000 hectares. He explained that the current city council will conduct a study to expand and update the zoning plan in line with the changes the city has undergone over the past years, especially urban expansion into agricultural land.

More than a year after the fall of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime, the city of Deir-ez-Zor continues to suffer from a structural housing crisis due to extensive wartime destruction, without any serious or clear steps by the transitional administration towards rebuilding the destroyed areas. This crisis comes amid existing population pressure within the city, which has intensified with the return of large numbers of residents since the end of 2024.

In 2014, the Islamic State (ISIS) gradually took control of most neighbourhoods of Deir-ez-Zor, following a broad military campaign it launched against armed opposition factions. At the same time, ISIS tightened its siege on Assad regime forces in the neighbourhoods of Al-Joura and Al-Qusour between 2014 and 2017, before the Syrian army, with Russian support, launched a military operation regaining control of the city by November 2017. These military operations caused widespread destruction affecting to varying degrees 22 out of the city’s 24 neighbourhoods.

From the fall of the Assad regime at the end of 2024 to the end of 2025, the city of Deir-ez-Zor has witnessed the return of around 150,000 people, including 75,000 who returned from camps in northern Syria. According to the same estimates, around 200,000 people displaced from Deir-ez-Zor have not yet returned to the city, whose population was approximately 600,000 before 2011, while its current population stands at about 400,000.

In reality, only the neighbourhoods of Al-Joura and Al-Qusour escaped damage. They are now inhabited by around 250,000 people, more than half of the city’s population. By contrast, around 150,000 people are distributed across the other partially damaged neighbourhoods, despite limited services and a lack of adequate infrastructure. This distribution reflects an urban imbalance imposed by years of destruction, siege, and fighting. Al-Joura and Al-Qusour have become almost the only residential refuge within a city largely in ruins, leading to heavy pressure on water, electricity, and sewage networks, in addition to worsening overcrowding and rising rental costs compared with other neighbourhoods.

Deir-ez-Zor mayor Majed Hattab told The Syria Report that 80 percent of the city is destroyed, though the levels of destruction  vary from one neighbourhood to another. Mr Hattab said they did not have precise figures on the number of damaged or structurally unsafe houses due  to the loss of most municipal records during the years of war. This hinders the preparation of a clear database that could be relied upon to assess the reality of housing damage.

Mr Hattab said that current efforts are focused on removing rubble to relieve population pressure on Al-Joura and Al-Qusour. The city council is also cooperating with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to remove around 75,000 tonnes of rubble from five neighbourhoods: Al-Rashidiya, Al-Khasarat, Sheikh Yassin, Al-Huweiqa, and Al-Hamidiya, in an attempt prepare these areas for repair works. This comes as infrastructure in Al-Joura and Al-Qusour are still deteriorating, due to the high population density.

The housing crisis inside the city might be compounded by the displacements that have followed the recent take-over by the Syrian transitional government forces of parts in the northeast – among them the eastern countryside of Deir-ez-Zor governorate –  territory previously under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).  Mr Hattab warned that any increase in return movements by displaced residents who had fled to Al-Jazira, i.e. the northern part of Syria’s eastern regions, during the years of war could add further pressure to an already strained housing situation inside the city.

A property expert from Deir-ez-Zor, who requested anonymity because of his work with an international organisation, explained that damaged housing in the city can be divided into three categories according to the nature of the damage. The first category includes houses whose internal fittings were looted without damage to the structural framework, constituting around 60 per cent of the total damaged housing. These are repairable. The second category includes houses that suffered structural damage but remain repairable, constituting between 10 and 15 per cent, although their rehabilitation will be costly. The third category includes houses that are completely destroyed and cannot be repaired, requiring full reconstruction. These constitute around 25 per cent of the total damaged housing in the city.

The expert noted that the role of international organisations currently working in Deir-ez-Zor is limited to helping rehabilitate repairable housing, which makes the scope of their intervention small and not commensurate with the scale of existing destruction. He added that the nature of these interventions remains linked to funding ceilings set by donor countries, despite the presence of six United Nations organisations and around 20 international organisations, in addition to dozens of local associations.

Property expert Walid Haj Ali told The Syria Report that the absence of any clear mechanism for surveying damage at the city level in Deir-ez-Zor means that reliable figures on the number of damaged houses are not available. He said this reflects a lack of basic practical steps in dealing with the reconstruction file, noting that no official, locally adopted damage survey has been carried out so far that could be used as a reference for reconstruction planning. Haj Ali expressed surprise that the transitional administration has not undertaken such a survey to date, stressing that any reconstruction process requires, as a first step, a precise assessment of the existing situation and a clear determination of the scale of damage before moving to address it, which has not yet been achieved in the case of Deir-ez-Zor.

The city of Nashabiya, in the East Ghouta area of Rural Damascus, is facing an escalating housing crisis, amid the widespread destruction inflicted during years of siege and bombardment, and the absence of any broad plan for reconstruction following the fall of the Assad regime.

Thousands of residents have returned to the city since late 2024, but find limited options for living there long-term: either staying in damaged or structurally unsafe homes, or bearing the cost of repairs they cannot afford, at a time when interventions by official bodies and international organisations fall far short of actual needs.

Nashabiya is about 19 kilometres from the centre of Damascus, and is situated near the Marj Al-Sultan Military Airport. It serves as the centre of the Al-Marj district, which includes around 28 villages and towns, granting it administrative and service-related weight within East Ghouta.

Historically, the city has been known for its agricultural importance and extensive cultivated lands, earning it the moniker of East Ghouta’s “food basket.” This agricultural role made Nashabiya an essential part of East Ghouta’s economic system before the war and one of its population centres. The most recent amendment to Nashabiya’s zoning plan was issued in 2011, according to which approximately 80 per cent of its construction is formally zoned, while 20 per cent consists of informal housing.

After 2012, the year Nashabiya came under opposition control, the city and nearby military airport were subjected to shelling by Assad regime forces. In late 2013, the city entered a prolonged phase of siege. It ended five years later with the withdrawal of opposition factions and those who rejected settlement agreements. The years of war resulted in the extensive destruction of residential buildings and infrastructure within the city centre, also affecting nearby villages. Most of Nashabiya’s residents were displaced to northern Syria or to various areas in Damascus and its countryside.

Nashabiya Mayor Khaled Mueijel told The Syria Report that around 15 per cent of the buildings in the centre of Nashabiya city have been destroyed. He explained that destruction was more extensive in the neighbouring villages, pointing to the village of Al-Bahariya, located about eight kilometres from Nashabiya’s centre, which has been almost completely destroyed. The village had been home to around 1,500 residents, most of whom currently live in Nashabiya.

Mr Mueijel added that the ongoing repair activity in Nashabiya remains limited compared to the sheer scale of the damage, stressing that reconstruction requires resources beyond the capabilities of residents. To date, there are no concrete steps to begin rebuilding the destroyed villages, as this requires substantial planning and resources. He also noted that municipal estimates indicate that around 10 per cent of the damaged houses in the city are at risk of collapse.

After the fall of the Assad regime at the end of 2024, approximately 1,500 families returned to the city of Nashabiya from northern Syria, despite the lack of any general reconstruction programmes or housing provision. This coincided with the gradual return of residents who had been displaced to various areas in Damascus and its countryside during the years of siege.

Samir, who had left Nashabiya for northern Syria, returned after the fall of the Assad regime with his wife and two children. He sold a piece of agricultural land in order to repair his late father’s house and live in it. He explained that he had only two options: either repair the house or rent another one, and that repair was the only viable choice. He added that the return of a large number of young men who had left the city alone and then returned with their families has intensified housing pressure in Nashabiya.

According to local estimates, Nashabiya’s current population stands at around 40,000 people. Some returnees are forced to live in damaged homes that are incompletely repaired or structurally unsafe. The financial burden of repairs falls entirely on returning families, pushing them to choose between repairing their homes or renting alternative accommodation.

Abu Mohammad, a man in his sixties from the city, said that he still uses blankets to cover the windows of his house, noting that part of the home is destroyed and needs rebuilding. Despite this, he lives there because he does not own another house and cannot afford the cost of repairs.

Umm Samer, another resident, explained that she was forced to sell a piece of agricultural land for around USD 15,000 in order to repair her home, even though it still requires additional work to return to its previous condition. She pointed out that high rental prices in Nashabiya, ranging between USD 150 and USD 200, made repair a less costly option than renting.

Meanwhile, Mr Mueijel, noted that there are only limited efforts by NGOs to help with reconstruction in the city. He said that Oxfam is currently working to repair around 127 houses, though this number represents only a small fraction of the total damaged homes. Oxfam is an international NGO that operates in Syria through local partners, focusing on emergency assistance, livelihoods support, and housing rehabilitation for vulnerable communities affected by conflict. Mr Mueijel said that Oxfam selected the most severely damaged houses based on recommendations from engineering committees that surveyed affected dwellings, while also taking residents’ living conditions into account.

The United Nations Development Programme is working on removing approximately 75,000 cubic metres of rubble and transporting it to a landfill in the Al-Hajar Al-Aswad area of Rural Damascus, the mayor explained. These interventions are not accompanied by comprehensive reconstruction or rebuilding programmes, which limits their impact and prevents them from addressing the housing crisis in the city in a fundamental way.

The head of the Rural Damascus branch of the Engineers’ Syndicate, Akram Taama, told The Syria Report that the syndicate has introduced a 50 percent reduction on engineering fees for repair permits on homes damaged by shelling, in an attempt to ease the financial burdens for residents. He explained that this step comes in light of the significant rise in repair costs, stressing that the syndicate is working to provide whatever help it can for owners of damaged homes, despite the limited impact of these measures in the face of the scale of destruction and the cost of rehabilitation.

Damascus Governorate, in cooperation with the German development agency Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), has laid the foundation stone for a pilot Housing, Land and Property (HLP) Support Unit dedicated to serving residents of Jobar, one of the capital’s most heavily destroyed neighbourhoods. The unit is located in Abbasiyyin Square in central Damascus, and the project was officially launched on Monday, February 2.

The launch of the unit comes within a broader approach adopted by GIZ following the collapse of the Assad regime in late 2024.

This approach focuses on supporting residents of war-affected areas and the most vulnerable groups in protecting and reclaiming their property rights through the provision of legal and technical guidance. The Jobar unit constitutes one of two pilot HLP support units, with the second planned for the city of Darayya. Given the scale of destruction in Jobar and the lack of suitable premises inside the neighbourhood, Damascus Governorate allocated the site in Abbasiyyin Square to host the project. The premises still require rehabilitation due to destruction and looting sustained over previous years.

The HLP Support Unit is expected to provide integrated services, ranging from capacity building, legal support, and technical guidance to assistance in resolving property-related disputes. It will also offer referral services and due diligence related to housing, land, and property rights. In addition, the unit is intended to provide a space for participatory urban planning processes aimed at promoting spatial justice. Lessons learned from this pilot are expected to support the replication of the model in other parts of Syria.

Tanja Lohmann, the Head of Syria Portfolio at GIZ, told The Syria Report that these units are very important because they provide, for the first time, a physical space to begin addressing housing, land, and property rights violations in Syria. She stressed that the HLP Support Units represent one component within a broader set of activities implemented by the agency with support from the German government.

Ms Lohmann added that GIZ supports a network of Syrian experts and partner organisations that continue to assist returnees seeking to claim their housing, land, and property rights, noting that the Jobar unit represents an additional project within this wider effort.

Regarding prospects for expansion, Ms Lohmann explained that the Jobar unit was designed as a pilot project. She noted that a number of partners are closely monitoring its development and that there is expected interest in replicating the experience elsewhere in Syria from governmental actors, other stakeholders, as well as international actors.

She added that the agreement underpinning the project is not limited to Damascus, stressing that GIZ is open to initiating similar discussions with other governorates, in cooperation with the Ministry of Local Administration and Development and other relevant authorities. She also noted that available resources remain limited and are subject to discussions between the German and Syrian governments, as well as deliberations on the German federal budget.

GIZ has been active in Syria since 1976, but left the country following the German government’s severing of diplomatic relations with the Assad regime after the 2011 uprising. Since December 2024, the organisation has expanded its cooperation with emerging transitional state institutions, while maintaining collaboration with local actors. GIZ operates on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and the German Federal Foreign Office, with co-financing from the European Union and other partners.

The launch of the HLP Support Unit comes amid ongoing debates over the future of reconstruction in Jobar, where residents and local bodies have repeatedly stressed that safeguarding property rights remains a prerequisite for any credible return or rebuilding process.

*Disclosure: The HLP section of The Syria Report is funded by GIZ.